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ABSTRACT
SPACE COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY: COMMERCIALIZATION OF OUTER
SPACE AND SPACE SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
Irina V. Louts
Old Dominion University, 2004
Director: Dr. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz

The 20th century brought the most horrific weapons and most devastating wars in
the history of human civilization. It also gave us the most breathtaking discoveries and
technological breakthroughs, including the opening up of outer space to human reach.
The commercialization of outer space is one of the most significant developments of our
time, giving us an opportunity to put the richness of this medium to the betterment of
human conditions on Earth on an increasingly widening scale.
Technological advances have also made space more important militarily. A
puzzle now is whether the commercialization of outer space facilitates international
cooperation in the security realm or makes interstate relations more competitive in the
fourth medium. This study tries to address the issue of outer space security by placing it
within the realist-liberal debate on economic interdependence and international conflict
and cooperation. It shows that as the post-Cold War transition era drew to its close,
security interests of the United States, on the one hand, and Russia and China, on the
other, continued to diverge with regard to space security. The sole international
intergovernmental organization charged with the negotiations on space security issues
failed to bridge the differences and bring about compromises among the major space
players. As a result, a new space security regime regulating expanding military uses of
space has not emerged.
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Liberal expectations fail on two important accounts. Firstly, the cost-benefit
analysis that lies in the heart of the argument of liberal pacification consists of the costs
of fighting a war as well as the opportunity costs of war and the former has not
necessarily increased with technological progress and, even with greater
commercialization of outer space, the latter may not necessarily offset the trend in the
former. Secondly, the liberal expectation that expanding commercial relations between
states would gradually lead to progressive de-legitimization of the use force has so far
failed to materialize with respect to outer space.
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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

As was once said, ‘War is too important to
be left to the generals.’ Space likewise is too
important to be left to only the self-interested whose
choices impact all o f us.
Roger Handberg

2000

At the dawn of the 21st century, we have been privileged not only to experience
the excitement of the changing millennia and “tectonic shifts” in international politics
with the end of the Cold War, but also, and perhaps more uniquely, to witness
unparalleled technological advances in communications and computing that have truly
made our world global.1 It is thanks, in large part, to the technological advances that we
have been also advantaged to witness and reap the fruits of the extension of human
commercial activities into the fourth medium—into outer space.

This paper follows the format requirements o f The Chicago Manual o f Style, 14th edition
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1993).
1 The word “global” is taken to mean in this context “interconnected in important ways,” “representing a
whole.” Vogler, for example, uses this definition o f “global” in the concept o f “global commons.” See
John Vogler, The Global Commons: A Regime Analysis (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1995), 10.
2 Outer space is most often defined as the Universe beyond the Earth’s atmosphere. There is yet no
international agreement on definition and delimitation o f outer space. These issues have been discussed at
the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses o f Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). The vast region beyond Earth’s
atmosphere is a domain o f common pool resources to which all nations o f the world have a legal access.
Outer space is a domain o f both natural resources, those material resources that have economic or social
value once extracted from their natural state, and spatial-extension resources, those resources that have
value due to their location, for example, the geostationary orbit. See more Susan J. Buck, The Global
Commons: An Introduction (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998), 2-3. Outer space is the global
commons most recently opened to human reach. While outer space is vast, only near-earth space— space
beyond atmosphere, extending to the Moon’s orbit— is involved in human activities. Uses o f space have
been proliferating as progress in space technology leads to more space applications and safer and more
affordable access to space. The most common uses o f space have been for placing artificial satellites in
various orbits around the Earth. These satellites are used for telecommunications, remote sensing,
positioning and navigation, and some other purposes, including scientific research. Space near Earth is
divided into Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO), and
Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO). See more on the geography o f space Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik:
Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 60-85. Approximately 90% o f all
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As space technology progressed and was joined by the information technology
revolution in the recent years, uses of outer space have become an essential part of
everyday life, with satellite weather forecasting, telephony, satellite TV and radio
broadcasting being just a few examples. Banks and financial institutions all over the
world rely today on satellites to make their global transactions. Aircrafts, ships, and
various ground transportation use satellites for navigation across the air, water, and land.
Information technology and space technology, as they converged, transformed major
sectors of modem economy, and with it, the society, the state, and the military.
For more than three decades after the launch of Sputnik, outer space exploration
and utilization was largely about military competition between the two superpowers of
the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, the new
Space Age became more about commercial competition. By the dawn of the 21st century
425 communication satellites offering commercial services orbited the Earth.3 Overall
commercial satellites represented almost 70 percent of all satellites in orbit.4 With the
progress of technology new constellations of communications satellites providing mobile
satellite services began to arrive by dozens, and even hundreds, in the later part of the

satellites at present time are located in LEO and GEO. See, for example, Barry D. Watts, The Military Use
o f Space: A Diagnostic Assessment (Washington, D. C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
2001), 8-9, 50.
3 See U.S. Department o f Commerce, Trends in Space Commerce, Report by Office o f Space
Commercialization, June 2001, 3-11, http://www.technology.gov/space/library/reports/2001-06-trends.pdf
(accessed 05.22.04).
4 Carrington provides the following numbers for commercial satellites in orbit by the late 1990s: Low Earth
Orbit— 70 percent o f all satellites in this orbit are commercial satellites; Medium Earth Orbit— 59 percent;
High Orbits— 78 percent. Thus, on average commercial satellites constitute 69 percent o f all satellites. See
Damian Carrington, “The Roaring Business o f Rockets,” BBC News Online, December 9, 1999,
http://news.bbs.co.Uk/l/hi/sci/tech/556780.stm (accessed 03.17.04). The numbers o f commercial satellites
usually differ from source to source due to different methods o f classifying satellites.
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1990s.5 These new arrivals significantly expanded the presence of commercial
communication satellites from the Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) into the Medium
and Low Earth Orbit (MEO and LEO).6 So much so, that by the early 2000s only 54
percent o f communication satellites operated from GEO, while 42 percent operated form
LEO.7 Thus, the commercial utilization of space increased dramatically not only by the
number of commercial satellites but also by the geographic space that they utilized.8
Numerous new commercial actors entered space business providing space services to
customers around the world and generating billions in revenues. In 2000, satellite
systems enabled $1.7 trillion of business activity worldwide.9
Thus, the commercialization of space is changing the paradigm of outer space for
the 21st century. The military utilization of outer space that just recently was dominating
the fourth medium now increasingly coexists with commercial uses of outer space. A
puzzle now is whether the commercialization of space facilitates international
cooperation in the space security realm among the main players, or whether it makes their
security relationship more competitive. The main focus of the present study is on how
space commercialization affects security relations in the fourth medium.

5 See, for example, Watts, The Military Use o f Space, 2001, 121-122. See also Peter A. Swan and Carrie
L. Devieux Jr. eds., Global Mobile Satellite Systems: A System Overview (Boston: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2003), 8.
6 There have been three generation o f mobile telecommunications satellites: the first generation geosynchronous mobile satellite systems such as INMARSAT; second generation - called Global Mobile
Satellite Systems (GMSS); and third generation - high data rate systems such as INMARSAT-Horizons or
New ICO. Later generations o f satellites for global mobile communications are largely in non-GEO. See,
for example, Swan and Devieux, Global Mobile Satellite System, 2003, 1-8.
7 See U.S. Department o f Commerce, Trends in Space Commerce, 2001,3-11.
8 Handberg suggests that not only “commercialization o f space activities has grown enormously across the
past decade,” but that projections into the future are also “exceptionally optimistic.” See Roger Handberg,
Seeking New World Vistas: The Militarization o f Space (Westport: Praeger, 2000), 3.
9 See John E. Pike, “The Paradox o f Space Weapons,” in SIPRI Yearbook: World Armaments and
Disarmaments (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 2003), footnote 2, 433.
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4
THE COMMERCIAL SPACE AGE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Outer space is the most recently added to human reach global commons. Global
commons are often defined as areas, or resource domains, beyond sovereign jurisdiction
of states to which all have an equal right of access. Outer space, including the moon, the
various orbits and related radio frequencies, was established by the international
community as a global commons during the first decade of the Space Age.10 The “Treaty
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies” (the Outer Space Treaty) that
went into force in 1967, states in Articles 1 and 2:
Art. 1: The exploration and use o f outer space, including the m oon and
other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the
interests o f all countries, irrespective o f their degree o f econom ic or
scientific developm ent, and shall be the province o f all mankind. Outer
Space, including the m oon and other celestial bodies shall be free for
exploration and use by all w ithout discrim ination o f any kind, on a basis o f
equality and in accordance w ith international law there shall be free access
to all areas o f celestial bodies.
Art. 2: Outer space, including the m oon and other celestial bodies, is not
subject to national appropriation by claim o f sovereignty, by m eans o f use
or occupation or by any other m e a n s.11

The recognition of outer space as a global commons was an important achievement. It
provided a foundation for peaceful exploration and use of outer space during the Cold
War. Even though outer space became an arena of superpower competition, a security

10 The United Nations took position in 1957 that no nation could assert sovereignty over territory in outer
space. See Buck, The Global Commons, 1998, 139. The view o f space as global commons was reflected in
the “Declaration o f Legal Principles Governing the Activities o f States in the Exploration and Use o f Outer
Space.” See United Nations, “Declaration o f Legal Principles Governing the Activities o f States in the
Exploration and Use o f Outer Space,” the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVIII),
December 13, 1963, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org.SpaceLaw/lpostxt.htm (accessed 02.04.02).
11 See United Nations, “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities o f States in the
Exploration and Use o f Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” January
27, 1967, Articles 1 and 2, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/outersptxt.htm (accessed
02.11.04). See more on definitions o f “global commons” in Buck, The Global Commons, 5-6.
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regime in outer space emerged that helped to prevent space from turning into a
batllefield.
As outer space is becoming now an increasingly vital part of the economic
mainstream, the process whereby this is materialized—the commercialization of outer
space—raises a number of new, challenging questions: What are the emerging patterns of
space exploitation? Who are the main actors? What is the nature of their interaction? Is
it cooperative or fraught with potential conflict? How do national interests play out in
outer space, the world’s largest global commons, as it becomes an arena of commercial
competition, as well as a crucial medium for modem warfare? Do space activities in this
era of space commercialization add a new dimension to the international relations? What
is the influence of space commercialization on inter-state relations? How does the
commercialization of space affect space security regime? How should increasing uses of
space for commercial and military purposes be regulated? Who should formulate the
global space policy as the creation of wealth increasingly depends on outer space? What
purposes should this global space policy serve? How could a balance between various
national interests, both commercial and security interests, of all states be found? How
could an efficient utilization of outer space resources and equity be achieved? These are
but just a few questions that arise in the era of outer space commercialization.
These important questions still largely await their answers by international
relations scholarship, for there is still a lack of attention to outer space as a subject of the
mainstream international relations discourse. While outer space issues have been
intensively discussed within the space business community, by international space law
and strategic studies scholars, in arms control communities and military establishments
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6
around the world, the international relations scholars have not taken up the challenge of
thoroughly incorporating outer space issues, as they emerged in the last decade of the 20

tH

I

century, into their scientific inquiry.

This is probably, at least in part, because

challenges presented to international relations studies by the end of the Cold War and the

12 Project 2001: Legal Framework fo r the Commercial Use o f Outer Space is an example o f the
international discussions on outer space legal issues. The project was initiated by Institute o f Air and Space
Law o f the University o f Cologne and the German Aerospace Center (DLR), http://www.uni-koeln.de/jurfak/insstluft/project2001/legal-materials.html (accessed 02.17.02). See Susanne R e if s report “Project
2001: Shaping a Legal Framework for the Commercial Uses o f Outer Space,” Space Policy 15 (1999): 109112. The space security issues were extensively discussed by strategic studies scholarship in the 1980s,
particularly in the context o f the Strategic Defense Initiative announced by President Reagan in his famous
speech on March 23, 1983. The debate revolved around the possibility o f reconciliation o f two conceptual
opposites, as they were seen then— strategic deterrence and strategic defense. The debate produced
voluminous literature on this subject. See, for example, Edward Teller, Better a Shield Than a Sword:
Perspectives on Defense and Technology (New York: Free Press, 1987); Wolfgang Heisenberg, Strategic
Stability and Nuclear Deterrence in East West Relations (New York: Institute for East-West Security
Studies, 1989); Ashton B. Carter, David N. Schwartz, Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington D. C.:
Brookings Institute, 1984); William J. Durch, The ABM Treaty and Western Security (Cambridge, Mass.:
Ballinger Pub. Co, 1987) and William J. Durch, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Arms Control Options, and the
Military Use o f Space (Washington D.C.:ACDA, 1984); W. J. Durch, ed., National Interests and the
Military Use o f Space (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Pub. Co., 1984); Michael Charlton, From Deterrence
to Defense: The Inside Story o f Strategic Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987);
Joseph S. Nye, James A. Schear, eds., On the Defensive: The Future ofSD I (Lanham, MD: University
Press o f America, 1988); Raymond L. Garthoff, Policy vs. Law: the Reinterpretation o f the ABM Treaty,
(Washington D. C.: Brookings Institute, 1987); Walther Stetzle, Bhupendra Jasani, and Regina Cowen,
eds., The ABM Treaty: To Defend or Not to Defends (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Richard Sincere, Marin Strmecki, and Peter Wehner, eds., Promise or Peril, the Strategic
Initiative: Thirty-Five Essays by Statesmen, Scholars, and Strategic Analysts (Washington D. C.: Ethics
and Public Policy Center, 1986); Bhupendra Jasani, ed., Outer Space - A New Dimension o f the Arms Race,
SIPRI (London: Taylor & Francis, 1982); Bhupendra Jasani, ed., Space Weapons and International
Security, SIPRI (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Franklin. A. Long, Donald Hafiier, Jeffrey
Boutwell, eds., Weapons in Space (New York: Norton, 1986); T. K. Longstreth, John. E. Pike, L. B.
Rhinelander, The Impact o f U.S. and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Programs on the ABM Treaty
(Washington D. C.: National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty, 1985); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., James. A.
Schear, Seeking Stability in Space: Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Evolving Space Regime (Lanham MD:
University Press o f America, 1987); J. Sheffran, “Verification and Risk for an Anti-Satellite-Weapons
Ban,” Bulletin o f Peace Proposals, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1986, 165-174; John Tirman, ed., The Fallacy o f Star
Wars (New York: Vintage Books, 1984); Paul B. Stares, Space and National Security (Washington D. C.:
Brookings Institution, 1987); Jack Manno, Arming the Heavens: The Hidden Military Agenda fo r Space,
1945-1995 (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co, 1984); Bhupendra Jasani and Christopher Lee, Countdown to
Space War (London: Taylor & Francis, 1984); Keith B. Payne, ed., Laser Weapons in Space: Policy Issues
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1982); John M. Collins, Military Space Forces: the Next 50 Years (Washington
D. C.: Oergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1989); Thomas H. Karas, The New High
Ground: Systems and Weapons o f Space Age War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983); David E.
Lupton, On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press,
1988); Kenneth N. Luongo and W. Thomas Wander, The Search fo r Security in Space (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1989); David Ritchie, Spacewar (New York: Atheneum, 1982); Nicholas L. Johnson,
Soviet Military Strategy in Space (London: Jane’s, 1987); David Baker, The Shape o f War to Come (New
York: Stein and Day, 1982).
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dramatic developments that followed it have eclipsed outer space commercialization and
space security issues. In the meantime, the recent developments in outer space, and those
•

that are planned for a short and medium-term future,

1

are likely to have far-reaching

implications for international relations in the military and economic realms. More
generally, what happens in outer space will exert a strong influence over the shape and
feature of the world order emerging after a decade of post-Cold War transition, as we
face a fundamental choice—to weaponize, or not to weaponize outer space.

THE COMMERCIALIZATION AND WEAPONIZATION OF OUTER SPACE
The weaponization of outer space is often understood as emplacement of
weapons, weapon systems or their components, into the medium of outer space and their
use in, or from, this medium. It is a form of space militarization, which is distinct from
“military uses o f outer space,” or the use of outer space for military purposes, such as
space reconnaissance and satellite navigation and positioning.14 Outer space was utilized
for military purposes from the early beginning of the Space Age. Space weapons and
anti-satellite weapons were tested in outer space, but they have not been yet placed in
outer space.

13 For example, according to a RAND publication, an official DoD timetable calls for a ten to twenty year
period for acquisition o f space-based weapons for the United States. See Bob Preston, Dana J. Johnson,
Sean Edwards, Michael Miller, Calvin Shipbaugh, Space Weapons Earth Wars (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 2002), 1. There are also plans to start testing space-based interceptor missiles within the national
missile defense program as soon as 2006. See Nader Elhefnawy, “Four Myths about Space Power,”
Parameters, U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Spring 2003, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/
Parameters/03spring/elhefhaw.htm (accessed 01.29.04).
14 There is no internationally agreed definition o f space weapons and space weaponization, but ballistic
missiles passing through space have not been considered as part o f “space weaponization.” See more on
these definitions and discussion o f the issue in Pericles Gasparini Alves, ed., Building Confidence in Outer
Space Activities: CSBMs and Earth-to-Space Monitoring (Aldershot: Dartmouth, UNIDIR, 1996), 31-32.
The problem o f defining “space weapons” is complex. For example, the Soviet Union objected to the U.S.
space shuttle arguing that it could be used as a platform to carry anti-satellite weapons and it had the
capability to “snatch” satellites in orbit. See, for example, Stares, Space and National Security, 1987, 112.
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The weaponization of outer space has been at the center o f the intense debate in
international politics twice during the Cold War: early in the Cold War, there was a
debate over the possibility of bombardment satellites carrying nuclear weapons and, in
the closing years of the Cold War, over the possibility of space-based defenses against
nuclear missiles.15 These debates involved the United States and the Soviet Union,
opposing each other on the issue of placing weapons in outer space in the context of the
bipolar confrontation. Now, after the end of the Cold War, the issue of space
weaponization is again at the heart of international contention, with the United States,
Russia and China trying to pursue their national interests in this increasingly important
medium. The weaponization of outer space has emerged as one of the most important
and most contested issues in interstate relations in the post-Cold War era.
This third debate over weapons in space takes place in a very different
international environment. The East-West confrontation has been fading rapidly into the
background of history, with the threat of nuclear holocaust becoming increasingly
remote. The world has become highly interconnected due to the advances in
transportation and communication and interdependent economically due to the expansion
of global markets. New transnational threats have emerged, with terrorism dominating
the list of threats ever since the tragic events of September the 11th, 2001.
The commercialization of outer space has created a new set of factors that affect
space security, which did not exist during the previous debates on outer space
weaponization. On the one hand, commercialization of space allows those states who
invested in space technology to serve their military needs to turn space technology now,
at least in part, to the private sector and place it in the service of an ever-increasing
15 See, for example, Preston, Johnson, Edwards, Miller, and Shipbaugh, Space Weapons, 2002, 1.
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number of consumers in their own countries, as well as all over the world. In doing so
they make returns on their investment by promoting technological progress and the
economic prosperity o f their societies. Throughout the 1990s, the global space industry
was one o f the world’s vital economic engines. Space activities fueled some of the most
important high-tech sectors of the economy, such as software and hardware development,
sophisticated electronics, telecommunications, advanced materials research, which in
their turn contributed to a whole range of other industries. Space activities served as a
“trailblazer for technological development” and as “the key to an environment which has
only just begun to reveal its treasures.”16
On the other hand, the commercialization of space means that there are greater
incentives for various states—and non-state actors—to obtain their own space
capabilities, firstly, because of the benefits that space activities bring to the economy, and
secondly, because it may be easier now, as some technological components can be
acquired in a global space market. Given the inherently dual-use nature of space
technology, this proliferation o f space technology and capabilities raises serious security
concerns. Security concerns also arise with commercial space services that are provided
to an increasing number of customers around the world, such as, for example, accurate
timing and navigation data and other critical information generated by satellites. These
services may be used towards hostile ends and empower potential foes that otherwise
would not have had access to such information.
Moreover, the more modem economies become dependent on space services, the
more they become vulnerable to threats from hostile acts against space assets.
16 See Kevin Madders, A New Force at a New Frontier: Europe’s Development in the Space Field in the
Light o f its Main Actors, Policies, Law and Activities from its Beginnings up to the Present (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 593-594.
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Commercialization of outer space activities coupled with the reduction of military
budgets in the 1990s has also led to a significant reliance of the military on commercial
space service providers.17 As a result, commercial constellations can be appealing as
“soft” targets, since they provide services to the military. Therefore, commercialization
of outer space creates incentives to defend commercial space assets, not only because the
economy increasingly depends on them, but also because the military depends on them as
well.18
On the other hand, placing weapons in space to defend space assets may not be
welcomed by those commercial actors who operate in space. Most commercial systems,
including those that are used for communications, neither carry extra fuel for
maneuvering against kinetic energy weapons nor are they hardened enough - against
jamming or nuclear explosions, for example, - to share space with weapons. Hardening
of commercial satellites and providing them with extra fuel will inevitably raise the costs
of operating in space, making space services less affordable and cutting thereby the
market. This will impede further technological and economic progress, particularly
among the developing countries, and the development of space sector itself.19

17 See, for example, Frank P. Todd, “Current National Space Security Trends and Implications for the
Future,” Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 2002.
18 See Linda L. Haller and Melvin S. Sakazaki, Commercial Space and United States National Security,
Report prepared for the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and
Organization, 2001, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/article 06.html, accessed 09.20.02. See also Tom
Wilson, Threats to United States Space Capabilities, Report prepared for the Commission to Assess United
States National Security Space Management and Organization, http://www.fas.org/
spp/eprint/article 05.html (accessed 09.20.02).
1 See Theresa Hitchens, “U.S. Weaponization o f Space: Implications for International Security,”
Presentation at the Workshop on Outer space and International Security, Center for Defense Information,
September 29, 2003, http://www.cdi.org/ (accessed 01.29.04).
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As space competition becomes tougher and tougher in the international market,
the desire to succeed may lead commercial actors to turn to governments for help.
Since the World Trade Organization’s rules restrict subsidies to industries and services,
commercial space actors have an incentive to obtain help under the “umbrella” of
defense, thereby fueling further militarization of space activities.

*y i

The

commercialization of outer space that led to the reliance of the military on commercial
space providers has also made the military dependent for their technological edge upon
the success o f their national space firms in international competition and therefore made
the state eager to help these firms under conditions of tough international competition in
order to prevent the loss of a technological edge to foreign competitors.

In the

meantime, the reality of technology-based competition has also led many space firms to
form multiple, complex international strategic alliances with foreign firms, and therefore
raises concerns about technology transfers.

Internationalization is characteristic not

only of the space-manufacturing sector but also of space service providers, who are often

20 One o f the rationales for pursuing military space programs within European Security and Defense
Policy is to improve the competitive position o f the European space industry. The European space sector
suffers from a lower competitiveness in comparison with the U.S. space industry because recurrent and
fixed costs, such as research and development, are bom by the commercial and civil space sector.
Overwhelming dependence on the commercial space market also makes the European space industry
particularly vulnerable to the effects o f economic cycles, as the military space sector is too small to create
anti-cyclical demand. See Stefano Silvestri, Space and Security Policy in Europe, Executive Summary,
Occasional Paper No. 48, December 2003, Institute for Security Studies, European Union, http://www.isseu.org/occasion/occ48.pdf (accessed 04.19.04).
21 Commercial space activities remain highly dependent on various forms o f government assistance,
including subsidies. WTO rules restrict subsidies, leaving states w ith ju s t a few options to help out th eir
national firms. See, for example, Anders Hansson and Steven McGuire, “Commercial Space and
International Trade Rules: An Assessment o f the WTO’s Influence on the Sector,” Space Policy, Vol. 15
(1999), 199-205. See also Haller and Sakazaki, Commercial Space and United States National Security,
2001 .
22 See Beverly Crawford, The New Security Dilemma under International Economic Interdependence,
Working Paper, German and European Studies, University o f California, November 1992, and Richard C.
Doerer, National Security Implications o f Commercialization o f Space, Strategy Research Project, U.S.
Army War College, 2000.
23 See, for example, Haller and Sakazaki, Commercial Space and United States National Security, 2001.
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represented by multinational consortia. This means that distinguishing friendly assets
from those of an enemy in space has become increasingly problematic.
All in all, the commercialization of outer space that led to space technology
proliferation, increased accessibility to outer space, globalization and privatization of
space industries has created a qualitatively new space security environment, in which
there are incentives both for and against space weaponization. It has also created
international conditions conducive to international cooperation in regulating the security
externalities of space commercialization. These developments have also tempted the
United States, as the leading spacepower to take unilateral steps, for it more than any
other state depends on space for its economic well-being and national security.24

THE SPACE WEAPONIZATION DEBATE
Nowadays, in the face of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) and means of their delivery around the world combined with the threat of
terrorism, there is rather limited public discussion of the issues of space weaponization.
Nonetheless, there is an ongoing debate over space weapons. Those who support
weaponization of space argue that it is inevitable: very much like the ground, the sea and
the air were once militarized and turned into battlefield at times of violent conflicts, outer
24 The authors o f a RAND study on space as a source o f national power define the term “spacepower” as
“the pursuit o f national objectives through the medium o f space and the use o f space capabilities.” This
study adopts this definition as it is broad enough, and at the same time, it focuses on national objectives, the
use o f space and space capabilities. It should be pointed out that spacepower does not presupposes the use
o f military force as a necessary requirement to qualify as a spacepwer. In the future, however, a full
emergence o f spacepower is envisioned as being accompanied by full range o f space military capabilities
for conducting space control missions and space force application. See Dana J. Johnson. Scott Pace, and C.
Bryan Gabbard, Space: Emerging Options fo r National Power (Santa Monica: RAND, 1998), xi. Grey and
Sheldon use a definition that underscores military connotation o f spacepowers: “the ability in peace, crisis,
or war to exert prompt and sustained influence in or from space.” See Colin S. Grey and John B. Sheldon,
“Space Power and the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Glass Half Full?” Airpower Journal 13, (fall
1999): 23-38, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/aircronicles/apj/apj99/fal99/gry.pdf (accessed
04.23.04).
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space will also be weaponized and used as a battlespace.25 There is a great premium to
the country that puts its weapons in space first. The argument goes further to suggest that
the United States must do it first in order to ensure its national security, which otherwise
would be seriously threatened. The image of a “Space Pearl Harbor” is invoked to
support the argument for space weaponization.

It is maintained that the development of

space weapons “will buy generations of security that all the ships, tanks, and airplanes in
the world will not provide” and that it will bring a real “peace dividend.”27 There are also
suggestions that American weapons in space will have positive implications for world
peace: in a position of overwhelming strategic superiority the United States will be able
to impose a Wilsonian international order, with major wars becoming a relic of the past.28
Those who oppose space weaponization argue that the proponents of space
weaponization have based their position on the problematic assumption that U.S. steps
towards introduction of weapons in space would be unchallenged by other states.
Furthermore, they argue that “[ujnlike the strategy for nuclear weapons, there exists no
obvious strategy for employing space weapons that will enhance global stability.”29 They
see a military conflict in space as highly escalatory and therefore extremely dangerous
25 See, for example, Thomas D. Bell, Weaponization o f Space: Understanding Strategic and
Technological Inevitability, Occasional Paper No. 6, Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College,
January 1999, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/occppr06.htm (accessed 09.20.02).
This point o f view is also reflected in official U.S. documents, such as for example, the so-called Rumsfeld
Report, where the Commissioners state in the Summary: “ ,..[W ]e know from history that every medium air, land, and sea - has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different. Given this virtual
certainty, the U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from
space.” See Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization,
Report, Executive Summary, Washington D.C., January 11, 2001, 10,
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space2001011 l.html (accessed 02.12.04).
26 See Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization,
Report, 2001, 13.
27 Bob Smith, “The Challenge o f Space Power,” Airpower Journal 13, (spring 1999): 33,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj99/spr99/smith.pdf (accessed 04.15.04).
28 Elhefnawy, 2003.
29 Bruce M. DeBlois, “Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy,” Airpower Journal 12 (winter 1998):
41-57.
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when it involves nuclear-capable states.30 The U.S. advantage in space might not be so
•a i

overwhelming, as weaker spacepowers may effectively use asymmetric approaches.
Miscalculations and other errors will be very likely in this new, yet uncharted, medium
for militarized conflicts.

Any military exchange will have almost no internationally

recognized rules to rely upon and lines to draw to limit the conflict. Furthermore, space
is a uniquely unsuitable for supporting war-fighting: it is one of the most fragile
environments that exists because it has very small capacity for self-repair. The visual
image of our planet encased by a shell of whizzing debris, making the near space
unusable for manned flight, as well as commercial and military activities, powerfully
illustrates the argument o f space weaponization opponents.33 It is for these reasons that
they argue for making space a weapon-free sanctuary.34 Somewhat between these two
opposing opinions there is a point of view that the weaponization of space is not an all or
nothing issue, and that military uses of space, including those involving space weapons,
should be regulated by an international regime, with certain areas of space preserved free
of any weapons.35

30 See, for example, Hitchens, 2003. See also Jurgen Scheffran, “Options for Rules in Outer Space,”
International Network o f Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, Prevention o f an Arms Race in
Outer Space, Bulletin 20, http://www.inesap.org/bulletin20/bul20art02.htm (accessed 07.06.04).
31 Lloyd Axworthy and Merav Datan, “Prevention o f an Arms Race in Outer Space: Notes for an
Address,” International Network o f Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, Bulletin 20, August
2002, http://www.inesap.org/bulletin20/bul20art01/htm (accessed 06.06.04).
32 Handberg, Seeking New World Vistas, 2000, 17.
33 See Joel R. Primack, “Debris and Future Space Activities,” in James C. Moltz, ed., Future Security in
Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs, Occasional Paper No. 10, Center for NonProliferation Studies, Monterey Institute o f International Studies, Southampton, England, May 2002,18.
34 DeBlois, 1998, 41-57. The vision o f outer space as a weapon-free sanctuary found its supporters in the
U.S. military circles. DeBlois argues that preserving space as a sanctuary is a viable option serving U.S.
national interests.
35 Hays provides a more detailed classification o f the whole spectrum o f opinions with respect to outer
space weaponization: “space hawks,” “inevitable weaponizers,” “militarization realists,” and “space
doves.” “Space hawks” believe that space either already is or holds a great promise to become the
dominant source o f military power and that the United States should move quickly to extent its mission in
space to control space and project power from this dominant theater o f combat operations. “Inevitable
weaponizers” differ from “space hawks” in that they are not convinced that space weaponization would be
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THE PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this dissertation is not to analyze the merits of different positions
in this debate or possible future outcomes in military utilization of outer space. The goal
of the study is to gain an insight into space security issues by putting the discussion of
outer space in the context of one of the major international relations debates. The realistliberal debate on the relationship between economic interdependence, and international
institutions, on the one hand, and security relations between the states, on the other,
provides an intellectually attractive and methodologically appropriate venue for the
discussion of the relationship between space commercialization and space security
cooperation.

This international relations debate tries to analyze and explain the

beneficial to the United States or global security and they are more open to the idea o f space arms control
and international cooperation. “Militarization realists” are opposed to space weaponization since they think
that status quo serves the U.S. interests better. They support arms control and international cooperation that
preclude other states from pursuing weaponization o f space, while at the same time they believe that the
U.S. should prepare to fight in space. “Space doves” oppose space weaponization on various grounds:
moral, arms control, conflict resolution, stability, and ideological. See more on the debate Peter L. Hays,
“Military Space Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges,” in Moltz, Future Security in Space, 2002, 3244. See also Peter L. Hays, “Current and Future Military Uses o f Space,” Outer Space and Global Security,
Project Ploughshares, November 26-27,2002.
36 See on this debate among the recent publications that include issues from international relations theory
to foreign policy Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff, “Why Democracies
Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements,” International Organization 56
(summer 2002): 477-513; Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer, “Investing in the Peace: Economic
Interdependence and International Conflict,” International Organization 55 (spring 2001): 391-438. See in
Security Studies 9, 1-2 (autumn 1999-winter 2000) Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Edward D. Mansfield, and
Norrin M Ripsman, “The Political Economy o f National Security: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence,
and International Conflict,” 1-14; Dale C. Copeland, “Trade Expectations and the Outbreak o f Peace:
Detente 1970-74 and the End o f the Cold War 1985-1991,” 15-58; Peter Liberman, “The Offense-Defense
Balance, Interdependence and War,” 59-91; Edward D. Mansfield, Jon C. Pevehouse, and David H. Bearce,
“Preferential Trading Arrangement and Military Disputes,” 92-118; Rawi Abdelal and Jonathan Kirshner,
“Strategy, Economic Relations, and the Definition o f National Interests,” 119-156; Paul A. Papayoanou
and Scott L. Kastner, “Sleeping with the (Potential) Enemy: Assessing the U.S. Policy o f Engagement with
China,” 157-187; Daniel W. Drezner, “The Trouble with Carrots: Transaction Costs, Conflict Expectations,
and Economic Inducements,” 188-218; Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Asking the Right
Question: When Do Economic Sanctions Work Best?” 219-253; David M. Rowe, “Economic Sanctions Do
Work: Economic Statecraft and the Oil Embargo o f Rhodesia,” 254-287; Michael Mastanduno, “Economic
Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security: Agenda for Research,” 288-316. See also in Journal o f
Peace Research 36 (1999) Katherine Barbieri and Gerald Schneider, “Globalization and Peace: Assessing
New Directions in the Study o f Trade and Conflict,” 387-404; Solomon W. Polachek, John Robst, and
Yuan-Ching Chang, “Liberalism and Interdependence: Extending the Trade-Conflict Model,” 405-422;
John R. Oneal and Bruce Russet, “Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specification: Trade Still
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relationship between the economic and political realms, specifically the relationship
between economic interdependence and international conflict and cooperation, war and
peace. With regard to outer space, it provides tools for incorporating new developments
in outer space—the commercialization of space—and military uses of outer space, as
they evolve in parallel to space commercialization, into a single framework with the
analytical focus on the interaction of the two.
On a more philosophical level, the debate tries to answer the questions: Do we, as
human civilization, have a choice or are our actions determined by the unchanging nature
of the anarchy of the international system? Do we have a hope for progress and peace,
for betterment of human lives, or we are compelled to repeat in vicious circles our history
of violence on ever-increasing scale as our technological capabilities grow? The present
study does not aim at answering these fundamental questions. It attempts to answer the
questions: Does commercialization of outer space affect international cooperation in the
space security issue area? More specifically, does it make it easier for states to establish

Reduces Conflict,” 423-442; Han Dorussen, “Balance o f Power Revisited: A Multi-Country Model of
Trade and Conflict,” 443-462; Katherine Barbieri and Jack S. Levy, “Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact
o f War on Trade,” 463-479; James D. Morrow, “How Could Trade Affect Conflict?” 481-489. See James
D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, Tressa E. Tabares, “The Political Determinants o f International Trade:
The Major Powers, 1907-90,” American Political Science Review 92 (September 1998): 649-661. James D.
Morrow, “When Do ‘Relative Gains’ Impede Trade?” Journal o f Conflict Resolution 41, (February 1997):
12-37; Michael W. Doyle, Ways o f War and Peace. Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, (New York:
W.W. Norton and Company, 1997); John. R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, “The Classical Liberals Were
Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985,” International Studies Quarterly 41 (June
1997): 267-293; Paul A. Papayoanou, “Economic Interdependence and the Balance o f Power,”
International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997): 113-140; Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and
War: A Theory o f Trade Expectations,” International Security 20 (spring 1996): 5-41; Katherine Barbieri,
“Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source o f Interstate Conflict?” Journal o f Peace
Research 33 (February 1996): 29-49; John R. Oneal, Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Maoz, Bruce Russett, “The
Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85,” Journal o f Peace
Research 33 (February 1996): 11-28; Peter Liberman, “Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative
Economic Gains,” International Security 21 (summer 1996): 147-175; Rafael Reuveny, Heejoon Kang,
“International Trade, Political Conflict/Cooperation, and Granger Causality,” American Journal o f Political
Science 40 (August 1996): 943-970.
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an international regime regulating space security or it makes the security environment
more competitive?
This study is divided into two parts: Part I provides a theoretical and historical
ground for the analysis of space commercialization and security interests and interstate
interactions in the security realm, and Part II contains an analysis of space
commercialization and security strategies and interests, bilateral relations, and
interactions at the level of global governance in the post-Cold War transition period.
As its first step, the study examines the main arguments in the economic
interdependence and cooperation/conflict debate and analyzes where the findings and
arguments might help us better understand the potential for cooperation in space.
Chapter II o f the dissertation deals with this task. Quantitative analyses produced in the
course of the contemporary realist-liberal debate have systematically tested a number of
realist and liberal hypotheses related to economic interdependence and international
conflict and cooperation. These studies have allowed us to disconfirm some hypotheses,
such as, for example, that approximate equality in the distribution of power in the
international system is associated with more peaceful interstate relations,37 and confirm
others and therefore improve our understanding of the relationship between economic
interdependence and international conflict and cooperation. Overall these studies have
lent more support for the liberal propositions than realist ones.38 However, they have left

37 Russett and Oneal find no support for the argument that relatively equally distributed power in the
international system leads to more peaceful interstate relations. They instead find that it is preponderance
o f power that is associated with relatively less conflict among the states. See Bruce Russett and John
Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York:
W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 109.
38 McMillan analyzed twenty empirical studies— formal models, case studies and quantitative research—
and came to a conclusion that the majority o f them support the hypothesis that interdependence measured
in terms o f trade, inhibits violent conflict. See Susan M. McMillan, “Interdependence and Conflict,”
Mershon International Studies Review 41 (1997): 33-58.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

18
room for improving our understanding of the causal mechanism connecting economic
interdependence and international conflict and cooperation. Since direct observation of
causal mechanism is not feasible in the proposed cases that are under consideration here,
this study relies on temporal coincidence of commercialization of outer space and
security relations, as they both evolved in the 1990s and early 2000s.
The timeframe of this study encompasses a decade of 1992-2002—a decade after
the end o f the Cold War. There are quite a few dates one can choose to mark the end of
the era o f East-West confrontation and the beginning of a new one. For example, the
New York Times proclaimed the end of the East-West confrontation on April 2, 1989.
The Wall Street Journal confirmed this conclusion and exclaimed “We Won!” on May
■2Q

24,1989.

October 3,1990, the day of the reunification of Germany—a powerful

symbol o f fallen wall dividing Europe—can also serve to mark the end of East-West
confrontation. And so could February 25, 1991 when the Warsaw Pact finally dissolved.
But December 25,1991, ushered in the new era decisively when the last Soviet leader
Gorbachev signed a decree making Russian President Yeltsin commander o f the Soviet
nuclear arsenal and resigned from his post, finalizing the end of the Soviet Union.40
Thus, this study takes the year 1992 as the beginning of the post-Cold War transition
period and the starting point of the analysis.
On December 13,2001, after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon, President Bush announced that the United States had given Russia the sixmonth notice of its intent to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty—the treaty that

39 See Richard N. Lebow, John Mueller, and William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and the End o f the Cold
War,” International Security 20 (autumn 1995): 186.
40 See, for example, SIPRI Database, Chronology o f Security Related Events, SIPRI Yearbooks 19902002, http://first.sipri.org/index.php?page=step3&compact=true (accessed 03.04.03).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19
allowed the two Cold War superpowers first to stabilize their strategic relationship and
then move to reduce dramatically their offensive nuclear arsenals.41 On June 13,2002,
the U.S. withdrawal took effect. On the same day, the Foreign Ministry of the Russian
Federation issued a statement saying that Russia no longer felt bound by START II
Treaty. This date marks the end of the era of the ABM Treaty—the treaty that helped to
keep outer space free of weapons for three decades 42 It also concludes the time period of
this analysis.
In the present study, hypotheses are generated in accordance with liberal and
realist propositions advanced in the contemporary realist-liberal debate. Based on the
assumptions that the international system is comprised of states—unitary, rational actors,
striving to survive—and that it is anarchic, realists predict that economic interdependence
is likely to lead to a greater conflict between states. They also argue that international
cooperation, particularly in the security realm, is problematic because of high concerns
with relative gains and high price of a failure. Balancing—either internally by building
up its military capabilities or externally by building alliances with those states with whom
41 The 1972 ABM Treaty was concluded with the view o f “ending an emerging competition in defensive
systems which threatened to spur offensive competition to still greater heights.” It constrained strategic
defenses to a total o f 200 launchers and interceptors, 100 at each o f two widely separated deployment areas
in order to prevent the establishment o f a nationwide defense. It codified the principle o f “non
interference” by one party with the national technical means o f verification o f the other, thereby protecting
the right o f overflight by the reconnaissance satellites. It prohibited development, testing, or deployment o f
sea-based, air-based or space-based ABM systems. In 1974, the ABM Treaty Protocol reduced the number
o f ABM deployment areas permitted to each side from two to one, and the number o f ABM launchers and
interceptors from 200 to 100. See “Treaty Between the United States o f America and the Union o f Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation o f Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,” May 26, 1972,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/abm2.htm (accessed 03.19.04); and “Protocol to the Treaty
Between the United States and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation o f Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems,” July 3, 1974, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/abmprotl.htm (accessed
03.19.04).
42 The role o f the ABM Treaty in preventing space weaponization was that it excluded development o f
space-based components as part o f an ABM system “to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their flight
trajectories.” See Article II. 1 o f the ABM Treaty. Some experts believe that the role o f the ABM Treaty in
preventing weaponization o f space was rather limited and that it did not help to avert an arms race in outer
space. See Wulf von Kries, “The Demise o f the ABM Treaty and the Militarization o f Outer Space,” Space
Policy 18, (August 2002): 175-178.
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they have common security interests or both—should be expected in the anarchic
international system. Since economic cooperation affects state capabilities, it is also
rather difficult. Realist, thus, argue that it is common security interests that are likely to
lead to economic cooperation when security externalities of economic cooperation are
positive, and not vice versa.
Liberals, who argue that the relationship between the state and its domestic and
transnational societies critically shapes state behavior at the international arena, predict
that economic interdependence arising from international trade leads to greater
international cooperation and more peaceful relations—so much so, that liberal states,
particularly those who also share democratic values and build international institutions to
regulate their interactions, form a special community, in which relations between states
are characterized as Kantian “perpetual peace.” While from a liberal perspective, greater
economic interdependence is likely to lead to greater security cooperation directly via the
evolution o f structure of domestic preferences, from a neo-liberal perspective,
international institutions have an important role to play in bringing about more peaceful
and cooperative inter-state relations.
Chapter III takes a brief account of space security regime in outer space as it
evolved since the beginning of the Space Age and up to the closing years of the Cold War
by way of providing a background and a starting point for the present study. The main
attention in this chapter is devoted to U.S.-Soviet space security cooperation because the
Cold War space security regime, including its legal framework, was largely developed
within the context of the U.S-Soviet relations during the Cold War. The purpose of this
chapter is to establish that there was unambiguously a space security regime and to
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analyze its dynamics in order to contrast it with the dynamics of space security
cooperation in the post-Cold War era.
The next step of this study is to define commercialization and establish that the
commercialization o f outer space is not a marginal phenomenon, but a mainstream
development significant enough to affect state interests and have an influence on
interstate security relations. Chapter IV of the present study serves this purpose. Three
major space-faring states—the United States, Russia, and China—are chosen for this
analysis. This should not be taken to mean that the role of other space actors is
inconsequential. Currently, some forty states are engaged in space activities, and many
have designated space programs.43 Europe, for example, represents one of the major
space players, with a number of European states and Canada, cooperating on space
research and development and space applications within the framework of the European
Space Agency (ESA).44 Europe has played an important role in the commercialization of
outer space. It is only recently, however, that the European states have begun to emerge
as a political actor in space, developing—along with scientific and commercial interests
and collaboration—their military cooperation in space and redefining a European
“security concept” and strategic culture.45 While ESA remains the principle vehicle for
intergovernmental cooperation in Europe, the recent trend has been toward a more visible
role for the European Union in intergovernmental relationships: for two of the major

43 See A. I. Kiselev, A. A. Medvedev, V. A. Menshikov, Cosmonautics on the Frontier o f Millenniums:
Summary and Prospects (Moscow: Mashinostroenie, 2001), 28.
44 The European Space Agency was created in 1973. The Convention that established the development o f
cooperation among its member states in the area o f space technology research and application for
“exclusively peaceful purposes” o f outer space as one o f the main objectives o f the agency came into force
in October 1980. The new organization replaced two European organizations engaged in space activities:
the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) and the European Space Research Agency
(ESRO) created in 1964. See, for example, Madders, A New Force at a New Frontier, 1997, 41 -42, 180.
45 Silvestri, 2003.
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European space projects, Galileo and GMES,46 research and development aspects are
handled by ESA, while strategic issues are dealt with by the EU. Thus, even though
Europe has been a leading commercial actor in space and has begun to pursue its
common security interests in space within European security projects, it cannot be said to
represent a unified state actor on par with the United States, Russia, and China. European
space security cooperation in the post-Cold War era constitutes an important case, which
will lie, however, outside the scope of the present analysis. This study will focus on the
three states, the United States, Russia and China, who represent not only three major
spacepowers but also potential, former, or latent rivals.47 Thus, it is between these three
states that space security relations are of the particular essence.
In Chapter IV, it is shown that the move towards commercialization o f outer
space was launched nearly simultaneously via various state policies, including the
reduction of government budget financing of space activities and the liberalization of
space activities in the United States, Russia and China. As a result of these policies, a
large global space market emerged. The last section of this chapter analyzes security
implications of space commercialization.
Chapters V, VI and VII of this study focus on security issues of the three
spacepowers—the United States, Russia, and China—within a common framework. The

46 The Galileo program o f satellite navigation and positioning is the first genuine European Union-led
program. The GMES program, originally envisaged as a civilian program for monitoring the environment,
was recently upgraded to the CFSP’s security dimension. See Silvestri, 2003.
47 Diehl and Goertz define rivalry as “a relationship between two states in which both use, with some
regularity, military threats and force as well as one in which both sides formulate their foreign policy in
military terms.” According to these authors, all three pairs o f states— under consideration in the present
study— belong to a class o f “enduring rivalries:” the U.S.- U.S.S.R. rivalry lasted for some 40 years 19461986, the U.S.-China rivalry for over 20, 1949-1972, and Russia-China rivalry originated in 1860s and
“cannot be judged to have ended by 1992.” See Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, War and Peace in
International Rivalry (Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 2000), 4,144-145. It can be argued that
the Russia-China rivalry ended by the mid-1990s. The U.S.-China rivalry could be also assessed as being
in latent state.
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task of these chapters is to analyze the evolution of the overall security strategies and
security interests in outer space of the United States, Russia, and China in the post-Cold
War era. The objective is to assess whether the security interests of these three states
have been converging or diverging in the post-Cold War era and to what degree
commercial interests influenced the evolution o f their security interests. This study is
based on the analysis of the official promulgations of security strategies and space
security interests o f the three states under consideration: in case of the United States, the
National Security Strategies of the United States of a number of years are used as the
foundation, in case o f Russia—the National Security Concepts and Military Doctrines,
and in case of China—the White Papers on defense, arms control, and space activities
issued by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. Even though these
documents may not fully represent the state of security affairs of the three spacepowers
under consideration, these documents were produced with the view of communicating
information about state interests, objectives, and strategies, including with regard to outer
space, to other states in the international system. For this reason, and to the extent that
they were used to formulate and communicate state interests to other international actors,
these documents are useful for this study. The parallel analysis of national strategies and
security interests allows this study to evaluate the role of changing strategic environment
and identify changing objectives of the three states. The issue of space weaponization
serves in this analysis as a “litmus test” for assessing converging and non-converging
security interests o f the three states.
Chapter VIII focuses on bilateral security relations with a particular attention on
the interplay of U.S.-Russia, U.S.-China, and Russia-China security relations, space
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security interests, and space commercial cooperation. Chapter IX examines the role of
international intergovernmental organization in bridging differences in security interests
between the three states and facilitating emergence of consensus on space security issues.
This analysis speaks to the neoliberal-neorealist debate on the role of international
institutions. The neorealist position in this debate has been that international institutions
do not ameliorate the anarchy of the international system. Instead, they are seen as
reflections of the distribution of power in the international system and, thus, have only
marginal independent effect on state behavior and cannot ’’cause peace.”48 Neoliberals
have posited that international institutions matter because they facilitate cooperation
among states when they have mutual interests. International institutions promote
cooperation by providing information, including information about the distribution of
gains from cooperation; reducing transaction costs; making commitments more credible;
creating issue linkages; establishing focal points for coordination; facilitating in general
the operation of reciprocity; making cheating less appealing by making punishment more
feasible and providing early warnings of cheatings for the victims; and lessening the
implications of cheating.49 Two important functional characteristics of formal
international organizations—centralization and the degree of autonomy and
independence— set these vehicles of international cooperation apart from other forms of
international institutions. Neoliberal institutionalism emphasizes that IGOs provide
stable negotiating fora that enhance iteration in interstate relations and reputational
effects, make cooperative response to urgent developments easier, help to establish and

48 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise o f International Institutions,” International Security 19
(winter 1994/95): 47.
49 See, for example, Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise o f Institutionalist Theory,”
International Security 20 (summer 1995): 42 ,4 7 .
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reinforce norms, legitimize or de-legitimize certain activities, shape agenda of interstate
discourse, often provide information and expertise on the issues at hand and influence
political context in which interstate interactions take place, strengthen issue linkages and
stimulate trade-offs, monitor state activities and adherence to their commitments, thereby
stimulating compliance with existing agreements. Performing these and other functions,
they are said to affect the nature of the international system by enabling states to achieve
goals that they would not have achieved otherwise.50 In doing so intergovernmental
organizations are believed to make their important contribution in reducing the
occurrence of interstate conflicts, including militarized conflicts.51
This study focuses on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. This
intergovernmental body has been the single multilateral intergovernmental organization
charged with consultations and negotiations on military matters, including outer space
military matters. The United States, Russia and China have been members of this
organization. For the post-Cold War period, the analysis of the interaction of the three
spacepowers within this organization is based on the annual reports of the Conference on
Disarmament to the General Assembly of the United Nations, meetings’ verbatim records
and official documents of the Conference. The debates within the Conference show that
space security interests between the United States and Russia and the United States and
China continued to diverge: no significant compromises were achieved in the respective
positions— so much so that the conference was deadlocked for years because negotiations
on all other issues were made dependent upon the negotiations on the issue of prevention
50 Kenneth W. Abbott, Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act through International Organizations,” Journal o f
Conflict Resolution 42 (February 1998): 3-32.
51 Bruce Russett, John R. Oneal, and David R. Davis, “The Third Leg o f the Kantian Tripod for Peace:
International Organizations and Militarized Disputes,” International Organization 52 (Summer 1998): 445449.
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of an arms race in outer space. The Sino-Russian relations, on the other hand, despite the
fact that these two states were largely competitors on the emerging global space market,
developed into a close partnership, with space security interests converging to such a
degree that the two states jointly submitted a draft treaty, proposing an international ban
on space weapons and on the use of force or a threat of force in outer space and against
space objects.
Finally, the last chapter draws conclusions, bringing together all the findings in
order to confirm or disconfirm the set of realist, liberal, and neoliberal hypotheses. This
analysis shows that realist hypotheses, as they are formulated for the purposes of this
inquiry, are better supported by the evidence provided in this study. Commercialization
of space has not led to converging security interests between the United States, on the one
hand, and Russia and China, on the other, while they commercialized their space
activities and have developed extensive commercial cooperation. It also has not made it
easier for major space powers to make compromises within the international organization
where security interests have remained diverged between the United States, on the one
hand, and Russia and China, on the other. It follows from these findings that expanding
commercial cooperation is not enough to lead to converging interests on security matters
and therefore is unlikely to lead to the emergence of new multilateral security regime,
banning the use of force in outer space. Both Russia and China seem to feel increasingly
the pressure to make the use of force costly not only via increasing their space commerce
with the United States but also via building up their space capabilities in order to protect
themselves from possible coercion. A security regime may eventually emerge to
supplement balancing mechanism along the lines suggested by realists.
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Going back to the theoretical debate on interdependence, conflict and cooperation,
it should be noted, that these results do not disprove the liberal propositions altogether.
The space arms control issues are among the most challenging of all international
cooperation issues, and we cannot exclude the possibility that convergence of security
interests between the three major space powers may still emerge later, despite the
negative trend that we observe in the post Cold-War transition period. In the meantime,
realism that was put on the defensive by the academic advances of the recent liberal
studies on the issues of economic interdependence and international conflict and
cooperation, still provides a useful framework for explaining interstate relations in the
realm o f outer space. Based on the realist and liberal perspectives and insights gained
from this analysis, Chapter X presents a few possible scenarios of future developments in
outer space.
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PARTI
THE ANARCHY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND SECURITY
COOPERATION

I have never worked to improve weaponry; this is
contrary to my spirit. While working on reaction devices, my
objectives were peaceful and lofty: to conquer the Cosmic
Space for the good o f humanity.”
Konstantin E. Tsiolkovskii
1905
In the study o f politics, perhaps nothing seems so
dismal as writing about international cooperation. Indeed,
when I told a friend and former teacher o f mine that I was
writing a book on this subject, she replied that it would have to
be a short book.
Robert O. Keohane
1984

Most inquiries on international cooperation begin with the acknowledgement that
the international system is anarchic—that is, there is no central authority over states and
they must take care of their own security in order to survive.1 Anarchy represents an
analytical starting point for the attempts to explain why international cooperation,
particularly in the field of security, is difficult among sovereign states and how it leads to
varying outcomes of interstate interactions: to arms races and arms control, to war and
peace.
In the anarchic international system, states possess offensive capabilities that
allow them not only to protect themselves but also to launch an aggression against each
other. Under these conditions, states can never be sure about the intentions of other
states. Moreover, states are believed to look for opportunities to take advantage of each
other in their strife for power and have no reasons to trust each other. Their prime goal is
1 See, for example, Kenneth A. Oye ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1986).
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survival and, in order to provide for it, states aim to maximize their relative power
positions in the international system. Thus, relations between states under anarchy are
often seen as highly competitive and allowing for little room for cooperation:2 states are
in a “state of relentless security competition, with the possibility of war always in the
background.” This gloomy picture of the perpetual strife for power is contrasted by the
vision of the progressive evolution of the international system towards greater peace,
prosperity and justice achieved via growing economic interdependence, democratic
governance, and international institutions.
From the standpoint of international relations, outer space is a unique medium: it
was added to the physical reach of human civilization only very recently, no offensive
capabilities have been yet deployed in it, and its commercialization has been unfolding
before our eyes. Explaining emerging patterns in economic and security relations in
outer space represents a particular challenge and, at the same time, a great opportunity to
increase our understanding of the universe of international relations at the beginning of
the 21st century.
Part I of this dissertation serves the purpose of laying out the theoretical and
historical ground for the analysis of the role of the commercialization of outer space in
the emerging security relations in this increasingly important medium. It consists of two
chapters: Chapter II deals with the theoretical debate on economic interdependence and
international conflict and cooperation, and Chapter III outlines the features and evolution
of space security regime during the Cold War.
2 See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, 1979), 106, and Mearsheimer, 1994/95, 9. See also Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy,
1986,227. See also Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study o f International Security
Cooperation” in Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy, 1986, 58.
3 Mearsheimer, 1994/95, 9.
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The tasks of Chapter II are, first, to place the discussion of outer space issues
within one of the main international relations debates by outlining the relevant theoretical
framework and trying to identify where the debate has led the study of the international
relations so far, and second, to derive testable propositions for the present study. It is
argued that the realist-liberal debate on economic interdependence, democracy and
international institutions and conflict and cooperation provides an appropriate analytical
platform for examining the relationship between space commercialization and interstate
security relations in outer space. Given the important recent shift towards closer
examination of the mechanism of liberal pacification, the present study tries to make its
contribution by directing the focus of attention to the evolution of states’ interests as they
are being affected by the commercialization of outer space. It argues that, in the realm
of outer space security, in order for liberal propositions to hold, economic
interdependence must affect either the security interests of the main space powers—the
United States, Russia and China—to propel them towards greater convergence so as to
reduce incentives for competition or it must lead to international institutions that
effectively defuse conflictual interests. Looking at the evolution of security interests,
their bilateral relations, and interactions within international institutions in parallel to
space commercialization allows us to gain a better understanding of the changing
paradigm of outer space in the 21st century.
In order to provide a starting point for the analysis of the post-Cold War
relationship between commerce and security in outer space, Chapter III fulfills a twofold
task: it defines space security and outlines the necessary conditions for the formation of a
security regime, and it analyzes the features and the state of the Cold War security regime
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in outer space at the end of the Cold War. Chapter III concludes by stating that the space
security regime that was established during the Cold War and that restricted the use of
force in outer space was significantly eroded by the later part of the Cold War. Despite
this erosion, decades of peaceful uses of outer space by the Cold War superpowers for
their security needs led to the emergence of a tacit norm of non-use of force in outer
space, which endured beyond the historic epoch that gave rise to it.
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CHAPTER II
COMMERCE AND SECURITY: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND
OUTER SPACE

The proposition that gains from commercial
transactions would overcome the problem inherent in the
security dilemma and make war too expensive was believed in
1914. Hopes that a system o f international law and
organization could provide collective security to replace the
need for self-help inherent in the security dilemma were
disappointed by 1939. Nonetheless, the sharp opposition
between realist and liberal theories is overstated.
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye
1977

In the closing decade of the 20th century, outer space has emerged as an
increasingly vital medium—important not only strategically but also economically. With
respect to the study of international relations, the commercialization of outer space has
transformed this realm from being almost exclusively a subject of strategic studies into a
realm yielding itself to a broader discussion and analysis. The purpose of this chapter is,
firstly, to try to place the discussion of outer space issues within one of the main
international relations debates by outlining the relevant theoretical framework and,
secondly, to derive testable propositions for the present study. It is maintained that the
realist-liberal debate on economic interdependence, democracy and international
institutions and conflict and cooperation provides an appropriate analytical platform to
the analysis of space commercialization and interstate security relations in outer space.
This chapter shows that the progress made by the recent studies within that debate has led
to an important shift towards greater attention to the mechanism of liberal pacification.
This study argues that, in the realm of outer space security, in order for liberal
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propositions to hold, economic interdependence must affect either the security interests of .
the main space powers—the United States, Russia and China—to propel them towards
greater convergence so as to reduce incentives for security competition or lead to
international institutions that effectively defuse conflictual interests. Looking at the
evolution of security interests and interaction of states within international institutions in
parallel to space commercialization allows us to gain useful insights into both security
relations in outer space and a possible link connecting economic realm and the realm of
security relations.
The relationship between economic interdependence, democracy, international
institutions and war has been one of the central theoretical and empirical questions in
international relations discourse. The realist-liberal debate on this central issue goes back
to the times of Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant when the ideas of liberal peace and
“perpetual peace” entered the intellectual scene.1 It has received a renewed impetus in
the 1980s, and particularly since the end of the Cold War2 in the context of the political
democratization and economic liberalization in the former Socialist bloc, advancing
integration in Western Europe, and deepening globalization around the world.3 The main

1 Adam Smith laid the foundation for the liberal concept o f free trade and its influence on interstate
relations in his The Wealth o f Nations published in 1776. Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace was published
in 1795.
2 See, for example, Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War,” 1996, 5.
3 Liberalization is defined in this study as an introduction o f competition into monopolized markets. The
term should be distinguished from deregulation, a related term that means a reduction o f governmentimposed constraints on the behavior o f economic actors. Globalization is defined as a process o f
transformation o f human affairs— political, economic as well as social— resulting from the increasing flows
o f trade, investment, and technologies across national borders. The outcome o f this process is increasingly
growing links between nations, economies, and societies. “Economic globalization” refers to the
increasing integrative processes among national economies that lead to the emergence o f a global economic
system. See, for example, Robert Gilpin, The Challenges o f Global Capitalism: The World Economy in
the 21st Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 7, 19. In this understanding the term
“economic globalization” overlaps with the term “economic interdependence.” See Barbieri and
Schneider, 1999, 387. The term “globalization” came into popular use in the second half o f the 1980s in
the context o f increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational enterprises. It emphasizes
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question at the heart of this debate in the post-Cold War era has been whether expending
international economic exchanges, political democratization, and proliferating
intergovernmental institutions bring about more cooperative international relations and a
more peaceful world, or a world that is fraught with conflict and war.
Recent international relations research inspired by liberal ideas, and particularly
quantitative analyses within the so-called “democratic peace” and “liberal peace”
research agenda o f the past two decades or so, has put realism—the oldest, most
prominent theoretical paradigm in international relations—on the defensive.4 This
chapter argues that even though realism has suffered a great blow in its failure to predict
the peaceful end of the Cold War,5 it still provides a useful analytical framework for
analyzing state behavior in the post-Cold War world order and propositions that are
particularly relevant to the emerging interstate security relations in the realm of outer
space.
Although many international relations schools of thought have made their
contribution to the debate, the focus of this study is on liberalism and realism as the two
integrative outcomes and forces at the level o f the international system. See Gilpin, The Challenges o f
Global Capitalism, 2000,22. According to Baldwin’s conceptual analysis, the concept o f
“interdependence” can be traced back to the time o f Nicollo Machiavelli’s The Prince. The term
“interdependence” emphasizes the consequences o f economic interactions and links that emerge from such
interactions for relations between states. See David A. Baldwin, “Interdependence and Power: A
Conceptual Analysis,” International Organization 34 (autumn 1980): 481.
4 Modem realism emerged after World War I and became a dominant school o f thought after World War
II. See, for example William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and the End o f the Cold War,” International
Security 19 (winter 1994/95): 91.
5 Charles W. Kegley, Jr., “The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New
International Relations,” International Studies Quarterly 31 (June 1993): 131-147; Richard N. Lebow,
“The Long Peace, the End o f the Cold War, and the Failure o f Realism,” International Organization 48
(Spring 1994): 249-277; Friedrich Kratochwil, “The Embarrassment o f Change: Neo-Realism as the
Science o f Realpolitik without Politics,” Review o f International Studies 19 (January 1993): 63-80; John L.
Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End o f the Cold War,” International Security 17 (winter
1992/93): 5-58. See also responses, for example, William C. Wohlforth, 1994/95, 91-129; Ethan B.
Kapstein, “Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources o f International Politics,” International Organization
49 (autumn 1995): 751-774: Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and
U.S. Grand Strategy after the End o f the Cold War,” International Security 21 (spring 1997): 49-88; Robert
Jervis, “Realism in the Study o f World Politics,” International Organization 52 (autumn 1998): 971-991.
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main protagonists in the debate on economic interdependence and cooperation/conflict.
In their foundations, the two schools are based on two different visions of the
international relations and have presented two different analytical constructs linking
interdependence, democracy, and international institutions with the outcomes of interstate
relations in the security realm. Keeping with Waltz’s recommendations on theory testing,
this chapter first states the main liberal and realist propositions, evaluates the current
status of the debate, and then infers the hypotheses for the present analysis.6

REALIST AND LIBERAL PERSPECTIVES: ANARCHY, ECONOMIC
INTERDEPENDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
The commercialization of outer space can be understood as an expanding use of
outer space by commercial actors for activities that are launched with the view of
participation in economic exchanges determined increasingly by forces of supply and
demand. The result of the process of commercialization is a space market, an institution
of exchange in space services, information obtained from space, space technology and
equipment, and products manufactured in outer space that functions increasingly on the
basis of the rules of supply and demand. With the end of the Cold War, the
commercialization of outer space significantly accelerated due to the dramatically falling
government space budgets and the deregulation and liberalization of space activities at
the national level. In the absence of bipolar confrontation, deregulation and liberalization
contributed to the process of internationalization of commercial space activities and
emergence of a global space market.

6 See Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 1979, 13.
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The commercialization of outer space can be considered as one of the most
important developments of our time: it progressively incorporates this vast global
commons into the economic mainstream, turning its treasures into economic benefits on a
growing scale across the globe. If it were not for the commercialization of outer space,
this medium would still be predominantly a province of the military and would fall
mostly under the purview of strategic studies.7 Instead, the commercialization of outer
space has transformed the utilization of this medium and calls for an approach to outer
space issues that would allow us to incorporate new developments and analyze the
interaction of economic and security aspects of space uses.
The liberal school of thought places a particular emphasis on economic
interactions between international actors and puts forth a number o f propositions relating
to economic and security realms that link expanding international economic exchanges
with more cooperative and peaceful interstate relations. In the past two decades or so
liberal scholars have made considerable strides in analyzing this relationship and
providing evidence supporting their position. Numerous quantitative studies conducted
recently lent strong support for the liberal proposition that states who trade more are less
likely to be engaged in militarized disputes.
Realists disagree with the liberal propositions and argue that the economic
interdependence that arises from economic exchanges leads to greater conflict between
o

states, and greater cooperation between states in economic realm follows from common

7 See, for example, Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and
Organization, Report, Chapter 2 “Space: Today and the Future,” 2001.
8 Realism states three key assumptions: (1) that international system is comprised o f states, (2) that states
are unitary rational actors, and (3) that the system is anarchic— that is, there is no central authority over
states and they must take care o f their own security in order to survive. Among different strands o f
Realism, core assumptions vary and may include other propositions besides those identified above that
further specify how states engage in self-help. For example, Stephen Brooks identifies two competing
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security interests rather than vice versa.9 Security cooperation is rare between states even
when they do share common interests because of anarchy of the international system—a
system without a supra-state authority that would settle disputes between states and
enforce peace.10 Relations between states under anarchy are seen as highly competitive
and allowing for a little room for cooperation:11 they are seen as a “state of relentless

branches o f realism: structural realism or neorealism, and postclassical realism that continues traditions o f
the classical realism with some modifications. See Stephen G. Brooks, “Dueling Realism,” International
Organization 51 (summer 1997): 446-447. Michael Doyle identifies three distinct groupings within
realism— what he calls fundamental realism, constitutional realism, and structural realism— which all were
derived from complex, or Thucydidesian, realism. See Michael Doyle, Ways o f War and Peace, 1997,4548. Differences in the assumptions lead to differing outlooks on the prospects for peace and war,
cooperation and conflict as well as on how states can best pursue their interests. Structural realism, or
neorealism, also adds a fourth assumption that states are functionally similar units which differ in
capabilities but not in the ends they pursue. See Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 1979, 96-97.
Economic interdependence arising from states’ participation in the international division o f labor, is
believed to have negative consequences for their security under the conditions o f anarchy and therefore is
undesirable. Realists point out to two main reasons: first, economic interdependence undermines the
security o f states by making them dependent on other states for the economic goods and services;
dependence, in its turn, creates vulnerability or lack o f power and incentives to expand state control to
ameliorate it. It also creates potential sources o f conflict between the states borne by competition between
commercial actors. Interdependence is believed to create incentives for states to secure supplies on which
they depend on other states. This may lead to conquest. Moreover, interdependence creates hostility and
fear further contributing to the possibility o f a conflict. See Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 1979,
174.
9 According to realism, in the self-help system cooperation is limited for three main reasons. First, the
absence o f central authority over states means there is no one to enforce agreements, settle disputes, and
prevent force from being used. Under these conditions cheating is a formidable problem. Second, states
have to worry more about providing the means o f protecting themselves against others than about
promoting their welfare. It should be noted, however, that although all realists agree that military security
is the state’s primary responsibility, opinions diverge on the degree to which states prefer immediate
military preparedness to economic welfare gains. See Brooks, 1997, 446-447. And third, as argued by
neorealists, states, being concerned with their security above anything else, avoid cooperative endeavors
that may lead to their dependence on other states, or interdependence. See Waltz, Theory o f International
Politics, 1979, 106.
10 See Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (January 1978): 167214.
11 In the anarchic international system, states possess offensive capabilities that allow them not only to
protect themselves but also to launch an aggression against each other. Under these conditions, states can
never be sure about the intentions o f other states. Moreover, according to realism, states look for
opportunities to take advantage o f each other in their quest for power and have no reasons to trust each
other. Their prime goal is survival and, in order to provide for it, states aim to maximize their relative
power positions in the international system. Thus, relations between states under anarchy are seen as
highly competitive and allowing for little room for cooperation. See, for example, Waltz, Theory o f
International Politics, 1979, 106, and Mearsheimer, 1994/95, 9. See also Robert Jervis, “From Balance to
Concert,” and Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies
and Institutions,” in Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy, 1986, 58,227.
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security competition, with the possibility of war always in the background.” 12 Realism
thus presents a rather pessimistic picture of the world and “it holds little promise of
making that world more benign.”13 State behavior is determined by state interests, which
in their turn are principally shaped by the distribution of power in the system.
Adherents to the liberal school do not consider the international system to be in a
homogenous “state o f war,” even though they tend to agree with the realists that the
international system is anarchic.14 Moreover, in contrast to realists who believe that the
fundamental nature of interstate interactions does not change over time,15 liberals believe
that international relations can gradually evolve, progressively promoting greater human
freedom by establishing conditions of peace, prosperity, and justice.16 This difference in
the outlook comes from the assumptions liberals make about states—the important, but
not the only, collective actors at the international level17—and about relations between
the states.18 According to liberals, states are not all alike: they differ in the way they
relate to domestic and transnational societies in which they are embedded. Liberalism
draws a distinction between states that are liberal and non-liberal, democratic and

12 Mearsheimer, 1994/95, 9.
13 Ibid., 48.
14 Zacher and Matthew point out that followers o f the liberal school have not been satisfied with the
conception o f the international system as anarchic, arguing that the network o f international institutions has
become an integral part o f the international system. See Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew,
“Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands,” in Charles W. Kegley, ed.,
Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1995), 119.
15 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 11th ed, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995), 7.
16 Zacher and Matthew, in Charles W. Kegley, ed., Controversies in International Relations Theory,
1995, 109.
17 It should be noted that in contrast to realism, liberalism considers individuals the primary international
actors and states the most important collective actors at the international level. See, for example, Andrew
Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory o f International Politics,” International
Organization 51 (autumn 1997): 516.
18 Within the Liberal school o f thought, there are three major branches: ideational liberalism, commercial
liberalism, and republican liberalism. Each branch focuses on different aspects o f the relationship between
the state and domestic structures and formulates its assumptions. See Moravcsik, 1997, 515.
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autocratic. According to liberalism, this is an important distinction because the
relationship between the state and its domestic and transnational societies critically
shapes state behavior on the international arena.19 Liberals maintain that state
preferences and aims are multiple and they may change over time. Liberal states provide
beyond the narrowly defined security: they strive to protect and promote individual rights
and welfare of their citizens.

70

Based on these assumptions liberalism does not consider the inter-state relations
as a pure zero-sum game where one state’s gains are other state’s losses. There is much
more room for mutual benefits and cooperation between states, than realism portrays it.
Moreover, liberalism perceives international cooperation as central to the realization of
greater human freedom: it is instrumental in maximizing the benefits and minimizing
possible negative outcomes of international interactions—that is, in providing greater
peace, welfare, and justice.
Proponents of liberalism believe that international relations evolve and have been
•

•

•

undergoing a process of modernization

71

brought about by the scientific revolution and

the intellectual revolution of liberalism.22 From this point of view, the late 17th century
represents a historic benchmark when the process of modernization began transforming
international relations by laying the ground for significant improvements in human
morality and welfare. The growth and spread of liberal democracy or republican
government, international economic interdependence, and international law and
19 Ibid., 516.
20 Michael Doyle, Ways o f War and Peace, 1997, 211.
21 This concept o f modernization is a not the same concept as developed by the Modernization school o f
International Political Economy in the 1960s. See Zacher and Matthew, in Charles W. Kegley, ed.,
Controversies in International Relations Theory, 1995, 110.
22 There are suggestions that cognitive progress and international sociological integration could be added
to this list. See Zacher and Matthew, in Charles W. Kegley, ed., Controversies in International Relations
Theory, 1995, 110.
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institutions are seen as the key elements of this modernization. This process, however, is
seen as gradual and uneven. The engine at the heart of this modernization process is
believed to be a vital private sector largely free of governmental interventions.
As a result of the process of modernization, according to liberals, a group of
liberal states has emerged within which international interactions are more extensive,
more cooperative, and peaceful than between non-liberal states or between liberal and
non-liberal states.24 The relations between these liberal states are characterized by what
Kant called a “perpetual peace.” In order to explain the mechanism o f liberal
pacification, scholars adhering to liberal paradigm invoke various causal constructs with
the emphasis on different factors.25 Republican liberals stress the importance of
republican, or representative government. According to this explanation, democratic
states, where citizens have their say in decision making and bear the costs of war,
generally tend to avoid war and pursue more accommodating policies, particularly
towards other liberal democratic states with whom they share democratic values.26
Among liberal states international cooperation and peace are seen as a simple function of
23 With respect to the role o f the government two variants o f liberalism are distinguished: “conservative”
or laissez-faire liberalism and “liberal” liberalism. The latter expresses considerably less confidence in the
progressive potential o f the private sector and envisions a larger role for the government. See Michael W.
Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (summer
1983): 207-208.
24 Ibid., 213-215.
25 McMillan identifies four liberal approaches in explaining liberal pacification: political, economic,
sociological, and sophisticated liberalism. See McMillan, 1997,35. Zacher’s and Matthew’s typology o f
liberalism contains five different approaches: republican liberalism; interdependence liberalism with two
branches - commercial liberalism and military liberalism; cognitive liberalism; sociological liberalism; and
institutional liberalism. See Zacher and Matthew, in Charles W. Kegley, ed., Controversies in
International Relations Theory, 1995, 121.
26 This idea lies in the foundation o f the “democratic peace” literature. Within “democratic peace”
research scholars employ two different explanatory models: the structural model and the normative model.
The structural model asserts that complex political mobilization processes within democratic states impose
institutional constraints on the leaders, which make violent conflict unfeasible. The normative model states
that democracies do not use violence against each other because norms o f compromise and cooperation
prevent their conflicts o f interests from escalation into violence. See for example Zeev Maoz and Bruce
Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes o f Democratic Peace, 1946-1986,” ^ merican Political Science
Review 87 (September 1993): 624-638.
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converging state interests.27 Neoliberals, recognizing mutual interests as a necessary but
insufficient condition for successful international cooperation, emphasize the role of
international institutions—rules and norms that govern international interactions.28
Although all strands of liberalism acknowledge the role of economic
interdependence arising from international exchanges in bringing about more peaceful
relations between the states,29 proponents of economic, or commercial liberalism
underscore economic factors linking free international trade and investment to more
cooperative and peaceful relations between the states. According to liberal economic
theory, serving as a foundation of commercial liberalism, international trade makes all
participating countries better off because of more efficient allocation of resources and
higher productivity achieved by countries due to specialization in sectors where they have
comparative advantage. International trade is seen as a positive-sum game: growing
international trade leads to the growing mutual benefits of the trading nations. These
benefits of trade stimulate further participation in international division of labor. With
the growth o f international trade and increase of transnational economic interdependence,
mutual economic benefits of peaceful commercial relations are believed to grow larger in
comparison to the benefits of military competition and war.30 This is in part due to the
transformation of world economy brought about by the advancements of transportation,
communication, and internationalization of production and investment and more recently
27 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Ritterger, Theories o f International Regimes (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 57.
28 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and D iscord in the World Political Economy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
29 Michael Doyle, “Kant, Part I,” 1983,225.
30 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise o f the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World
(New York: Basic Books, 1986); and John J. Weltman, “On the Obsolescence o f War: An Essay in Policy
and Theory,” International Studies Quarterly 18 (December 1974): 395-416. Commercial liberals put forth
the following hypothesis: “the more diversified and complex the existing transnational commercial ties and
production structures, the less cost-effective coercion is likely to be.” See Moravcsik, 1997, 530.
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by information technology revolution;

i

and in part due to the prohibitively high costs of

modem warfare, particularly among the developed countries.

Thus, commercial

liberalism, in order to explain the phenomenon of liberal pacification relies on the logic
of cost-benefit calculations. As rational actors, states compare expected costs and
benefits of war with the costs and benefits of the current status quo, which are determined
to a large degree by the benefits from international economic exchange.
Rosecrance presents a liberal argument based on the cost-benefit analysis
characteristic of commercial liberalism. He asserts that in the post-1945 period peaceful
trading relations enjoy much greater efficiency in comparison to the strategy of military
competition. Through industrial-technological development and international trade,
states achieve their national goals and transform their positions in the international
politics, while all participants benefit from enhanced trade that economic cooperation
makes possible. According to Rosecrance, as technological progress and trade propel
interdependence, war becomes too costly for states to pursue their national interests
relative to the trading strategy. He does not, however, expect the emergence of a security
regime between “trading” states within the “political-military world,” in which the use of
force is one of the legitimate tools of interstate politics. Instead, he believes that the
system of international relations will switch into a different mode: it will become a
“trading world,” in which the use of force is neither cost effective nor legitimate.33

31 The shift toward knowledge-based economy in the developed countries and increased mobility o f
wealth creation have been reducing the potential benefits o f a war o f conquest. See Stephen Van Evera,
“Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15 (winter 1990/91): 14-15.
32 The emergence o f nuclear weapons vastly raised the costs o f war and bolstered peace by making states
to behave more cautiously. Nuclear weapons have made a war o f conquest among the great powers
virtually impossible. On the effects o f nuclear revolution see, for example, John L. Gaddis, “The Long
Peace: Elements o f Stability in the Postwar International System,” International Security 10 (Spring 1986):
120-123; and Van Evera, 1990/91, 12-13.
33 Rosecrance, The Rise o f the Trading State, 1985, 60.
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Realism largely rejects the idea of the evolution of the international system for its
fundamental nature remains anarchic: “International relations continue to be a recurring
struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy.”34
According to realism, economic interdependence is unable to ameliorate anarchy:
“Increased interdependence certainly leads to the increased need for the management of
collective affairs, but it does not produce a manager capable of doing it.”35 This is so as
long as the world remains to be politically fragmented into sovereign units. Conditions
of anarchy cannot be transcended except through a “universal imperium.”36 Gilpin goes
further: “... [T]he growth of economic interdependence and the prospect of mutual gain
have not eliminated competition and mutual distrust among nations. On the contrary,
with increasing interdependence, nations have become more apprehensive over the loss
of autonomy and such matters as access to foreign markets, security for sources of raw
materials, and the associated costs of interdependence.”

Changes in the international

system are determined by the changing distribution o f power in the system and war
remains as an instrument of change.
Neorealists distinguish between interdependence as a unit-level and system-level
IQ

characteristic.

At the systemic level, the degree of interdependence is measured by the

level of interdependence between the great powers in the system. They argue that the
smaller the number of great powers in the system, the lower the level of interdependence,

34 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 1995, 7.
35 Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 1979, 210.
36 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 1995,226.
37 Ibid., 219-220.
38 Interdependence and its consequences at the domestic level are considered to be different from
interdependence and its consequences at the international level. The former is more often called
“integration.” The difference between the two follows from the sharp distinction that realists make
between the domestic, or hierarchically organized realm, and international, or anarchical and unorganized
realm. See Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 1979, 106.
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the more stable the system.39 “With zero interdependence—Waltz maintains—neither
conflict nor war is possible.”40
Until recently, there had been rather few discussions of unipolarity and its
implications with respect to economic interdependence and conflict and cooperation.
Unipolarity was believed to be a rare and fairly transitory phenomenon in international
politics 41 Filling this gap is currently an important challenge facing international
relations scholars, as well as policy makers. This is because in a unipolar system
interdependence should be the highest among possible configurations, and therefore it is
not only an academic issue whether realists or liberals adequately explain the nature of
the relationship between economic interdependence and international conflict and
cooperation. If realists are right than unipolarity should bear the greatest potential for
conflict, whereas if liberals are right then uniploratiy should be the most peaceful and
cooperative of all international systems. In the context of profound changes that
accompanied the post-Cold War transformation from bipolarity to unipolarity many
scholars have come to conclude that “... world politics are experiencing a seismic shift,
and that paradigm other than realism are needed to understand contemporary
international relations” even though they concede that anarchy, state power and interests,
and positional competition still remain relevant to interstate relations42
Some scholars who adhere to the realist perspective advance an argument that
economic interdependence has no systematic effect on war and peace, as these issues are

39 Ibid., 145, 172, 176-177,209.
40 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” International Security 25 (summer 2000):
15.
41 Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mustanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After
the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
42 Michael Mastanduno and Ethan B. Kapstein, “Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War”, in
Kapstein and Mastanduno, Unipolar Politics, 1999, 22-23.
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determined based on political and military-strategic considerations. Buzan, for example,
maintains that the idea of linking economic structure to international security leads to
overestimation of the importance of economic factors for the matters of war and peace
and that non-economic factors, such as military deterrence and the bipolar structure of the
international system in the post-World War II period provide much more persuasive
explanations for phenomenon of the absence of superpower war and the decline in the use
of force among the secondary states during this period.43 In his later work, Waltz concurs
that among the forces shaping international politics “interdependence is a weak one.”44
As a rationalist school of thought, realism, similar to commercial liberalism,
engages cost-benefit analysis as an analytical concept when it comes to explaining
variation in occurrence of war within a particular distribution of power in the
international system. According to realist offense-defense theory the occurrence of war
varies with the changes in the relative efficacy of offense vis-a-vis defense: when offense
is more cost-effective than defense states are more likely to be attacked than when
defense is more effective than offense.45
The cost-benefit calculations that states are assumed to make in order to make a
decision to pursue peace or war is a concept that further helps to explain the difference
between realist and liberal approaches in this debate. For both schools of thought, states,
being rational actors, must calculate costs and benefits of going to war versus costs and
benefits of status quo: “...[A] decision to expand, make demands, and fight must clear

43 Barry Buzan, “Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits o f the Liberal Case,”
International Organization 38 (autumn 1984): 606-607.
44 Waltz, “Structural Realism,” 2000, 14.
45 Adams recently made a contribution to the offense-defense theory by identifying “deterrence
dominance” as a third distinct set o f conditions that affects occurrence o f war. See Karen R. Adams,
“Attack or Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance,” International
Security 28 (winter 2003/2004): 45-83.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the threshold of costs and benefits.”46 These cost-benefit calculations involve not just
opportunity costs of war but total costs of war, which consist of expected cost of fighting
a war and occupation and foregone gains from peaceful international economic exchange.
The foregone gains from trade represent opportunity costs of war. Liberals suggest that
economic interdependence increases the opportunity costs of going to war and makes the
use of force a relatively inefficient means of extracting resources from a territory, shifting
the balance in cost-benefit analysis towards a peaceful trading strategy. This assumption
would hold only if costs of fighting a war and costs of occupation are either constant or
increase over time. The latter, however, are subject to change by technological progress
that may increase or decrease these costs, dramatically changing the cost-benefit
calculations 47 Thus, while realists look at the costs of fighting war and the costs of
occupation as the main determinant of interstate interactions with respect to war and
peace, commercial liberals look at the other component—the opportunity costs of war—
as the one of the most influencial factors shaping the outcomes in the international
system.
Besides the changing balance in the cost-benefit calculations of war-versus-trade
options towards a peaceful trading strategy, sophisticated liberalism suggests that over a
long-term period a progressive de-legitimization of the use of force takes place as more
countries become liberal and democratic. Talking about the multicausal liberalism,
Moravcsik points out that it was Kant who already in his time considered balance of
46 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 2001, 58.
47 Technological progress affects offense-defense balance and therefore affects prospects for war. See
Adams, 2003/04,45-83. According to Liberman’s study, coercive and repressive regimes can make
conquest cost-effective. Moreover, modernization increases the profitability o f conquest. See Peter
Liberman, “The Spoils o f Conquest,” International Security 18 (fall 1993): 125-153. Powell’s study
rigorously demonstrates that technological changes can revolutionize cost-benefit calculations by making
war relatively more or less costly. See Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International
Relations Theory,” American Political Science Review 85 (December 1991): 1313.
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power as an “unstable, second-best mechanism” suitable only among non-republican
states that was useful to the extent that it served the purpose of limiting rivalry among
states and permitting republican government, commerce, and international law to emerge
and gradually reduce the relevance of balancing and war as an instruments of
international politics.

AO

Doyle argues that freedom from foreign intervention among the liberal
democracies is one of the basic postulates of liberal international theory that is derived
from the right for political independence of liberal democratic states. Together with
international commercial activities, mutual respect for states’ rights for political
independence form a cooperative foundation among liberal democracies, relying on
which a zone of peace, or a pacific union, emerges where “threats of war also have been
regarded as illegitimate.”49 Kant’s pacific union, as Doyle suggests, could be envisioned
as collective security arrangement among the liberal democratic states. This pacific
union would rest on economic interdependence, domestic democratic governance, and
international law and institutions—what Russett, Oneal, and Davis have labeled the
Kantian tripod.50 Although each element of the mechanism of liberal pacification has its
own independent contribution to liberal peace, Doyle, following Kant’s lead, argues that
it is only in combination of all three factors—democracy, economic interdependence, and
international law—working together that lasting peace can be established among liberal
states.51

48
49
50
51

Moravcsik, 1997, 546.
Michael Doyle, “Kant,” 1983, 213.
Russett, Oneal, and Davis, 1998, 441.
Michael Doyle, “Kant,” 1983, 232.
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Clarifying further the relationship between economic interdependence and more
cooperative interstate relations in security realm, Doyle maintains, as he analyzes Kant’s
concept of “perpetual peace”:
Liberal econom ic theory holds t h a t... cosm opolitan ties derive from a
cooperative international division o f labor and free trade according the
com parative advantage. Each econom y is said to be better o f f than it w ould have
been under autarky; each thus acquires an incentive to avoid policies that w ould
lead the other to break these econom ic ties. Since keeping open markets rests
upon the assum ption that the next set o f transactions w ill also be determ ined by
prices rather than coercion, a sense o f mutual security is vital to avoid securitym otivated searches for econom ic autarky. Thus avoiding a challenge to another
liberal state’s security or even enhancing each other’s security by m eans o f
alliance naturally fo llo w s econom ic interdependence.52

Thus, Doyle, while concurring with realist assertions that some security
conditions conducive to the conduct of international economic interactions are necessary
for these activities to take place, argues that mutually beneficial security arrangements,
including alliances, follow “naturally” from economic interdependence. The formation
of alliances among liberal democracies, however, cannot be said to cause or explain the
phenomenon of liberal pacification.

The formation of alliances is a mechanism, in fact,

more in line with the realist balance of power. What sets apart liberal understanding of
alliances and their role is the causal link whereby alliances are connected to economic
interdependence. Realists do not generally recognize the causal logic going from
international economic exchanges to security cooperation: for them, “trade follows the
flag.” For liberals, this casual relationship is essential. An important distinction within
the liberal school of thought exists between a liberal and neoliberal positions: while
liberal perspective assumes that greater economic interdependence is likely to lead to

52 Ibid., 231.
53 Liberal pacification cannot be also explained exclusively by the presence o f a liberal hegemon in the
international system, though its role in it is important. Neither can it be explained by the absence o f deep
conflicts o f interests among liberal states. See Ibid., 223-224.
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cooperation directly via the converging structure of domestic preferences, from a neo
liberal perspective, international institutions have an important role to play in bringing
about more peaceful and cooperative inter-state relations.
Thus, the following three realist propositions regarding the relationship between
economic interstate intercourse and outcome of interstate relations in the security realm
are most often used for empirical tests in the contemporary realist-liberal debate: first,
economic interdependence leads to greater conflict between states;54 second, economic
interdependence either does not matter or has a marginal influence over the issues such as
war and peace among the states—these matters are decided on the basis of political and
military-strategic calculations; and third, it is common security interests that lead to
economic cooperation and interdependence;55 and two propositions derived from the

54 With respect to the impact o f trade on conflict, Barbieri’s empirical analysis based on a disaggregated
interdependence provides evidence for the opposite conclusion: states with high economic interdependence
have higher levels o f conflict. She measures overall economic interdependence at the dyadic level, as well
as two different dimensions o f interdependence— salience and symmetry. The results for the period 18701938 under the study show that rather than inhibit conflict, extensive economic interdependence increases
the likelihood that dyads will engage in militarized interstate disputes, and seems to have little influence on
the incidence o f war. Mutually dependent trading relations are found to be somewhat more peaceful, but
even in those cases the relationship between economic interdependence and conflict appears to be
curvilinear, with low to moderate levels o f interdependence reducing the likelihood o f dyadic dispute and
with high levels o f interdependence increasing the probability o f militarized disputes. Extreme
interdependence, whether symmetrical or asymmetrical, is found to have the highest potential for
increasing the likelihood o f interstate conflict. In this study, Barbieri also finds no evidence from the preWorld War II period that alliance commitment has a statistically significant effect on the probability that
dyads engage in conflict with each other. See Barbieri, 1996, 41.
5 Pollins, for example, argues that, all else being equal, importer will choose to buy goods from a friendly
nation. He builds a model o f bilateral trade flows using public choice approach and analyzes relevant data
for 25 nations representing different worlds o f development during 1960-1975. Pollins’ statistical results
show that the relationship between the indicator o f international conflict and cooperation and bilateral trade
flows is statistically significant and robust, indicating that trade flows are significantly influenced by broad
political relations o f amity and enmity between nations. See Brian M. Pollins, “Does Trade Still Follow the
Flag?” American Political Science Review 83 (June 1989): 465-480. In support o f Pollins’ case, Gowa and
Mansfield argue that it is trade externalities— the uncompensated costs or benefits o f trade arising from
greater economic efficiency that can be transformed into military advantages or disadvantages for the
trading partner— that make economic cooperation more difficult for states. Their quantitative analysis
based on a non-cooperative game model and covering an 80-year period from 1905 to 1990 suggests that
alliances have a direct, statistically significant, and large impact on bilateral trade flows and this
relationship is stronger in bipolar rather than in multipolar systems. See Janne Gowa and Edward D.
Mansfield, “Power Politics and International Trade,” American Political Science Review 87 (June 1993):
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liberal perspective: first, economic interdependence leads to more peaceful interstate
relations, particularly between liberal democracies; and second, greater economic
interdependence leads to greater security cooperation and peace via international
institutions.

COMMERCE AND SECURITY: THE CONTEMPORARY REALIST-LIBERAL
DEBATE
Over the past two and a half decades, and particularly since the early 1990s,
international relations scholars have made considerable efforts to test systematically
liberal and realist hypotheses that would shed more light on the relationship between
democracy, economic interdependence, and international institutions, on the one hand,
and the international conflict and cooperation, war and peace, on the other. These efforts
have taken the form of formal studies, quantitative and case studies.
The quantitative studies have made significant contribution. It is these studies
that produced a shift in the contemporary realist-liberal debate towards greater attention
to the consequences of economic interdependence for interstate conflict and
cooperation,56 and within the latter from the efforts to establish the nature and direction
of the relationship between international economic exchanges and interstate conflict or
408-428. Gowa further investigates the relationship between political-military alliances and international
trade and finds again that the influence o f alliances on trade is strong and more pronounced in bipolar than
in multipolar systems and that the results do not depend on whether the trading partners are democratic,
members o f preferential trading arrangements, or parties to military disputes. See Joanne Gowa, Allies,
Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). Mansfield and
Bronson also find that alliances create political incentives for the members o f the same alliances to trade
with each other: since trade creates security externalities states are more likely to trade with their allies than
with adversaries so that gains from trade accrue to those states that have common security goals. Together
with preferential trading agreements, alliances help to explain patterns o f bilateral trade in the period
between 1960 and 1990. See Edward D. Mansfield and Rachel Bronson, “Alliances, Preferential Trading
Arrangements, and International Trade,” American Political Science Review 91 (March 1997): 103.
56 Economic interdependence as an independent variable was relatively less appreciated than other
variables at the outset o f the contemporary debate. See, for example, Russett and Oneal, Triangulating
Peace, 2001, 129.
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cooperation to trying to pinpoint the causal mechanism linking economic
interdependence to outcomes of interstate interactions in the security realm.

CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS, AND VARIABLES

Although many of the studies investigating the role of international
interdependence formally adhered to Keohane and Nye’s definition of interdependence as
mutual dependence—“situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or
among actors in different countries,” resulting from international transactions: flow of
money, goods, people, and messages across international borders,57—in substance the
concept was largely abandoned. The key in Keohane and Nye’s concept was the
presence of reciprocal costly effects of international transactions— interactions that do not
have significant costly effects were defined as interconnectedness. In many recent
studies this distinction is not clearly drawn because of the difficulty of determining the
level at which interconnectedness becomes interdependence.
Approaches to economic interdependence adopted in the recent inquires differ on
a number of important aspects. They vary with respect to components of
interdependence that researchers include or choose to leave out of their studies: some
scholars analyze interdependence arising exclusively from trade, some add
interdependence arising from global capital markets, others believe that political,
diplomatic, and institutional relations are also aspects of interdependence of some
57 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2d ed., (Harper Collins Publishers,
1989), 8-9. Other scholars also made valuable contribution to the development o f the concept o f
interdependence. See James A. Caporaso, “Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System: A
Structural and Behavioral Analysis,” International Organization 32 (1978): 13-43; Karl W. Deutsch, The
Analysis o f International Relations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1978); Baldwin, 1980, 471-506;
James N. Rosenau, “A Pre-Theory Revisited: World Politics in an Era o f Cascading Interdependence,”
International Studies Quarterly 28 (September 1984): 245-305; John A. Kroll, “The Complexity o f
Interdependence,” International Studies Quarterly 37 (1993): 321-348.
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CO

importance to the analysis.

Some scholars operationalize interdependence as a

structural characteristic, others as a characteristic of a dyadic relationship, and some
others as a characteristic of a single country’s dependence on international markets.59
The majority o f the studies on economic interdependence and interstate interaction follow
a dyadic approach, but the scholars who analyze the effects of interdependence at a
dyadic level use different approaches of measuring interdependence: Polachek uses levels
of bilateral trade in his earlier studies,60 Oneal and his colleagues use trade-to-GDP
ratio,61 Polachek and McDonald employ the elasticity of supply and demand for
commodities traded,

and Barbieri relies on bilateral-trade-to-total-trade ratio.

These

different approaches to measuring interdependence and its impact on the outcomes of
interstate interactions make comparisons of these studies difficult. At the same time they
reflect the complex multiformity of the phenomenon under the study.
In the realist-liberal debate, considerable differences exist across the recent
studies in the treatment of the dependent variable. The empirical studies usually deal
with interstate conflicts and peace, with a number of differing definitions and
measurement approaches.64 In the majority of these studies conflict is taken to mean war
or war and lower levels of militarized interstate disputes, and much less frequently other

58 Michiel S. de Vries, “Interdependence, Cooperation and Conflict: An Empirical Analysis,” Journal o f
Peace Research 27 (November 1990): 432.
59 McMillan, 1997,35.
60 Solomon W. Polachek, “Conflict and Trade,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution 24 (March 1980): 55-78.
61 Oneal, F. H. Oneal, Maoz, Russett, 1996, 15.
62 Solomon Polachek and Judy McDonald, “Strategic Trade and the Incentives for Cooperation”, in Manas
Chatterji and Linda Forcey, eds., Disarmament, Economic Conversion and Peace Management (New York:
Praeger, 1992), 273-284.
63 Barbieri, 1996,36.
64 There is an implicit debate on what to consider “peaceful” conflict resolution and what to include in the
indicators o f conflict: some believe that all militarized interstate disputes as defined by the Correlates o f
War project are relevant, other consider wars alone. See Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, “Common
Interests or Common Polities? Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace,” Journal o f Politics 59 (May 1997):
395.
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forms of conflict, including verbal forms of conflict.65 Peace is thus comprised of events
that fall short of war or war and lower level of militarized interstate disputes. In the
formal studies, however, the international relations scholars deal with cooperation as a
dependent variable defined in terms of conscious policy coordination, necessary to the
realization of mutual interests.66 Translated into the language of game theory,
cooperation often means the outcomes in which a change in strategy by either actor
would not increase both actors’ payoffs. All other outcomes are considered to be cases of
conflict.67 This concept is applied within the framework provided by game theory to both
economic and security realms. When applied to the economic realm, international trade,
as well as coordination of economic policies of states, are considered as cooperation.
Adopting the framework of this debate to the realm of outer space, this study uses
commercialization as an independent variable and converging/non-converging security
interests as a dependant variable. It defines space commercialization as an increasing use
of space for activities launched with the view of participation in economic exchange that
is based on transfers of space goods and services according to the prices determined by
the forces of demand and supply instead of those defined by non-market relations
between suppliers and consumers of these goods and services.68 The concept of space
commercialization includes the whole spectrum of market relations, including emergence

65 See de Vries, 1990,433. It should be pointed out that for de Vries “conflict” and “ cooperation” are two
opposite points on the spectrum o f inter-state relations gradually changing from one into another rather than
two mutually exclusive outcomes.
66 See Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” in Oye,
ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy, 1986, 5.
67 See footnote 13 in Kroll, 1993, 332.
68 In other words, commercialization is an introduction o f market relations between suppliers and
consumers. Market can be defined as a coordinating mechanism where forces o f supply and demand
determine prices, output, and methods o f production o f goods and services. See, for example, Robert
Boyer and Daniel Drache, eds., States Against Markets: The Limits o f Globalization (New York:
Routledge, 1996), 3.
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of global space market and strategic corporate alliances stretching across the borders. It
also presupposes economic interdependence arising from international economic
exchanges. In this case, economic interdependence is understood as a unit-level
characteristic: the dependence of a state on a global space market. Degree of the
commercialization of space activities of states defines economic interdependence.
As a dependent variable, the present study proposes to use concepts of
“converging security interests” and “non-converging security interests,” since “a
militarized interstate dispute” is not applicable to outer space in the time period of this
study. This substitution is arrived at via the following suppositions: first, it is assumed
that militarized conflicts between states take place within a context of interstate rivalries
that have a certain temporal continuity and a pattern of development so that they do not
generally happen purely accidentally;69 secondly, militarized interstate conflicts are less
likely when states’ security interests are converging.70 Converging security interests can
be defined as interests that become more compatible over time, and non-converging
security interests as those interests that either diverge—that is, become less compatible—
or remain relatively unchanged over time.
The concept of converging security interests has been used in some liberal studies
on economic interdependence and interstate conflict and cooperation. For example,

69 Diehl and Goertz, War and Peace in International Rivalry, 2000, 1.
70 State security interests cover a spectrum o f interests, such as protecting lives o f its citizens, maintaining
sovereignty and territorial integrity o f the state, preserving values and institutions, and promoting economic
prosperity and well-being o f the nation. U.S. national interests, for example, are divided into three
categories: vital interests— those interests that are o f overriding importance to the survival, safety and
vitality o f the nation, such as physical security o f the territory and safety o f the citizens, economic well
being and protection o f the critical infrastructure; important interests— those interests that do not affect
national survival but affect national well-being and the character o f the world; humanitarian and other
interests— those interests dictated by values, such as respect for human rights and support for
democratization. See White House, A National Security Strategy fo r A New Century, Washington D. C.,
October 1998, 5-6.
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Abdelal and Kirshner’s study is based on a liberal approach involving a concept of
converging security interests. Focusing on the domestic political consequences of
international trade and drawing upon Hirshman’s idea about asymmetrical trade as a
source of influence, Abdelal and Kirshner investigate the link between economic
interdependence and cooperation. They argue that countries’ national interests are
significantly shaped by the patterns of international economic relations via domestic
politics. They hypothesize that, in asymmetric trading relations, a smaller state’s
perception of its national interests over time converges with that of the larger state. This
expectation is based on the assumption that an act of participation in economic exchanges
with the larger state strengthens economically and politically those who benefit from
these trading arrangements.71
The idea that international trade flows can stimulate a change in domestic
composition of interests and redefinition o f national interests, and thereby influence
foreign policy, making it more cooperative, is a link to how trade affects cost-benefit
calculations of states. This idea lies at the heart of the recent liberal literature on
economic inducements and sanctions.72 This literature points to the pragmatic side of the
debate on economic interdependence and international cooperation and conflict.

71 The authors analyze three case studies: the Hawaii-United States relations in the later 19th century, the
Austria-Czechoslovakia relations between in the interwar period o f the 20th century, and the UkraineRussia relations after the dissolution o f the Soviet Union. They show that patterns o f economic relations
influence the balance o f political power within smaller trading states and thereby have an effect on their
foreign policy. See Abdelal and Kirshner, 1999-2000, 154.
72 See, for example, Drezner, 1999-2000, 188-218; Blanchard and Ripsman, 1999-2000,219-253; and
Rowe, 1999-2000, 254-287.
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COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF WAR-VERSUS-TRADE
OPTIONS

Three main types o f models used in the formal studies within the trade-conflict
debate—the expected utility models, cooperative models, and non-cooperative models—
rely on cost-benefit calculations of war-versus-trade options, focusing on gains from
trade.73 Although these formal analyses provided more logical support for the realist

73 The expected utility models assume that trade raises the costs o f conflict and thus promotes peace
directly - the higher the levels o f trade, the greater the costs o f conflict, the lower levels o f conflict. See, for
example, Polachek, “Conflict and Trade,” 1980, 55-78; Solomon W. Polachek, “Why Do Democracies
Cooperate More and Fight Less: The Relationship Between International Trade and Cooperation,” Review
o f International Economics 5 (1997): 295-309; Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War,” 1996, 541, and Copeland, “Trade Expectations and the Outbreak o f Peace,” 1999-2000, 15-58. The cooperative
models have been used mostly by realists in two main variants: a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game and a
Deadlock game. This tradition originates with the attempts to contest the neo-liberal argument that
cooperation is more likely under anarchy than realists assume because o f the role o f international
institutions. Grieco suggests an amended Prisoner’s Dilemma model with the modified state utility
function, which includes— along the individual payoffs from cooperation— the gap in the payoffs o f the
cooperating partners. See Joseph M. Grieco, “Realist Theory and the Problem o f International
Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Journal o f Politics 50 (August 1988): 607608. The logical development o f this tradition with respect to security implications o f international trade is
the claim that the impact o f trade on conflict is an epiphenomenon caused by other factors. In this
perspective, both trade and conflict are shaped by anarchy and distribution o f power in the international
system. Propositions derived from this perspective establish the relationship between polarity o f the
international system, alliances, and trade patterns, with the logical order reversed from going from trade to
conflict or cooperation to going from security concerns to trade patterns. See Gowa and Mansfield, 1993,
408-420, and Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade, 1994. Snidal, using an iterated relative
gains PD model with N number o f players, where N is greater than two, shows that security concerns, and
thus, security-induced relative gains concerns do not provide a sufficient response to the liberal
propositions regarding the possibility o f cooperation under anarchy. According to this model, an
introduction o f the third actor to the two-actor relative gains game is equivalent to cutting the concern for
relative gains in half. More generally, Snidal shows that the greater the number o f actors in the system, the
more relative gains concerns are attenuated, the less the relative gains impede cooperation. See Duncan
Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Patterns o f International Cooperation,” American Political Science Review
85 (September 1991): 701-726. Werner develops a model in which she modifies states’ utility function to
incorporate an assumption that a trading partner may play different roles in a possible dispute: it can be an
adversary or an ally. Thus, pure security concerns may lead to situations in which a state’s utility is a
positive function o f some states’ relative gains. In such cases, security concerns do not impede
cooperation: they may actually encourage it, if a state can utilize resources that it gains from an agreement
with one state to improve its security vis-a-vis other state or states in the system. See Suzanne Werner, “In
Search o f Security: Relative Gains and Losses in Dyadic Relations,” Journal o f Peace Research 34 (August
1997): 295-296. Powell develops non-a cooperative model. He argues that cooperation between states
collapses even if states are assumed to receive equal absolute gains when a model includes the possibility
o f the use o f force and in which state’s relative loss can be turned against it. This model offers a
reformulation o f the problem o f absolute and relative gains by shifting the focus away from states’
preferences to constraints and introducing resource allocation, technology, and the cost effectiveness o f
using force as the intervening variables. This reformulation leads to the inclusion o f neoliberal and realist
concerns in a single model as special cases. It also brings the study o f both international conflict and
cooperation within a single analytic framework and demonstrates that cooperation between states is even
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propositions, the recent quantitative studies lend more support to liberal propositions:
international economic exchanges lead to more cooperative and peaceful relations
between the states. For example, Polachek in his analysis, which has influenced most of
the later work in the trade-conflict research, draws upon the idea that eradicating hostility
and promoting cooperation via international trade is an important step leading to peace.
Building upon an expected utility model, he maintains that mutual dependencies arising
from bilateral trade make conflict more costly, thereby increasing trading states’
incentives towards cooperation, and hence towards peace.74 The results of the statistical
analysis based on the ten-year period between 1958-1967 and involving trade and conflict
data for thirty countries supports the liberal hypothesis that countries with the greatest
levels of trade engage in the least amounts of conflict.75 Furthermore, he suggests that
the type o f traded goods—essential or strategic goods versus other types— should have an
impact on the trade-conflict relationship, with trade in strategic goods having greater

more difficult, than realists previously assumed when the use o f force is made cost effective by
technological progress. See Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains,” 1991, 1313. Morrow’s noncooperative model demonstrates that relative gains from trade do not impede trade even between potential
foes, unless it is trade in military goods or unless the division o f gains from trade is so skewed that the state
has to devote most o f its gains from trade to armaments. See Morrow, “Relative Gains,” 1997, 12-37.
Dorrussen, using revised balance-of-power game, assesses the link between trade and political conflict by
analyzing how trade affects expectations about gains from the use o f force. His findings suggest that trade
generally reduces the incentives for conflict but its pacifying effects diminish as greater number o f
countries become involved in trade. See Dorussen, 1999,453.
74 In order to measure overall amount o f conflict and cooperation Polachek creates an index o f net conflict
as the difference between the frequencies o f conflictual and cooperative events taken from a data bank o f
daily and yearly events coded on a 15-point scale ranging from states’ voluntary unification, formation o f
military alliances, military and economic assistance on the cooperative end o f the scale to extensive wars
on the conflictual end o f the scale. See Polachek, “Conflict and Trade,” 1980, 55-78.
75 See Ibid. Gasiorowski and Polachek further examine the relationship between economic
interdependence and conflict using U.S.-Warsaw Pact trade and conflict data during the ddtente era o f
1967-1978. The authors find a strong inverse relationship between trade and conflict— that is, trade
decreases conflict among states. Gasiorowski and Polachek conclude that the expansion o f East-West trade
in the early 1970s and linkage diplomacy led to Soviet cooperation on arms control SALT I negotiations,
on the Vietnam and Middle East negotiations. These findings lead the authors to a policy-related inference
that international conflict can be considerably eased by engaging hostile states in a beneficial economic
exchange. See Mark Gasiorowski and Solomon W. Polachek, “Conflict and Interdependence: East-West
Trade and Linkages in the Era o f Ddtente,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution 26 (December 1982): 713, 717.
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deterrent effect than trade in non-strategic goods. Some later studies investigating the
direction of causality, however, bring inconclusive results and suggest a more complex
relationship.76 Polachek and his coauthors in later works consistently find a negative
relationship between international trade and interstate conflict, with causality running in
the direction asserted by liberalism.77
In his statistical analysis conducted at the systemic level, rather than the dyadic
level, and encompassing data for over a hundred years (1850-1965), Mansfield finds that
the level of international trade is inversely related to the frequency of major-power war
independent o f any other structural influences on war, such as distribution of power in the
system. Mansfield uses two systemic level indicators for measuring interdependence: the
openness of world trade and the ratio of global exports to total global production. His
study controls for other systemic factors, such as hegemony, polarity of the system, the

76 Reuveny and Kang’s statistical study performs a Granger causality test for 16 dyads for the period from
1960 to the early 1990s. The results show that the causal relationship between the outcomes o f interstate
interaction and trade is dyad dependent and, in most cases, it is found to be reciprocal: in approximately
equal number o f the dyads in the study, Granger causality is found to run from trade to conflict and
cooperation, in the opposite direction, and in both directions. See Reuveny and Kang, “International
Trade,” 1996, 956. In the follow-up publication, Reuveny and Kang investigate whether the direction o f
causality in the trade-conflict relationship depends on the types o f goods traded. The results o f the tests
involving 16 dyads in the time period between the early 1960s and early 1990s point to the conclusion that
the causal relationship between bilateral trade and political conflict or cooperation is reciprocal in most
goods and dyad and goods dependent. It does not depend on whether a dyad consists o f rivaling states or
friendly states. However, for the U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. and U.S.A.-China dyads, Reuveny and Kang observe a
trend for trade in certain types o f goods to be correlated with the improvement or deterioration o f political
relations, with the causality going from conflict to trade for more goods than from trade to conflict. Overall
results for 16 dyads and four major rivalries— U.S.A.-U.S.S.R, U.S.A-China, Turkey-Greece, and IsraelEgypt— the evidence suggests that political conflict or cooperation tend to Granger-cause bilateral trade in
minerals, iron and steel, fuels, basic manufactures and control and science equipment, and bilateral trade
tends to Granger-cause conflict or cooperation in food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, and
machines and transport equipment. Thus, this study o f disaggregated trade brings overall inconclusive
results, which show a rather complex picture. It only confirms that bilateral trade and the character o f
interstate political interactions are interrelated. See Rafael Reuveny and Heejoon Kang, “Bilateral Trade
and Political Conflict/Cooperation: Do Goods Matter,” Journal o f Peace Research 35 (1998): 581-602.
77 Polachek and McDonald, building upon Polachek’s approach, add in their study an additional measure of
interdependence, the import demand elasticities. Their results lead to the conclusion that dyads engaged in
the most trade have the least conflict and that including import price elasticities makes the relationship
between trade and conflict stronger. See Polachek and McDonald, in Chatterji and Forcey, Disarmament,
Economic Conversions, and Management o f Peace, 1992,279.
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concentration o f capabilities among the major powers, changes in power concentration,78
and changes in powers shares among the major powers. The effect of trade on war as
measured by the ratio of exports to total production is quantitatively large and statistically
significant in his study, while effect o f the openness of world trade is not statistically
significant. Mansfield concludes that both distribution of capabilities and international
trade help to explain the outbreak of war.79 Mansfield also finds that conflict suppresses
levels of trade but after further analysis concludes that trade has a more significant effect
on the level of warfare than warfare has on the level of trade.
Domke also reports findings that support liberal propositions concerning
pacifying effects of international commerce. In contrast to most research in the field, his
analysis is unit-based. Domke measures interdependence in three ways: by the country’s
exports as a proportion of national income, by the percent change in exports as a
proportion of gross national product (GNP), and by exports as a percentage of GNP
corrected for economic size.80 As a dependent variable Domke uses “decision for war.”
The trade data used in this analysis covers one year prior to the decision to go to war and
years in which major power wars occurred between 1877 and 1974. He finds that during
this period countries with high levels of total exports relative to the size of their
economies were less likely to initiate wars than countries that were relatively selfsufficient. This relationship is particularly strong for the post-1948 period.

ni

78 Mansfield defines concentration o f power as “the coefficient o f variation o f the proportion o f the
aggregate major-power capabilities possessed by each major power divided by the square root o f one less
than the number o f major powers.” In other words, it measures the aggregate inequality among all the
major powers in the international system. See Edward D. Mansfield, Power, Trade, and War ( Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994), 13-14.
79 Ibid., 126, 233.
80 William K. Domke, War and the Changing Global System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988),
119-126, 132.
81 Ibid., 135.
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Oneal, Oneal, Maoz, and Russett, investigating the effect of economic
interdependence on the outcomes of interstate interactions within a multi-stage
“democratic peace” research project, find that for the politically relevant dyads—those
that are comprised of at least one major power or contiguous states—during time period
1950-85 trade was a powerful influence for peace, especially among the war-prone
contiguous states. In the earlier democratic peace studies, economic interdependence was
largely unappreciated as an explanatory variable.
In their 1997 study, Oneal and Russett provide further evidence of pacific benefits
of trade both at total and dyadic levels for the Cold War era. While they argue that peace
can be built on the Kantian tripod of complementary influences—representative
democracy, international law and organization, and economic interdependence—they
clearly emphasize the role of economic interdependence and democracy. According to
their explanation, economic interdependence reinforces structural and liberal norms of
democracy by creating transnational ties that encourage accommodation—that is,
cooperation—rather than conflict. Material incentives, via international exchange, add
their force to law and morality, contributing importantly to the creation of a “security
community.”83 Democracy is believed to encourage interdependence as economically
powerful groups also get a stronger voice within a democratically governed polity.
Democracies trade more, particularly with other democracies.

QA

Together democracy and

interdependence reinforce each other to produce more cooperative and peaceful interstate
relations. In support of Oneal and Russett’s argument, Mousseau reports that

82 Oneal, F. H. Oneal, Maoz, and Russett, 1996, 12.
83 Oneal and Russett, 1997, 269, 270.
84 Mansfield, Milner, and RosendorfF, 2002,477-513.
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democracies do not only fight each other rarely, they are more likely to provide each
other military help and to align with each other in a military conflict.85
In their statistical tests, Oneal and Russett find that higher levels of economically
important trade, measured by a bilateral trade-to-GDP ratio, are associated with lower
level incidents of militarized interstate disputes and wars, even when controlling for
potentially confounding factors, such as geographic contiguity, the balance of power,
alliance bonds, and economic growth rates. Adding the influence of the third Kantian
variable, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), Russett and Oneal find further support
for the Kantian peace. Their tests show that economic interdependence has a strong,
statistically significant influence in reducing interstate dispute. In a test where all three
Kantian variables are involved, an increase in the level of economic interdependence by
one standard deviation is reported to cut the probability of an interstate conflict by 43
percent, the probability of conflict for a typical dyad with an average level of economic
interdependence.86 Russett and Oneal also report that an increase in democracy reduces
the probability of conflict by 33 percent from the baseline and an increase by one
standard deviation in the number of joint membership in IGOs shared by a pair of states
diminishes the likelihood of a dispute between a typical pair by 24 percent. If all three
Kantian variables are increased simultaneously in the model, the likelihood of an
07

interstate dispute is reported to fall by more than 70 percent.

Importantly, Russett and

85 Michael Mousseau, “Democracy and Militarized Interstate Collaboration,” Journal o f Peace Research
34 (February 1997): 73-87.
86 See the definition o f a “typical dyad” in Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 2001, 107-108. See
the summary o f the results, 171-172.
87 Ibid., p. 172. In their earlier publication, Russett, Oneal, and Davis reported for the period 1950-85
that: (1) an increase in the number o f joint membership in IGOs by a standard leads to the reduction o f
militarized disputes by 23 percent from the baseline rate for a typical dyad; (2) if both states in a dyad are
fully democratic the conflict is 35 percent less likely; and (3) an increase in the level and the trend o f the
trade-to-GDP ration by a standard deviation lowers the probability o f conflict by 38 percent; and thus
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Oneal also find that the three Kantian variables are significantly correlated with each
other: democracies tend to be more economically interdependent and members of the
•

same IGOs to regulate their economic and security interactions.

oo

Although Russett and Oneal’s analyses provide strong support for the liberal case,
their study includes important realist variables as well, such as the power ratio and
alliances.89 In a test that evaluates influences of all three Kantian variables and the realist
variables, being allied and having power ratio increased by one standard deviation reduce
the probability of conflict between a “typical” pair of states by 40 percent and 36 percent
respectively.90 Thus, Russett and Oneal’s study does not refute the realist case as they
find support for the liberal hypotheses. Instead of considering the realist perspective as
antithetical to the liberal one, they combine the two perspectives in their model and use
the realist case as a baseline against which liberal influences are compared. While not

together the three Kantian variables account for 72 percent in reduction o f the likelihood o f interstate
militarized conflict. See Russett, Oneal, and Davis, 1998,441-467.
88 The directionality o f causation in trade-conflict relationship is also evaluated in this study. Russett and
Oneal report that an increase o f bilateral trade by one standard deviation reduces the probability o f conflict
in their democracy-interdependence model by 44 percent and that conflict reduces trade by only 8 percent
in their model that identifies influences on trade patterns for the same time period. Thus, they find that
causality works both ways and argue that the effect o f trade in reducing conflict is at least as strong as the
effect o f conflict in reducing trade. See Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 2001,226.
89 Russett and Oneal find no support for the argument that relatively equally distributed power in the
international system leads to more peaceful interstate relations. They instead find that it is preponderance
o f power that is associated with relatively less conflict among the states. See Russett and Oneal,
Triangulating Peace, 2001, 109.
90 See Ibid., 171. Drawing policy relevant conclusions, Russett and Oneal also combine both realist and
liberal prescriptions, arguing that the prospects o f peace in the 21st century will depend largely upon the
success o f incorporating Russia and China into the Kantian system. They maintain that inclusion o f Russia
into the NATO alliance is the most important entry point for Russia because if Russia continues to feel
threatened by NATO eastward expansion, it will turn to China in order to balance against the U.S.dominated coalition. As a policy towards China, Russett and Oneal advocate a greater incorporation o f
China in the global economy and network o f international organizations and greater accommodation, while
at the same time preserving a significant preponderance o f power over China in order to deter any potential
challenge to the U.S.-dominated international system. See Ibid., 287-288.
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proving the realist case wrong, they maintain that the realist explanation is simply
incomplete.91
While quantitative studies within the realist-liberal debate have provided stronger
support for the liberal, rather than realist perspective, empirical research based on casestudies has showed inadequacies of liberal explanations of the political outcomes of
interstate interactions under the conditions of economic interdependence. Most of these
analyses have either suggested modifications of the basic liberal postulates or provided
various syntheses of liberal and realist propositions.

Liberman, for example,

investigating the impact of security concerns on patterns of interdependence using two
case-studies—British trade with Germany prior to World War I and U.S. trade with Japan
in the decade leading up to World War II—finds that under the conditions of
multipolarity security concerns do not significantly shape patterns of economic
cooperation among states and economic interdependence, arising from international
exchanges, does not lead, in these two important cases, to more peaceful state

91 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 2001, 90.
92 Papayoanou offers an example o f a theoretical synthesis o f realist and liberal propositions. He
elaborates a theory amalgamating economic liberal perspective and realist balance-of-power theory. It is
argued that different patterns and levels o f economic interdependence in the great power system generate
different societal-based economic incentives and constraints on state leaders o f status quo powers. Firm
balancing policies, which are considered in this theory as being associated with peace in the international
system, are most likely when there are extensive economic ties among status quo powers and few or no
economic links between them and arising challenger. When economic interdependence is not significant
between status quo powers or if status quo powers have strong economic links with threatening power,
weaker balancing and conciliatory policies by status quo powers, and following them aggression by
aspiring revisionist powers become more likely. Thus, economic interdependence has a profound effect on
interstate relations by affecting the ability o f state leaders to mobilize their domestic support for the
opposition to arising threat, their ability to play power politics abroad, and the credibility o f their
international commitments for effective balancing o f the threat and, thus, their ability to cooperate on
security issues. See Paul A. Papayoanou, “Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance o f Power: Britain,
Germany, and World War I,” International Security 20 (spring 1996): 74. Copeland also provides a liberalrealist synthesis, elaborating a dynamic theory o f trade expectations. See Copeland, “Economic
Interdependence and War,” 1996, 5-41, and also Copeland, “Trade Expectations and Outbreak o f Peace,”
1999-2000, 15-58.
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interactions, as liberalism would predict.93 Further examining the consequences of
economic interdependence under the conditions of defense dominance, Liberman shows
that economic interdependence combined with defense dominance may actually
encourage military conquest. This is because defense dominance makes conquest more
difficult, and at the same time it makes it more desirable as a means of achieving greater
self-sufficiency. Economic interdependence makes war more costly and also creates
incentives to diminish economic vulnerabilities through expansion. A potential threat of
blockade or embargo during a crisis or war may provide states with a strong stimulus to
risk a war in order to minimize vulnerability and reach greater economic self-sufficiency.
Using process tracing of the perceptions and decision-making in Japan before Second
World War and in Germany before the two World Wars of the 20th century, Liberman
analyzes the weight of economic and strategic factors as they influenced the perception
and calculations in the two states before the war. He finds that interdependence and
defense dominance did not become decisive factors in calculations for German and
Japanese leaderships before wars. Instead, both German and Japanese expansionist
policies were influenced by misperceptions and miscalculations, many of which were due
to the political ascendance of pro-militaristic actors.94 Thus, high levels of trade can be
combined with the dominance of pro-military interests at the domestic level.
In their study, Ripsman and Blanchard also weaken the liberal case by showing
that during the July crisis of 1914 and the Rhineland crisis of 1936, economic
consideration did not contribute significantly to the decision making process. Thus, they
conclude that if leaders do not feel constrained by economic interdependence, then

93 Liberman, “Trading with the Enemy,” 1996, 166.
94 Liberman, “The Offense-Defense Balance,” 1999-2000, 59-91.
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economic interdependence cannot bring about peace, as predicted by the commercial
liberalism. They suggest a modification of the realist perspective to take into
consideration the role o f domestic political factors that can affect national security
decision-making and interfere with strategic considerations.95
Gartzke, Li, and Boehemer’s research represents another attempt to elaborate on
the substantive linkages between conflict and international economics based on
quantitative analysis. They call into question the liberal assumption that trade and
interdependence affect interstate security relations by changing cost-benefit calculations.
Their study argues that if international economic exchange affects only opportunity costs
of war, then the liberal case cannot be supported. First, the study points out that crossborder economic relations are much more diverse and extensive than indicators of trade
alone lead us to believe: global capital markets surpass the volume of exchange in goods
and services manifold. Second, based on the findings of the recent studies on the causes
of war. They argue that the mechanism through which economics deters conflict
suggested by the liberals is questionable. According to Gartzke, Li, and Boehemer, the
danger of disrupting trade ties may deter some conflicts between interdependent states,
but opportunity costs are insufficient to prevent interstate militarized disputes. Instead,
they argue that interdependence offers non-militarized channels of communicating
resolve through costly signaling. The quantitative results obtained by Gartzke, Li, and
Boehemer suggest that capital interdependence contributes to peace independent of the
95 First, Ripsman and Blanchard develop a strategic goods test— a complex multi-stage test which
measures country’s vulnerability: whether a country is dependent for strategic goods on its potential
adversaries at a given time, whether these goods could be substituted by other goods, and whether these
goods would be cut off in a time o f crisis. Then, they focus on the decision-making in order to determine
whether the systemic constraints o f interdependence exert any influence on state behavior—that is, whether
any cost-benefit calculations are made and acted upon. See Norrin M. Ripsman and Jean-Marc F.
Blanchard, “Commercial Liberalism under Fire: Evidence from 1914 and 1936,” Security Studies 6 (winter
1996/97): 40-41.
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effects of trade, democracy, interests, and other relevant variables. Monetary and
financial indicators used in the study are significant, while measures of trade and joint
democracy are found to be insignificant or marginal in their impact.96 Thus, while
accepting the soundness of the correlation between interdependence and peace, the
underlying logic of this study and the scope of indicators used in assessing the
relationship between economic interactions and conflict significantly differ from those
studies that are based on the expected utility model. The key idea in this explanation is
that in order for economic interactions to promote peace, economic interdependence must
remove incentives for states to resort to violence. This can be achieved under the
conditions of interdependence via costly signaling: capital flows and trade between states
serve as venues for costly signaling that reduces uncertainty about states’ relative resolve.
Economic interdependence can bring hope for a more pacific global order to the extent
that costly signaling under the conditions of economic interdependence reduces states’
incentives to resort to military violence.
All in all, the recent research on economic interdependence and its influence on
the outcomes o f interstate interaction in security realm have moved closer towards the
challenge of identifying a mechanism underlying the phenomenon of liberal pacification.

COST-BENEFIT CALCULATIONS AND SECURITY INTERESTS IN OUTER
SPACE
The cost-benefit calculations that states make deciding on issues such as war and
peace involve not just the opportunity costs of war—the foregone gains from trade. They
have to include the total costs of war, which consist of expected cost of fighting a war

96 Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, 2001,416-417.
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and occupation and foregone gains from peaceful international economic exchange.
Commercial liberalism suggests that economic interdependence increases the opportunity
costs of going to war and makes the use of force a relatively inefficient means of
extracting resources from a territory, shifting the balance in cost-benefit analysis towards
favoring a peaceful trading strategy.

07

This assumption would be true as long as costs of
QO

fighting a war and costs of occupation are either constant or increase over time.

These

costs are the subject of attention of realists who argue that technological progress and
innovation in military doctrines can change these costs, altering the overall cost-benefit
calculations and prospects for w ar."
Progress in space and information technologies of the past two decades made the
commercialization of space economically viable. In contrast to the earlier period when
governments ran activities in space, in the era of space commercialization certain space
activities, such as satellite communications and others, are being driven by the
commercial sector. In parallel, technological progress has also significantly advanced
military usefulness and with it the strategic importance of outer space. Over the past two
decades more and more military functions migrated into outer space. Since the end of the
Cold War, military space functions advanced from enhancing strategic stability to
terrestrial force enabling, with space communications, command, control, computers,

97 Rosecrance, The Rise o f the Trading State, 1985, ix, xi.
98 This is the assumption Rosecrance makes when he writes: “The costs o f the military-political world are
not likely to decrease, and they may increase further.” See Ibid., 161.
99 Technological progress may change the relative efficiency o f offense and defense. War may become
more likely i f offense is cheaper and more effective than defense. See, for example, Jervis, “Cooperation
Under the Security Dilemma,” 1978, 188-189. Adams contributes to the offense-defense theory by
identifying deterrence dominance as a separate category besides offense dominance and defense dominance
and analyzing whether occurrence o f war varies across these three categories. She finds that offensedefense-deterrence balance is a better predictor o f attacks and conquests than binary offense-defense
balance, relative capabilities, and duration o f great power status. From 1800 to 1997 the average rates o f
great power conquest and attack were consistently higher in offense-dominant eras than in defensedominant and particularly in deterrence-dominant eras. See Adams, 2003/04,45-83.
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intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, stealth platforms, and
precision weapons guided by the Global Positioning System (GPS) being important
components of the emerging military space system of systems.100 Increasing military
uses of space have started to revolutionize and transform the military itself,101 prompting
a new Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).
Following Krepinevich, Hays defines an RMA as a major discontinuity in military
affairs that are brought about by “changes in military relevant technologies, concepts of
operation, methods of organization, and/or resources available, and are often associated
with broader political, social, economic, and scientific revolutions. These periods of
discontinuous change have historically advantaged the strategic/operational offense, and
have provided a powerful impetus for change in the international system.”

1A9

They are

said to occur abruptly in a span of two-three decades and make the previous means of
conducting warfare obsolete or subordinate. There is yet no agreement as to what
features the impending RMA will have or when it will start.

1m

Some experts believe that

it has already started and argue that the First Gulf War was the beginning of the modem
RMA, while others believe that transformation into spacepower104 is itself going to be the

100 Hays, “Current and Future Military Uses o f Space,” 2002. See also Benjamin S. Lambeth, Mastering
the Ultimate High Ground: Next Steps in the Military Uses o f Space (St. Monica: RAND, 2003), 97.
101 See, for example, Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs 81(May/June
2002): 20-32.
102 Hays, “Current and Future Military Uses o f Space,” 2002.
103 The authors o f Battlefield o f the Future, for example, warn: “Although we think that we now stand at
the start o f a long period in which we may face a RMA, we cannot be certain about when the transition
period might start, how long it might last, what new competitors might arise, when they will rise, or what
new warfare areas might be developed, not to mention a host o f other key questions. In short, we do not
have an absolute grasp o f the scope, pace, and implications o f this possible RMA.” See Jeffrey McKitrick,
James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage, George Kraus, Richard Blanchfield, Dale Hill, Battlefield o f the Future,
Chapter 3 “The Revolution in Military Affairs,” September 1995, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mi/
airchronicles/battle/chp3.html, accessed 04.16.04.
104 In this context, “spacepower” is defined as the “ability in peace, crisis, and war to exert prompt and
sustained influence in or from space.” See Grey and Sheldon, 1999.
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next RMA.105 The development of the idea and theory of spacepower has been
significantly hampered over the past two decades by the debates first over Reagan’s
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and more recently over the information revolution, and
it is only in the second half of the 1990s that the concept of spacepower as such has
become a center of attention for military theorists, political experts, and policy makers.106
In 1999, the Defense Science Board recommended that the U.S. Department of
Defense acquire some of the space-based weapons for implementing the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Joint Vision 2010.107 Thus, weaponization of outer space has emerged as a real next
step in the advancement of military uses of space.

1fiR

•

The next space missions to be

developed are “space control” and “space force application.”109 The former involves
ensuring access to space by U.S. military and allies and denying access to the enemies,
and the latter envisions striking terrestrial targets with space-based weapons.110
Weaponization of space and advancement of combat into ultimate high ground is
envisioned as a full emergence of spacepower.111

105 Hays, “Current and Future Military Uses o f Space,” 2002.
106 Grey and Sheldon, 1999. Many variants o f space power theory have been presented but up to date
there is no comprehensive spacepower theory. See Hays, “Current and Future Military Uses o f Space,”
2002. See on theories o f spacepower Johnson, Pace, Gabbard, Space, 1998; Watts, The Military Use o f
Space, 2001; Steven Lambakis, On the Edge o f Earth: The Future o f American Space Power (Lexington:
University Press o f Kentucky, 2001); Dolman, Astropolitik, 2002; Preston, Johnson, Edwards, Miller,
Shipbaugh, Space Weapons Earth Wars, 2002.
107 Preston, Johnson, Edwards, Miller, Shipbaugh, Space Weapons Earth Wars, 2002, 74.
108 The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) requested $10 million in FY 2005 for space-based interceptor
test-bed with the view o f holding in-orbit experiments around 2010 and deploying a constellation with
interceptors in 2012. This represents a small fraction o f $511 million in FY 2005 o f MDA’s budget
devoted to the development o f kinetic energy interceptors. The plan with regard to kinetic energy
interceptors is to spend $8 billion through FY 2009. See Center for Defense Information, CDI Missile
Defense Update #3.2004, February 24, 2004, http://www.cdi.org (accessed 04.07.04).
109 See more detailed description o f space control in U.S. Department o f Defense, Office o f the Chairman
o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, Joint Doctrine fo r Space Operations, Washington D.C., August 9, 2002, IV-5,
JP-14, pp. IV-6 - IV-8. See also Grey and Sheldon, 1999,23-38.
110 Lambeth, Mastering the Ultimate High Ground, 2003, 98.
111 Four space missions— space support, space force enhancement, space control and force applications—
were formulated by AFSPC in 1983 Space Plan and were formally endorsed by the Department o f Defense
in 1987. See Lambeth, Mastering the Ultimate High Ground, 2003, 98. This typology provides a useful
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Strike weapons based on satellites or trans-atmospheric vehicles are expected to
enable precision strikes to affect targets in a much higher speed than other options would
allow. Orbital operations require speeds of some 17,000 miles per hour—higher than
those obtainable in the atmosphere. This quantitative advantage in speed in space
operations is expected to transform qualitatively the future warfare.

1 1 *7

Most importantly,

the significance o f space weapons113 is in that they hold the potential of changing the
existing deterrence dominance into offense dominance by minimizing the power of
offensive nuclear forces.114 Thus, the current transformation of military is likely to
revolutionize not only the way modem wars are fought, which it has already started to do,
as evidenced first by the 1991 Gulf War and then by the wars in the Balkans,
Afghanistan, and again in Iraq in 2003, but also the cost-benefit calculations on which
states decide on the issues of war and peace.
Space weapons can be expected to decrease the costs of war-fighting for a
spacepower by providing global operations with decreasing forward bases of
infrastructure, by eventually giving the capability to negate or minimize strategic nuclear
forces of the enemy, and the capability to destroy hardened underground bunkers, silos,
munitions storage depots, underground command posts, naval vessels, and all kinds of
heavily defended targets with precision attacks that reduce collateral damage, by
way o f categorizing space military activities and their progress. See Hays, “Current and Future Military
Uses o f Space,” 2002.
112 McKitrick, Blackwell, Littlepage, Kraus, Blanchfield, and Hill, “The Revolution in Military Affairs” in
Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E. Grinter, eds., Battlefield o f the Future: 21s' Century Warfare Issues,
Air War Collage, Maxwell Air Force Base, September 1995,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mi/airchronicles/battle/chp3 .html (accessed 04.16.04).
113 A RAND study defines space weapons as “things intended to cause harm that are based in space or that
have an essential element based in space.” See Lambeth, Mastering the Ultimate High Ground, 2003, 112113.
114 Hays, “Current and Future Military Uses o f Space,” 2002. See also Hui Zhang, “FMCT and PAROS:
A Chinese Perspective,” International Network o f Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, Prevetion
o f an Arms Race in Outer Space, Bulletin 20, 2002, http://www.inesap.org/
bulletin20/bul20art06.htm (accessed 07.06.04).
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providing the capability to conduct world-wide military operations in a greatly reduced
time frame.115 Space weapons, thus, may provide to a space-capable power a more
efficient option for conducting certain operations in comparison to establishing and
maintaining modem navy with global reach and military bases around the world.116 It is
not clear, however, whether the costs of conflict in space can be calculated due to a very
different geography of this medium and due to the absence of any precedent.117
1 1Q

As the ongoing transformation can be perceived as making war less costly,

all

else being equal, it can make war more likely. Falling costs of militarized conflict can be
offset by increasing gains from trade. Uncertainty, thus, exists as to whether increasing
gains from trade, as a result of commercialization of outer space, offset perceived
reduction of costs of war option. Each state makes its own cost-benefit calculations and
however it calculates the costs and benefits of war versus trade options, if the war option
is perceived to be less attractive it is reasonable to assume that this state is likely to favor
weapons-free space and a security regime banning weapons in space or restricting the use
of force in space. If a state finds a war option involving outer space cost-effective it is
not likely to pursue a regime banning weapons in space, but it may be interested in
pursuing some international regulations on the use of force in outer space. In both cases,

115 Lambeth, Mastering the Ultimate High Ground, 2003, 113. See also McKitrick, Blackwell, Littlepage,
Kraus, Blanchfield, and Hill, Chapter 3 “The Revolution in Military Affairs,” 1995.
116 On advantages and limitations o f space weapons see Preston, Johnson, Edwards, Miller, and
Shipbaugh, Space Weapons Earth Wars, 2002, 96, 101-107. Satellite programs are more expensive at the
acquisition phase than other weapons systems. This is because they are RDT&E intensive. They have to
go through extensive development testing. However, once launched in space they require a reduced
funding to operate them compared to other large production DoD programs. See U.S. General Accounting
Office, Military Space Operations: Common Problems and Their Effects on Satellite and Related
Acquisitions, GAO-03-825R, Satellite Acqusition Programs, June 2, 2003,
http://www.telecomweb.com/papers/military.pdf (accessed 03.31.04).
117 See how space weapons differ from weapons on land, sea, or in the air in Preston, Johnson, Edwards,
Miller, and Shipbaugh, Space Weapons Earth Wars, 2002, 83. Making any definitive cost-benefit
calculation o f a potential military conflict in space is beyond the scope o f the present study.
118 Preston, Johnson, Edwards, Miller, and Shipbaugh, Space Weapons Earth Wars, 2002, 106.
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states’ calculations should be reflected in the security interests that they pursue with
regard to outer space.

METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES
While advances in space technology may be making space weapons more costeffective in comparison to other options, the decision to place weapons in space will be
made by political leadership of the space-capable powers based on national security
interests, which in their turn are shaped by a number of factors, including political,
ideological,119 as well as economic factors. For this reason an analysis of the evolution of
security interests with regard to outer space represents a proper subject of study.
To the extent that the commercialization of space has become an important factor,
liberal propositions concerning economic interdependence and international cooperation
and peace are relevant to the study of space security. They raise hopes for more
cooperative and peaceful interstate relations in space. According to the argument of
liberal pacification, the commercialization of space should promote convergence in the
interests of the major spacepowers with regard to outer space security and is likely to lead
to the creation of a security regime regulating proliferating military uses of space so as to
make war in space less likely. Realists, whose perspective is also quite relevant for the
study of space security in the Commercial Space Age, not least due to the described
effects of technological progress on the costs of war, would predict that the

119 According to some adherents o f liberalism, both threat perception and national interests are shaped by
ideology—a broad concept o f what is legitimate and what is not. Concepts o f legitimacy shape power
aspirations and constrain state behavior at the international level. Material factors, including the
distribution o f power in the international system, are secondary in determining conflict and cooperation,
war and peace. See Francis Fukuyama, “Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon,” PS: Political
Science and Politics 24 (December 1991): 662-663. See also John M. Owen, IV, “Transnational
Liberalism and U.S. Primacy,” International Security 26 (winter 2001/2002): 117-152.
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commercialization of space leads to greater conflict of security interests and a more
competitive security environment. They would also argue that commercial cooperation is
most likely between those states that share common security interests.
Thus, the following four hypotheses are formulated for this study:
Realist hypothesis No. 1: the commercialization of outer space
leads to non-converging security interests
Realist hypothesis No. 2: converging security interests lead to
greater commercialization and greater commercial cooperation
Liberal hypothesis: commercialization and greater commercial
cooperation leads to converging security interests
Neo-liberal hypothesis: greater commercialization and commercial
cooperation may not lead to converging security interests, but conflicting interests
are reconciled via international institutions
In contrast to the majority of the studies produced within the realist-liberal debate,
the present analysis draws upon liberal methodology that relies on the postulate of the
primacy of state interests over state strategic interaction and calls for two-stage research
design: (1) analysis of the state preferences at the domestic level and (2) analysis of
strategic interaction of states.

10C\

For liberals, defining interests of the main actors is

theoretically central. The state is not perceived as an actor but a representative institution
that aggregates the interests of a group of societal actors.

121

In the present study, the

main attention is on state security interests—those interests that are aggregated, in this
case, in a form o f state security strategies. National security strategies reflect security
in terests and p r e se n t b road p la n s fo r a c h ie v in g n a tio n a l o b je c tiv e s su p p o rtin g th o se

interests.

1‘7*7

Changes in security strategies represent changes in security interests, based

120 Moravcsik, 1997, 543-545.
121 Ibid., 517-518.
122 See, for example, White House, National Security Strategy o f the United States, January 1988, 3.
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on them security objectives, or security environment. Interests underlie not only strategic
calculations o f the state but also strategic interaction with other states. Therefore, in
order to understand the outcomes of strategic interactions of states, analysis of state
interests is fundamentally important.
This study analyzes the evolution o f state security interests of three major space
powers—the United State, Russia, and China—with respect to outer space since the end
of the Cold War. All three spacepowers under study are former, potential or latent rivals
who may develop interest in acquiring outer space weapons for strategic purposes, in
order to serve their interests
As the issue of weaponization of outer space has emerged as one of the highly
prominent issues in interstate relations in the post-Cold War era, this issue is used as a
“litmus test” for assessing converging and non-converging security interests of the three
spacepowers. The fundamental interest of states with respect to outer space—and the
right granted by the Outer Space Treaty—is a free, unimpeded access to outer space.
Extension of commerce into outer space creates incentives both for and against
weaponization of outer space. Extending the use of force to this medium, including via
the weaponization option, threatens the states’ fundamental interest in free access to outer
space. Weapons put in space will also create new security threats besides the threat of
denied access to outer space. Two main options to deal with these threats are available:
first, arms control banning the use of force and weaponization of outer space,123 and

123 Arms control may be defined as “any agreement among states to regulate some aspects o f their military
capabilities or potential.” This agreement may apply to a location, readiness and types o f armaments,
facilities. The main objective o f arms control is to make war less likely. It is assumed that banning
weapons in space would contribute significantly to this end. Other objectives o f arms control are to reduce
political and economic costs o f preparing for war and to minimize the scope and violence o f war if it
occurs. See Jeffrey A. Larsen, ed., Arms Control: Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002), 1-2. See also Thomas C. Shelling and Morton H.
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second, weaponization of space in order to deter, defend, and deny the use of space to
enemies. A third option, a combination of the two, is also possible: a mix of
weaponization of space and arms buildups and arms control restricting the use of force to
some extent so as to make space security relations more stable. A new security regime
for outer space can emerge: firstly, via negotiations and consensus-building; secondly, as
a result of imposition on the part of the dominant state; and thirdly, as a result of power
balancing and bargaining, if weaker powers manage to build an effective alliance. The
former regime would be a collective-security type regime in line with liberal
expectations, and the latter would be based on balance of power system in line with
realist expectations.
The liberal hypothesis shall be considered as confirmed, if it is demonstrated that
under the conditions of progressing space commercialization the three major
spacepowers’ interests increasingly converged over the time period under the study.
Liberal theory also maintains that liberal states who share democratic values should have
more cooperative and peaceful relations. Thus, it can be said that a “democratic” liberal
hypothesis would predict that security interests of the United States, an economically
liberal and democratic state, and those of Russia, an economically liberalizing and
politically democratizing state, are more likely to converge than those of the United
States and China or Russia and China, as China remains a non-democratic state. The

Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (Washington D. C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1985), 3; and Robert Jervis,
“Arms Control, Stability, and Causes o f War,” Political Science Quarterly 108 (summer 1993): 239-253.
Outer space arms control is one o f the most challenging areas o f arms control due to two factors: first, the
dual nature o f space technology and therefore the difficulty o f distinguishing civil and military systems;
and second, great strategic advantage that space weapons can potentially provide. Verification is
problematic as well. Klotz also point out that the speed with which space technology develops makes it
hard for arms control: “Space technology is developing so rapidly that entirely unforeseen threats could
emerge within the life o f a formal arms control treaty.” See Frank G. Klotz, Space, Commerce, and
National Security (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998), 27.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

76
“democratic” liberal hypothesis shall be considered confirmed, if it is shown that space
security interests of the United States and Russia increasingly converged in the timeframe
of this study, rather than those of the United States-China pair or Russia-China pair. The
neo-liberal hypothesis shall be considered as confirmed, if state interactions at the
Conference on Disarmament can be shown to have contributed to reaching or moving
closer to making compromises and concluding agreements establishing new security
regime regulating the military uses of space. The first realist hypothesis shall be
confirmed, if it is shown that security interests of the major space powers did not
converge as the commercialization of space proceeded. The second realist hypothesis
shall be confirmed, if it can be shown that converging security interests between pairs of
states led to greater commercial cooperation.
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CHAPTER III
THE SECURITY REGIME IN OUTER SPACE DURING THE COLD WAR

The exploration and use o f outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the
benefits and in the interests o f all countries, irrespective o f
their degree o f economic or scientific development, and shall
be the province o f all mankind.
The Outer Space Treaty
1967

Almost half a century ago human activities expanded from the land, ocean and
atmosphere into outer space. It was a remarkable achievement of human civilization that
opened new opportunities for improving human conditions on Earth. Space technology,
however, proved to be one of the forces that exerted a profound influence on modem
civilization not only as a source of human betterment, but also as a source of military
power. Under the conditions of the Cold War, this incursion into the fourth medium had
significant security implications. The launch of Sputnik 1 was a dramatic demonstration
of Soviet advancement in the ballistic missile technology and the emergence of a new
threat: a threat of extending an arms race, including a nuclear arms race, and potentially
warfare, into outer space. Military activities in outer space transformed the strategic
environment of the Cold War. However, during the Cold War, even though outer space
was used for military purposes, it was not weaponized and a regime grew up that
gradually restricted the use of force in space.
The task of this chapter is to show: (1) that a security regime in outer space was
established during the Cold War that considerably restricted the use of force in outer
space, and (2) that the foundation of the regime significantly eroded by the later part of
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the Cold War. Arguably, despite this erosion, decades of “peaceful uses” of outer space
by the Cold War superpowers for their security needs gave birth to the norm of non-use
of force in outer space. First, this chapter defines space security and the concept of a
security regime, and then outlines the Cold War space security regime and its evolution.
Security in general, including space security, involves military, political,
socioeconomic and environmental aspects. Various schools of thought define security
differently. Traditional approaches define security in predominantly military terms and
tend to consider it as a goal in itself. Other approaches may not consider security as an
ultimate goal, treating it instead as a means to achieving such goals as human survival,
international order, societal welfare, personal freedom or freedom from environmental
degradation. In this study, a narrow definition is used according to which security is
understood as a condition, in which states perceive no danger o f military attack, political
pressure or economic coercion, so that they are able to pursue freely their own
development and progress.1
Space security has two main components: first, free access to outer space and
secure and equitable use of space, including the security of space assets; and second,
freedom from a hostile use of space, including space systems, services and information
they provide against a state—its territory, population, industrial infrastructure, as well as
political, economic, and social systems and culture. In accordance with a narrow
definition of space security, this study focuses on military aspects of security, leaving out
such aspects as equitable use of space and environmental issues.

1 Stephen E. Doyle, Civil Space Systems: Implications fo r International Security (Aldershot: Dartmouth,
1994), 12. •
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THE LEGAL SECURITY REGIME IN OUTER SPACE
A space security regime, similar to international regimes in general, is a set of
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which states’
0
expectations converge regarding the issues of space security. International relations
•

•

•

scholars seem to agree that security regimes are difficult to achieve in comparison to
other areas of international relations.3 This is because security regimes imply a form of
international cooperation that requires states to forego their short-term security interests
for the sake of long-term security interests, while there is a threat that other states may
cheat and take advantage of the situation in a highly competitive realm of security where
the ultimate price may be state survival.
In order for a security regime to emerge, certain conditions have to be met. First,
states must prefer a regulated issue area and want to establish a security regime. Second,
states should perceive that others share their security interests, or that the security
interests of the states involved can converge so that a consensus can be built. Third, all
states should be satisfied with the status quo in the issue area and not to prefer unilateral
steps for providing their security. Fourth, war and the individualist pursuit of security
must be considered as costly.4 Conditions when offensive and defensive weapons and
policies are distinguishable and the former cheaper and more effective than the latter, or
when they cannot be distinguished but it is easier to defend than attack are considered to

2 The definition o f international regimes is given by Krasner as being “sets o f implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a
given area of international relations.” See Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1989), 2.
3 Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner, ed., International Regimes, 1989, 174.
4 Jervis elaborates these four conditions that are necessary for the formation o f a security regime. See
Ibid., 176-178.
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be the most favorable for the emergence of regimes.5 And finally, states need to be able
to overcome the relative gains problems that are inherent in security issues in order to
establish a security regime.6
The space security regime that emerged during the Cold War was an
unambiguous example of a security regime. These were years of extensive
disagreements between the Soviet Union and the United States on the governance across
the whole spectrum of outer space issues—military and even commercial issues.
Nonetheless, under the conditions of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet
Union came to an understanding that security in the outer space issue area had to be
established through cooperation rather than unilateral steps early into the Space Age. The
first global multilateral treaty regulating military activities of states in outer space was
concluded in 1963, just six years after the launch of Sputnik 1.
At the outset o f the Space Age, the United States and the Soviet Union advocated
starkly different approaches to the governance of outer space, particularly in the issue
area o f military uses of space. The U.S. approach was based on the principles embodied
in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the separation of the issue area of outer space from
other issue areas. The Soviet approach linked outer space security to other security and
disarmament issues. The Soviet Union was not willing to restrict the uses of outer space
for peaceful purposes unless the United States would eliminate its foreign bases with
short-and medium-range missiles.7

5 Ibid., 178.
6 This condition is particularly emphasized by Grieco. See Joseph Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits o f
Cooperation: A Realist Critique o f the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization 42
(summer 1988): 485-507.
7 See U.S. State Department’s narrative to the Outer Space Treaty at the Department o f State website at
http://www.state.gov/ (accessed 01.26.01).
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In the commercial realm, the Unite States saw great opportunities for commercial
activities in outer space from the beginning of the Space Age and wanted to ensure that •
this opportunity would be available under the emerging regime governing activities in
outer space. When President Eisenhower announced his administration’s space policy in
1960 he emphasized the importance of satellite communications and the role of
commercial sector in realizing this endeavor. The Soviet Union was strongly opposed to
commercial activities in outer space. Moreover, the Soviet objection to commercial
activities in outer space was fundamental: it was grounded in the Marxist ideology that
considered commerce as a source of international conflict and violence. According to the
Soviet perspective, in order to preserve the peaceful uses of outer space it should not be
perverted by the capitalist practices of commercial actors.8 In 1962, the Soviet Union
submitted to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space—
established in 1958 to promote international cooperation in the exploration and use of
outer space—a “Draft Declaration of the Basic Principles Governing the Activities of
States Pertaining to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,” which specified that “[a]ll
activities of any kind pertaining to the exploration of outer space shall be carried out
solely and exclusively by States....”9 The United States responded to this position by
pointing out that, according to the already enacted Communication Satellite Act of 1962,

8 See H. Peter van Fenema, The International Trade in Launch Services: The Effect o f U.S. Laws, Policies
and Practices on its Development (Leiden: H.P. van Fenema, 1999), 67.
9 See United Nations, “Draft Declaration o f the Basic Principles Governing the Activities o f States
Pertaining to the Exploration and Use o f Outer Space,” A/AC.105/L.2, 1962; A/5/81, Annex 3, 1962,
quated in Kunihiko Tatsuzawa, “The Regulation o f Commercial Space Activities by the Non-Governmental
Entities in Space Law,” Space Future, Online publication, http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/
the_regulation_of_commercial_space_activities_by_the_non_govememtnal_entities_in_space_space_law.s
html (accessed 03.14.01). See also Wayne White, “The Legal Regime for Private Activities in Outer
Space,” Space Future, Online publication, http://www.spacefuture.com/pr/archive/
the_legal_regime_for_private_activities_in_outer_space.shtml (accessed 07.10.04).
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private firms were granted the right to engage in activities in outer space.10 Thus, the two
superpowers’ perspectives on outer space governance were far apart and, under the
conditions of intense Cold War confrontation, it took quite dramatic developments to
bring about their consensus on space security issues that could then lead to the
establishment of an outer space security regime.
The 1962 Cuban missile crisis pushed the world to the brink of a nuclear war.
The emergence of the agreement on the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty was brought about,
in large part, by this dramatic event. The Cuban Missile Crisis took place against the
background of nuclear tests in the atmosphere and in outer space conducted by both
superpowers.11 The timing and dynamics of these tests were quite telling of their military
as well as political purposes. It is these events that brought about the four conditions
emphasized by Jervis as necessary for the emergence of a security regime. These
developments also demonstrate what it took to reach a consensus and create the space
security regime.
The series of experiments with nuclear explosions began on August 1, 1958 when
the United States exploded a thermonuclear device at 76.8 kilometers above the sea level.
On August 12, 1958, the United States carried out another thermonuclear explosion at

10 The US adopted the Communications Satellite Act in 1962. In this act the US Congress laid the
foundation for the world’s first global communications satellite system. Congress declared that “it is the
policy o f the United States to establish, in conjunction and cooperation with other countries, as
expeditiously as practicable, a commercial communications network, which will be responsive to the needs
and national objectives, which will serve the communications needs o f the United States and other
countries, and which will contribute to world peace and understanding.” Eventually, that global satellite
system became the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) system. The
Act is the first policy statement o f the US government to assume that space was am appropriate place for
commercial activities: it provides a mechanism for the involvement o f both the government and the private
sector.
11 Steven Weber and Sidney Drell, “Attempts to Regulate Military Activities in Space,” in Alexander L.
George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S. Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements,
Failures, Lessons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 381.
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42.98 kilometers above the sea level. Both these explosions were conducted as a part of
the U.S. antiballistic missile defense program, a reaction to the 1957 Soviet launches of ■
its first ballistic missiles.12 August 27,1958, went down in the historic record as a date
when the first nuclear explosion took place in outer space proper. The United States
exploded a nuclear device at 161 kilometers above the sea level and a few days later
repeated the explosion at 292 kilometers. On September 6, 1958, the United States
exploded a nuclear device at the record altitude of 750 kilometers above the sea level.13
A moratorium on nuclear explosions during 1958-61 did not allow the Soviet
Union to respond immediately with nuclear explosions in kind. However, on October 27,
1961, the Soviet Union conducted two nuclear explosions in outer space. The goal of the
experiments was twofold: (1) to study the impact of nuclear radiation on space systems,14
and (2) to test a system for the interception of ballistic missiles within the Soviet anti
ballistic missile defense program. On June 20,1962, the United States renewed its

12 The United States started planning for the research and development o f missile defense shortly after
World War II when U.S. defense contractors concluded that anti-ballistic missile technology was beyond
their current reach. In 1957, the United States began work on its first major missile defense effort, the
Nike-Zeus system. By 1962 the technology flaws in the Nike-Zeus system led the United States to begin
work on the Nike X missile defense program, which was based on nuclear-tipped interceptors.
13 According to some sources, the September explosion took place at the altitude o f 467 kilometers above
sea level. See A. Zhelesnyakov and L. Rosenblum, “Yademye Bsryvy v Kosmose” (Nuclear Explosions in
Space), Novosti Kosmonavtiki, N o 9 (236), 2002, 68.
14 Nuclear explosions in outer space cause radiation belts around Earth to form that damage unshielded
satellites in orbit that pass through these belts. The Soviet Union studied this effect in order, firstly, to use
these effects in its ballistic missile defense program, secondly, to avoid damage to its satellites in outer
space, and, thirdly, to ensure that Soviet cosmonauts sent in space would not be harmed by this radiation.
For example, nuclear radiation belts that formed as a result o f the nuclear tests in outer space in the early
1960s had to be taken into consideration in planning o f Soviet manned missions o f Vostok-3 and Vostok-4
o f August 1962. The United States had to plan for avoiding these radiation belts for its mission Mercury
MA-8 that took place in October 1962. The consequences o f the nuclear explosions in outer space were
known to endure for a few years after the explosions. The last Soviet nuclear explosion within the
atmosphere was conducted on November 1, 1962, when the impact o f a nuclear explosion on radio
communication was studied. The United States conducted its last atmospheric nuclear explosion on
November 4, 1962. In total count, the United States conducted 9 atmospheric and space nuclear
explosions, the Soviet Union - 5. The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty put an end to Soviet and American
nuclear explosion in the atmosphere and other space. China, however, never joined the treaty and on
October 27, 1966, China’s ballistic missile Dong Feng-2A delivered a nuclear warhead that exploded over a
military training ground in China. See Zhelesnyakov and Rosenblum, 2002, 68-70.
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nuclear tests in outer space.15 The United States carried out a large nuclear explosion that
could be seen from hundreds of miles away on the ground on July 9,1962. On October .
22, 1962, so did the Soviet Union with a smaller nuclear device. This explosion took
place amid the Cuban missile crisis— slightly over a week after a U.S. U-2
reconnaissance flight discovered the construction of the Soviet missile bases in Cuba. On
October 26,1962, the United States conducted a large explosion in the atmosphere. The
Soviet Union responded with its nuclear explosion on October 28,1962.16
On the one hand, the 1961-62 nuclear tests, particularly those during the crisis
itself o f October 16-28, 1962, significantly exacerbated the specter of a nuclear war
during the Cuban missile crisis, and on the other, prompted caution on the part of the two
Cold War rivals in managing their conflictual interests and hastened the emergence of an
agreement between the two that some security regime for outer space, and more generally
for managing the Cold War nuclear rivalry, was necessary. In June 1963, the United
states offered to sign an agreement prohibiting nuclear explosions in three media: in the
atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. The Soviet Union agreed almost
immediately. Thus, the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain signed the
“Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water,” outlawing nuclear explosions in outer space.17 It was the first legally binding
document containing a specific prohibition of the military use of outer space.18

15 It was a failed launch and experiment was terminated on the 65th second. See Zhelesnyakov and
Rosenblum, 2002, 68.
16 The Soviet Union conducted its fifth and the last nuclear explosion at the edge o f the atmosphere at the
altitude o f 80 kilometers above the sea level on November 1, 1962. The United States carried its last
powerful nuclear explosion at the altitude o f 97.5 kilometers above the sea level on the same day. See
Zhelesnyakov and Rosenblum, 2002, 69.
17 “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,” (Partial
Test Ban Treaty), August 5, 1963, Article I, http://www.unog.ch/ffames/disarm/distreat/
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In the same year, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted
Resolution 1962 (XVIII), in which the basic rules of the use of outer space were laid out,,
establishing that activities o f states in the exploration and use of outer space would be
carried “for the benefit and in the interests of all mankind” and “of maintaining
international peace and security and promoting cooperation and understanding.”19 In
1967, ten years after the opening of outer space to the reach of humanity, the United
States and the Soviet Union negotiated and, finally, signed the Outer Space Treaty that
became the cornerstone of the legal regime for outer space.20 The treaty established the
fourth medium as global commons and granted free access to outer space and the right of
all states to explore and use space on the basis of equality. It prohibited the emplacement

part_ban.htm (accessed 10.13.03). The treaty was signed by the United States, the Soviet Union and Great
Britain in Moscow on August 5, 1963, and entered into force on October 10, 1963. Many other countries
joint the treaty later.
18 The United States put forth the first proposal for international verification o f the testing o f space object
before the launch o f Sputnik, in early 1957. The development o f an inspection system for outer space was a
part o f Western proposal presented in August 1957. The Soviet Union, being in the midst o f testing its first
ICBM, declined this proposal. See comments to the Outer Space Treaty at the Department o f State website
at http://www.state.gov/ (accessed 01.26.01).
19 United Nations, “Declaration o f Legal Principles Governing the Activities o f States in the Exploration
and Use o f Outer Space,” Paragraphs 1 and 4.
20 The idea o f limiting the military use o f space originated in the Western bloc. On September 22, 1960,
President Eisenhower in his address to the United Nations General Assembly proposed that principles o f
the Antarctic Treaty, that had been just signed, should be applied to outer space. In the mid-1960s, the
United States pressed for an arms control treaty, regulating the use o f outer space and giving the rules
bounding power. See comments to the Outer Space Treaty at the Department o f State website at
http://www.state.gov/wwwglobal/arms/treaties/spacel.html (accessed 01.26.01). The “Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities o f States in the Exploration and Use o f Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies” was negotiated within the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses o f
Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) established by the resolution o f the UN General Assembly in 1958. The goal
o f this body was to provide a legal framework for the peaceful uses o f outer space and promote
international cooperation in space exploration and utilization. Since its inception, the Legal Subcommittee
o f the UNCOPUOS also prepared four other major treaties governing outer space activities: (1)
“Agreement on the Rescue o f Astronauts, the Return o f Astronauts and the Return o f Objects Launched
into Outer Space” (Rescue Agreement, 1968); (2) “Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects” (Liability Convention, 1972); (3) “Convention on Registration o f Objects
Launched into Outer Space” (Registration Convention, 1974); and (4) “Agreement Governing the
Activities o f States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies” (Moon Agreement, 1979).
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of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in outer space.21 It also limited the use of the
Moon and other celestial bodies exclusively to peaceful purposes and prohibited their use
for establishing military bases, installations, or fortifications, testing weapons of any kind
and conducting military maneuvers.22 The treaty put all the national activities in outer
space—whether by governmental agencies or non-governmental entities—under the
supervision and international responsibility of states.
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty also promulgated a norm of non-interference with
the peaceful space activities of other states. In Article IX of the Treaty, it specified:
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment
planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of
other State Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international
consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State
Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment
planned by another State Party in outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in
the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or
experiment.23
This article gave the right to the state parties to the treaty to initiate consultations on any
space activities they may find threatening to their space activities and established the
responsibility of the states conducting activities that may be harmful to other states’ space
activities to hold the requested consultations.
The 1979 Moon Agreement elaborated many of the provisions of the Outer Space
Treaty relating to the peaceful use of the Moon and other celestial bodies. The
significance of this treaty, even though it was not supported by the main space-faring

21 Earlier, in October 1963, a UNGA resolution welcomed the Soviet and U.S. statements, affirming the
intentions o f the two superpowers not to place weapons o f mass destruction in outer space.
22 United Nations, “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities o f States in the Exploration and Use o f
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” 1967, Article IV.
23 Ibid., Article IX.
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states, was that it legally established the Moon and its natural resources as the common
heritage of mankind24 and required to form an international regime governing the
exploitation of its resources when this becomes available with an intent to prevent any
militarized competition for the natural resources of the celestial bodies or the use of it for
military bases.25 Therefore, the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement established
-y /r

a legal international norm of peaceful uses of outer space.
Three United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions were adopted
related to the space security regime in a broad sense. The 1982 UNGA resolution on
“Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International
Direct Television Broadcasting” specified that activities of states in the field of
international direct television broadcasting by satellites should be carried out in a
“manner compatible with the sovereign rights of States” and “compatible with the
development of mutual understanding and the strengthening of friendly relations and
cooperation among all States and peoples in the interest of maintaining international

24 Common heritage o f mankind (CHM) concept was first proposed by the UN Ambassador Arvid Pardo
o f Malta in 1967 regarding the governance o f the ocean. The concept includes five basic principles: (1) the
principles o f non-appropriation; (2) the principles o f shared management, which entails a new form o f
social relations based on an international regime o f cooperation; (3) the principles o f “common benefit for
mankind as a whole”, implying an equitable scheme o f distribution and redistribution o f wealth; (4) the
principle o f “use for exclusively peaceful purposes”, which presupposes the notion o f disarmament in the
process o f implementing the CHM concept; and (5) the principle o f conservation for future generations,
which serves as a foundation for sustainable development o f the commons. See, for example, Peter B.
Payoyo, ed., Ocean Governance: Sustainable Development o f the Seas (New York: United Nations
University Press, 1992), 250-251, and Buck, The Global Commons, 1998, 28-29.
25 United Nations, “Agreement Governing the Activities o f States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies,” United Nations General Assembly Resolution, 34/68, December 18, 1979,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/gares/htm/gares_34_0068.html (accessed 02.04.02). It was
signed in 1979 and entered into force in 1984. Only 9 countries ratified the agreement by February 1,
2001 .
26 United Nations, “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities o f States in the Exploration and Use o f
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” 1967, Article IV, and United Nations,
“Agreement Governing the Activities o f States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” Article II. It
should be pointed out that there are different interpretations o f the term “peaceful.” Some interpret
“peaceful” as non-military, others as “non-aggressive.” See, for example, Bin Cheng, Studies in
International Space Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 528-529.
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peace and security.”27 It also called for peaceful resolutions of any disputes that may
arise from activities of states in the field of international direct television broadcasting via
satellites. The 1986 UNGA resolution on “Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the
Earth from Outer Space” stipulated the principle of “freedom of exploration and use of
outer space on the basis of equality” based on “full and permanent sovereignty of all
•J Q

States and peoples over their own wealth and natural resources.”

It sought to encourage

international cooperation and ensure affordable access by developing countries to non
military satellite imaging. In order to promote and intensify international cooperation, it
obligated the states that conducted remote sensing via satellites to enter into consultations
with sensed states upon their request. The purpose that these resolutions served was to
diminish the possibility of conflicts arising from emerging new activities in the fourth
medium and thus lessen the incentives for extending militarized confrontation into outer
space.
In order to minimize the risk of radioactive exposure from nuclear operated
satellites, the UNGA resolution on “Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power
Sources in Outer Space” required states to limit the use of nuclear power sources and,
when they were used, to protect individuals, populations, the biosphere, and the
environment of outer space against radioactive hazards. It also specified the
responsibilities of states operating satellites with nuclear power sources on board and

27 United Nations, “Principles Governing the Use by States o f Artificial Earth Satellites for International
Direct Television Broadcasting,” United Nation General Assembly Resolution 37/92, Articles A,
paragraphs 1 and 3, December 10, 1982, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/dbstxt.htm (accessed
02.04.02).
28 United Nations, “Principles Relating to Remote Sensing o f the Earth from Space,” United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 41/65, Principle IV, December 3, 1986,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLawrstxt.htm (accessed 02.04.02).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

89
those that have the capability to assist states affected by exposure to radioactivity from
such sources.29
The 1977 Geneva “Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques,” whose goals were “halting the arms
race” and “saving mankind from the danger of using new means of warfare,” prohibited
the use of environmental modification as a means of destruction, damage or injury to any
state party. This convention is also applicable to outer space and represents a significant
component of the space security regime. Article II stated:
As used in article I, the term “environmental modification techniques” refers to
any technique for changing—through the deliberate manipulation of natural
processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its
biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or outer space.30
The 1968 Rescue Agreement required to render all necessary assistance to
astronauts if they have “suffered an accident, or experiencing conditions of distress or
have made an emergency or unintended landing” in a territory of foreign state.31 This
agreement gave astronauts a diplomatic immunity that was not granted to military pilots,
thereby signifying that uses of space for human exploration were not recognized as
29 United Nations, “Principles Relevant to the Use o f Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space,” United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/68, Principle 3, Article 1, Paragraphs (a) and (b), Principle 7,
Article 1, Paragraphs (a) and (b), and Principles 8 and 9, December 14, 1992,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org?SpaceLaw/spbentxt.htm (accessed 02.04.02). Although this resolution was
adopted in 1992, negotiations on the issue took place at the UNCOPUOS during the 1980s, after the crash
o f the Soviet satellite carrying a nuclear power source (NPS) that scattered radioactive debris over
Canadian territory.
30 United Nations, “Convention on the Prohibition o f Military or Any Other Hostile Use o f Environmental
Modification Techniques” (ENMOD Convention), United Nations General Assembly Resolution 31/72,
December 10, 1976, Article II, http://www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/distreat/environ.pdf (accessed 05.22.04).
The ENMOD Convention was open for signature at Geneva on 18 May 1977 and entered into force on
October 5, 1978. Both the Soviet Union and United States signed the 1977 Geneva Modification
Convention on May 18, 1977, while China never became a party to this multilateral agreement. See United
Nations, Status o f Multilateral Arms Regulations and Disarmament Agreements,
http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf (accessed 05.22.04).
31 United Nations, “Agreement on the Rescue o f Astronauts, the Return o f Astronauts and the Return o f
Objects Launched into Outer Space” (Rescue Agreement), United Nations General Assembly Resolution
2345 (XXII), 1968, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/gares/html/gares_22_2345.html (accessed
02.04.02).
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military activities. The 1972 Liability Convention provided for compensation for damage
that was caused by a space object either to people or property of another state or
international intergovernmental organization either in space, atmosphere, or on the land.

39

And the 1975 Registration Convention put in place a central registry for mandatory and
uniform registration of objects launched in outer space, kept by the United Nations
Secretary-General and publicly accessible.33 This agreement was designed to strengthen
the international responsibility of states undertaking space activities and provide for the
transparency of space activities so as to make them less threatening and destabilizing.
Furthermore, the international telecommunications regime, governing the use of
radio frequencies, including their use in outer space, established the norm of avoiding
harmful interference with space radio communications.34 This norm was extended from
the terrestrial telecommunications regime to space telecommunications in 1963 at the
Space Communication Conference held by the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU),35 the oldest international organization regulating and coordinating the use of radio
spectrum worldwide.36 In 1971, the World Administrative Radio Conference on Space
Telecommunications (WARC-ST) brought geostationary orbit and allocation of radio
32 United Nations, “Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects”
(Liability Convention), United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2777 (XXVI), 1972,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/gares/html/gares_26_2777.html (accessed 02.04.02).
33 Nowadays, the UN registrar o f objects launched in outer space is accessible online. See United Nations
Registrar o f Objects Launched in Outer Space, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SORegister/regist.html
(accessed 03.03.04).
34 The rights o f users o f frequencies are defined in terms o f the protection from harmful interference once
frequency is registered with the International Telecommunication Union. This is specified in the 1992 ITU
Constitution. See International Telecommunication Union, Constitution o f the International
Telecommunication Union, Article 1, December 22, 1992, amended October 14, 1994,
http://www.austlii.edu.au/other/dfat/treaties/1994/28.html (accessed 10.20.03).
35 Issues related to radio communications in outer space were first discussed at the World Administrative
Radio Conference (WARC) in 1959. This Conference produced the first international agreement
applicable to space activities.
3 The regime governing the use o f electromagnetic spectrum for communications evolved over the period
o f time since 1903 when international arrangements on a coordinated use o f radio frequencies was first
discussed at the Berlin Conference. See, for example, Vogler, The Global Commons, 1995, 114.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

91
frequencies for the use in outer space under the supervision of the International
Telecommunications Union for the purpose of preventing harmful interference with space
radio communications and providing more equitable access to the use of these outer
space resources. The conference adopted the principle that the registration and use of a
satellite orbital position could not be interpreted as giving permanent property right and
should not create obstacles to the establishment of space systems by other countries. The
1973 ITU Convention, in which ITU responsibilities were expanded to include the
allocation of geosynchronous (GSO) positions and frequencies, confirmed the principle
of equitable access to the GSO and associated frequencies.

The underlying intention of

this provision was to put in place a mechanism for avoiding international conflicts over
the access and use of the “limited natural resources” of outer space and, thus, to ensure
the peaceful use of outer space. Although some authors do not include the space
telecommunication regime as a part of the outer space regime,38 it is an important regime
supporting the norm of peaceful uses of outer space.
The 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),39 a cartel-type regime,
was established by a number of leading industrial countries led by the United States to
deal with the problem of proliferation of missile technology to other countries and non
state actors. This regime was created to complement the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),

37 Ibid., 116.
38 Buck, for example, draws sharp distinction between the space telecommunication regime and outer
space regimes, whereas some other authors consider space telecommunication regime as a sub-regime o f
outer space regime. See Buck, The Global Commons, 1998, 138. Vogler divides outer space into four
issue areas each with its own sub-regime: (1) military uses o f outer space, including ASATs; (2) space
debris and environmental issue area; (3) information flow; and (4) the orbit and radio frequency spectrum
resource allocation. See Vogler, The Global Commons, 1995, 103.
39 The agreement on Guidelines for the Transfer o f Equipment and Technology Related to Missiles— an
exchange o f diplomatic notes and statements confirming adherence to the common export controls between
the seven original members, including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, West
Germany, Italy and Japan— gave a start to the Missile Technology Control Regime on April 16, 1987. See
van Fenema, 1999, 141.
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which addressed the threat of proliferation of nuclear technology, and the Coordinating
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, which dealt with the threat of proliferation
of all strategically important goods and technologies.40 Although the MTCR did not
regulate outer space per se, it was another important regime supporting the space security
regime without which the commercialization of outer space activities could have had
disastrous consequences. This is because space launch technology for non-military and
military purposes is virtually indistinguishable.41 An unrestricted market for space
launch technology or systems would facilitate the selling of missiles to military
establishments and possibly terrorist organizations around the world.42 Thus, the United
States and its G-7 partners agreed to tighten their restrictions on the transfer of equipment
and technology used in military ballistic missiles, civilian sounding rockets and space
launch vehicles to countries suspected of developing or planning to develop nuclear

40 If the NPT dealt with the threat o f proliferation o f nuclear technology, the Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) tried to prevent the flow o f strategically important goods and
equipment from going into the Soviet bloc and benefiting the Cold War adversary. To serve this goal,
CoCom— a non-treaty organization established by the Western bloc countries led by the United States in
1949— maintained a list o f embargoed products and technologies that served as a basis for national export
controls o f the member countries. Nearly all space-related products and technologies, such as launch
vehicles and technology, communications satellites, and computers were included in the CoCom lists. On
March 31, 1994, at a high level meeting o f the 17 CoCom governments in The Hague, an official end o f the
CoCom was announced due to the fact that it outlived its strategic rationale and could not be sustained. In
December 1995,28 countries, among which the former CoCom members, Russia and some other countries,
agreed on the establishment o f the new arrangement. The new agreement, titled the Wassenaar
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, was
launched with the purpose o f preventing destabilizing buildups o f armaments and precluding transfer o f
dual-use technology, including space-related goods and technology, to countries o f concern. It was
officially created in July 1996. See Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “Wassenaar Arrangement on
Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies,” ACDA Fact Sheet, July
1996, http://www.acda.gov/factsheet/conwpn/wassenaa.htm (accessed 06.15.04). See also van Fenema,
The International Trade in Launch Services, 1999, 128-129, 135.
41 See, for example, van Fenema, The International Trade in Launch Services, 1999, 147.
42 After the Reagan administration took a course on commercialization o f space activities, experts warned
that the commercialization o f space activities in the United States might accelerate missile technology
development in the Third World. See, for example, Aaron Karp, “Space Technology in the Third World:
Commercialization and the Spread o f Ballistic Missiles,” Space Policy, May 1986, 157.
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weapon launch systems.43 The Missile Technology Control Regime became a
mechanism for the coordination of national export restrictions to limit proliferation of
missile technology. It put in place an administrative framework for achieving this goal.44
The regime relied on adherence to common export guidelines that were applied to a list
of controlled items, the “MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex.” Decisions with
respect to the guidelines and the annex were made by the regime members based on the
consensus and it was the responsibility of the individual members to provide control over
their exports 45 The Soviet Union was not a member of the MTCR but experts expected
the Soviet Union to be willing to follow the Western states in restricting proliferation of
missile technology to the third countries.46
The regime governing the use of outer space was, to a very large degree,
determined by the security relationship between the two Cold War superpowers that for a
time were the only space-faring states.47 Their role was important both in the
negotiations of the multilateral space legal framework and in their actual interaction on
the issues of space security. In addition to multilateral agreements, a number of bilateral
43 The seven original members o f the MTCR included the United States, Canada, France, the United
Kingdom, West Germany, Italy and Japan. At first, the regime targeted nuclear-capable missiles and later
was expanded to cover unmanned systems capable o f delivering weapons o f mass destruction. In 1993,
the Guidelines were revisited and a new version replaced term “nuclear” weapons by “weapons o f mass
destruction”. See van Fenema, The International Trade in Launch Services, 1999, 141.
44 The MTCR members meet regularly to review the “Equipment and Technology Annex” and exchange
views on the national implementation o f the regime. See van Fenema, The International Trade in Launch
Services, 1999, 145.
45 Membership in the MTCR did not give the right to obtain technology from another member o f the
regime or an obligation to supply it. It also did not provide sufficient guarantee against the misuse o f the
technologies bought, as the regime did not provide for inspections or any other measures to ensure that
peaceful launch technology is not diverted to military uses. After the end o f the Cold War, the MTCR
membership was expanded to include the major space-capable states. With the considerable erosion o f the
missile non-proliferation regime due to the indigenous missile research and development around the world,
as well as commercialization o f outer space activities, the regime needed strengthening. In November
2002, in order to augment the MTCR regime, 93 countries signed the International Code o f Conduct, which
calls for more transparency in national missile policies.
46 See, for example, Karp, 1986, 167.
47 France became the third space-capable country and joined the exclusive space club when it launched its
satellite Asterix into orbit on November 26, 1965.
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U.S.-Soviet agreements provided important components of space security regime during
the Cold War. In 1971, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the “Agreement on
Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War.” This agreement legitimized
the existence and use of certain satellite systems for military purposes. The Hot Line
Modernization Agreement of 1971 provided for the creation of two secure satellite links
for direct communications in case of emergency or crisis between the United States and
-JO

the Soviet Union for the sake of their mutual and global security.

This agreement

updated the original Hot Line Agreement of 1963, taking advantage of the advances in
satellite communication technology offering more reliable communication channels via
satellites. This signified the fact that by the early 1970s outer space was considered by
the two Cold War superpowers as a safe medium for their direct communications in time
of an emergency or international crisis.
The 1972 ABM Treaty limited the deployment of ABM systems and components
to agreed levels and regions. Importantly, among other provisions, the ABM Treaty
prohibited the testing, development, and deployment of space-based ABM systems or
components.49 The ABM Treaty helped to keep outer space free of weapons since the

48 The original Hot Line Agreement was signed in 1963. It established a direct communications link
between the leader o f the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce the chances o f a nuclear exchange
stemming from an accident or miscalculations. This agreement followed the dramatic events o f the Cuban
Missile Crisis o f 1962 that compellingly underscored the necessity o f the prompt, direct communications
between the heads o f stats o f the two nuclear superpowers. The 1963 agreement provided for the creation
o f a wire telegraph circuit routed Washington-London-Copenhagen-Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow, and for
a radio telegraph circuit routed Washington-Tangier-Moscow as a backup system. It was modified to take
advantage o f advances in telecommunication technology in 1971. The satellite system became operational
in January 1978. See “Memorandum o f Understanding between the United States o f America and the
Union o f Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment o f a Direct Communications Link,” June 20,
1963, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/hotlinel.html (accessed 07.10.04); and “Agreement
between the United States o f America and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures to Improve
the U.S.A.-USSR Direct Communications Link,” September 30, 1971,
http://www.state.gOv/t/ac/trt/4787.htm (accessed 07.10.04).
49 “Treaty Between the United States o f America and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation o f the Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,” Article 5, May 26, 1972. On September 26, 1997, a
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time it entered into force and allowed the United States and the Soviet Union come to
mutually acceptable arms control agreements and gradually reduce their nuclear offensive
arsenals. It became seen as a cornerstone of the Cold War arms control process and
global stability.
Furthermore, the ABM Treaty, together with the Interim Agreement on the
Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms, also established the bilateral norm of non
interference with the national technical means of verification that included both groundbased and space-based systems.50 One of the interpretations of this norm was that any
interference with any early warning, imaging, or intelligence satellite, and, by extension,
with any ocean surveillance satellite of the United States and the Soviet Union was
prohibited.51
The 1988 “Agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on
Notification of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched
Ballistic Missiles” (ICBMs and SLBMs) specified that each party would provide an

Memorandum o f Understanding was signed recognizing Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine as the
successor states to the Soviet Union and parties to the ABM treaty, thereby making it a multilateral treaty.
50 See “Treaty Between the United States o f America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation o f the Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,” Article 12, May 26, 1972, and “Interim Agreement
Between the United States o f America and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures
with Respect to the Limitation o f Strategic Offensive Arms,” Article 5, May 26, 1972, http://www.fas.org/
nuke/control/salt 1/text/salt l.htm (accessed 10.15.03). The principle of non-interference with national
technical means (NTM) o f verification was taken over into the INF Treaty, which is o f indefinite duration,
and into the START I Treaty, which has been extended to 2009.
51 This norm was made multilateral in the Conventional Force in Europe (CFE) Treaty the treaty, members
o f which include thirty NATO and East European countries, including former republics o f the Soviet
Union. See “Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty,” November 19, 1990, Article XV,
http://www.fas.0rg/nuke/c0ntr0 l/cfe/text/cfe_t.htm#l (accessed 10.20.03). Originally the CFE Treaty was
signed by 22 State Parties, including the Soviet Union. Although, according to the CFE Treaty, only
satellites used for verification o f specific treaties are protected, in most cases it cannot be reliably
determined which satellites are actually used or could be used in future for this purpose and therefore
almost all can be thought as being covered by this provision.
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advance notification concerning the launches of ICBMs and SLBMs.

The agreement

was to ensure that the two superpowers would not mistake a satellite launch for a possible
nuclear attack.

It provided an important measure of transparency of the two space

powers’ launch activities, ensuring their security in general, and free and safe access to
outer space in particular, contributing to the overall space security regime.
All in all, by the twilight of the Cold War, a multifaceted space security regime
was in place that significantly restricted the use of force in outer space and, along with
supporting regimes that diminished the incentives for the use of force by providing
important mechanisms of coordinating activities in space and, if not resolving, then
significantly defusing conflictual interests, contributed to peaceful exploration and use of
outer space. However, despite considerable success in maintaining security in outer
space throughout the Cold War, the multi- and bilateral treaties and agreements, lying in
the foundation of the regime, left a considerable gap in the outer space security regime,
making further militarization of space possible and leaving the door open for its
weaponization and extending war-fighting into this medium.
According to Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty that declare outer space
and celestial bodies as being free for exploration and use by all states without
52 “Agreement Between the United States o f America and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics on
Notifications o f Launches o f Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic
Missiles,” May 31, 1988, http://www.state.gOv/t/ac/trt/4714.htm (accessed 10.15.03).
53 Some previous agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as the 1971 Accidents
Measures Agreement and the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, and some provisions o f the SALT II
Treaty, which was not ratified, however, required the two countries to provide notification o f their launch
activities in some specified cases. None o f the previous agreements, however, covered all strategic ballistic
missiles. In 2000, a follow-on Memorandum o f Understanding (MOU) between the United States and
Russia expanded the agreement to include pre-launch as well as post-launch notification on short-range
ballistic missiles, sounding and research rockets and most space launch vehicles. The MOU significantly
reinforced the transparency o f launch activities. The MOU provided for the voluntary notification o f
satellites forced from orbit and certain space experiments that could adversely affect the operation o f early
warning radars. See “Memorandum o f Understanding on Notification o f Missile Launches” (PLNS
MOU), released by the Bureau o f Arms Control, Washington D. C., January 19, 2001,
http://www.state.gOv/www/global/arms/treaties/mou_msllaunch.html#text (accessed 05.22.04).
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discrimination and not being a subject to national appropriation, there are no specific
restrictions on testing or deployment of non-WMD weapons in space, no prohibition of
target practice, dumping of waste in outer space, or generally on military use of outer
space as long as freedom of other states to use space is not undermined.54 The Outer
Space Treaty prohibits only placing in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear
or any other weapons of mass destruction. As follows from Article IV, the Treaty does
not reserve outer space as a whole for use “exclusively for peaceful purposes.” It does
not forbid military bases on orbiting artificial satellites around the Earth. There is no ban
on air-based or ground- or sea-based anti-satellites or anti-missile weapons. Although the
Moon and other celestial bodies are reserved for “exclusively peaceful purposes,” the
notion of “peaceful” receives fundamentally differing interpretations. According to those
who believe that “peaceful” use means “non-military” use, the Moon and other celestial
bodies are completely demilitarized. According to those who consider “non-aggressive”
use as “peaceful” use, the Moon and other celestial bodies can be used, with the
exception where specific prohibitions are mentioned in the treaty, for military purposes as
long as these purposes are not aggressive.55
The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty prohibits the use of nuclear explosions—
whether for testing, or against satellites, or missiles or for any other purpose—in outer
space for those states that are parties to the treaty.56 However, the notion of “nuclear
explosion” in the treaty, according to some interpretation, pertains only to open

54 Cheng, Studies in International Space Law, 1997,525.
55 Ibid., 650-652.
56 Although China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on September 24, 1996, it was
never a party to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). See the UN information on the treaty status by
country and treaty in United Nations, Status o f Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament
Agreements, http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf (accessed 03.12.02).
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explosions, and not to enclosed nuclear explosions, which may be used to supply gammaray, X-ray or other type of laser weapons in space without producing a nuclear explosion
in outer space or causing radioactive debris to be present in the environment of outer
space beyond the interior of the weapon. Furthermore, the 1963 Treaty can be interpreted
in such a way as to be relevant only to regulating nuclear tests in outer space in
peacetime. It does not regulate the use of nuclear explosions in outer space in time of
war.
This is not merely to emphasize that the Cold War legal regime for outer space
was deficient in restricting the use of force, but to point out that the fact that outer space
was used peacefully and was kept free of weapons despite the existing loopholes in the
legal regime and that this was largely based on the consensus of the two superpowers and
other states, joining them later in the space club. Furthermore, an argument can be made
that by keeping space free of weapons and free of the use of force in space throughout the
C*7

Cold War and after its end—whether purposefully or not—the main space actors helped
to establish a norm of non-use of force in outer space. Those who oppose weaponization
of outer space call for upholding and strengthening this international norm in a new
emerging world order. The above outline of the legal outer space regime seems to
support the claim that this norm is more than their wishful thinking. Moreover, this norm
has received overwhelming support, which was reflected in the voting on the annual

57 During the Cold War, there was a suspicion that in October and November 1975 the Soviet Union
intentionally used intense radiation beams to interfere with three American satellites. Later, however, after
a Department o f Defense investigation, the U.S. government gave an explanation stating that the observed
degradation o f those satellites was caused by natural phenomenon. See Lambeth, Mastering the Ultimate
High Ground, 2003, 102-103. Apparently, a large rupture and resultant fire along the trans-Siberian gas
pipeline affected the sensors o f the U.S. satellites, according to the official U.S. explanation. See Stares,
The Militarization o f Space, 1985, 146.
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United Nations General Assembly resolutions for the past two decades, calling for
maintaining peaceful uses of space and preventing an arms race in outer space.58
The legal framework of the security regime was a foundation of the security
regime that governed outer space. The second important component of this regime was
the actual interaction of the United States and the Soviet Union in the issue area of outer
space—tacit agreements between the two superpowers and actual military uses of outer
space. This is the focus of the next section, which will also show that progress in space
technology towards the end of the Cold War began to undermine the underlying
foundation of the norm of non-use of force in outer space.

EVOLUTION OF THE COLD WAR SPACE SECURITY REGIME: THE MILITARY
USES OF OUTER SPACE
The launch of the R-7 rocket, the Soviet ICBM that carried Sputnik 1 into space,
could be considered as the first military use of space.59 Although the Soviet Union
launched Sputnik I as their contribution to the International Geophysical Year, the R-7
missile was designed for military purposes by the OKB-1 and its flight on October 4,
1957, was a demonstration of the Soviet Union’s newly acquired military capability.60
In the United States, in response to the launch of Sputnik 1, a number of space weapon
systems were proposed and their feasibility examined, including anti-satellite weapons,
58 Most o f these resolutions have been unanimous and without opposition, although the United States and
some other states have abstained.
59 Weber and Drell, in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet
Security Cooperation, 1988, 373.
60 S. P. Korolev, the chief designer o f the Experimental Design Bureau No. 1 (OKB-1), who also often
called the founder o f the Soviet space program, proposed the launch o f Sputnik as a part o f the test program
o f the ICBM project on May 26, 1954. By that time, the R-7 missile was designed to be capable o f
propelling an H-bomb warhead o f 5 tons over an intercontinental ballistic trajectory. See James J. Harford,
“Korolev’s Triple Play: Sputniks 1, 2 and 3,” in Roger D. Launius, John M. Logsdon, and Robert W. Smith
eds., Reconsidering Sputnik: Forty Years since the Soviet Satellite (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic
Publishers, 2000), 76.
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orbital bombardment systems, and space-based ballistic missile defenses.61 Some of
them were tested, as discussed in the previous section. Even before Sputnik 1 the United
States began developing reconnaissance satellites in order to gather strategic intelligence
and get a better understanding of what was going on in the Soviet Union, as it remained a
virtually closed country. The development of reconnaissance satellites became
particularly urgent for the United States after the Soviet Union shot down one of the
United States’ high altitude U-2 reconnaissance aircrafts.

ff)

Thus, from the beginning of

the Space Age, space was an integral part o f the superpower military competition.63
The military uses of outer space evolved over time from photoreconnaissance to
more and more military uses to include uses of highly sophisticated systems, such as
integrated tactical warning and attack assessment (ITW&AA), weather and
environmental monitoring, satellite communications, surveillance and reconnaissance,
navigation and positioning. With the exception of ITW&AA, which is a military
function that cannot be provided by nonmilitary resources, these activities are of dual-use
nature—they can serve military as well as non-military purposes. Military space systems
have been used for detecting missile launches, mapping, aerial refueling and rendezvous,
weather forecasting, verification of arms control treaties and monitoring of non
proliferation activities.64 To the extent that outer space has been used for these military

61 See Stares, The Militarization o f Space, 1985, 19.
62 The first flight o f a U-2 aircraft over the territory o f the Soviet Union took place in 1956. On May 1,
1960, the Soviet Union destroyed Gary Power’s U-2 plane with anti-aircraft missiles. See Stares, The
Militarization o f Space, 1985, 32, 46.
63 The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the development o f military
applications o f space technology did affect the ongoing arms race taking place between the United States
and the Soviet Union. One o f the consequences o f Sputnik was a new round o f strategic weapons buildup.
See Stares, The Militarization o f Space, 1985, 13, 236.
64 Weber and Drell classify military activities in outer space during the Cold War into two categories. The
first category is comprised o f “benign” military activities, such as use o f photoreconnaissance for
verification o f arms control agreements, early warning o f a nuclear attack, reliable communications. The
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purposes, this medium is militarized, but not weaponized. Although both superpowers
invested in the development of anti-satellite technologies and anti-satellite weapons were
tested in outer space,65 no weapons have yet been deployed in this strategic medium.
Military space activities during the Cold War and up to now have been generally
compatible with the norms of the peaceful use of outer space and the non-use of force in
outer space.66
The maintenance of the outer space security regime was influenced by a number
of factors, such as the overall political climate in the relations between the United States
and the Soviet Union, advances in space technology, developments in military theory,
and bureaucratic politics. Weber and Drell divide the Cold War years into four periods of
U.S.-U.S.S.R. security cooperation in outer space based on the characteristics of the U.S.
policies towards space security: the 1960-1968 period—the period of the formation of
legal regime regulating outer space—was characterized by the American strategy of
contingent restraint in military space activities and limited coordination of space policies
of the two superpowers; during the late 1960s-early 1970s, the United States maintained
the strategy of contingent restraint and this period was distinguished by successful
cooperation in military uses of space despite a number of serious challenges; the mid-

second category encompasses less “benign” activities that enhance or multiply the effectiveness o f military
forces on the ground, on the sea or in the air. The third category o f military uses o f space, the direct
application o f force in space and from space, never materialized during the Cold War. See Weber and
Drell, in Alexander L., George Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security
Cooperation, 1988, 374-375.
65 In 1968, the Soviet Union, for example, tested its anti-satellite capability by launching in a “killer”
satellite capable o f intercepting and destroying target satellites in a low earth orbit (LEO). See John L.
Gaddis, “The Evolution o f a Reconnaissance Satellite Regime,” in George, Farley, Dallin, U. S.-Soviet
Security Cooperation, 1988, 363. The United States deployed two ground-based AS AT systems in the
Pacific during the 1960s, one o f which was operating until mid 1970s. See Stares, The Militarization o f
Space, 1985,19.
This is not to say that maintaining a regime restraining military uses o f space was unproblematic. See
Gaddis, “The Evolution o f a Reconnaissance Satellite Regime,” and Weber and Drell, in Alexander L.
George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation, 1988, 353-354, 373.
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1970s-1980 period was characterized by the shift in the U.S. strategy towards a two-track
approach—contingent threats of escalation linked to the process of negotiations of formal
agreements limiting military activities in space, a period of significant deterioration of
space security regime; and finally, the 1980-1986 period was marked by the United States
move to unrestrained competition in military space activities and the near collapse of the
U.S.-U.S.S.R. security regime governing military uses of space.67
Discussing the outer space security regime in the context of superpower
coordination of their policies for the military uses of space, Weber and Drell show that
technology was an influential factor for change in the space security regime. According
to Weber and Drell, military satellites (MILSATs) can be distinguished by the nature of
their mission: some may be classified as benign, others as having hostile functions, and a
third category are those capable of the direct application of force from space, such as
ballistic missile defense and anti-satellite weapons based in space. In the early days of
the Space Age, military satellites with benign functions could be distinguished from those
with hostile functions but anti-satellite weapons technology was in the early stages of
development and the available forms of denial did not allow the two superpowers to
discriminate sufficiently between those military satellites that served benign or stabilityenhancing functions and those that could carry out hostile functions.

Application of

force from space was not deemed militarily advantageous by either superpower at that

67 Within each o f these periods, Weber and Drell analyze influences o f the following five clusters o f
variables on security cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union: (1) interests and
incentives o f the superpowers, (2) general political environment, (3) development o f military and strategic
theory, (4) bureaucratic politics and (5) the importance o f “saliencies”— that is, focal points around which
the states’ expectations converge. See Weber and Drell, in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and
Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation, 1988, 373-433.
68 Ibid., 375.
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time,69 even though the capability was technologically feasible and was being developed
by the two superpowers.70 The overall situation provided favorable conditions for
developing and maintaining a security regime based on the U.S. and Soviet restraint in
the military activities in space during the early part of the Space Age.
Later, however, as anti-satellite weapons technology improved and ASAT
weapons could be made to eliminate hostile satellite discretely, the line between benign
and hostile military satellites began to blur. In the late 1960s, advances in military
satellite technology started to erode the distinction between the use of space for activities
of mutual benefits and hostile uses of space. These advances were increasing the
potential for the use of space assets in the support and enhancement of the military forces
on the ground.71 Advancing technology enabled benign satellite capabilities to expand
into hostile applications. In the 1980s, the United States launched the first
photoreconnaissance satellite capable of digital imaging and real-time transmission of
data to ground stations and started to deploy its NOVSTAR Global Positioning System
(GPS) satellite constellation capable of providing support to ground forces and air
operations. Advances in technology not only led to the expansion of military uses of
space towards greater force support and force enhancement,

77

but also stimulated

69 See, for example, Stares, The Militarization o f Space, 1985, 240-241.
70 The Soviet Union demonstrated that it was developing a capability to launch weapons from space at
other targets in space or on the ground in 1961. See Weber and Drell, in Alexander L. George, Philip J.
Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation, 1988, 380.
71 See Weber and Drell, in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet
Security Cooperation, 1988, 394-395.
72 While for the first decade and a half o f the Space Age military systems predominantly supported
strategic forces with early warning, communication, targeting and navigation information, in the later part
o f the Cold War satellite services expanded to provide support for the armed forces on the ground with
battlefield surveillance, tactical targeting and communication information. See Stares, The Militarization o f
Space, 1985, 242-243.
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development o f plans for the direct application of force from space.

TX

The continuing

development of space technology also considerably undermined the distinction between
dedicated and residual ASAT capabilities.74 Weber and Drell point out, that at the point
where increasing hostile capabilities of satellites started overshadowing their stabilityenhancing functions the interests of the two superpowers in regulating military activities
in outer space started to diverge significantly. The saliencies, the focal points around
which cooperative measures were possible in the 1960s, eroded by the early 1980s. The
consensus that underlay the outer space security regime began falling apart. The
possibilities of advancing space technology were seen by the United States as providing it
with greater advantages than any cooperative restraint in the military uses of space. The
Soviet Union, on the contrary, perceived greater threat in further escalation of military
activities in space and became more and more attracted to cooperative approaches to
regulating military space activities. Furthermore, rapid advances in space technology
also made it difficult for the two states to interpret each other’s behavior, when shared
definitions of cooperative behavior did not seem to keep up with the pace of
technological change.75 As a result, the underlying technological basis of the space
security regime and perceptions changed and led to the significant erosion of the space
security regime by the late 1970s and early 1980s.76
Development of strategic and military theory during the Cold War was another
factor that influenced the evolution of security strategy and the security regime in outer
73 Stares maintains that the influence o f technological advances, particularly in non-nuclear kill techniques
and terminal homing devices developed within the BMD and ASAT research programs was particularly
strong on President Reagan’s decision on the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983. See Stares, The
Militarization o f Space, 1985, 243.
74 Weber and Drell, in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet
Security Cooperation, 1988, 419.
75 Ibid., 406.
76 Stares, The Militarization o f Space, 1985, 242-243.
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space. Increasingly, in the later part of the Cold War, strategic theorists and U.S. policy
makers started interpreting the requirements of deterrence as conditions in which the U.S.
capabilities should match and exceed Soviet capabilities for war-fighting in order to
ensure extended deterrence. This trend found its materialization in the Presidential
Directive PD/NSC 59.77 According to the new strategy, the United States would have to
actively threaten the Soviet Union in order to achieve viable deterrence, as well as
strategic and political stability. This posture was not conducive to cooperative regulation
of military uses of space.78
Deterioration of political climate after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
also contributed to the deterioration of the space security regime, for the military actions
of the Soviet Union ushered in the end of the superpowers’ detente and cessation of the
U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations on the issue of ASAT weapons.

70

In the early 1980s, the

incoming Reagan Administration made a political commitment to the unilateral pursuit of
military capabilities in space in accordance with the U.S. security interests. The famous
“Star Wars” speech by President Reagan was an announcement of a new strategy—the

77 President Carter signed PD/NSC 59, “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,” in 1980. PD/NSC 59
represented a major shift in the U.S. nuclear strategy. First, it mandated a shift in targeting priorities from
the destruction o f economic recovery targets being key task o f a U.S. nuclear strike to the destruction o f
Soviet political and military assets— specifically strategic military targets, leadership bunkers, C31 facilities
and links and other military targets (conventional forces, theater/tactical nuclear forces). Second, the
directive required that the United States develop the capability to fight a protracted nuclear conflict, which
might last months instead o f days. It required strategic weapons and C31 systems, which would have the
characteristics o f endurance and flexible response. Such forces would be expected to survive a first strike,
be available for use in an immediate retaliatory strike, and be able to operate for months afterwards. See
U.S. President, Presidential Directive PD/NSC 59, “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,” July 25, 1980,
http://jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/pddirectives/pd59.pdf (accessed 10.29.03). See also Digital
National Security Archives, “The Presidential Directives on National Security From Truman to Clinton,”
http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/pdessayx.htm (accessed 10.29.03).
78 Weber and Drell, in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet
Security Cooperation, 1988,406.
79 The U.S.-U.S.S.R. talks on the issue o f ASAT weapons began in Helsinki on June 8, 1978. Three
rounds o f negotiations held during a period o f one year made considerable progress. In June 1979, the
talks were put on hold following President Carter’s decision to give priority in the arms control field to the
ratification o f the SALT II Treaty.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

106
strategy of unconditional defection from the regime, or non-contingent escalation.
After 1983, the U.S. interests in the development of ASAT capabilities was no longer
contingent on Soviet activities in this field. The goal of the U.S. ASAT program now
was the development and deployment of anti-satellite capability with the purpose to deter
threats to space systems of the United States and its allies and to deny any adversary the
use of space-based systems that could provide support to hostile military forces.
President Reagan’s policy of strategic deterrence was also to change from relying on
deterrence alone to developing the capabilities to defend against ballistic missiles,
O 1

including via space-based weapon systems.

During Reagan’s tenure in the White

House the concept of the use and projection of force from space was thoroughly
considered for the first time.
In August 1983, in response to these developments in U.S. military space policy,
the Soviet Union announced unilateral contingent moratorium on ASAT tests and
pursued international venues, trying to outlaw weapons in space. At a meeting between

80 See U.S. President, “Address to the Nation on National Security By President Ronald Reagan,” March
23, 1983, http://www.fas.org/soo.starwars/offdocs/rrspch.htm (accessed 10.29.03). Although the March
1983 speech was an official announcement o f the new strategy, its elements were present already in the
earlier statements. In 1982, in a White House policy statement, the Administration expressed its
commitment to proceed with the development o f ASAT capabilities with “operational deployment as a
goal”. The purpose o f this program was to acquire a capability to deny the adversary, if necessary, access
to space assets. See citation in Weber and Drell, in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander
Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation, 1988, 413. However, it was two days after the famous
speech that President Reagan singed NSDD 85 “Eliminating the Threat From Ballistic Missiles,” which
requested “an intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program aimed at an ultimate
goal o f eliminating the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles” and an assessment o f “the roles that
ballistic missile defense would play in future security strategy o f the United States.” See U.S. President,
National Security Decision NSD 85, March 25, 1983, http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/
nsdd085.htm (accessed 11.21.03). BMD research guidance were formally set in Strategic Defense
Initiative NSDD 119, which was signed by President Reagan almost a year later, in January 1984. See
National Security Decision Directive 119, January 6, 1984,
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/nsddl 19.htm (accessed 11.21.03).
81 Stares, The Militarization o f Space, 1985, 218.
82 The U.S. Air Force’s “Space Master Plan,” identifying long-term objectives till the year 2000, for
example, envisioned “space combat” systems. See Stares, The Militarization o f Space, 1985,219.
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the General Secretary Andropov and a group of United States Senators visiting Moscow,
Andropov announced:
The U.S.S.R. assumes the commitment not to be the first to put into outer space
any type of antisatellite weapon, that is, imposes a unilateral moratorium on such
launchings for the entire period during which other countries, including the USA,
will refrain from stationing in outer space antisatellite weapons of any type.83
The day after the announcement of the moratorium, the Soviet Union submitted to
the United Nations a second draft of a treaty, proposing to outlaw the use of force in
space and calling for a prohibition on testing and deployment of space-based weapons
capable o f striking against targets in space or on the Earth.

The Reagan

Administration, however, did not take up this opportunity to negotiate a ban on the ASAT
weapons. The 1984 Report to the Congress on U.S. Policy on ASAT Arms Control
stated:
... [N]o arrangements or agreements beyond those already governing military
activities in outer space have been found to date that are judged to be in the
overall interests of the United States and its Allies. The factors which impede the
identification of effective ASAT arms control measures include significant
difficulties of verification, diverse sources of threats to U.S. and Allied satellites
and threats posed by Soviet targeting and reconnaissance satellites which
undermine conventional and nuclear deterrence.85
Adropov’s successor at the helm of the Soviet Union, General Secretary
Chernenko, called again for a ban on ASAT weapons and confirmed the Soviet Union’s
commitment to the unilateral ASAT moratorium. Despite this new effort by the Soviet

83 Dusko Doder, “Andropov Urges Ban on Weapons to Attack Satellites,” Washington Post, August 19,
1983,5, quoted in Stares, The Militarization o f Space, 1985,231.
84 The first “Draft Treaty on the Prohibition o f the Stationing o f Weapons o f Any Kind in Outer Space”
was submitted by the Soviet Union to the United Nations in August 1981. See United Nations, “Draft
Treaty on the Prohibition o f the Stationing o f Weapons o f Any Kind in Outer Space,” submitted by the
Soviet Union to the United Nations, U.N. Document A/36/192, August 1981. The second draft titled
“Treaty on the Prohibition o f the Use o f Force in Outer Space and From Space Against the Earth” was
submitted in August 1983. See United Nations, “Treaty on the Prohibition o f the Use o f Force in Outer
Space and From Space Against the Earth,” submitted by the Soviet Union to the Untied Nations, U.N.
Document A/38/194, August 1983.
85 U.S. Congressional Conference, Report to the Congress on U.S. Policy on ASAT Arms Control, March
31, 1984, http://www.security-policy.org/papers/other/ASAT-0384.html (accessed 11.21.03).
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Union, the United States tested its ASAT weapons in 1985, thereby emphasizing its
commitment to unrestrained competition in space and giving the Soviet Union an
opportunity to withdraw from the self-imposed contingent moratorium on the ASAT
tests.87 In the decision to carry on the ASAT testing, it is likely that the political situation
in the Soviet Union in the first half of the 1980s—when the CPSU General Secretaries
succeeded one anther at the reigns in a matter o f months—played an important role.
Numerous political changes in the Soviet leadership after the death of long-time Soviet
leader General Secretary Brezhnev must have raised significant concerns with respect to
security and uncertainty as to what would be the new course of the Soviet leaders.
In the Soviet Union, however, changes in the leadership did not result in a change
in the overall stance towards the space security regime. The new General Secretary
Gorbachev who came to power in 1985— after a rather short rule of General Secretary
Chernenko— followed the suit of both his predecessors Andropov and Chernenko in
continuing to insist on the prevention of an arms race in space:
SDI is the continuation of the arms race into a different, more dangerous
sphere... It will only foment mistrust and suspicion, with each side fearing the
other is overtaking it. The Soviet Union strongly opposes an arms race in space.
But if the Americans remain deaf to common-sense arguments and to our appeal
to seek a way out of the arms race and reduce existing nuclear stockpiles, we will
have no choice but to accept the challenge. ... ’I think you should know that we
have already developed a response. It will be effective and far less expensive
than your project, and be ready for use in less time.’ ... I can assure you that we
were not bluffing.88

86 The United States tested its Air-Launched Miniature Vehicles (ALMV) twice in 1984 firing interceptors
but not against a target. Its first and the only test against a satellite was performed in October 1985 when
an old U.S. satellite was destroyed in orbit. The U.S. Air Force continued testing ASAT system in 1986
but not against real target in space. See Laura Grego, “A History o f U.S. and Soviet ASAT Programs,” the
Union o f Concerned Scientists, Online Publication, April 9, 2003, http://www.eusuca.org/
global_security/space_weapons/page.cffn?pageID=T 151 (accessed 10.29.03).
7 The Soviet Union, nonetheless, continued to observe the unilateral moratorium, while at the same time
pursuing the development o f missile defense technologies. See Ibid.
8 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 407.
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Gorbachev did not believe in the purely defensive nature of Reagan’s SDI and
OQ

thought that it was opening the door for the weaponization of space.

On his part,

Gorbachev was committed to the prevention of an arms race in space perhaps as
passionately as President Reagan was committed to the SDI program.90 To Gorbachev,
prevention of an arms race was a matter of principle, as well as strategic calculation.91
Gorbachev strongly urged a continuing commitment to the ABM treaty. However, he
was prepared to agree that the United States would conduct research and tests for the SDI
program.

QO

He continued to adhere to the unilateral ASAT weapons test moratorium even

after the United States conducted its ASAT tests. He was also prepared to go to great
lengths in order to address Western concerns with the Soviet development of ASAT
weapons. In 1989, the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Soviet Academy of
Sciences arranged for a U.S. delegation to visit the Sari Shagon Laser-Ranging Facility in
Kazakhstan where the Soviet laser ASAT project was under the development. It was
after this visit that the U.S. Congress included bans on using the MIRACL laser against
AT

objects in space in the defense appropriations bills for 1991-1995.

89 Ibid., 455.
90 President Reagan’s so-called “Star Wars” speech was founded on a conviction that it was a moral
obligation o f the President o f the United States to defend American people against ballistic missile attacks
and end the strategy o f mutual deterrence based “solely on offensive retaliation.” He specifically said:
“Over the course o f these discussions, I’ve become more and more deeply convinced that the human spirit
must be capable o f rising above dealing with other nations and human beings by threatening their existence.
Feeling this way, I believe we must thoroughly examine every opportunity for reducing tensions and for
introducing greater stability into the strategic calculus on both sides. ... If the Soviet Union will join with
us in our effort to achieve major arms reduction, we will have succeeded in stabilizing the nuclear balance.
Nevertheless, it will still be necessary to rely on the specter o f retaliation, on mutual threat. And that’s sad
commentary on the human condition. Would it not be better to save lives than to avenge them? Are we not
capable o f demonstrating our peaceful intentions by applying all our abilities and ingenuity to achieving a
truly lasting stability? I think we are. Indeed, we must.” See U.S. President, “Address to the Nation on
National Security By President Ronald Reagan,” March 23, 1983.
91 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 1996,446,455.
92 Ibid., 418, 445.
93 In the United States Congress development and testing o f the ASAT weapons proved to be a
controversial issue at that time. See Grego, 2003.
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Analyzing the Cold War space security regime, Stares argues that up until the end
of the 1970s the absence of an arms race in outer space was a result of a convergence of
national interests of the United States and Soviet Union based on military disincentives
and technical constraints.94 He also maintains that formal arms control played a
significant role in buttressing the space security regime during the Cold War.
Technological advances, leading to the development of new or more efficient space
capabilities, increasing military reliance on space assets, bureaucratic politics, and
decline of superpower detente led to the erosion of the space security regime in the late
1970s and early 1980s. Stares concludes that the foundation on which convergence of
U.S. and Soviet security interests had been possible was no longer there and it was only a
matter of time before outer space would become an arena for a fierce arms race unless
measures were taken to prevent it.
Thus, all four prerequisites for a security regime pointed out by Jervis were
significantly eroded: (1) the United States no longer preferred to further restrict military
uses o f outer space; (2) U.S. and Soviet interests regarding security arrangements in outer
space began to diverge significantly; (3) the United State did not prefer the status quo',
and (4) it did not perceive unilateral steps as being more costly than cooperative ones.
The wisdom of the conclusion made by the Palm commission in its 1982 study started to
lose solid ground under its feet just as it was made public:
In the m odem age, security cannot be obtained unilaterally. E conom ically,
p olitically, culturally, and— m ost importantly— m ilitarily, w e live in an
increasingly interdependent world. The security o f one nation cannot be bought
at the expanse o f others. The danger o f nuclear war alone assures the validity o f
this p r o p o sitio n .... Peace cannot be obtained through military confrontation. It
m ust be sought through a tireless process o f negotiation, rapprochement, and

94 Stares, The Militarization o f Space, 1985, 237-238.
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norm alization, w ith the goal o f rem oving mutual suspicion and fear. W e face
com m on dangers and thus m ust also promote our security in com m on.95

The sudden end of the Cold War gave the ailing space security regime some
extension of life by presenting the United States with more urgent issues to deal with,
such as ensuring a peaceful transition of the Soviet Union’s partners in the Warsaw bloc,
and the Soviet Union itself, to more liberal forms of governance— a task that for a while
largely overshadowed space security issues. The norm of non-use of force in outer space,
however, endured beyond the historic time period that gave rise to it, preserving space
free of weapons and allowing commercialization of outer space to take off. The
significance of the norm of non-use of force in outer space is that unlike the legally
established norm of “peaceful” use of outer space that acquired such a loose
interpretation over the years so as to permit space-based missile defense systems and
non-ABC weapons, this norm underscores unacceptability of introduction and use of
weapons in or from space, and against space objects—a taboo on the use of force in
space.96

93 O lof Palme, et al., Common Security: A Programme fo r Disarmament (London: Pan Books for the
Independent Commission on Security and Disarmament Issues, 1982), 12.
96 See, for example, Theresa Hitchens, “Rushing to Weaponize the Final Frontier,” Arms Control Today,
September 2001, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_09/hitchenssept01.asp (accessed 09.28.02).
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PART II
COMMERCIALIZATION OF OUTER SPACE AND THE EVOLUTION OF SPACE
SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA:
THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA, AND CHINA

Earth is the cradle o f humanity but one cannot remain
in the cradle forever...
Konstantin E. Tsiolkovskii
1895
In the long run, the very long run indeed, the security
o f the human race most likely will depend upon its space
power. The dinosaurs faced a grim prospect between
emigrating and extinction and were condemned
technologically to the latter. Fortunately for us, the random
menace from fast-moving alien object in space would appear
to pose far more severe a threat to life on Earth than does
purposeful menace from an alien civilization that would be
unschooled in the niceties o f the Geneva Convention. An
asteroid may just terminate the human experience and settle
religious arguments, but at least in principle it is detectable,
trackable, and possibly divertable.
Colin S. Gray and John B. Sheldon
1999

Part II of this dissertation consists of two large components: the first component
deals with the phenomenon of commercialization of outer space, the independent variable
of this study, and the second component contains the examination of the evolution of
space security interests of the United States, Russia and China at three different levels: at
the domestic and bilateral levels, and at the level of global governance. The tasks of
Chapter IV are fourfold. First, it outlines the economic potential of outer space and
defines the commercialization of outer space. Second, this chapter maintains that
although the economic potential of outer space was recognized even before the dramatic
opening o f the Space Age by states as well as commercial actors, this medium was used
largely for military and foreign policy ends during the Cold War. Third, it shows that
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although commercialization of space began well before the end of the Cold War, it was
after the end of the bipolar confrontation that commercialization of outer space took off
and transformed space activities into an economic mainstream. And finally, it argues that
commercialization of space activities significantly progressed after the end of the Cold
War in all three states under consideration in this study—the United States, Russia and
China.
Chapters V through IX analyze the evolution of the overall security strategies and
security interests in the issue area of outer space of three spacepowers—the United
States, Russia, and China. The objective is to assess whether security interests of these
three states have been converging or diverging in the post-Cold War era and to what
degree commercial interests influenced the evolution of their security interests as
contrasted with their strategic concerns.
The present analysis draws upon liberal methodology that relies on the postulate
of the primacy of state interests over state strategic interaction and adopts two-stage
research design: (1) analysis of state preferences at the domestic level and (2) analysis of
the strategic interaction of states.1 For the liberal perspective, defining the interests of the
main actors is theoretically central. The state is considered as a representative institution
0
that aggregates the interests of a group of societal actors. In this analysis, the main
»

•

•

attention is on state security interests—those interests that are aggregated, in this case, in
a form of state security strategies. National security strategies reflect security interests
and present broad plans for achieving national objectives supporting those interests.3

1 Moravcsik, 1997, 543-545.
2 Ibid., 517-518.
3 See, for example, White House, National Security Strategy o f the United States, Washington D. C.,
January 1988, 3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114
Interests underlie not only the strategic calculations of the state but also strategic
interactions with other states at the bilateral level and at the level of global governance.
Therefore, in order to understand the outcomes of strategic interactions of states, analysis
of state interests is fundamentally important. In order to explain liberal pacification, it is
necessary to analyze how economic interdependence affects security interests. With
respect to space, it requires an analysis of whether the commercialization of outer space
leads to converging or non-converging security interests in outer space.
In the post-Cold War period, all three states—the United States, Russia, and
China—produced documents with official assessments of the security environment,
outlining their security interests and strategies to deal with identified threats. In the
United States, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 requires the
President to submit an annual report on the national security strategy.4 The purpose of a
President’s report is to give a comprehensive assessment of the security environment, a
clear statement of United States security interests, objectives, and concepts for achieving
them, and thereby lend coherence to the budgeting process. In Russia, Concepts of
National Security and Military Doctrines are issued by the National Security Council as a
measure to provide greater transparency in security matters for both domestic purposes
and for foreign relations. The first document of a series of such documents was signed
by the President of the Russian Federation in 1993. In the post-Cold War era, China also
published documents that broadly serve similar purposes as U.S. National Security
Strategy and Russian Concepts of National Security.

4 See U.S. Congress, The Goldwater-Nichols Department o f Defense Reorganization Act o f 1986
Conference Report, September 1986, Section 603, http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/99824pt2.pdf
(accessed 11.25.03).
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Even though these documents may not fully represent the state of security affairs
of the three spacepowers under consideration or may not show wholly the true interests of
states, these documents were produced with the view of communicating information
about state interests, objectives, and strategies, including with regard to outer space, to
other states in the international system and domestic audiences. For this reason, and to
the extent that they were used to formulate and communicate state interests to other
international and domestic actors, these documents are useful for this study. Their
consistency is checked against state behavior at the level of interstate interactions at the
bilateral level, at the level of global governance, and in the context of changing security
environment. The distinction is also made with respect to the nature of security approach
between liberal and non-liberal concepts of security.
Chapters V, VI, and VII are devoted to the task of analyzing the three
spacepowers’ security strategies and interests based on these documents. The analysis of
the documents and the broader security context in which these documents were brought
into being will focus on the following five questions. First, what were the overall
security strategies of the United States, Russia, and China in the post-Cold War era? A
particular attention will be devoted to two aspects: (a) the changing vision of the
emerging world order: multipolarity versus unipolarity, and (b) to the type of security
concepts of the three spacepowers: liberal versus non-liberal. The former is important for
the realist argument and the latter for the liberal one. Second, what were their security
interests in regard to outer space security? Third, what place did space security occupy in
their overall security strategies? Fourth, to what extent did the three states’ economic
interests in the issue area of outer space affect, if at all, their security interests? And
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finally, did their security interests with regard to outer space converge or diverge over the
period of time under consideration?
As the issue of the weaponization of outer space has emerged as one of the most
important, urgent and the same time contested issues in interstate relations in the postCold War era, this issue is used as a “litmus test” for assessing the converging and non
converging security interests of the three spacepowers. The fundamental interest of states
with respect to outer space—and the right granted by the Outer Space Treaty—is a free,
unimpeded access to outer space. Extension of commerce into outer space has created
incentives both for and against the weaponization of outer space. Extending the use of
force to this medium, including via the weaponization option, threatens the states’
fundamental interest in free access to outer space, as well as raises other security
concerns. Two main options to deal with these threats are available: first, arms control
banning the use of force and weaponization of outer space, and second, weaponization of
space in order to deter, defend, and deny the use of space to enemies. A third option is a
combination of the two: a mix of weaponization of space and arms buildups and arms
control restricting the use of force in an effort to make space security relations more
stable. The present study will focus on these issues, as they are important for evaluating
converging and non-converging security interests.
Chapters VIII and IX deal with interstate interactions at the bilateral level and
between the three states within the framework of the chief international organization
charged with negotiations on security issues, including space security—the Conference
on Disarmament in Geneva—respectively. At the bilateral level, the study analyzes
bilateral documents: treaties, agreements, memoranda, and communiques. The analysis
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of the inter-state interaction at the level of global governance is focused on the annual
reports, verbatim records and other documents of the Conference on Disarmament.
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CHAPTER IV
THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF OUTER SPACE: THE UNITED STATES,
RUSSIA, AND CHINA

[L]ess than ten years ago, it was thought that
commercial space communications had leveled off as an
activity area. Now, the sky is the limit and the possibilities are
deemed confined only by one’s imagination.
Roger Handberg

2000

The commercialization of outer space is one of the most significant developments
of our time. It opens the vast richness of outer space for an improvement of human
conditions on Earth on increasingly widening scale. If it were not for the
commercialization of outer space, this medium would still be predominantly a province
of the military.1 The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that placing the discussion
of outer space issues in the context of liberal-realist debate on economic interdependence
and international conflict and cooperation is proper and timely. To that end, this chapter
fulfills the following tasks: first, it outlines the economic potential of outer space and
defines commercialization of outer space; second, it establishes that during the Cold War
outer space was used overwhelmingly for military purposes, even though its economic
potential was recognized from the beginning not only by the states engaged in space
activities but also by commercial actors; third, although commercialization of space
began well before the end of the Cold War, it was after the end of the bipolar
confrontation that commercialization of outer space took off and transformed space
activities into a part of the economic mainstream; fourth, commercialization of space
1 See, for example, Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and
Organization, Report, Chapter 2 “Space: Today and the Future,” 2001.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

119
activities significantly progressed after the end of the Cold War in all three states under
consideration in this study—the United States, Russia and China. In each of the cases,
the following questions are addressed: (1) What steps did the governments of the United
States, Russia, and China take to promote commercialization of outer space activities in
their countries and what were the main features of their commercialization strategies? (2)
To what extent was commercialization of space activities allowed to affect overall space
activities of these states? (3) Did commercial space activities become an important part of
their overall space activities so as to have an influence over their security perceptions and
interests?

THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF OUTER SPACE
During the Cold War, outer space was extensively used for military purposes by
the two superpowers and “space race” became an integral part of the Cold War. The
space competition between the United States and the Soviet Union spawned large space
industries and government bureaucracies that guided and supervised the two countries’
space endeavors.2 While researchers, designers and manufacturers commissioned by the

2 “Space industry” is a term often used in a broad sense to describe any number o f companies that are
related to space whether companies manufacture or launch rockets or satellites, operate satellites in space
or provide satellite communication services. In a narrow definition, “space industry” includes companies
that build or market space launch vehicles, spacecrafts, and ground equipment. The Department o f
Commerce's Office o f Space Commercialization in its 2001 report Trends in Space Commerce defines
space industry as follows: “It is not only composed o f satellites and their launches, but now encompasses
many direct-to-consumer applications, Internet services, and entertainment applications.” The report
identifies four major sectors o f space industry: (1) space transportation, (2) satellite communication, (3)
remote sensing, (4) navigation and positioning. See U.S. Department o f Commerce, Trends in Space
Commerce, 2001, 1-1. Space industry emerged as a government driven sector and, in the West, was a part
o f the larger aerospace industry. Space industry started separating from aerospace industry as an
independent sector o f economy only recently and this is why its definition is still problematic. Another
reason is that space industry partly overlaps with already well-established industries, such as electronics,
information technology, software, communications, manufacturing, materials, transportation and defense.
The 1998 State o f the Space Industry suggests the inclusion into space industry o f the following: (1)
manufacturing o f space launch vehicles, (2) satellite manufacturing; (3) ground equipment manufacturing,
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governments of the two superpowers competed fiercely for the marvelous “firsts,” the
space industries grew under conditions when there was almost no price too high for the
two rivals to pay for the victory in the space race: both governments invested great
material, financial, and intellectual resources in their space projects.
Despite the flurry of activities in space exploration for the sake of foreign policy
and military gains of the superpowers, the economic potential of space was appreciated
rather early in the Space Age. Indeed, the possibility of the use of outer space for
communication purposes and its economic significance was recognized even before the
beginning of the Space Age. In his Extraterrestrial Relays, Arthur C. Clark described a
global communication system based on satellites placed in geostationary orbit.3 He
foresaw that such satellites linked by radio with one another and the ground would allow
anyone to communicate with others almost anywhere on Earth. Such a system would be
a solution to the rapidly growing communication needs between the United States and

(4) satellite telecommunications; (5) remote sensing; (6) GPS; (7) microgravity manufacturing; (8) support
(legal) services and finance; and (9) government activities. According to the report, space industry defined
by industry sectors, consists of: (1) space based infrastructure (satellites, space stations); (2) ground-based
infrastructure (equipment, facilities, software); (3) transportation infrastructure (launch vehicles and
propulsion systems); (4) applications (utilization o f space assets, mircrogravity manufacturing, tourism,
robotic exploration; (5) telecommunications (fixed and mobile satellite services, direct-to-home services);
(6) support services (legal, licensing, finance, insurance, consulting); (7) research and development. See
1998 State o f the Space Industry, Bethesda: Space Publications LLC, 1998. In the present study the broad
definition o f space industry is employed. Using the broad definition is more appropriate in this study
because it includes an important segment o f satellite services. Space industry in a narrow sense and
satellite services are two large categories o f space industry that can be said to have differing interests
relating to space security arrangements. The global distribution o f economic power between these two
categories is as follows: in 2002, worldwide launch services, satellite manufacturing, and ground
equipment manufacturing provided for $37 billion in revenues, while satellite services accounted for $49.8
billion. See, for example, Jeff Foust, “What is the ‘Space Industry?’” Space Review, July 14, 2003,
http://www.thespacereview.eom/article/34/l (accessed 03.12.04). A detailed analysis o f the differing
security interests will remain outside the scope o f this study. Some reports also refer to “space industry” as
“satellite industry.” See, for example, Haller and Sakazaki, 2001.
3 Arthur C. Clark— then an officer in the Royal Air Force and later a well-known British science-fiction
writer—described an idea for a global communications system based on three orbiting satellites placed at
an equidistance from one another at an altitude o f 22,300 miles over the equator. See John L. McLucas,
Space Commerce (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 16.
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Western Europe, as their economic ties expanded rapidly after the Second World War.4
A satellite link between the United States and Europe was the first application where the
possibility of using satellites was seriously considered for economic purposes—to
support growing economic relations.
Sputnik 1 did not only gave a start to the superpower “space race,” but also served
as a first step towards satellite communications: the first Soviet satellite carried a small
transmitter that sent radio signals back to Earth. The first communication satellite
launched by the United States in December 1958 was for the military. However, in 1962,
NASA launched two satellites: one of them was Telstar 1, a privately financed and
developed by AT&T’s Bell Telephone Laboratories satellite, and the second was Relay
developed by RCA and underwritten by NASA. In the early 1960s, NASA also pursued
Syncom communications satellite project that led to the development of the Early Bird 1
commercial communication spacecraft. It was launched in orbit in April 1965. The
emplacement of Early Bird 1 in a 24-hour orbit ushered in a new era of
communications—an era of global commercial satellite communications.
As the prospective satellite system was designed to provide connection between
the countries on different continents of the globe the United States needed an
international organization to put in place the necessary cooperative framework. A year
before the launch of Early Bird 1, several countries led by the United States signed an
agreement on cooperation in establishing a single, global communication satellite system.

4 The radio connection established first by Guglielmo Marconi between Europe and America in 1915 was
rather unreliable even after improvements made over the years. The first transatlantic underwater cable
TAT-1 built between Scotland and the United States went into service in 1956, giving Europe and America
a reliable voice connection for the first time. It had, however, a limited capacity: it was designed to handle
simultaneously only 36 telephone calls and provided no capacity for television transmission between the
continents. Ibid., 18.
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This agreement established the International Telecommunication and Satellite
Organization (INTELSAT). This organization was set up as a commercial enterprise but
its commercial nature was limited. It was a politicized international organization that
bore the burden of the Cold War rivalry. Neither the Soviet Union nor the members of
the socialist bloc joined the INTELSAT during the Cold War.
This does not mean, however, that the Soviet Union did not appreciate the
advantages of satellite communication and its economic significance. The Soviet Union
saw a great promise of using outer space for satellite communications in its own country
with its huge territory stretched over eight time zones and harsh terrain that is not always
amenable to terrestrial communications. The Soviet Union launched its first
communication satellite to the Molniya5 orbit in April 1965—at nearly the same time as
the United States launched its Early Bird 1—and its first satellites to the geosyncronous
orbit nearly a decade later—in 1974.6
In 1968, in order to break INTELSAT’s monopoly on global satellite
communication services, the Soviet Union established an alternative international
organization INTERSPUTNIK that provided satellite communication services for the
members of the Socialist bloc, Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam and some other countries from
the Soviet economic orbit.7 INTERSPUTNIK, however, was unlike INTELSAT in that

5 In contrast to the United States who pursued development o f communication satellites for the
geosynchronous orbit— an orbit in which satellites appeared stationary in the sky over the equator, the
Soviet Union chose the Molniya orbit for its communication needs— a highly elliptical orbit with a 12-hour
period o f rotation out o f which 8 hours a satellite lingered over Siberia allowing Soviet northern cities to
receive satellite services. Although satellites in such orbit required a more complicated tracking system
and heavy shielding because they passed through the Van Allen radiation belt, the Molniya orbit became
the basis o f the Soviet satellite communication system.
6 Brian Harvey, Russia in Space: The Failed Frontier? (Chichester: Springer, 2001), 159.
7 McLucas argues that INTERSPUTNIK is a regional organization, whereas INTELSAT is a global
international organization. See McLucas, Space Commerce, 1991, 63.
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its members did not jointly own any satellites: INTERSPUTNIK leased capacity on
Soviet communication satellites and it was not a commercial enterprise.
Satellite communications was one of the earliest, most economically significant,
and commercially successful utilizations of outer space. It also was established quite
early as a cooperative international activity within the limits of the Cold War rivalry. The
international organizations created under the leadership of the United States and Soviet
Union allowed their members to receive the benefits of the advancements in satellite
communications.
Over the years, with the progress of communications and information
technologies many new satellite communications applications have emerged, such as
mobile satellite communications that allow its users to communicate from a distant
location, aboard a ship, in-flight airplane or a land transportation from any point on Earth;
satellite high-speed Internet access that provides point-to-point connection anywhere on
Earth; live public and private broadcast “videolinking” people and businesses again
anywhere on Earth; direct-to-home television and satellite radio, bringing entertainment
and news to any location on Earth; telemedicine transferring medical data and offering
medical expertise.
The potential of outer space is truly amazing. Other uses of outer space with great
economic benefit are satellite remote sensing, positioning and navigation. Earth’s remote
sensing includes a wide spectrum of methods of study of the earth’s surface via images
done by radar, infrared, microwave radiometers, still and TV cameras, magnetic sensors,
atmospheric sounders, laser distance meters, object plane scanners and others. Remote
sensing has been used for monitoring meteorological conditions, ocean currents and
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ocean temperatures, anthropological and natural changes in the environment and climate
in the short and long term, for observing difficult-to-access terrain, for providing synoptic
views o f large portions of Earth’s surface without being hindered by political boundaries
or natural barriers, and many others. Information gathered via remote sensing can be
used for detailed mapping of the land, for urban planning, agriculture, forest
management, water resource assessment, for management of known natural resources and
exploration of new ones. Navigation satellites make it possible for users with ground
receivers to pinpoint their locations with great precision anywhere on the globe. This
space application has been used for navigating and tracking movements of ships,
airplanes, ground transportation, and people.
During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union pursued
development of their capabilities in remote sensing and navigation for military purposes
o

but used them to benefit their economies as well. In 1978, the United States introduced
its satellite navigation system called NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) for
military use and later extended it to civilian users all over the world.9 The Soviet Union
followed the suit and introduced its navigation satellite system called GLONASS in 1982
and later the Russian government transferred the GLONASS system from the Defense
Ministry to the Russian Space Agency as a step towards its “civilianization.”
8 In 1965, NASA obtained the support o f the Department o f Agriculture to develop methods for studying
Earth’s surface and resource from space. Shortly afterwards, the Earth’s Resources Technology Satellite
program, later known as LANDS AT, was established. The first remote sensing satellite Landsat 1, from
which current space-based remote sensing applications evolved, was launched by the United States in 1972.
In the Soviet Union, the development o f remote sensing was done within the Cosmos program and its Zenit
spy satellites. It is not precisely known when the first Soviet remote sensing satellite was launched, but
between 1975 and 1989, Cosmos satellites carried out 39 various remote sensing missions. See Harvey,
Russia in Space, 2001, 148-149. According to Joseph Angelo, Cosmos represents a name o f a large series
o f Soviet spacecrafts for both military purposes and scientific research. Cosmos 1 was launched in March
1962. See Joseph A. Angelo, Jr., The Dictionary o f Space Technology (New York: Facts on File Inc.,
1999), 88.
9 Developed by the Department o f Defense and operated by the U.S. Air Force, this system in, its
completed form, consists o f 20 orbiting satellites.
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Advances in space technology also led to utilization of outer space for material
processing in micro-gravity.10 Some other uses of outer space are only in planning
stages, such as space-based solar power systems and space mining for scarce natural
resources.11 Space tourism took off the ground with the flight of the world’s first space
tourist Denis Tito to the International Space Station on April 28-May 6, 2001, but
expectations are that it may grow into one of the largest activities in outer space.

19

In a

somewhat distant perspective, space-based manufacturing and settlement are also
considered.13
All in all, the economic potential of outer space is vast and some of what just
recently was the subject of science fiction has materialized. Nearly half a century after
the beginning of the Space Age, space activities have ceased to be predominantly a
matter of superpowers’ competition for prestige and military gain. Outer space has
entered the economic mainstream and given global reach to major sectors of the modem
world economy. Banks use satellite links to make their transactions around the world.
ATM machines and private communication networks that are used to process credit cards
rely on satellite systems. Tracking the location of parcels, ground transportation, air
traffic and ships rely on satellites. Farmers use satellite imaging for improving crop
yields. Management of natural resources relies on data from satellites. Weather
forecasting, monitoring of the environment and climate changes, gathering information
for news, direct-to-home TV and satellite radio depend on satellites. Education in

10 At the end o f the 1990s, microgravity manufacturing entered the experimental level o f development.
See Oliver Ferrandon, “International Market for a Reusable Launch Vehicle,” in G. Haskell and M.
Rycroft, eds., New Space Markets, 1998, 248.
11 Lou Dobbs, Space: The Next Business Frontier (New York: Pocket Books/ ibooks, 2001), 196-205.
12 Paula Berinstein, Making Space Happen: Private Space Ventures and the Visionaries Behind Them
(Medford: Plexus Publishing, Inc., 2002), 115.
13 Dobbs, Space, 2001,203.
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“virtual classrooms,” “videoconferencing” and business private communication networks
are made possible by satellites. Satellites provide mobile telephony and access to the
Internet as well as many other services. The developed countries have become dependent
on services provided by satellites for every-day life and business, while many developing
countries have pinned their hopes for economic development on space technologies that
can help them to leapfrog stages of economic development, facilitate better use of their
national resources, improve living conditions and promote their nation-building.
Commercialization of outer space has been instrumental in translating great
economic potential of outer space and amazing advances of space technology into real
economic gains. However, in order to materialize these gains, commercial actors needed
to have a reliable and affordable access to outer space. Space launch industry tightly
controlled by the military remained one of the bottlenecks of outer space
commercialization until the end of the Cold War.14

THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF OUTER SPACE
In a general definition, “commercialization” means an introduction of transfers of
goods and services based on the prices determined by the forces of demand and supply15
in place of non-market relations between suppliers and consumers. It needs to be
distinguished from “privatization”—a transfer of government-owned and operated

14 See Roger Handberg, The Future o f the Space Industry: Private Enterprise and Public Policy
(Westport: Quorum Books, 1995), 17. The average cost-per-pound for placing payloads in geosynchronous
orbit even by the late 1990s remained high at about $9,200-11,200, and for LEO $3,600-4,500. See Watts,
The Military Use o f Space, 2001, 6-7.
15 In other words, commercialization is an introduction o f market relations between suppliers and
consumers. Market can be defined as a coordinating mechanism where forces o f supply and demand
determine prices, output, and methods o f production o f goods and services. See, for example, Boyer and
Drache, States Against Markets, 1996, 3.
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facilities to private ownership and operation.16 Commercialization is possible without a
change in ownership.17 In a socialist system, for example, introduction of market
relations is not necessarily accompanied by privatization. In a capitalist system,
privatization is often considered as a goal of successful commercialization of private
enterprise of government-owned facilities. Generally, in such a system, a commercial
enterprise is a private enterprise, in which responsibility for the costs associated with the
conduct of business lie with the owner. However, even in a capitalist system
privatization is not always possible, even when commercialization is. In reality
ownership of enterprises may be anything from a full government ownership to a mixture
of private and government ownership, to a full privatization. What defines a commercial
enterprise as such is its participation in a market exchange, where outputs, prices and
profits are determined largely by the demand and supply.

1o

This is important for this

study since it deals with space sectors of Russia and China in which state-owned
enterprises are the main participants in market relations and where privatization has not
spread to a high degree in the space sector.
While the commercialization of outer space is clearly related to
commercialization defined above, there is no single agreed academic definition of outer
space commercialization. Jasentuliyana describes the commercialization of outer space

16 Three levels o f privatization can be distinguished: (1) “outsourcing,” when governments outsource, for
example, their needs for space flight to private industry; (2) “corporatization,” when governments create
private corporations similar to AMTRACK to provide certain services; and (3) divestiture, when
governments transfer the full responsibility and management o f their facilities to private entity. See James
C. Adamson, “Privatization o f Space Flight Operations,” in G. Haskell and M. Rycroft, eds., New Space
Markets, 1998, 138.
17 In this case, it would be more appropriately called “marketization.”
18 A different school o f thought defines commercialization as occurring when governments transfer
ownership, responsibility, liability and control to private industry with the latter then competing for
domestic and international market. See Adamson, in G. Haskell and M. Rycroft, eds., New Space Markets,
1998,141.
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as a “tendency away from space activities fully financed by national governments to
those which either government and private industry finance jointly or those which are
fully financed by the private sector.”19 McLucas defines “space commerce,” or
“commercial space,” as activities in which private enterprises provide goods and services
that depend on satellites in orbit at their own risk.20 In this context, commercialization
could be understood as an increase of the contribution of private sector in the provision of
such goods and services in relation to governments’ contribution. Goldman also
discusses “space commerce” but shifts the emphasis from the issue of ownership to the
emergence of a market of space goods and services provided either through private
enterprise or nationalized efforts.21 Focusing on the space policy issues, Handberg also
considers the commercialization of outer space as an increasing participation of private
actors in space activities.22 In all of these conceptualizations, an increasing participation
of private actors in space activities, in the context of commercialization of outer space,
does imply the emergence of markets where exchange of space goods and services takes
place and market incentives for private actors’ participation exist. At this stage,
commercialization of space does not presuppose the privatization of outer space.
The commercialization of outer space should be understood as an increasing use
of outer space by the private, government, and mixed private-govemment actors for
19 N. Jasentuliyana, “Space Issues for the Millennium,” Space Policy 15 (1999): 188.
20 McLucas, Space Commerce, 1991, 4.
21 Nathan C. Goldman, Space Commerce: Free Enterprise on theHighFrontier (Cambridge: Ballinger
Publishing Company, 1985), 15.
22 Handberg, The Future o f Space Industry, 1995, 1.
23 The issue o f ownership in outer space is one o f the issues that has been discussed recently, particularly
within the legal space community. Some argue that the Outer Space Treaty, which does not allow states or
persons, to claim outer space or celestial bodies as their property induces disincentives for commercial
development o f space and thereby deprives all o f humanity o f the long-term benefits o f the development o f
outer space. See, for example, Dolman, Astropolitik, 2002, 139. Others maintain that customary law
consistent with the Outer Space Treaty has already developed a regime for property use that is compatible
with private investment and thus private property in space is not necessary. See, for example, Jonathan F.
Galloway, “Game Theory and the Law and Policy o f Outer Space,” Space Policy 20 (May 2004): 87-90.
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activities that are launched with the view of participation in economic exchanges
determined largely by forces of supply and demand. The commercialization of outer
space, thus, have two components: first, the physical expansion of utilization of space for
commercial purposes via emplacement of greater numbers of commercial satellites in
various orbits around Earth; and second, the increasing degree of retreat of the state from
direct participation in space activities and/or increasing autonomy of commercial actors
in their activities in outer space.
The commercialization of outer space is a result of the commercialization of space
activities of states, which in turn, is a result of the commercialization of the activities of
firms and corporations, which increasingly undertake their activities based on their own
commercial calculations and at their own risk.24 The result of the process of
commercialization is a space market, an institution of exchange in space services,
information obtained from space, space technology and equipment, and products
manufactured in outer space that functions increasingly on the basis of the rules of supply
and demand, as liberalization and deregulation of space activities takes place. Space
market has six segments: satellite telecommunications, the largest and most successful
segment of space market; remote sensing; navigation and positioning; space
transportation; space tourism; and material processing.

24 The U.S. Commercial Space Act o f 1998 defines the term “commercial provider” as “any person
providing space transportation services or other space-related activities primary control o f which is held by
persons other than Federal, State, local, and foreign governments.” See U.S. Congress, House, Commercial
Space Act o f 1998, H.R.1702, 105th Congress, January 27, 1998, http://www.permanent.com/
archimedes/hr1702.htm (accessed 06.18.04). The President signed the Commercial Space Act o f 1998
creating Public Law 105-303 on October 28, 1998. Russian Federal Law “On Commercial Space Activity”
o f 1997 defines “commercial space activity” as “independent space activity performed in line with the
existing legislation by legal entities and natural persons at their risk and aimed at gaining systematic profits
and other benefits from sales o f goods, performing work or rendering services in the field o f exploration
and use o f space.” See Russian Federation, Public Law, “On Commercial Space Activity,” Chapter 1,
Article 1, April 1997, http://www.jaxa.jp/jda/library/space-law/chapter_4/4-l-l-5/4-l-l-51_e.html
(accessed 05.11.04).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

130
With the end of the Cold War, the commercialization of outer space significantly
accelerated due to dramatically falling government space budgets around the world, and
deregulation and liberalization of space activities at the national level.

Deregulation

and liberalization contributed to the process of internationalization of commercial space
activities and emergence of a global space market.
Space activities were seen as an unlikely candidate for widespread
commercialization for quite some time since the beginning of the Space Age. Space was
perceived as a province of states due to the extremely high levels of investment and other
resources required for research and development, expensive access to and operation in
space, and the very high risks involved in space activities. Nonetheless,
commercialization of outer space was a logical step in the development of space
activities, given the huge economic potential of space and the level of the development of
space technology.26
The development of space activities proceeded along a more or less typical path.
Tracing the evolution of technologies and government policies in satellite
communications, computers, and space launch industry, Whitney identifies three non
discrete stages along this path, leading up to the formation of a market: (1) a
“centralized” stage when development of assets is under a central control of either a
government or a corporation often due to the lack of competing technologies or market
players, and when there are little or no commercial services; (2) “decentralized” stage
25 See, for example, G. Khozin, “Space Activity at the Threshold o f the 21st Century: A Geopolitical and
Geoeconomic Perspective,” in G. Haskell and M. Rycroft, eds., New Space Markets , 1998, 109; and V.
Zervos, “The Economics o f the European Space Industry: The Impact o f the European Military Space
Market on Structure, Conduct and Performance,” in G. Haskell and M. Rycroft, eds., New Space Markets ,
1998, 117.
26 Economic potential is not a sufficient condition for market to exist: market potential needs to exist in
order for private sector to invest in developing o f economic potential. See Adamson, in G. Haskell and M.
Rycroft, eds., New Space Markets, 1998, 138-139.
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when there is more than one main technology provider or when controls and functions are
dispersed from central to regional or local control; and (3) “distributed” stage when
multiple points of control, multiple operators and multiple technologies coexist,
commercial services are provided, and thus a market is formed.

01

Handberg provides a timeframe of the progress of space activities along this
evolutionary path. He divides the Space Age into three periods based on the degree of
commercialization of space activities and their separation from the governmental space
activities: the first period from 1946 to 1966 is the developmental period characterized by
the absence of commercial actors operating in space and absolute dominance of
government space activities; the second period from 1966 to 1986 is the quasi
commercial period characterized by the beginning of involvement of private actors in
space activities and initial separation of public and private efforts in outer space; and the
period from 1986 on is the period of space commercialization characterized by the
emergence of independent from government private enterprises in outer space.28
The commercialization of outer space did not automatically follow from a
particular level of the development of space technology, although that was a significant
factor. The commercialization of outer space resulted from state policies. The next three
sections focus on commercialization of space activities in the United States, Russia, and
China. Despite some differences, the commercialization of space activities in these three
states shared a number of similar features: a considerable retreat of the government from

27 Pamela L. Whitney, “Tracing the Evolutionary Path for Space Technologies,” Space Policy 16 (2000),
172.
28 See Handberg, The Future o f the Space Industry, 1995, 14-19.
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•

space activities accompanied by budget funding reductions,

IQ

,

,

,

and policies encouraging

commercial actors to step in and take part in space activities via liberalization,
deregulation, and technology sharing. Once commercial relations are established market
influences begin to affect space players in similar ways across borders.

THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED
STATES
In the United States in the years immediately following World War II, the space
program emerged as an exclusively military effort that only later opened up to include
civil activities.30 However, even before the formal opening of the Space Age,
commercial actors in the United States became interested in using the potential of outer
space and pursued the development of space technology on a commercial basis. The
development of the civil communication satellites Telstar I and Telstar II, launched in
1962 and 1964 respectively, was privately financed.31 The U.S. government gave the
monopoly on satellite communications to the Communications Satellite Corporation
(COMSAT), formed as a result of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. This newly
created corporation was privately owned: it was a consortium of U.S. common carriers,
such as AT&T, RCA, Western Union and others. At the same time, it was closely
regulated by the government in the technical, economic, and foreign policy issue areas.
Thus, the commercial nature of this enterprise was rather limited. The significance of the
29 According to the data provided by the Futron Corporation, the worldwide space commercial revenues
had steep growth over the 1990s and surpassed worldwide government spending on space in 1996.
See dynamics o f worldwide government spending on space and commercial revenues from space activities
in Watts, The Military Use o f Space, 2001, 16.
30 See, for example, Joan Johnson-Freese and Roger Handberg, Space, The Dormant Frontier: Changing
the Paradigm fo r the 21st Century (Westport: Praeger, 1997), 69. Robert H. Goddard was the pioneer o f
rocketry who successfully launched the world’s first liquid-propelled rocket. His work, however, was
largely ignored by the U.S. government until near the end o f Goddard’s life. He died in 1943.
31 Angelo, The Dictionary o f Space Technology, 1998, 78.
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1962 Act was that it legally established the U.S. government’s position towards
commercial activities in outer space: it allowed commercial actors to take part in space
activities.
INTELSAT, the world’s first satellite communication corporation, was also
organized as a commercial venture but of a limited nature as well. The international
agreement establishing the organization affirmed the INTELSAT as a monopolist in the
provision of global satellite communications: its Article 14 precluded competition from
any other global satellite system created by members of INTELSAT. COMSAT became
an official representative of the United States in this international consortium with an
original share of 60 percent. Although the INTELSAT was organized as a commercial
space venture, it was an organization that charged its members only for the operational
costs and the costs of new facilities and did not make a profit.
Starting up in the space business involved huge investments that could be hardly
sustained in the early stages by private actors alone. Goodrich provides estimates,
according to which the average start-up cost for a manufacturing plant in non-space
industry was approximately $5 million, whereas for a space venture it was $50 million
and higher.32 The space business involved high risk, large sums of borrowed capital with
high interests, high salaries for scientists and engineers, large plant and equipment costs,
high launch costs, and long payback periods. These were only part of the reason why the
involvement of the state in the early stages of space activities was crucial not only for the
sake of national security but also simply for the establishment of viable space industry.

32 Jonathan N. Goodrich, The Commercialization o f Outer Space: Opportunities and Obstacles fo r
American Business (New York: Quorum Books, 1989), 21-22.
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During this quasi-commercial phase of space activities, private efforts were
significantly hampered by the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet
Union. The two superpowers exercised strict control over their space technology for
security reasons, which impeded the diffusion of this technology and thus made the
entrance of new enterprises difficult.33 This early period of the Space Age was also
marked by ideological struggles over the role of capitalism in outer space. Article VI of
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty affirmed that the state parties to the Treaty bore the
responsibility for national activities in outer space conducted both by the governments or
non-governmental entities. Likewise, the 1968 International Convention on Liability
established national governments as entities legally responsible for damages resulted
from activities of private enterprises under their jurisdiction operating in outer space.
Regulations required governmental approval of all private activities in space. The
government also controlled physical access to outer space via the control over space
launch infrastructure: private actors needed U.S. government facilities to launch their
payloads in outer space.
The first significant effort by the U.S. government to commercialize space
activities was made in the early 1980s within the larger framework of “neo-conservative
revolution.”34 After a comprehensive space policy review initiated by the White House
in 1981 and conducted under the direction of new Science Adviser George Keyworth III,
President Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 42, also known as the
National Space Policy, on July 4, 1982. In this document, the President pronounced new
guidelines for the development of U.S. space programs and identified the expansion of

33 Handberg, The Future o f the Space Industry, 1995, 16-17.
34 Goodrich, The Commercialization o f Outer Space, 1989, 31.
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private investment in space activities as a major objective of the United States.35 This
announcement was followed by legislative and executive directives, providing for the
implementation of the guidelines. In July 1984, in order to further promote the
commercialization of space activities, President Reagan issued the National Policy on the
Commercial Use of Space.36 Following this initiative, U.S. Congress amended the
NASA Space Act of 1958 and directed NASA to seek and encourage “the fullest
commercial use of space.”37 In response, NASA adopted its own Commercial Use of
Space Policy in October 1984 and created a NASA Commercial Space Office as a locus
of commercial space interactions with the aerospace industry.

TO

Initiatives to stimulate private investment in space ventures included measures
aimed at reducing financial, technical, and institutional risks for the American private
companies willing to venture into outer space. NASA was to provide affordable and
reliable access to space for private actors via the Space Shuttle, to assist with the
installation of commercial equipment on the Shuttle and provide funding for hightechnology commercial research, to share its experience, know-how, and patents and to

35 U.S. President, National Security Decision Directive Number 42, “National Space Policy,” July 4, 1982,
http://www.hq.hasa.gov/office/pao/History/nsdd-42.html (accessed 09.26.03).
36 This policy envisioned measures to encourage space commercialization in four areas: (1) economic
initiatives; (2) legal and regulatory initiatives; (3) research and development initiatives; and (4) initiatives
to implement the National Policy on the Commercial Use o f Space. See U.S President, “National Policy on
the Commercial Use o f Space,” released July 20, 1984, available at http://www.jaxa.jp/jda/library/spacelaw.chapter_3/3-l-l-l_e.html (accessed 06.18.04).
37 See National Aeronautics and Space Act o f 1958, sec. 102 (c), as amended July 16,1984 by Public Law
98-361, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act o f 1985 quoted in Richard M. Obermann and
Ray A. Williamson, “Implications o f Previous Space Commercialization Experiences for the Reusable
Launch Vehicle,” Space Policy 14 (1998): 17. See also van Fenema, The International Trade in Launch
Services, 1999, 77.
38 “Commercial space industry” was recognized for the first time as a separate sector by the U.S.
government in the 1988 Presidential Directive on National Space Policy. The policy statement itself was
classified and only unclassified summary statement was released. See NASA Historical Reference
Collection, “Presidential Directive on National Space Policy Fact Sheet,” February 11, 1988.
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/poliicy88.html (accessed 06.18.04).
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develop facilities necessary for the commercial use of space.39 Thus, the Space Shuttle
was to become the main transportation system of the U.S. military and civil space
program and the workhorse of the nascent commercial sector that would provide easy and
affordable access to space.
In 1972, President Nixon approved plans for the development of the Space
Transportation System (STS), or Space Shuttle, based on cost projections that
demonstrated its economic viability. These projections, however, could be realized only
by launching all public and private payloads aboard the Shuttle. In order to achieve this
objective later on, when the Shuttle finally arrived, NASA provided subsidies for
payloads flown on the Shuttle, thereby considerably impeding the development of
alternative commercial launch projects. There was an expectation that the Shuttle would
lower the costs of launch by a factor of 4 and even up to 10. Instead of lowering the costs
of launches, however, these policies led to increased difficulties in obtaining launch
services and to greater expenses over the longer run.40
When under the Reagan Administration, the Space Shuttle was declared the
“national launch capability”—the primary space launch system for national security and
civil government missions and domestic and foreign commercial missions41—NASA
terminated procurement of Delta and Atlas vehicles, while Department of Defense
decided to stop production of Titan III vehicles shortly afterwards and started a new
project that became later known as the Titan I V program.42 Simultaneously, in order to

39 Johnson-Freeze and Handberg, Space, The Dormant Frontier, 1997, 182-183.
40 Goodrich, The Commercialization o f Outer Space, 1989, 18.
41 U.S. President, National Security Decision Directive 42, “National Space Policy,” July 4, 1982.
42 Marcia S. Smith, “Space Launch Vehicles: Government Activities, Commercial Competition, and
Satellite Exports,” Issue Brief for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Library o f Congress, Order
Code IB93062, April 17, 2003.
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facilitate the development of commercial operation of expendable launch vehicles
(ELVs), Congress passed the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 with the specific
purpose of encouraging, facilitating, and promoting commercial space launches by the
private sector, thereby setting the stage for the development of a U.S. commercial launch
industry. However, the Reagan Administration’s policy to make the Space Shuttle
competitive with the European Ariane rocket and attract commercial customers to the
Shuttle effectively precluded the entrance of U.S. commercial actors in the emerging
commercial market of expendable launch vehicles.43 Thus, the U.S. manufacturers of the
expendable space launch vehicles found themselves in a difficult situation when the U.S.
government cut its spending on the expendable vehicles and created disincentives for
commercial space launch providers.
The tragic demise of the Space Shuttle Challenger in January 1986 marked the
end of an era when non-military space activities were overwhelmingly dominated by the
government and NASA.44 After the Challenger disaster, in accordance with the Reagan
Administration’s National Space Policy and its Commercial Space Initiative of 1988,
NASA was directed to shift commercial payloads that did not require to human
participation and many government payloads from the Shuttle to expendable launch
vehicles (ELVs).45 However, it was not until 1989 that the first U.S. commercially
operated launch took place on a Delta vehicle manufactured by McDonnell Douglas. In
the intermediate period, many private companies planning to launch their payloads in
43 The major U.S. aerospace companies did not take up an opportunity provided by the 1984 Commercial
Space Launch Act. See Obermann and Williamson, 1998, 20.
44 Handberg, The Future o f Space Industry, 1995, 18. After the Challenger accident the Department o f
Commerce took charge over the space commercialization efforts and established an Office o f Commercial
Space to encourage private efforts in the development o f space technologies and applications.
45 See NASA Historical Reference Collection, “Presidential Directive on National Space Policy Fact
Sheet,” February 11, 1988. See also Johnson-Freese and Handberg, Space, The Dormant Frontier, 1997,
117.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

138
space started to seek other, non-U.S., launch service providers, just as foreign providers
started to aggressively seek U.S. customers, including the Chinese and Soviet launch
service providers.46 Thus, the situation with launch vehicles in the United States in the
second half of the 1980s both created greater need for a commercial launch services and
opportunities for the entrance of new players from other countries into an emerging space
launch market. This international market of commercial launch services finally provided
the necessary foundation for the further commercialization of outer space activities.
After 1986 and particularly after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, the commercialization of space activities in general, and the launch
industry in particular, in the United States considerably accelerated driven by declining
government budgets.47 Space funding from the Department of Defense peaked in 1989 at
$23.7 billion dollars and from that point decreased precipitously with the minimum at
$11.7 billion in 1995, while NASA funding started to diminish from $16.0 billion in 1991
to approximately $13 billion throughout the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s.48
At the same time as government funding diminished, commercial investment in space
activities, such as space launch vehicles, infrastructure, and transportation,
communication satellite constellations, and high-resolution remote sensing spacecrafts
started to pick up.49
The reduction of government funding for space activities did not by itself
stimulate commercialization. The policies of President Bush reflected in the U.S.
Commercial Space Policy Guidelines of 1991, significantly encouraged the process of
46 McLucas, Space Commerce, 1991, 96.
47 See, for example, van Fenema, The International Trade in Launch Services, 1999, 165.
48 Figures are given in constant dollars o f September 30, 2001. See “Military and Civilian Space
Budgets,” Air Force Magazine, August 2002, 29.
49 See, for example, 1998 State o f the Space Industry (Bethesda: Space Publications, 1998), 8-12.
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commercialization. These incentives included the U.S. government’s commitment to
procuring commercially available goods and services, maintaining restraint in competing
with commercial suppliers, transferring publicly developed technology to the private
sector, allowing private access to public facilities on a reimbursable basis, and
encouraging free and fair trade internationally in commercial space activities.50
The end of the Cold War and relaxation of security concerns also made it possible
to open up formerly classified technologies. The lessening o f tensions at the international
arena also allowed the United States to relax export controls with respect to certain dualuse goods and technologies, which considerably spurred commercialization of space
activities and accelerated the establishment of global space market.51 Along with these
political, economic and technological incentives, there were revolutionary developments
in computer technology that opened up new possibilities for space applications.
Space-based communications attracted the interest and participation of
commercial actors from the early stages of the development in the United States. By the
late 1970s, satellite communications were already a major commercial success.52
Between 1970 and 1972, the Federal Communications Commission authorized the first
domestic communications satellites and shortly later these enterprises became the first
space industry existing independently of the government funding: telephony and then TV
broadcasting started to earn revenues for the industry.53 The first privately owned

50 Congressional Budget Office, Encouraging Private Investment in Space Activities, February 1991, xi.
51 The relaxation o f the East-West tensions and the developments in the Soviet Union led to a considerable
reduction in the list o f the CoCom controlled dual-use goods in June 1990 and September 1991. In 1994,
the demise o f CoCom regime freed access o f the countries from the former Communist bloc to dual use
goods and technologies, opening up more opportunities for space related trade. See, for example, van
Fenema, The International Trade in Launch Services, 1999, 165-169.
52 Goldman argues that communication satellites became profitable by the later 1960s. See Goldman,
Space Commerce, 1985, 75.
53 Goldman, Space Commerce, 1985, 63.
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international satellite system, PanAmSat, was found in 1984. It was conceived from the
beginning as an alternative to INTELSAT’s services in Latin America. PanAmSat’s first
satellite was launched in 1988 and its first customer for Latin American transmission
became CNN. Shortly later, PanAmSat moved to serve communication markets all
around the world. Since 1996 when it was bought by Hughes Electronics, PanAmSat
grew into a $1 billion company operating a network of 20 satellites. PanAmSat became
the largest commercial geosynchronous communication system in the world.54
In the 1990s, satellite communication entered a new era of revolutionary change
driven by innovation in information and communication technologies and a growing
demand for communication services around the globe. The satellite communication
industry became one of the main beneficiaries of the rapid growth in computing power
and miniaturization technology: satellites, receivers, and switching technologies benefited
from progress in these two areas. Throughout the 1990s, the number of communication
satellites grew dramatically. Their applications expanded and numerous new commercial
players entered the business offering services that were inconceivable just a short while
ago. The Iridium company with a LEO satellite constellation was envisaged by its
founders led by Motorola as an embodiment of the best promises of satellite
communications. Its 66 satellites began providing global phone services anywhere on
Earth.55 Globalstar Communication led by Loral Space & Communications also started
to provide mobile communication services to customers around the world in March 2000.

54 Dobbs, Space, 2001, 69-70.
55 After it filed for bankruptcy in 2000, Iridium was rescued in April 2001 by a group o f investors from
Brazil, Australia, and Saudi Arabia. Boeing began managing Iridium satellite network. The Pentagon
became one o f the largest customers o f new Iridium LLC.
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The New ICO began offering satellite based Internet access via Very Small Aperture
Terminals (VSATs).
The U.S. Office of Space Commercialization reports in its 2001 Trends in Space
Commerce that satellite communications worldwide were the largest and fasters growing
segment of the space industry in the second half of the 1990s.56 Some of the most
significant factors that shaped this segment of commercial space activity were the global
deregulation of telecommunications markets, the introduction of large non-geostationary
orbit (non-GSO) satellite constellations for mobile communications, and the emergence
of the Internet. American satellite manufacturers, who had the leading position in the
communication satellite market, particularly benefited from these developments. Signing
of the 1997 World Trade Organization (WTO) Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement
on Trade in Services by sixty-nine WTO member states, committing themselves to
opening up their markets and to providing impartial regulatory treatment and
nondiscriminatory allocation and use of resources was a milestone, marking the
formation of a global competitive satellite communications market, with the U.S. satellite
manufacturing business and satellite operators gaining large new markets all around the
world.57

56 U.S. Department o f Commerce, Trends in Space Commerce, 2001, 1-3. According to this report, space
industry encompasses such directly involved segments o f industry as satellite manufacturing, satellite
operation, space launch vehicle manufacturing, and many other, as well as many direct-to-consumers
applications, Internet services and entertainment applications. See Ibid., p. 1-1.
5 An exception was made for measures necessary for providing national security. In the Annex IB
“General Agreement on Trade in Services,” Article XIV, the exception specifies: “Nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed: (a) to require any Member to furnish any information, the disclosure o f
which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or (b) to prevent any Member from taking any
action which it considers necessary for the protection o f its essential security interests: (i) relating to the
supply o f services as carried out directly or indirectly for the purposes o f provisioning a military
establishment; (ii) relating to fissionable or fusionable materials or the materials from which they are
derived; (iii) taking in time o f war or other emergency in international relations; or (c) to prevent any
Member from taking any action in pursuance o f its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the
maintenance o f international peace and security.” See World Trade Organization, The Uruguay Round
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By the beginning of the new millennium 425 operational communication satellites
offering commercial services orbited the Earth. Satellite systems also expanded from the
GEO orbit into the Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Out of 425
commercial communication satellites only 54% orbited Earth in GEO. U.S. firms
operated 26% of the GEO commercial communication satellites.
The U.S. communication satellite manufacturers and operators also benefited
from domestic deregulation. For example, the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act
that went into effect in 1999 removed legal barriers that limited transmission over
satellites of local television signals. This contributed to the expansion of the Direct-ToHome (DTH) satellite services in the United States. Retail and subscription satellite
services as well as commercial firms and operators of satellites that lease or sell access to
their satellite transponders to communication service providers, such as
telecommunications and data relay firms, represent a segment of the space market that
also expanded throughout the second half of the 1990s.
Following this wave of space commercialization revolution, the oldest satellite
communication organization established under the U.S. leadership, INTELSAT, also
underwent a fundamental restructuring in order to adapt to new conditions characterized
by increasing competition. The Assembly of Parties, the highest decision-making body
of INTELSAT, consisting of all the member states, took the decision to restructure the
organization in October 1999 and a year later the new legal instruments and framework
were finalized. On July 18,2001, the intergovernmental organization transferred some of
its assets, including satellites, to Intelsat Ltd., a new Bermuda-registered private

Agreement: the WTO Legal Texts, Annex IB “General Agreement on Trade in Services,” 1994,
http://www.wto.Org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm#services (accessed 06.05.04).
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commercial company that would provide international communication services, while the
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (ITSO) as an intergovernmental
organization was charged with monitoring and supervision of the public service and
lifeline connectivity obligations of the new private telecommunication company.58
The Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 was the first attempt to
privatize and commercialize remote sensing activities in the Unuted States.59 Landsat
was a remote-sensing satellite system developed by NASA as an R&D project in the
1960s. In 1979, it was transferred to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA). The 1984 Act led to the selection of EOS AT as a private
company that was to operate the Landsat satellite system and distribute imagery. This
experience of privatization, however, was only partially successful. During the Cold
War, remote sensing of Earth was considered to be a matter of high national security
concern and for this reason was heavily regulated. As Landsat demonstrated, this
regulation considerably impeded commercialization of remote sensing activities.60 With
the end of the Cold War the reduction of security concerns finally made it possible to
create a remote sensing market with minimal restrictions.61 Remote sensing technologies
developed in the military domain now were made available for commercial use. The
Remote Sensing Act that came into effect in 1992 further encouraged the development of
58 After the restructuring, INTELSAT ceased to exist in its old form. It was divided into two separate
entities. As an intergovernmental organization it now is called ITSO, while the new commercial
communication organization is called Intelsat Ltd. See International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (ITSO), Official website at http://www.itso.int/php_docs/tpl l_itso.php?dc=aboutus (accessed
03.011.04).
59 The planning for a phased out transition to private operation and ownership o f N A SA ’s Landsat system
began under the Carter Administration. The Reagan Administration switched to a plan o f an accelerated
privatization o f Landsat envisioned in the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act o f 1984. See
Obermann and Williamson, 1998, 19. See also Handberg, The Future o f the Space Industry, 1995, 58-59.
60 Johnson-Freese and Handberg, Space The Dormant Frontier, 1997,192. See also Obermann and
Williamson, 1998, 19-20. The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act o f 1992 brought the development and
operation o f Landsat 7 back within the government.
61 Certain restrictions on remote sensing activities still exist due to national security concerns.
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private remote sensing systems.62 The Bush Administration granted a license to the first
commercial remote sensing satellite system in January 1993. Following President
Clinton’s approval of the relaxation of restrictions on the sale of high-resolution satellite
imagery, four U.S. companies were granted licenses to operate commercial remote
sensing satellites with 1-meter resolution. One of the most significant factors
contributing to the significant expansion of the remote-sensing market in the 1990s was
the development of an information infrastructure that allowed users easier and cheaper
access and storage of the data obtained via remote-sensing satellites. Between 1996 and
2002, the worldwide sales of commercial imagery grew 14% annually, with the U.S.
share in global revenues from pre-value-added imagery from remote-sensing satellites
increasing from 27% to 36%.63 By the year 2000, there were five U.S. and one U.S.Canada remote-sensing satellites from which commercial satellite imagery was available
with some new commercial satellites coming shortly.64
Commercialization of the Global Positioning System (GPS) is an example of
commercialization without privatization of the relevant space assets:65 the GPS continues
to be controlled and operated by the U.S. Air Force while offering services to a
commercial market. The GPS constellation was completed in 1994. In 1996, the Clinton
Administration issued an official policy on GPS in which it preserved its governmental
status but allowed it to provide commercial services and encouraged private investment

62 On April 25, 2003, President Bush signed a new commercial remote sensing policy that tries to strike a
new balance between economic and national security goals. See White House, U.S. Commercial Remote
Sensing Space Policy Fact Sheet, released May 13, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2003/05/20030513-8.html (accessed 05.05.04).
63 U.S. Department o f Commerce, Trends in Space Commerce, 2001, 4-5.
64 Ibid., p. 4-8, 4-11.
65 Privatization o f the GPS has been proposed but rejected. See, for example, Handberg, The Future o f
Space Industry, 1995, 55; and Johnson-Freese and Handbeg, Space, The Dormant Frontier, 1997, 199.
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in the use of U.S. GPS technologies and services.66 GPS commercial uses are in aviation
for air-traffic management, marine surveying, recreation, timing, and in-vehicle
navigation. The variety of services expanded as manufacturers of the GPS user
equipment diversified their product lines and incorporated them into high value-added
products, such as cell phones, car navigation, and flight management systems. The
revenue o f the U.S. manufacturers of GPS user equipment grew at an annual rate of 14%
between 1996 and 1999.67
In 1994, the Clinton Administration issued a new National Transportation Policy
that was to carry the United States space launch industry into the next century. The
document envisioned the development of new generation of space transportation in close
partnership between the government and private industry in order to dramatically reduce
the cost of access to outer space and thereby further encourage commercial space
activities.68 The new policy committed the United States government “to encouraging a

66 On March 28, 1996, President Clinton approved a comprehensive policy on the management o f the U.S.
Global Positioning System, PDD/NSTC-6. This document transferred the responsibility o f GPS
management oversight from Department o f Defense to an Interagency GPS Executive Board (IGEB) co
chaired by senior officials o f the Departments o f Transportation and Defense in order to ensure that GPS
meets civil, commercial, and military requirements. See U.S. President, Presidential Decision Directive
NSTC 6, “U.S. Global Positioning System Policy,” March 28, 1996, Office o f Science and Technology
Policy and National Security Council Fact Sheet, March 29, 1996,
http://www.ostp.gov/NSTC/html/pdd6.html, accessed 07.11.04.
67 U.S. Department o f Commerce, Trends in Space Commerce, 2001, 5-3.
68 President Clinton approved “National Space Transportation Policy” on August 5, 1994. It commits the
United States to a two track strategy: (1) maintaining and improving the current fleet o f expendable launch
vehicles a necessary to meet civil, commercial and national security requirements; and (2) investing R&D
resources in developing the next generation reusable space transportation systems. The new policy
envisions a close partnership between the U.S. government and private sector in the development o f the
next generation reusable space transportation systems for the 21st century. See U.S. President, Presidential
Decision Directive NSTC 4, "National Space Transportation Policy,” August 5, 1994, Office o f Science
and Technology Policy Fact Sheet, August 5, 1994, http://www/ostp.gov/NSTC/html/pdd4.html (accessed
07.11.04). Partnerships between government and private industry within countries and among the private
industries o f different countries became a widespread phenomenon in the 1990s. In general term,
“partnership” can be defined as a long-term commitment between two or more organizations for the
purpose o f achieving specific business objectives by maximizing the effectiveness o f each other’s
resources. Partnerships are created by forming strategic alliances or consortia. Sea Launch is an example
o f multinational partnership. See P. R. Harris and D. J. O’Donnell, “Facilitating a New Space Market
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viable commercial U.S. space transportation industry” via promoting innovative types of
arrangements between the U.S. government and the private sector, via timely transfer of
unclassified government-developed space transportation technologies to the private sector
and facilitating commercial space operations, via involving the private sector in the
design and development of space transportation capabilities, and via government
procurement strategies that use commercial U.S. space transportation products and
services. 69
The main U.S. launch vehicle manufacturers, Boeing and Lockheed Martin,
started to develop redesigned launch systems with Delta 4 and Atlas 5 family of vehicles.
Partial support for this effort came from the Air Force within the framework of the
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. There were also significant
activities in the second half of the 1990s on commercial reusable launch vehicles (RLVs)
with a number of companies developing new vehicles with innovative RLV designs such
as Astroliner (Kelly Space and Technology), K -l (Kistler Aerospace Corporation),
Pathfinder (Pioneer Rocketplane), Roton c-9 (Rotary Rocket Company), Space Cruiser
System (Vela Technology Development), and VentureStar (Lockheed Martin). The
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) finally granted licenses to four commercial
spaceports: the Virginia Space Flight Center, Kodiak Launch Complex, Spaceport in
Florida, and the California Spaceport. Operations of the Space Shuttle were also
commercialized, when in 1996 United Space Alliance, a Limited Liability Company

Through a Lunar Economic Development Authority,” in G. Haskell and M. Rycroft, eds., New Space
Markets, 1998, 224.
69 U.S. President, Presidential Decision Directive NSTC 4, “National Space Transportation Policy,” 1994,
Section IV “Commercial Space Transportation Guidelines.”
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(LLC) equally owned by the Boeing Company and Lockheed Martin Corporation, took
•

«

•

•

over managing, conducting operations, and maintaining the Space Shuttle.

70

In the latter half o f the 1990s, the growth of private investment in the space
launch industry started to materialize in commercial launch rates greater than those of
governmental and quasi-commercial launches combined. According to the Office of
Space Commerce, the number of commercial launches started to exceed the number of
governmental and quasi-commercial launches in 1997, except for the year 2000.71 The
increase in the commercial launches was driven by the launch requirements of the
arriving new constellations of LEO and other non-GEO communication satellites such as
Iridium, Globalstar, ICO Global, and Sirius direct radio satellites.
In response to the rapid commercialization of outer space activities, globalization
of the space market, and ever-increasing competition, the U.S. space industry went
through a wave of mergers and acquisitions. In 1995, for example, as a result of a merger
between Lockheed Corporation and Martin Marietta Corporation, Lockheed Martin was
formed that became the largest space company in the world with the space related
revenues of $ 7.3 billion in 1996 and capable to build and launch almost any type of
unmanned spacecraft.72 In 1997 this new corporation expanded its operations from
satellite manufacturing and space launch industry into operating satellites when it formed
70 As the prime contractor for N A SA ’s Space Shuttle Program, United Space Alliance is responsible for
the operation and management o f the U.S. Space Shuttle fleet, including for mission design and planning,
flight operations, software development and integration payload integration, integrated logistics, astronaut
and flight controller training, vehicle processing, launch and recovery. See United Space Alliance (USA)
company, Official website, http://www.unitedspacealliance.com/about/ (accessed 03.14.04). See also
Marcia Smith, “Space Launch Vehicles,” 2003.
71 The Office o f Space Commercialization’s report Trends in Space Commerce defines commercial
launches as “those launches procured on the international launch services marketplace” and civil
government and quasi-commercial launches as “launches procured by governments through commercial
launch service providers, which the purchaser typically restricts to the launch providers o f a single
country.” See U.S. Department o f Commerce, Trends in Space Commerce, 2001,2-2.
72 See, for example, Mark Williamson, “Corporate Mergers— Lifeline for the Space Industry,” Space
Policy 13 (November 1997): 286-287.
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a joint venture with INTERSPUTNIK to create one of the largest commercial
communications satellite operators in the world called Lockheed Martin Intersputnik
(LMI).73 In August 2000, Lockheed Martin was allowed to buy COMSAT.74 Other
American companies followed the suit, competing rather fiercely among each other for
businesses to merge with or to acquire. In 1996, Boeing bought Rockwell, and Northrop
Grumman acquired Westinghouse Defense Electronics, and in that configuration, in
1997, they were purchased by Lockheed Martin. In 1997, Boeing added McDonnell
Douglass. This consolidation process of the 1990s resulted in the creation of space
industrial giants with “the big three” leading the U.S. space industry: Lockheed Martin,
Boeing and Raytheon earning annually billions in space revenues.75
Over the past two decades, since the commercialization of outer space began,
commercial space activities have become a sizable business: in 2001, overall space
business has grown to about $100 billion in revenues, with the share of the United States
estimated at approximately 40 percent.76 The same year, the space budget of the
Department of Defense was $14.3 billion, and the NASA budget - $13.3 billion.77 Thus,
the revenues of the U.S. commercial space sector surpassed combined budgets of NASA
and DoD in 2001.

73 Ibid., 288.
74 Dobbs, Space, 2001, 68.
75 G. Haskell and M. Rycroft, eds., New Space Markets, 1998, 33. See also National Science Foundation,
Science and Engineering Indicators, http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind98/c4/fig04-10.htm (accessed
03.12.04).
76 Different sources give somewhat different estimates. See, for example, U.S. Department o f Commerce,
Trends in Space Commerce, 2001, 1-3; Dobbs, Space, 2001,2; and Edward L. Hudgins ed., Space: The
Free-Market Frontier (Washington D.C.: CATO Institute, 2002), xiv. In the aftermath o f September 11,
2001, overall revenues from the space industry fell to $82.8 billion in 2001, according to the 2002 State o f
the Space Industry, released in February 2002. The Report announced the end o f the late 1990s boom
market for commercial satellites and launches. See “Space Revenues Down; M&As Up In Volume and
Value,” Space Daily, March 6,2002, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/industry-02a.html (accessed
03.12.04).
77 See “Military and Civil Space Budgets,” Air Force Magazine, August 2002, 29.
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These numbers, however, may not folly reflect the significance of the commercial
space activities. In the United States, space applications have expanded into nearly every
component of society, economy and government. Over the post-Cold War years,
commercial satellites have become a part of the U.S. critical infrastructure, on which both
the U.S. government and U.S. economy depend.78 The U.S. government has become a
large consumer of the commercial space services, including for its defense and
intelligence needs, and its dependency increases.

70

Furthermore, the U.S. government

and economy have become dependant not only on commercial space services but also on
the commercial sector to provide innovative technology to assure military superiority and
the competitiveness of the United States economy.

OA

The strength of the commercial

space sector is largely based on the technological edge that the United States’ space
industry maintains over other market competitors. The commercial success of the U.S.
space industry is increasingly seen as the foundation of the U.S. military power. A report
prepared for the Commission assessing United States National Security Space
Management and Organization concurs with a conclusion that if weakened U.S. satellite
makers cede the satellite market to foreigners, it will jeopardize America’s global

78 “Critical infrastructure” is defined as “those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum
operations o f the economy and government.” These governmental and private systems include:
telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems, and emergency services.
These systems rely on satellites. See U.S. President, Presidential Decision Directive 63, “White Paper on
Critical Infrastructure Protection,” May 22, 1998, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/paper598.htm (accessed
03.14.04).
79 See, for example, Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and
Organization, Report, Executive Summary, 2001. As o f 2000, the Department o f Defense satisfies about
60% o f its satellite communication requirements with commercial satellite services. See Haller and
Sakazaki, “Commercial Space and United States National Security,” Chapter VIII “U.S. Government Use
o f Commercial Satellites for National Security,” 2001.
80 Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Report,
Executive Summary, 2001. See also U.S. President, Presidential Policy Directive 49, “National Space
Policy,” Fact Sheet, September 19, 1996.
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surveillance, reconnaissance and communications network, “the linchpin of the
Pentagon’s 21st century battle plan.”81
The introduction of market forces does not only mean commercial competition
and what it entails—mergers and acquisitions—but also cyclical fluctuations. While
during the satellite communication boom of the 1990s, the U.S. space industry could
lessen its ties to the military, pursuing commercial projects, the economic situation in the
world space industry in the early 2000s made those ties important again. For example, if
during the 1990s the average number of satellite launches per year was 90, in 2001 this
number was 60, of which only 15 were purely commercial launches.82 In 2000, mobile
satellite communication provider Iridium with the constellation of 66 LEO satellites
declared bankruptcy. Some other companies experienced financial difficulties as well.
As a result of the difficult economic situation, commercial space industry became more
dependent again on the military for military plans for the use of space.

81 Haller and Sakazaki, 2001, Chapter VIII “U.S. Government Use o f Commercial Satellites for National
Security.”
82 Loring Wirbel, “The Space Industry: Supporting U.S. Supremacy,” Foreign Policy in Focus, Vol. 7,
No. 13,2002, http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/pdf/vol7/13ifspace.pdf (accessed 03.14.04).
83 ICO and Globalstar, two mobile telephone companies, also declared bankruptcy. See Marcia Smith,
“Space Launch Vehicles,” 2003.
84 The NIM A’s relationship with the commercial sector provides an example o f the emerging symbiotic
relationship between the military and the commercial space sector. During the war in Afghanistan in 2001,
the NIMA contracted Space Imaging, the leader in commercial remote sensing, for satellite imaging in
order to satisfy its growing demand for satellite remote sensing information for the use with its Coordinated
Seeking Weapons (CSW). In 2002, the NIMA increased its purchases o f commercial images and spent in
total $96 million on those products. Space Imaging took part in a bid for a contract from NIMA in order to
satisfy its need for financing o f the development o f new generation o f remote sensing satellites. Starting in
2003, Space Imaging and DigitalGlobe, another commercial player in remote sensing segment o f the space
market, began selling their products to NIMA in a framework o f a multi-year program called ClearView.
NIMA’s ClearView program has been the most expensive so far. In November 2003, NIMA granted a
contract for the development o f a new generation o f commercial remote sensing satellites to DigitalGlobe,
working in collaboration with Gall Aerospace, Boeing Launch Services, BAe Systems, and some other
space companies. The contract is a part o f another large NIM A’s program called NextView established to
help develop a new generation o f remote sensing satellites by Boeing, the main supplier o f military remote
sensing satellites. As a result o f the military-commercial partnership in remote sensing the next generation
o f remote sensing satellites will be a generation o f pure dual-use remote sensing satellites. The
commercial-military partnership is a growing trend in the United States and in Europe. Such partnerships
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THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES IN RUSSIA
The commercialization of outer space activities began in the United States as a
matter of U.S. government policy in the first half of the 1980s in order to reduce budget
expenditures. At the same time, the Soviet Union was increasing government spending
on its space program. It continued to do so until the end of the Soviet period. In 1989,
the Soviet government spending on outer space activities reached its peak of
approximately R6.9 billion, which was estimated to be about 1.5 percent of the gross
national product.85 A larger half of this money, or R3.9 billion, was spent on the Soviet
military space program, R1.3 billion went into the Buran project, the Soviet analog of the
Space Shuttle, and R1.7 billion went into civilian space projects.
The Soviet space program was considered to be a high national security priority
and from its early days was put under the tight control of the Communist party and Soviet
government.86 Government spending was the only source of the Soviet space program.

were materialized in China and Russia as well. See A. Kucheiko, “Novoe Partnerstvo Voennykh I
Kommercheskikh Struktur SshA o Oblasti Kosmisheskikh Snimkov” (New Partnership between the
military and Commercial Structures o f the USA in Space Imaging), Novosti Kosmonavtiki, Vol. 14, No. 1
(252), January 2004, 40-42. The new relationship between the military and commercial remote sensing
sector was laid out in the new U.S. remote sensing policy signed into effect on April 25, 2003. According
to this new policy, the U.S. government, including the military, is required to satisfy its need in space
imaging via purchases o f commercial remote sensing products where possible. See White House, “U.S.
Commercial Remote Sensing Policy Fact Sheet,” released by Office o f the Press Secretary, April 25, 2003,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030513-8.html (accessed 05.05.04). A similar
situation developed in the U.S. space launch industry. The U.S. companies who participated in the
development o f D oD ’s new EELVs—Atlas 5 and Delta 4— are, as reported, seeking additional DoD
funding to defray their costs under the conditions o f diminished commercial demand. See Marcia Smith,
“Space Launch Vehicles,” 2003.
85 At the end o f the Soviet period the ruble was set at parity with the British sterling. See Harvey, Russia
in Space, 2001, 281.
86 The Soviet government established the first laboratory charged with the development o f rockets shortly
after World War I, in 1921. In 1933 this laboratory conducted military tests o f its weapons. Thus, the
Soviet government was aware o f the military utility o f rockets in particular, and development o f space
technology in general, from the early stages o f evolution o f space technology. On May 13, 1946, the
Soviet government issued the Directive N o.l017-419ss, establishing the governmental structures
responsible for the Soviet space efforts, scientific institutes, design bureaus and rocket manufacturing
plants. See, for example, Russian Space Agency, 50 Years Ahead o f Its Time, International Educational
Program, Moscow, 1998, 5, 244. After World War II, the Soviet space program was directed by the
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However, the Soviet government started to look for opportunities to make money on its
space activities at approximately the same time as the United States government began
commercialization of its outer space activities. In 1982, the Soviet Union conducted its
first “commercial” launch contract, putting India’s indigenously developed remotesensing satellite IRS-1 in orbit.

87

In 1985, when Perestroika was just initiated by the then

new Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Michael Gorbachev,
the Glavkosmos agency was created to carry out coordination of Soviet efforts in putting
space technology to the service of the Soviet economy. The very next year, Glavkosmos
started its “commercial” activities, sending a group of marketing specialists abroad in
order to look for commercial contracts for the Soviet Proton rocket.
The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union were the two
most important factors that shaped the space program of the former Soviet Union in the
last decade o f the 20th century. On December 30, 1991, the prime ministers of the
republics of the former Soviet Union, except the three Baltic states, Moldova and
Ukraine, signed an agreement according to which their civilian space activities would be
governed by a new interstate council, their joint strategic forces would be run by the
military program, and the Baikonur cosmodrome would be used as their common
spaceport.88 In the Russian Federation, on February 25, 1992, President Yeltsin created

Ministry o f General Machine Building (MOM) and the Commission on Military Industrial Issues (VPK),
while key decisions on the space issues were made at the highest level jointly by the Communist party
leadership and government. See also Chapter 2 “Economic o f Space Activity in Russia” in Federation o f
American Scientists, Space Policy Project, Russian Space Industry, http://www.fas.org/spp/civil/russia7
chap_2.htm (accessed 01.31.01).
87 See van Fenema, The International Trade in Launch Services, 1999, note 140, 241.
88 See “Minsk Agreement,” December 30, 1991, http://www.jaxa.jp/jda/library/space-law/chapter_4/4-22-2_e.html, (accessed 05.22.04). The utilization o f space infrastructure were further specified in the
“Tashkent Agreement Concerning Arrangements for Maintaining and Using Space Infrastructure Facilities
in Pursuance o f Space Programs,” May 15, 1992, http://www.jaxa.jp/jda/library/space-law/achapter_4/4-2-
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the Russian Space Agency (RKA) to replace the old Soviet bureaucratic structures—the
Ministry of General Machine Building89 (MOM) and Glavkosmos—as the main
coordinating body of Russia’s space activities. It was charged with the development and
oversight o f the Russian space program as well as with the coordination of commercial
space projects and assistance with their realization.90 The Agency with nine main
divisions—government programs, maimed projects, launch facilities, science,
commercial, international, ground, external and legal, and resources and business
divisions—was to steer the Russian space program through the times of dramatic
contraction of government spending and political uncertainties of the 1990s.91
The reduction of government spending on space activities took place in three
phases. The first budget cut was made in 1990, with the Buran project bearing the
heaviest loss. When the first manned flight of Buran was being prepared, the project was
cut by R80 million: from R300 million in 1989 it was reduced to R220 million in 1990.
As a way of earning money to support space program, a seat on board of the
manned Soyuz spacecraft to the station Mir was offered for customers who would pay in

2-3_e.html (accessed 05.11.04). According to this agreement, space infrastructure facilities located in the
territories o f the state parties were pronounced to be the property o f those states.
89 The Soviet General Machine Building Ministry was dissolved in November 1991, even before the
dissolution o f the Soviet Union.
90 See President o f the Russian Federation, “On Structure o f Management o f Space Activity in the Russian
Federation,” Edict o f the President o f the Russian Federation No. 185, February 25, 1992,
http://www.fas.org/spp/civil/Russia/annex_14.htm (accessed 08.16.02). In 1997, the Russian space industry
was brought into the Ministry for Space and Telecommunications.
91 The Russian Space Agency (RKA) was established by the Presidential Decree No. 185. The Agency
was put in charge o f four space organizations: TsNIImash, which became the main institute o f the RKA,
N il TP named after M. V. Keldysh, NUChimmash, and “Agat.” In 1998, the RKA was reorganized in
accordance o f the Government Decree No. 440. Thirty-eight state-owned space enterprises were
transferred from the Ministry o f Economics to the RKA. In 1999, the RKA was reorganized again in
accordance with the Presidential Decree No. 651 and Government Decree No. 735. It was enlarged and put
in charge o f the aviation industry as well as space industry. The RKA became Russia’s ministry o f aviation
and space industry in all but the name. In 2004, was reorganized into the Federal Space Agency (FKA)
with the aviation industry transferred to the newly created Federal Aviation Industry Agency. See S.
Shamsutdinov, “Rosaviokosmos Preobrasovan v Federal’noe Kosmicheskoe Agenstvo” (Rosaviokosmos
is Reorganized into the Federal Space Agency), Novosti Kosmonavtiki. 14 (May 2004): 52.
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hard currency within the framework of intergovernmental cooperation. In December
1990, the first Japanese astronaut flew on board of Soyuz to the Mir station. In May
1991, the first British astronaut flew on board of Soyuz to the Mir station, followed by
the first Austrian astronaut in October 1991. The financial package to fly Helen Sharman,
the British visitor, to the Mir station collapsed just before the flight, but she was flown to
Mir anyway in May 1991.

09

In 1992, the reduction of the government funding started to have serious impact
on the space program: only half of the planned civilian launchings were carried out and
less than a third of military launchings.93 In 1992, the second phase of space budget
retrenchment began: the first reports on outer space activities suggested serious shortages,
delays, postponements, and cancellations. In February 1992, for example, the tracking
fleet was permanently recalled from the oceans. Then, in 1993, the Buran-Energiya
project was cancelled. By this time the space sector had lost approximately 30 percent of
its personnel. In the same year, the director of the Russian Space Agency, Yurii Koptev,
held a press conference where he articulated his grave concern with the situation. He
expressed his fear that the space program was about to collapse. Despite his warning,
however, government allocations to the space program were dramatically reduced in
1994 and the situation deteriorated even further, with a radical reduction in military and
unmanned space activities. By 1996, there were hardly any satellites manufactured and
available for launch and almost no rockets to put them in orbit.94 The space budget
contracted yet further with the financial crisis of autumn 1998. In this third phase of
space budget reduction, many space activities that were still going slowed down or
92 Russian Space Agency, 50 Years Ahead o f Its Time, 1998, 245-246.
93 Harvey, Russia in Space, 2001, 282.
94 Ibid., 283.
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stopped altogether, with the employment being at one quarter of what it was at the peak
of Soviet space program just a decade prior. The launch rate— one of the main indicators
of measuring and comparing space activities95— fell by almost a half between 1991 and
2000: from 59 in 1991 to 35 in 2000.96 Over this decade, government investment in the
space program in Russia fell by 80 percent.97 By 2000, Russia’s government space
budget had shrunk to be the smallest space budget in the world among the major
spacepowers.98
The commercialization and internationalization of outer space activities was seen
as the key, if not the only way to provide for the survival of the Russian space program.
In 1992, as the situation in the post-Soviet economy deteriorated dramatically, the design
bureaus in Russia launched a desperate effort to attract foreign investment. Their first
steps on the road toward commercialization included offering cosmonaut training courses
to tourists, selling some of the historically significant items at auctions in the West,
filming advertisements for Western companies in outer space and the like. In 1992-1993,
a significant number of small enterprises, cooperatives, joint ventures99 and other
commercial structures around Russia’s big enterprises of the space complex emerged.

95 With the expansion o f the lifespan o f spacecrafts this may be no longer the case recently. See, for
example, John E. Pike, “The Military Uses o f Outer Space,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments,
Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, SIPRI, 2002), 627.
96 See “Foreign Space Activities,” Air Force Magazine, August 2002,44.
97 Harvey, Russia in Space, 2001, 284.
98 Harvey compares the Russian space budget with the budgets o f NASA in the United States and the
European Space Agency, and also with government spending on space in France, Italy, Germany, Japan,
China, and India. See Ibid., p. 285.
99 A joint venture can be defined as an enterprise established for the purposes o f cooperation between any
number o f market actors in design, production, marketing and funding o f projects. An important advantage
o f joint ventures in comparison with other forms o f commercial cooperation is that they permit companies
to expand markets while maintaining selective control o f their technological assets. See Vicki L. Golich,
“From Competition to Collaboration: the Challenge o f Commercial-Class Aircraft Manufacturing,”
International Organization 46 (autumn 1992): 924.
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These companies provided up to 10 percent of a parent company’s turnover.100 These
efforts, however, were rather futile, since they could not provide for the survival of the
Russian space program. More viable forms of commercialization emerged when Russia’s
large space companies started to create closed joint-stock companies, cooperating in a
framework of some sectors of space program and focusing on commercial operations on
international and domestic markets, such as, for example, Sovinformsputnik or
Informkosmos.
Cutting the space budget was an unavoidable measure: the Russian government had
to reduce spending on the space program due to the seriously deteriorated economic
situation in the country. The Russian space program probably would not have survived the
drastic cuts in funding had it not gotten a chance to earn money via commercial activities.
For that, however, the Russian space complex needed an adequate legal, political and
economic foundation, which was largely absent in the immediate aftermath of Soviet rule.
Shaping an environment conducive to the survival and successful transition of the Russian
space program became Russian government’s main role in the 1990s with respect to space
activities.
In the former Soviet Union, there was no legislation regulating space activities.
The space sector was regulated by decrees issued by the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., and
decrees and directives issued by the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. These documents were
issued on an ad hoc basis depending on the current political, economic or military
situation. In order to provide a legal foundation for space activities, the Supreme Soviet of
100 See Chapter 2 “Economics o f Space Activity in Russia,” in Federation o f American Scientists Space,
Policy Project, Russian Space Industry, http://www.fas.org/spp/civil/russia/chap_2.htm (accessed
01.31.01).
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the Russian Federation adopted the Law of the Russian Federation “On Space Activity,”
which came into effect in 1993.101 This law represented an important step towards the
creation of the necessary foundation for the commercialization and internationalization of
space activities,102 for it committed the state to promote international cooperation in the
field of space activities, to protect technologies and commercial secrets of foreign
organizations and citizens undertaking space activities under the jurisdiction of the Russian
Federation, and provided for equal rights to all participants in space activities—both
domestic and foreign.103 Furthermore, the document also provided guarantees for foreign
investments into space activities in Russia.104
In 1993, as the conditions in the space sector deteriorated considerably, the
Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation made an effort to stabilize the situation and
issued a resolution “On Measures to Stabilize the Situation in Space, Science and
Industry.” This document, issued prior to the Federal Law “On Space Activity,” outlined
administrative measures aimed at improving the delivery of government funding and
materials for the space program and commercial space projects and formulated a goal of

101 This document stated: “In the Russian Federation the exploration and use o f outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies, is one o f the most important directions o f activities in the interests o f the
citizens, society and state.” See Russian Federation, Public Law, “On Space Activity,” August 20,1993,
Preamble, http://www.jaxa.jp/jda/library/space-law/chapter_4/4-l-2-7/index_e.html (accessed 05.011.04).
102 Article 4 “The principles o f Space Activities” o f the Federal Law “On Space Activity” promulgated
that the development o f entrepreneurial activities in space and promotion o f international cooperation were
among the main principles. See Russian Federation, Public Law, “On Space Activity,” 1993, Article 4.
103 Articles 26 and 27 o f the Russian Federation, Public Law, “On Space Activity,” 1993. An exception
was made for contractors included in the Federal Space Program, where foreign participation was limited to
no more than 49 percent o f shares. See Maxim Tarasenko, “Russia’s Place in Space: A Home View,”
Space Policy 10 (May 1994): 118.
1 4 Article 12, Par. 4 o f the Law o f the Russian Federation “On Space Activity,” 1993. In 1997, further
legislative support for commercial space activities was provided in the Federal Law “On Commercial
Space Activity.” This document legally defined aims o f commercial space activities and key concepts,
including “commercial space activity” and “commercialization o f space activity,” and further specified
state support for commercial space activities. See Russian Federation, Public Law, “On Commercial Space
Activity,” April 1997, http://www.jaxa.jp/library/space-law/chapter_4/4-l-l-5/index_e.html (accessed
05.11.04).
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developing a transformation program for Russia’s space program.105 This resolution also
called for the creation of a Russian space fund as an independent organization to
accumulate funding from domestic as well as foreign sources with a view to stimulate
space activities, introduce space technology into the national economy, and support
measures to utilize the achievements of space science for public education and cultural
purposes.106 Simultaneously, the resolution of the Supreme Soviet “On the Priority of
Russian Federation Space Policy” announced the goal of structural transformation of
space activities.107 In December 1993, the Russian government issued the Decree on
“State Support and Backing for Space Activity in the Russian Federation” that contained
concrete steps necessary for preservation and development of the Russian space program
“in the interests o f the economy, science, and technology, and for support o f the
country’s defense and security.”108 Appended to this decree there was “Space Program
for the Period 1994-2000.”109 This document focused on the conversion of defense
production for the benefit of Russian economy and commercialization o f the Russia’s
space industry.110
Privatization of Russia’s space production facilities was a part of the envisioned
plan.111 For example, Energiya, the largest design bureau in the Russian space sector,

105 Russian Federation, Supreme Soviet, “On Measures to Stabilize the Situation in Space Science and
Industry,” Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree No. 4378-1, April 27, 1993,
http://www.jaxa.jp/jda/library/space-law/chapter_4/4-l-2-82_e.html (accessed 05.11.04).
106 Ibid.
107 Russian Federation, Supreme Soviet, “On the Priorities o f Russian Federation Space Policy,”
Resolution o f the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet No. 4878-1, April 27, 1993,
http://www.jaxa.jp/jda/libarary/space-law/chapter_4/4-l-2-81_e.html (accessed 05.11.04).
108 Russian Federation, Council o f Ministers, “On State Support and Backing for Space Activity in the
Russian Federation,” Decree 1282 o f the Council o f Ministers o f the Russian Federation, December 11,
1993, http://www.fas.org/spp/civil/Russia/pp931282.htm (accessed 08.16.02).
109 Ibid.
110 See Harvey, Russia in Space, 2001,288.
111 It was first mentioned in the resolution o f the Supreme Soviet o f the Russian Federation “On the
Priority o f Space Policy o f Russian Federation,” 1993.
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was partially privatized by a presidential decree: 49 percent of its shares were offered to
its management, employees, citizens, domestic institutional investors and foreign
•

investors, while the rest remained in the government’s ownership until 1998.

119

Between

1994 and 1995, a number of other enterprises of Russia’s space industry were partially
privatized, such as Arsenal Production Association, Perm’ Motors and others. In order to
facilitate commercialization, a number of space enterprises under the supervision of the
State Committee of the Russian Federation on Defense Branches of Industry
(Goskomoboronprom) were transferred to the Russian Space Agency in 1994.

11^

The other key component of commercialization of Russia’s space activities, the
creation of joint commercial ventures with foreign firms, was also encouraged and
promoted by the Russian government. However, in order to pave the way to commercial
cooperation with the foreign firms, certain political steps were needed.
Russia did not have independent access to the emerging global space market. The
United States effectively controlled Russia’s access to the international space market
because most of the communications satellites that Russia could offer to launch on its
rockets on a commercial basis were either manufactured in the United States or included
American components and technology that were subject to the U.S. export controls.114
Under U.S. law, a U.S. export license was necessary to ship satellites to Russia’s

112 Later, in 1998, another 13 percent o f Energiya was privatized in order to fulfill Russia’s commitments
to the International Space Station and delivery o f the Zvezda service module. With this the government’s
share fell to 25 percent.
113 In May 1996, the State Committee o f the Russian Federation on Defense Branches o f Industry was
transformed into the Ministry o f Defense Industry. In 1997, this ministry was abandoned, while its
responsibilities were transferred to the Ministry o f Economy. See Chapter 1 “Structure and Methods o f
State Management o f Space Activity,” in Federation o f American Scientists, Space Policy Project, Space
Industrial Complex o f Russia.
114 See van Fenema, The International Trade in Launch Services, 1999, 140.
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spaceports.115 In 1992-1993, Russia and the United States signed a number of
agreements on expanded cooperation in outer space activities, including a new U.S.Russian Space Cooperation Agreement that envisaged cooperation in “commercial
applications of space technologies for the general benefit.”116 This document was to
provide the foundation for the U.S.-Russian space cooperation and encourage private
companies to expand their search for new commercial space business. It opened the door
for commercial cooperation between U.S. firms and Russian space industrial
organizations and plants.

117

In return for the introduction of Russia’s space firms into the

commercial space market the United States insisted on Russia’s adherence to the
MTCR.118 On July 15,1993, Russia finally agreed to abide by the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) rules.119 This agreement eliminated the obstacle that prevented
Russia from entering the commercial space market. After Russia agreed to adhere to the
MTCR rules, the United States and Russia signed an agreement on space launch services

115 The 1976 Arms Export Control Act authorized the U.S. President to control the export and import o f
defense goods and services “in furtherance o f world peace and security and foreign policy o f the United
States.” See Ibid., 110.
116 See “Agreement Between the United States o f America and the Russian Federation Concerning
Cooperation in the Exploration and Use o f Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes,” Washington D. C., June 17,
1992, http://www.jaxa.jp/jda/library/space-law/chapter 4/4-2-2-6e.html (accessed 05.11.04).
117 In July 1992, following the June summit, under the sponsorship o f the U.S. Department o f Commerce,
representatives o f 17 U.S. aerospace firms visited 40 Russian space-related organizations with the view o f
identifying possible joint commercial projects.
118 See van Fenema, The International Trade in Launch Services, 1999, 149-150.
119 Russia canceled its contract with India signed in November 1990 in accordance with which Russian
Glavkosmos was supposed to sell rocket engines and technology o f their production to the Indian Space
Research Organization (ISRO). The United States considered this Russian-Indian deal as an act of
proliferation o f missile technology and, in 1992, imposed trade sanctions on Russian companies
participating in the deal. These sanctions precluded Russian companies from establishing joint ventures
with American companies. On July 15, 1993, Russia adhered to the MTCR. On September 1-2, 1993,
Russia’s Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and U.S. Vice President Gore signed a Joint Memorandum o f
Understanding on missile related exports. Russia sold the engines to India but did not transfer its
technology to the ISRO as a result o f the reached agreement between the U.S. and Russia. Russia formally
became a member o f the MTCR only in 1995.
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on September 2, 1993.120 In this agreement, the U.S. set quotas allowing Russian space
vehicles to launch a limited number of U.S.-built satellites or satellites containing the
U.S. components or technology subject to U.S. export controls.121
Another, seemingly unrelated to the commercial space activities, but nonetheless
important step on the road towards commercialization o f Russian space activities was the
1993 United States’ invitation to Russia to join as a full member along with other U.S.
partners—Japan, Canada, and nine European countries— in the design, development and
operation o f an international space station.122 Russia’s manned space flight program,
regarded as one o f the greatest achievements in cosmonautics by the Russians, presented
the greatest concern and difficulties during the 1990s.123 For Russia, it was an
opportunity to provide for the survival of its manned flight program. It also had a

120 See “Agreement Between the United States o f America and the Russian Federation Regarding
International Trade in Commercial Space Launch Services,” September 2, 1993,
http://www.jaxa.jp/jda/library/space-law/chapter_4/4-2-2-7_e.html (accessed 05.11.04).
121 Ibid., Article IV “Quantitative Limits.” On January 30, 1996, the United States and Russia signed an
agreement amending the September 2,1993 agreement regarding international trade in Commercial launch
services. See “Agreement Between the United States o f America and Russian Federation Amending the
Agreement o f September 2, 1993, Regarding International Trade in Commercial Launch Services,”
Washington D. C., January 30, 1996, http://www.jaxa.jp/jda/library/space-law/chapter_4/4-2-214/index_e.html (accessed 05.11.04). See also van Fenema, The International Trade in Launch Services,
1999,244-248, and Marcia Smith, “Space Launch Vehicles,” 2003. The U.S. removed quotas only in
2000. Cancellation o f quotas for Russian space launches was made dependent upon the record o f Russia’s
efforts in non-proliferation. Between 1992 and 2002, the United States sanctioned Russian entities more
than 6 times for export o f missile and nuclear technology, and chemical and biological dual-use equipment.
At the same time in the 1990s, Russia did make efforts in to stem proliferation, becoming a member o f the
Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Supplier Group, the MTCR, and the Zangger Committee. In 1999,
Russia enacted its basic export control law. See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental
Affairs. Russia and China: Nonproliferation Concerns and Export Controls: Hearing before the
International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee o f the Committee on
Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., June 6, 2002, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2003.
122 Russia formally joined the International Space Station project in 1998 when the Memorandum o f
Understanding between NASA and the Russian Space Agency was finally signed. See “Memorandum of
Understanding between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration o f the United States o f
America and the Russian Space Agency Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station,”
January 29, 1998, ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/reportsl998/nasa_russian.html (accessed 07.26.04).
123 See, for example, David Bernstein ed., Cooperative Business Ventures between the U.S. Companies
and Russian Defense Enterprises, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University,
1997, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/10236/cooperative.pdf (accessed 03.11.04).
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symbolic meaning: it stood for the recognition of Russia and welcoming her into the
international space community as an equal member. This symbolism was useful not
only, and probably not so much, for the sake of Russia’s prestige but much more as a
signal for the commercial sector that the minimal political cooperation necessary for
commercial enterprises to get engaged in Russia had been achieved.
The manned exploration of space was the one area of space activities where the
two states had some experience of cooperation during the Cold War—the Soyuz-Apollo
program of the 1970s.124 This area of space activities was used again as a foundation for
the further development of cooperation,

17^

including commercial cooperation, in outer

space.126 Participation in the ISS project provided for the first steps in establishing

124 In May 1972, as a part o f the detente policy, President Nixon signed an agreement with the Chairman
o f the Soviet Council o f Ministers Alexei Kosygin on a cooperative project in manned space flight. This
cooperative project included a rendezvous and docking o f a U.S. Apollo spacecraft and a Soviet Soyuz
vehicle. The project was successfully executed and it culminated with the famous “handshake in space” in
July 1975. The Nixon and Ford Administrations planned to have more cooperative space project with the
Soviet Union. In May 1977, the leaders o f NASA and the Soviet Academy o f Science reached an
agreement on the “Study o f the Objectives, Feasibility and Means o f Accomplishing Joint Experimental
Flight o f a Long-Duration Station o f the Salyut-type and Reusable ‘Shuttle’ Spacecraft” (the so-called
Salyut-Shuttle Program). This agreement also envisaged a study o f the feasibility o f developing an
international space platform, the so-called International Space Platform Program. These plans were not
implemented, however, due to the deteriorated U.S.-Soviet relations, particularly after the Soviet invasion
o f Afghanistan in 1979. A new agreement for U.S.-Soviet cooperation was negotiated in 1987. See John
M. Logsdon, “The Evolution o f U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Human Space Flight,” Appendix B, in John
M. Logsdon and James R. Miller eds., U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Human Space Flight: Assessing the
Impact, Space Policy Institute and Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Elliott School o f
International Affairs, the George Washington University, Washington D.C., February 2001,
http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/usrusappb.html (accessed 09.06.01).
125 Space cooperation was high on the political agenda o f the Soviet leader Michael Gorbachev, while he
was trying to improve East-West relations. During his visit to Washington D.C. for a summit meeting with
President Bush in June 1990, Gorbachev discussed various directions o f U.S.-Soviet space cooperation,
including the possibility o f a flight o f a U.S. astronaut to the Soviet space station Mir, with U.S. Vice
President Dan Quayle, the chair o f the Bush Administration’s National Space Council. The agreement on
the exchange o f astronauts and cosmonauts was signed by Presidents George Bush and Michael Gorbachev
at the summit meeting in Moscow in July 1991. At this meeting, Gorbachev expressed the desire o f the
Soviet Union to enter the commercial space launch market. See John M. Logsdon and James R. Miller
eds., U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Human Space Flight, 2001.
126 Technical, foreign, security, economic and political factors influenced the U.S. decision on cooperation
with Russia in human flight. At least in part, the U.S. decision to invite Russia to participate in ISS project
was dictated by the interest o f the United States to have a way to encourage Russia to follow policies o f
non-proliferation o f missile technology. Another security-related reason was to help Russia to maintain
and modernize the basic military space assets in order to prevent an accident or erroneous launch o f
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Russia’s commercial partnerships with the U.S. and other Western aerospace companies:
it helped Russia to develop the necessary infrastructure, business practices, as well as the
degree of political cooperation between the two countries that encouraged the U.S.
companies to collaborate with Russian space industry on a commercial basis.
The first Russian-American commercial enterprise was created between the
American aerospace giant Lockheed and the Khrunichev factory, the supplier of the
Proton rocket, to provide space launch services on the Russian Proton vehicle and
American Atlas and Titan rockets.127 This new company called International Launch
Services (ILS) won its first contract for the Proton rocket to launch an International
Maritime Satellite Organization’s (INMARSAT) navigation satellite in 1992. More
orders followed and by 1995 Proton attracted 15 percent o f the world market in its
category. The joint enterprise became Russia’s big success story of commercialization of
its space activities. It brought Russian space industry in general, and the Khrunichev
factory in particular, access to the world space launch market and much needed
investments in its space infrastructure. In 1995, ILS announced plans to invest $23
million in order to make improvements in the Baikonur cosmodrome, transforming an old
and run down infrastructure for Proton rockets into one of the world’s best assembly and
integration areas. 128
•

•

The deal between Lockheed and Khrunichev was followed by more joint
ventures. Boeing entered into a joint venture with NPO Yuzhnoe for the marketing of the

strategic nuclear weapons. As a broader, foreign policy goal, the United States pursued this cooperative
project in order to ally Russia with the West via close space cooperation. See, for example, Logsdon and
Miller, eds., U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Human Space Flight, 2001.
127 Later Lockheed merged with Martin Marietta and Energiya was invited to take part in the joint venture
that was renamed Lockheed Khrunichev Energiya Intenraitonal (LKEI). In 1995, the joint enterprise was
renamed International Launch Services (ILS).
128 Harvey, Russia in Space, 2001, 289.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

164

Zenit booster, which then grew into a multination joint enterprise Sea Launch to provide
space launch services from a platform floating in the High Seas. Rockwell formed a joint
venture for marketing Tsyklon, and Assured Access followed the example by creating a
joint venture with NPO Polyot for the Cosmos 3M. By 2000, 87 Scientific and
Production Organizations (NPOs) in Russia’s space sector had established commercial
partnerships with the foreign, mostly Western, companies.

129

Besides creating joint ventures for marketing its launch vehicles, the Russian
space industry started to trade its space technology and hardware. Energomash signed a
deal worth over $1 billion with Pratt & Whitney for delivery of its RD-180 rocket
engines that would be used in the new Atlas III and V rockets.

12 0

The Kuznetsov plant

sold its engines NK-31 and NK-43 to Aerojet. The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization (SDIO), which later was reorganized, purchased a Topaz, a Soviet nuclear
reactor that was designed to provide reliable and long-lasting power source for
spacecraft.131
American companies were not Russia’s only partners in joint space ventures. In
1995, Khrunichev and German Daimler-Benz Aerospace created a joint venture called
Eurokot to market a Cold-War missile Rockot for civilian launches of small satellites. In
129 Some differences exist in the reported numbers o f partnerships between Russian and foreign
enterprises. The Russian Space Agency reports that, jointly with Russian space enterprises, it negotiated
and signed over 100 commercial contracts with foreign firms from 1996 to 2000. See Russian Space
Agency, Russian Space Industry: Catalog o f Enterprises and Organizations, 2001-2002, (Moscow: OmVLuch, 2001), 14.
130 Pratt & Whitney and Energomash (NPOE) worked together since 1992. They formalized their relations
in a joint venture in 1997. This is a case where technology transfer was done in a sensitive area with
further use o f this technology by the American company and then by the U.S. Air Force. This represents a
new, more advance stage o f collaboration between Russian and American companies. See U.S.
Department o f Commerce, Commercialization o f Russian Technology in Cooperation with American
Companies, Report to the Office o f Space Commercialization, 1999, http://cisac.standford.edu/
docs/bemstein99.pdf, 63, 64-65 (accessed 10.06.03). The first Russian made RD-180 engine was delivered
in late 1999.
131 Judyth L. Twiggs, “The Russian Space Program: What Lies Ahead?” Space Policy 10 (February 1994):
26.
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1996, TsSKB Progress in Samara and the French Arianespace created a joint company
called Starsem to develop and market the Russian Soyuz rocket for commercial launches.
Starsem proved to be successful in attracting commercial consumers and signed contracts
for launching American Globalstar communication satellites and later European
scientific satellites series Cluster. In 2000, the new Soyuz MT rocket won its first
contract for launching SkyBridge communication satellites. Similarly to ILS, Starsem
provided necessary funds for improvement of the production facilities in Samara, at the
Energiya assembly building, and at Baikonur cosmodrome.
All in all, between 1996 and 2000, the most difficult period for the Russian space
program transformation, Russian space launch vehicles served on average 24 percent of
the world launches. The overall results of these commercialization efforts were the
survival and transformation of Russia’s space activities, their growing integration with
the U.S. and European space activities, particularly in the launch industry sector. It also
strengthened the position of Russia’s pro-Westem space industry elite. Yurii Koptev, the
RKA’s chief, became known as an industrial leader promoting pro-Westem values and
business culture, and joint projects with Western firms.

1

The commercialization of Russian space activities was not confined to Russia’s
launch industry, in which Russia had a certain edge inherited from the Soviet Union.
Russia inherited an advanced photoreconnaissance program from the Soviet Union as

132 See, for example, Logsdon and Miller, U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Human Space Flight, 2001. On
March 11,2004, in the course o f reorganization o f the Russian Space Agency (RKA) into the Federal
Space Agency, Yurii Koptev was released from his post as a head o f the Russian Space Agency. The
Decree No. 335-r o f the Russian Government put in charge o f the newly formed Federal Space Agency
General Colonel Anatolii N. Perminov who until then was the Commander o f the Space Forces o f the
Russian Federation formed in 2001. See Biographical Note on Anatolii N. Perminov, Novosti
Kosmonavtiki 14 (May 2004): 53.
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well. Beginning in 1992, when economic conditions became difficult,

Russia

declassified two of its camera systems with 10 and 2-meter resolutions and started selling
pictures from its remote-sensing satellites Resurs and Kometa to Western customers on a
commercial basis through Soyuzkarta, a Russian state company supplying cartography.134
Between 1992-1993, the U.S. Air Force purchased considerable quantity o f Russian
remote-satellite images. Soyuzkarta also reached a deal with Aerial Images, a company
in North Carolina, for marketing pictures from its Kometa satellites in cooperation with
Kodak and Microsoft. The first successful mission, called SPIN-2, of this commercial
project flew in February-April 1998. Using images of high resolution from SPIN-2,
Aeriel Images sold maps of U.S. territory on the Internet. It also placed them on the web
for a free viewing by anyone. The commercialization of Russian remote-sensing
activities influenced U.S. policies in this area. President Clinton decided to relax
restrictions on the remote sensing activities of the U.S. companies and allow them to sell
high-resolution images following Russia’s example. Similarly to the launch activities,
Russia’s efforts to commercialize its remote-sensing activities led it again to establish
cooperative commercial partnerships with foreign companies, particularly in the West.
Russia’s commercialization efforts in satellite communications are even less
known than in remote-sensing and launch services. The International Organization of
Space Communications (INTERSPUTNIK), established in 1971 as a satellite
communication system serving the socialist bloc and other countries in the Soviet

133 In January 1992, a package o f economic liberalization measures was adopted by the Russian
government. These measures, known as “shock therapy,” had a negative impact on many budget
dependent industries.
134 The initiative actually originated during the Soviet period. See Harvey, Russia in Space, 2001, 113.
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economic sphere, began commercial operations in 1992.

n r

The organization has its

headquarters in Moscow and the Russian Satellite Communications Company (RSCC)
operates the satellites for INTERSPUTNIK. After the end of the Cold War, the RSCC
started to provide communication services meeting high world standards.136 It was able
to benefit from the utilization of cutting-edge domestic technology originating from the
military as well as from the incorporation of foreign hardware. Leasing Russia’s
Gorizont and Express series communication satellites and Gals DBS, INTERSPUTNIK
began to provide a wide range of satellite communication services—television, voice
traffic, data, video conferencing, VSATs and others. It is one of Russia’s space
commercialization success stories. Over the past decade, it increased its membership and
customer base. Its system capacity now is used by more than 100 states and private
companies in various regions of the world. South and Southeast Asia, the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Central and Eastern Europe are major
markets for INTERSPUTNIK. Between 1992 and 1996, INTERSPUTNIK’s profitability
increased 4.3 times.

1 11

Dealing with an increasingly tougher competition at the global

telecommunications services market, the organization decided to procure
INTERSPUTNIK’s own new generation satellites and to form a strategic partnership
with Lockheed Martin in 1994. A joint venture between INTERSPUTNIK and Lockheed
Martin was established in 1997, called the Lockheed Martin Intersputnik (LMI). Its
scope encompassed the whole technological cycle of satellite services: from satellite
135 First, INTERSPUTNIK began its operations in 1972. It used Soviet communication satellites in the
Molniya orbit and started using geostationary communication satellites in 1979. See historic overview at
INTERSPUTNIK, Official Website, http://www.interspumik.com/history.shtml (accessed 01.29.01).
136 The Russian Satellite Communication Company (RSCC) is a State Unitary Enterprise. See the RSCC
official website at http://www.rscc.ru/eng/history.html (accessed 03.17.04).
137 See United Nations, Office o f Outer Space Affairs, Space Activities o f the United Nations and
International Organizations, A Review o f the Activities and Resources o f the United Nations, its Specialized
Agencies and Other International Bodies (New York: United Nations, 1999), 114.
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manufacturing and launching to long-term in-orbit satellite operation. In the autumn of
1999, the first LMI-series satellite LMI-1 was successfully launched and put into
operation. In July 2002, INTERSPUTNIK signed a distribution agreement with
EUTELSAT, a European satellite organization. The agreement enables
INTERSPUTNIK to sell EUTELSAT’s satellite capacity and satellite telecommunication
services. Recently INTERSPUTNIK launched a new project called Intersputnik- 100M.
Within the framework of this project, INTERSPUTNIK plans to manufacture, launch and
operate a series of small satellites that will carry payload modules tailored according to
clients’ unique requirements and communication needs. The idea of this innovative
approach is to provide cheap, fast, reliable connections to global communication
networks for news, video, telephony, and Internet access for wider possible number of
customers around the world, and particularly those whose needs are not well served by
large satellite communication companies. Thus, within the past decade or so,
INTERSPUTNIK has undergone a major metamorphosis: from a political organization
serving the socialist camp into a successful commercial player in the global market for
telecommunications services. Again, as in the launch industry and remote-sensing
sectors, it developed an extensive cooperation with the West.
Other satellite communication projects include an Italian-Russian company that
developed a system that routes international telephone calls from Moscow first to a
Russian communication satellite and then on to their destination via an Italian ground
station, and Sokol America Inc., that concluded a deal with the Russian Space Agency to
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help convert Russian military space satellites to civilian use and to provide a fiber-optic
•
•
138
network on the ground to meet growing communication requirements.
Building partnerships with the Western space companies in satellite
communications was crucial for Russia’s success in commercializing its activities in this
segment of space activities. Not only did it give Russia access to the global satellite
communications market where the United States has dominated technologically and
commercially, but it also stimulated Russian space industry to make significant
improvements in the satellite manufacturing sector, a space sector where Russia had
significant difficulties. Due to the absence of any commercial imperatives during the
Soviet era and lags in the development of electronics, the satellites’ life in orbit was much
shorter than that of American communication satellites.139 By mid 1990s, Russian
satellite manufacturers were able to make considerable improvements in characteristics of
their communications satellites, in part, thanks to cooperation with Western
companies.140 Furthermore, since Russia entered the global market o f satellite
communications via INTERSPUTNIK, strong stimuli emerged to develop more
competitive communication satellites that would meet the high expectations of the
consumers around the world. The Intersputnik-100M project—project that involves such
important Russian space players as Khrunichev State Space Research and Production
Center, Reshetnev NPO PM, NPO Mashinostroyeniye, and Korolev RSC Energiya—
represents one of the attempts to build and offer to international consumers around the

138 Twiggs, 1994,24-25.
139 If American satellites operated in orbit on average 7-10 years since the 1980s, Russian communications
satellites o f the early 1990s operated in orbit 5-6 years on average. See Harvey, Russia in Space, 2001,
163.
140 Kiselev, Medvedev, Menshikov, Cosmonautics on the Frontier o f Millenniums, 2001,210. Some o f
the problems were resolved by importing components from the West. See U.S. Department o f Commerce,
Commercialization o f Russian Technology in Cooperation with American Companies, 1999.
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world communication satellites that could provide Russian satellite manufacturers with a
place in the future satellite communications market.
While Russia made its entrance into the global telecommunication market as a
provider of satellite communication services, it also opened its own domestic market for
the introduction of foreign satellite communication services. In 1999, a decree of the
Russian government allowed the use of global mobile personal satellite communications
•

-i-fc

•

systems in Russia.

141

Russia’s global satellite navigation system GLONASS, begun in 1982, despite
being a military space system, managed to attract some commercial interests from foreign
companies. Honeywell signed a deal with the RSA to develop a dual GPS/GLONASS
ground receiver for satellite navigation. Honeywell also assisted Russian manufacturers
in establishing commercial production lines that would meet Western standards.142 In
order to further attract commercial interests to GLONASS, the Russian government
transferred the GLONASS system from the Defense Ministry to the Russian Space
Agency in 1998. In February 1999, the Presidential Directive No. 38 authorized the use
of foreign investments for maintenance and upgrading of the GLONASS system. It also
changed its status from a military system to a “dual use” system, and permitted it to be
offered as a basis for international GNSS.143

141 Russian Federation, Council o f Ministers, “On Order o f Regulation o f Access and Use on
Telecommunication Market o f Russia o f Global Systems o f Mobile Personal Satellite Communications,”
Decree No. 180 o f the Government o f the Russian Federation, March 16, 1999,
http://www.fas.org/spp/civil/Russia/pol_docs.htm (accessed 08.16.02).
142 Twiggs, 1994,25. More joint projects followed, such as, for example, a partnership between Russia’s
State Scientific Institute o f Aviation System (GosNIIAS) and a French company Sextant Avionique to
develop an integrated GPS/GLONASS receiver for aviation application. See U.S. Department o f
Commerce, Commercialization o f Russian Technology in Cooperation with American Companies, 1999.
143 See Federation o f American Scientists, Space Policy Project, Russian Space Policy Documents,
http://fas.org/soo/civil/russia/pol_docs.htm (accessed 08.16.02).
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Being the first country to launch a man in outer space, Russia also launched in
outer space the world’s first space tourist, an American businessman Dennis Tito, 40
years after Gagarin’s historic flight, giving a start to space tourism—a sector where
Russia plans to compete strongly when other space-capable states join in this commercial
market.
Similarly to the space industry in the United States, the Russian space industry
underwent a process of restructuring. In 1994, the design bureau Salyut merged with
Khrunichev plant to become the State Space Scientific-Manufacturing Center named after
M. V. Khrunichev. Other scientific and engineering institutes as well as designing
bureaus were added to this center, transforming it into a complex capable of designing
and building space systems, space launch vehicles and launch ground equipment, and
ground stations. In 1997, the TsSKB was merged with manufacturing plant Progress to
establish State Scientific-Manufacturing Space-Rocket Center TsSKB-Progress,
designing and producing space systems.144 As a result of these mergers, large space
industry complexes emerged in Russia. Thus, the wave of industry consolidation affected
Russian space industry, as it was taking place around the world.145
All in all, by 2000, Russia has developed a commercial space program in main
areas of its space activities due to severely retrenched governmental financing. It has
achieved it under the conditions of political and economic instability of the 1990s. Its
commercial space program proved to be the major undertaking, rather than a marginal

144 Kiselev, Medvedev, Menshikov, Cosmonautics on the Frontier o f Millenniums, 2001, 179-180.
145 In 2001, governmental policy o f industry consolidation started to bear the results, according to Iliya
Klebanov, the deputy premier for the aerospace industry. See Robert Wall, David A. Fulghum and Alexey
Komarov, “Russian Defense Industry Struggles with Reform,” Aviation Week & Space Technology,
August 20, 2001, http://www.aviationnow.com/content/publication/awat/20010820/
avi_news.htm (accessed 03.12.04).
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activity, that allowed Russia not only to keep, but also revitalize and further develop its
space activities. The commercialization of Russia’s space activities considerably differed
from the commercialization of space activities in the United States, where the market
economy was well established and the aerospace industry was already a major market
player. In Russia, socialist economy had to make a transition to a market economy and
space industry had to reinvent itself as a market player relying largely on civil, rather than
military, customers.146 Certain sectors of space industry had to be built from scratch,
such as space insurance, without which there could be no space commerce.147 Thus, for
Russia, the commercialization of its outer space activities was a part of much larger and
much more fundamental endeavor— gradual integration into the world economy. Russia
has created its commercial space program relying on the strategy of building strategic
alliances— be it joint ventures or other partnerships—with foreign, mostly Western,
companies.148 In the span o f a decade or so, the space program was transformed from
being a part of the Soviet military industrial complex—militarized, closed, secretive, and
fully government financed—into one of the most competitive and global in the world.
Through the process of commercial cooperation Russia’s space activities were
transformed into more open, internationally focused and oriented towards civilian
needs.149

146 U.S. Department o f Commerce, Commercialization o f Russian Technology in Cooperation with
American Companies, 1999.
147 Kiselev, Medvedev, Menshikov, Cosmonautics on the Frontier o f Millenniums, 2001,227-231.
148 Russian space enterprises have contracted with companies in Japan, as well as India, Brazil, Argentina.
See Ibid., 35. See also, Federation o f American Scientists, Space Policy Project, Russian Space Industry,
12 .

149 See, for example, Logsdon and Miller, U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Human Space Flight, 2001.
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THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES IN CHINA
Although the world’s first rockets were invented in China in 970,150 China
launched its first satellite on April 24, 1970, becoming the fifth country to be able to put
its satellites in space independently.151 On October 15, 2003, China put its first man in
orbit and finally joined an exclusive club of Russia and the Untied States—two other
spacepwers capable of putting men in orbit.
Both American and Soviet influences were quite significant in the process of
China’s formation as a spacepower. Tsien Hsue-shen, the person who contributed the
most to China’s first steps in modem space exploration and therefore often called one of
the founding fathers of Chinese space program, received his training as an aeronautics
engineer in the United States. Working on the developments of rockets with a group of
amateur rocketeers in California, he made his contribution in the development of early
plans for a missile program in the United States. He became a professor of Aeronautics
in 1943 and later took part in the study of the Nazi missile program in Germany at the
end of World War II. After being victimized during the McCarthy era in the United
States, Tsien returned to China in 1955, where a year later, in October 1956, the Chinese
missile program was officially established.152 A number of scientists of Chinese origin
educated in the United States also went back to China and made valuable contribution to
the development of China’s space program.

1

150 Harvey explains that rockets were not only invented in China but also used as weapons as early as
1083. See Brian Harvey, The Chinese Space Program: From Conception to Future Capabilities
(Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1998), 1.
151 China became the fifth space power with independent launch capabilities after the Soviet Union, the
United States, France, and Japan. Japan launched its first satellite Ohsumi on February 11, 1970—just a
few month before China launched its first satellite.
152 Harvey, The Chinese Space Program, 1998, 3-5.
153 Tu Shoue, for example, also returned from the United States and became one o f the leaders in the
development o f Chinese missiles in the later 1950s. See Harvey, The Chinese Space Program, 1998, 9.
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Simultaneously, Chinese leadership started negotiations for cooperation on a
missile program with the Soviet Union. In September 1956, during the visit of Chinese
delegation to Moscow, the Soviet Union agreed to sell two R -l missiles to China, which
arrived in China a month later. Further cooperation followed after another visit of the
Chinese delegation to Moscow in summer of 1957 and signing of a Sino-Soviet
agreement “The New Defense Technical Accord 1957-58.” According to this accord, the
Soviet Union agreed to supply to China R-2 missile models, technical documentation,
designs and a number of Soviet specialists who arrived in China with some 10,000
volumes of blueprints.154 Dozens of Chinese graduate students went to study in Moscow.
The cooperation on missile programs continued until the Sino-Soviet split in
1960, just before China was about to test its first replication of the Soviet R-2 rocket.155
In August 1960, approximately 1,400 Soviet specialists working in China left with their
blueprints and more than 200 joint Sino-Soviet space projects were terminated.156
However, the Soviet impact on China’s space program was more than this massive initial
technology transfer. The Chinese space program adopted the overall organizational
structure similar to that of the Soviet Union.157 The Chinese space program, like that of

154 Joan Johnson-Freese, The Chinese Space Program: A Mystery Within a Maze (Malabar: Krieger
Publishing Company, 1998), 45.
155 Soviet R -l rockets were copies o f German V-2 rockets. The R-2 rockets represented significantly
improved missile technology at that time. See Harvey, The Chinese Space Program, 1998, 5-6.
156 The primary cause o f the Sino-Soviet split was Soviet Union’s refusal to supply nuclear technology
specifically requested by the Chinese. Krushchev grew very concerned that China, if provided with nuclear
technology, would use nuclear weapons without serious consideration and restraint. See Harvey, The
Chinese Space Program, 1998, 11. A doctrinal split also occurred between the two communist powers.
See Johnson-Freese, The Chinese Space Program, 1998, 16. Johnson-Freese points out that concern for the
use o f nuclear weapons in a war by China was o f greatest concern to Krushchev. See Ibid., 46.
157 Harvey, The Chinese Space Program, 1998, 100.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

175

the Soviet Union, was state-financed, militarized, secretive, and tightly controlled by the
Chinese leadership.158
After the Sino-Soviet split and cessation of Soviet technology transfer, China
converted its production base to produce its first indigenous missile, the CSS-1, an early
ancestor of the Long March rockets. During the years of China’s isolation and
particularly later, after President Nixon’s opening of China, Chinese scientists relied on
openly published information. Those publications focused mostly on the U.S. space
technology, research and achievements. In the first half of 1980s, the Chinese built a new
launching site near Xichang, in a location similar by its latitudinal coordinate to that of
Kennedy Space Center in the United States, arguably, in order to emulate more easily the
launch procedures described in the open literature and possibly with the view to compete
later with the United States in the market for space launch services.159 In January 1984,
the Chinese attempted their first launch of a satellite into a geosynchronous orbit from the
new launch site at Xichang, paving the way for the entrance of China into the emerging
space launch market, and for the commercialization of China’s space launch activities.
The emergence of China’s commercial space program took its beginning in Deng
Xiaoping’ economic reforms of the late 1970s. In March 1978, before the main
economic reforms began, Deng Xiaoping had called for the Chinese defense industry,
which also included the space industry, to focus on economic growth. In October 1978,
Deng Xiaoping announced the “Four Modernizations” plan that encompassed the
development of science and military technology, agriculture, education, and industry.160

158 Johnson-Freese, The Chinese Space Program, 1998, 5.
159 Ibid., 55.
160 The “Four Modernizations” plan was approved by the 3rd plenary session o f the 11th party Central
Committee in December 1978. This marked the official launch o f Deng’s reforms.
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Deng’s reforms envisioned an opening of Chinese economy and science research to the
world. Foreign investments were encouraged, many sectors of the economy privatized,
special economic zones established, and international technological cooperation
promoted. These reforms of the Chinese economy provided a necessary foundation for
the commercialization of China’s space activities.
The Chinese government also took important political measures to prepare China
for its entrance into the international commercial space scene. In 1980, China joined the
International Aeronautical Federation (IAF) and the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS).161 Thus, China’s 20-year isolation from
the world’s space community was ended. In 1983 and 1988, China acceded to the
“Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” “Agreement on the Rescue
of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space,” “Convention on Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,” and
“Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.”162
China adopted a proactive position in the space issue area: in the mid-1980s,
China not only started participating in, but also hosting regional and international space

161 See information at United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses o f Outer Space (UNCOPUOS)
website, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/COPUOS/members.html (accessed 10.10.03), and International
Aeronautical Federation website, http://www.iafastro.com (accessed 10.10.03). The Committee on
Peaceful Uses o f Outer Space became the main international forum for the discussion o f the space legal and
technical issues with its two subcommittees— the Legal Subcommittee and Technical Subcommittee—
preparing important international instruments for dealing with the whole spectrum o f peaceful uses o f outer
space.
162 See, for example, State Council o f the People’s Republic o f China, “China’s Space Activities,” White
Paper, released by the Information Office o f the State Council, November 22, 2000,
http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/china/wpl 12200.html (accessed 08.19.03).
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conferences and exhibitions,

1 zr-i

providing other developing countries with scholarships

for long-term technology training. Finally, China began opening up its space program to
her own people and to the world in order to establish its reputation as a serious,
responsible space player and provide some level of transparency for building commercial
partnerships.164
The defense industry reform, initiated in early 1983, significantly reduced
government funding and started to transform many defense-oriented enterprises into
civilian-oriented enterprises. Unlike the abrupt state funding reduction in Russia after the
Cold War, however, Chinese government retrenchment took place gradually, allowing
the space enterprises to adapt to market relations. Nonetheless, space budget reduction
was quite dramatic: in 1987, China’s space budget funding reached 0.035 percent of
China’s Gross National Product (GNP), compared with 0.52 percent in the United States,
1.5 percent in the Soviet Union, and 0.04 percent in Japan.165 While cutting its funding,
Chinese government encouraged state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to go into business on
their own. Even the People’s Liberation Army was allowed then to have business
enterprises domestically as well as foreign ventures.166
Thus, the conversion and commercialization policy stimulated the Chinese space
industry to supplement the decreasing state funding with earnings from entrepreneurial
activities domestically as well as in the emerging international space market. China’s
163 In 1994, for example, China hosted the first Asian-Pacific regional Ministerial Conference on Space
Applications for Sustainable Development in Asia and the Pacific in Beijing. In 1999, in collaboration
with the UN and ESA, China held the Symposium on Promoting Sustainable Agricultural Development
with Space Applications. From July to August 2000, in cooperation with the OOSA and ESCAP, the
Chinese government opened the Short-Term Training Course for Asia-Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in
Space Technology and Applications.
164 Harvey, The Chinese Space Programme, 1998, 37-38.
165 J. Barry Patterson, “China’s Space Program and Its Implications for the United States,” Research
Paper, Air War College (Maxwell Air Force Base, April 19, 1995), 4.
166 See Johnson-Freese, The Chinese Space Program, 1998, 34.
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astronautics minister Li Xue made a formal announcement of the official line allowing
China’s space enterprises to conduct foreign activities in order to generate income in
October 1985. And between 1987 and 1989, Chinese space industry provided its first
commercial services to the Western customers, flying microgravity experiments.167
It was realized that the commercialization of China’s space activities in general,
and its launch industry in particular, required concerted efforts not only from space
industry but from government as well. Shortly after the first successful attempt at
launching a satellite into a geosynchronous orbit,168 Chinese officials began to develop a
plan for commercialization of their launch industry. In 1985, the China Great Wall
Industry Company (CGWIC), established in 1980 to represent China’s Ministry of Space
Industry (MASI) abroad, was put in charge of marketing commercial launches of the
Long March rocket. In the summer of 1985, China for the first time made its Long
March rocket available for commercial use in the international space launch market but
the first marketing trip did not bring positive results.
The situation with China’s entrance into the international space launch market
changed significantly after the Challenger tragedy of 1986, when the Space Shuttle was
grounded for many months. In the same year, two U.S rockets, an Atlas and a Titan,
exploded. To make the situation on the nascent space launch market even worse,
Europe’s Ariane rocket went down, leaving the European consortium Arianespace with

167 China’s first commercial contract was with the French company Matra for putting a scientific payload,
some microgravity experiments utilizing a converted capsule from China’s reconnaissance satellite FSW as
a platform, in orbit. See Lawrence Cooper and Corinne Contant, “The People’s Republic o f China—
Consolidating its Space Power, Enhancing its Military Might,” in Rebecca Jimerson and Ray A.
Williamson eds., Space and Military Power in East Asia: The Challenge and Opportunity o f Dual-Purpose
Space Technology, Washington D.C., George Washington University, Space Policy Institute, 2000,
http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/spacemilchl.html (accessed 04.03.03).
168 The first attempt to launch a satellite to a geosyncronous orbit failed because o f the technical
malfunction o f Long March-3 rocket on January 29, 1984.
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no extra capacity. The political situation in the world as well as the situation on the space
launch market was conducive to the introduction of China’s launch services. The Reagan
Administration was keen to help China enter into the market and use this opportunity to
balance the Soviet influence in Asia.169
China’s first customers started to arrive but they encountered considerable
complications related to export controls on the high technology put in place by the
Western allies in order to prevent the Communist bloc from gaining access to advanced
technology. Aussat and the AsiaSat consortium decided to use Chinese launch services
for launching their satellites that were manufactured in the United States and thus subject
to export controls. The desire to introduce China to the space launch market and
concerns for the possible transfer of sensitive technology to the Chinese as a result of the
launch activities led the United States into negotiations with the Chinese government in
order to conclude an agreement that would preclude unauthorized transfer o f U.S.
technology to China. In 1988, the “Memorandum of Agreement on Satellite Technology
Safeguards Between the Governments of the United States and the People’s Republic of
China” was signed. The second Memorandum of Agreement, signed later the same year,
addressed the issue of pricing of Chinese launch services. This agreement imposed limits
on prices and number of launches that China could perform. The conclusion o f these
agreements marked the formal introduction of China into the world space launch
market.170 With the successful launch of AsiaSat-1 in 1990 on a. Long March-3 rocket,

169 Cooper and Contant, in Jimerson and Williamson, Space and Military Power in East Asia, 2000.
170 See detailed explanation o f the three agreements’ provisions in van Fenema, The International Trade in
Launch Services, 1999, 199-209.
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China finally joined the space launch market. Throughout the 1990s China’s
participation in this market, however, was confined to just a few launches a year.171
In order to facilitate the commercialization of its space activities, the Chinese
government reformed the organizational structure of its space industry. In 1982, the
Ministry of Space Industry (MASI) was established in place of the Seventh Ministry of
Machine Building responsible for space industry. The new government body supervised
numerous academies—the First Academy also known as China Academy of Launch
Vehicle Technology, the Fifth Academy or China Academy of Space Technology,172 and
others—that developed products for export. Companies were established as marketing
outlets. Until the mid-1980s, these companies and organizations were militarized and
classified. Some necessary administrative changes were made, as China undertook
“civilianization” and commercialization of its space program. In 1991, a Space Leading
Group at the State Council with the responsibility of coordinating relations with foreign
governments and attracting foreign contracts was established. In 1993, the Chinese
National Space Administration (CNSA), the analog of NASA, was created as China’s
main space policy-making body. In the same year, the China Great Wall Industry
Corporation (CGWIC) was reformed: the China Aerospace Great Wall Group was
created in order to improve operation of the business, including such issue areas as
import and export. At that time the CGWIC ranked 51 in the selection of 100 most

171 Since the 1970s, when the first Chinese satellite was put in orbit, China conducted a total o f 79
launches as o f October 21, 2003. In 1990, China captured 4% o f world’s launch market and by 1997 it had
9.5%. Between 1997 and 2000, China made on average 5 launches a year— both commercial and non
commercial, in 2001 it made only 1. See “Foreign Space Activities,” Air Force Magazine, August 2002,
44. See also Marcia S. Smith, “China’s Space Program: An Overview,” CRS Report for Congress, October
21, 2003; The 1998 State o f Space Industry, 1998, 39; and Yanpin Chen, “China’s Space
Commercialization Effort,” Space Policy. 9 (February 1993): 45.
172 Federation o f American Scientists, Space Policy Project, Chinese Space Companies,
http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/china/corp/index.html (accessed 07.11.04).
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famous enterprises by the China Enterprise Association. By 1995, the corporation made
considerable progress and started to occupy a more important position in China’s
economy: the CGWIC was selected by the State Administration Bureau of State Property
to be listed in the official publication called “The Backbone of China - the Best 500 State
Owned Enterprises.” The CGWIC was the only company selected from the space
industry. At that time, the CGWIC was the 6th biggest enterprise in China with its
volume of exports o f mechanical and electrical products, and the 9th largest with its
import volume of technology and equipment. Being the main foreign trade and economic
cooperation channel for China’s space industry, the CGWIC recently reached the level of
annual gross value o f imports and exports of estimated $400 millions.173 Its exports went
to about 60 countries and regions. The geography of its trading relations encompassed
Asia, Africa, Europe, North America, South America, Australia, and Pacific islands. The
United States and Russia became some of the most frequent destinations of its space
related exports and imports.
In the 1990s, the Chinese Aerospace Corporation (CASC) and Chinese National
Space Administration (CNSA) took over the responsibilities of the MASI. CASC,
established in 1993, was charged with research, design, test, manufacture, and
commercialization of technological products and civilian application. Its scope of
responsibilities also included launch vehicles, satellites, and other space products. CASC
made significant contribution in application of space technology via spin-offs in various
sectors of China’s economy, such as electronics, computers, communications, automatic
control systems, medical equipment, automobiles, and others. It was also successful in

173 See China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC), Official Website,
http://www.cgwic.com/trade/index.html (accessed 10.08.03).
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creating joint ventures with foreign partners. As China had a limited capability to
produce reliable communications satellites, CASC particularly sought cooperation with
Western communications satellite manufacturers in order to gain access to
communications satellite technology and components. In 1994, CASC established a joint
venture with Daimler-Benz Aerospace of Germany, called EuraSpace GmbH, for the
production of the Sinosat series of communications satellites for China’s domestic use.
In 1995, CASC and Loral signed a Memorandum of Agreement for joint development of
an advanced high capacity communication satellite, with Loral providing the design and
technical support, and Germany and China making final integration of the
communication satellite. In 1997, China and France began to explore some commercial
cooperative projects in remote sensing. At the same time, the Chinese and French
governments agreed to a broad cooperation on space research and satellite construction.
Later, Alcatel Space won a bid to develop and produce a payload module to be integrated
into next-generation Chinese telecommunications DFH-4 satellite.174 By 1998, CASC
established some 100 joint ventures for space technology applications in China and
abroad.175
In the 1990s, China worked out a project called “Torch” that was aimed at
promoting commercialization of high-technology outcomes, industrialization of hightechnology commodities and the development of high-technology industries. The focus
of this program was on the training of specialists who would be better equipped to adapt
to fast changes in the field of high technology. The idea was to involve teaching methods

174 See more on China’s third generation o f communication satellites and their capabilities “China
Launches Dongfanghong-IV Satellite Project,” P eople’s Daily, Online publication, December 28, 2001,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200112/27/eng20011227_87589.shtml (accessed 03.17.04).
175 Johnson-Freese, The Chinese Space Program, 1998, 66.
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and materials from the advanced industrial countries and to send Chinese specialists to
study abroad.
While actively pursuing commercial ventures in satellite manufacturing with the
Western companies in order to improve its own technology and facilities for
communications satellite manufacturing, China also undertook commerci alization of the
satellite communications providers in order to facilitate the development of
telecommunication services and to satisfy the rapidly growing demand for
telecommunications services in its booming economy. It commercialized the China
Telecommunications Broadcast Satellite (ChinaSat),

1 'I ft

•

subsidiary of China’s Ministry of

Post and Telecommunications. Furthermore, to break ChinaSat’s domination of the
Chinese satellite communications market and encourage commercial competition, the
Sino Satellite Communications (SinoSat) was formed in 1994, with China Aerospace
Corp (CASC), Commission of Defense Science & Technology (COSTIND), People’s
Bank of China and the Government of Shanghai as participants.177 In April 1995, the
China Orient Telecommunications Satellite Company (COTS) was established by
China’s Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT) and the State Planning
Commission as an autonomous satellite body operating ChinaStar satellites built by

176 In late 1992, China bought a 9-year-old Spacenet I satellite from GTE, renamed it ChinaSat 5 and
transferred to ChinaSat, China Telecommunications Broadcast Satellite. In 1993, ChinaSat became
China’s first commercial satellite operator. See Federation o f American Scientists, Space Policy Project,
Zhongxing/ChinaSat, http://www.fas.org/ssp/guide/china/comm/chinasat.htm (accessed 03.17.04).
177 In 1993-1994, DASA and SinoSat formed a joint venture EuraSpace to develop a new communication
spacecraft. Financed primarily by the German banks and the European partners, the new system SinoSat-1
was to be assembled and tested in China. See Federation o f American Scientists, Space Policy Project,
SinoSat, http://www.fas.org/ssp/guide/china/comm/sinosat.htm (accessed 03.17.04).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

184

Lockheed Martin and providing commercial satellite communications services in South
Asia and the Middle East.178
Thus, in the 1990s, China set up a satellite communications market by
commercializing the activities of existing satellite communication providers and
establishing new ones. China also sought participation in international commercial space
telecommunications consortia to satisfy its rapidly growing communication needs.
China’s International Trust and Investment Corporation became a member of a Hong
Kong-based consortium, Asia Satellite Telecommunications Company (Asiasat) that
entered the commercial telecommunications market in 1990 with the launch of Asiasat 1.
Asiasat offered telecommunications services in China, Japan, Malaysia, Burma, Thailand,
Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 1992, APT Satellite Company, a consortium of four
regional companies, in which three out of four founding members were Chinese stateowned enterprises, was created as a commercial rival to Asiasat to provide
telecommunications services in the East Asian region via the HS-601 spacecraft built by
Hughes.179 In 1995, the Asia Pacific Mobile Telecommunications Satellite (APMT)
consortium was created with two-thirds of the equity originally belonging to various
Chinese enterprises and organizations. APMT was to provide a regional mobile satellite
communications services through National Service Providers in countries of the Asia
Pacific region.

1Rf)

All in all, through participation in international telecommunications

178 Federation o f American Scientists, Space Policy Project, ChinaStar,
http://www.fas.org/ssp/guide/china/comm/chinastar.htm (accessed 03.17.04).
179 Federation o f American Scientists, Space Policy Project, APT Satellite Co.,
http://www.fas.org/ssp/guide/china/comm/apstar.htm (accessed 03.17.04).
180 Federation o f American Scientists, Space Policy Project, Asia Pacific Mobile Telecommunications
Satellite (APMT), http://www.fas.org/ssp/guide/china/comm/apmt.htm, (accessed 03.17.04).
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consortia and benefiting from Western satellite technology, China entered and became an
important player in the emerging market of satellite telecommunications.
Commercial space cooperation with the West was not the only direction of
Chinese opening to the world and its commercial cooperation. In 1993, China reopened
its links with Russia with the visit of the chief of staff of the People’s Liberation Army,
Chi Haotian, to Star City, Russia’s cosmonaut training center in Moscow.181 A formal
agreement on cooperation between the Russian Space Agency (RS A) and the Chinese
National Space Administration (CNSA) followed in May 1994. Later, Chinese
cosmonauts, or as they are referred to “taikonauts,” underwent training in the Russian
Star City training center.182 In March 1995, Chinese space experts return to Moscow for
the first time since the Sino-Soviet split of 1960 in order to negotiate and sign a
commercial contract for purchasing Russian space products and technology. They were
particularly interested in space systems for a manned flight, such as environmental
control systems and docking and emergency systems. The Chinese also bought some
Russian RD-120 rocket engines. After a reciprocal visit of the Russian delegation to
China, the Chinese bought an entire spacecraft life support system, an Energiya docking
module and the Kurs rendezvous system, used to dock supply crafts with the M ir space
station.
Trade relations between China and Russia expanded from manned space flight
into other areas of space activities as well. Since the second half of the 1990s China
181 Mowthorpe reports that even prior to this— in May 1990— Chinese and Russian industrial
representatives signed an agreement to cooperate on ten projects covering such areas as satellite navigation,
space surveillance, propulsion, satellite communications, joint design efforts, material, intelligence sharing,
scientific personnel exchanges, and space system testing. See Matthew Mowthorpe, The Militarization and
Weaponization o f Space (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), 97.
182 On August 20, 1996, a group o f Chinese visitors— according to some estimates, from 20 to 50
taikonaut trainees and future instructors— arrived in Star City led by Shen Jungjun. See Harvey, The
Chinese Space Programme, 1998, 147-148.
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stopped launching its imaging intelligence satellites, Fanhui Shi Weixing, or return type
satellites, and instead began purchasing satellite images from Russia on a commercial
basis.183 During an official visit of the Russian head of the government, Mikhail
Kas’yanov, to China in early November 2000, the Chinese and Russians negotiated on
the joint exploitation of the Russian satellite navigation system GLONASS.

1 OA

Later, the

Sino-Russian space cooperation expanded into satellite communication. In June 2003,
the Russian Satellite Communication Company and ChinaSatCom, the Chinese National
Satellite Communications Operator, signed the Agreement on Cooperation in
development of satellite telemedicine network in China, Russia and South East Asian
countries.

185

Thus, China vigorously pursued the commercialization of its space activities and,
similarly to Russia, it had to go quite a distance in order to transform its space industry
from being highly secretive, tightly controlled sector of communist economy into a
commercial player at the international level. Although it started early with its economic
reforms, China needed to catch up technologically in order to be competitive at the
international level. China developed mutually beneficial relationships with major spacefaring states, including the Untied States and Russia, across a wide spectrum of
commercial space activities. In its commercial endeavors China particularly sought
183 See, for example, Pike, in SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security,
2002, 635.
184 Igor’ Korotchenko, “M oscow and Beijing Expand Strategic Relations,” Independent M ilitary Review,
November 10, 2000, http://nvo.ng.ru/printed/wars/2000-ll-10/l_kasyanov.html (accessed 11.16.00).
Before that, China was reported as expressing interests in acquiring GLONASS. See Cooper and Contant,
in Jimerson and Williamson, Space and Military Power in East Asia, 2000. China plans to build and
deploy its own regional satellite navigation system, the Beidou Navigation System. On October 31, 2000,
China’ Long March 3 rocket successfully put the first navigation satellite, the Beidou Navigation Testing
Satellite, into orbit. See “China Puts 1st Navigation Positioning Satellite into Orbit,” Press Release,
SpaceRef.com, October 31, 2000, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid:=2944 (accessed
10.07.03).
185 See News at the official website o f the Russian Satellite Communications Company (RSCC),
http://www.rscc.ru/eng/news_comp25.html (accessed 03.17.04).
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access to advanced space technology in order to build modem space capabilities. In the
post-Cold War era, China’s commercial space activities became a part of its
comprehensive development strategy whose goal was to provide for economic
development and modernization of the People’s Republic of China.

THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF SPACE COMMERCIALIZATION
The commercialization of outer space activities in the three major space powers—
the United States, Russia, and China—was begun nearly simultaneously and marked the
next step in the evolution of space technology and space utilization. This transition was
influenced by such factors as progress in space and information technologies, ideological
revolution neo-conservatism, economic globalization, and political changes brought
about, first, by the superpower detente of the mid-1980s and later by the end of the Cold
War. Outer space started to play an increasingly important role not only in the security
realm but also in the economy of the three states under the study, as well as the world as a
whole.
According to some estimates, worldwide commercial space revenues in 1990
were some $8 billion, whereas worldwide government spending on space at that time was
at approximately $35 billion.186 By the end of the 1990s, the commercial space sector
generated some $60.4 billion while worldwide government spending on space remained
under $40 billion.187 The populations of commercial satellites grew dramatically over

186 The number is approximate. See Watts, The Military Use o f Space, 2001,16.
187 According to the Satellite Industry Association, worldwide satellite revenues that included
manufacturing, launch, ground segment and services, were estimated at $60.4 billion in 1999, and at $86.8
billion in 2002. See Satellite Industry Association, “Perspective on the Commercial Satellite Industry,”
http://telecomweb.com/papers/FCCsat.pdf (accessed 03.31.04). Other assessments offer different
estimates. The discrepancy is due to different sources o f data and methodologies that may include different
segments o f space industry due to the absence o f a unified definition o f the space industry.
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this decade. Whereas previously, communication satellites providing commercial
services were confined mostly to the geostationary orbit, with the arrival of the new
generation of commercial communication satellites providing mobile communication
services commercial satellites now spread into LEO and MEO. With respect to the
degree of commercial utilization of outer space, it is estimated that commercial satellites
in LEO comprise 70 percent of the LEO satellite population, 59 percent of MEO satellite
population and 78 percent of the high orbits satellite population.188 The
commercialization of space, thus, represents a mainstream trend in the closing decade of
the 20th and early 21st centuries rather than a marginal, or temporary phenomenon caused
by budget reductions. The commercialization of space activities in the three states was
accompanied by changes in the domestic legal foundations on which space activities
relied, policies that provided an encouraging economic environment, restructuring of
space industries of the three spacepowers and by the emergence of commercial actors
engaged in the development of space. As a result of commercialization of space
activities, a global space market emerged.
The formation of the global space market was a response to demands of
globalizing world economy. Satellite networks and services they provide—
communications, satellite TV and radio broadcasting, GPS, Earth observation and remote
sensing—represent a part of a vital infrastructure of the world economy supporting global
economic activities.189 In its turn, the level of interconnectedness achieved via satellite
networks represents a qualitatively new phase of globalization.

See Carrington, 1999.
189 See G. Pandozy, “Market Strategy and Ethics,” in G. Haskell and M. Rycroft, eds., New Space
Markets, 1998, 148.
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The commercialization of outer space activities required major efforts on the part
of the three space powers under consideration, though the distance that they had to go
setting up market relations differed significantly: in the United States the space industry
was already a market participant, whereas in Russia and China space industries were
integral parts of defense sectors in non-market, centrally planned economies. What all
three spacepowers had in common was that with the commercialization of their space
activities they had to take steps towards “civilianization,” deregulation, and liberalization
of major space sectors. As a result of the commercialization, all three spacepowers
became dependent on the global space market: China grew to depend on the global space
market for technology, while trying to take shortcuts to full-fledged modem space
capabilities and propel economic development of its country into the 21st century; Russia
grew to depend on the global space market for the survival of its space industry, as its
domestic market and state funding could support only a fraction of its space activities; the
United States, the sole superpower with dominant space capabilities, came to rely on the
global space market both as a supplier of space services and products and as a consumer
as required by its global interests.
All in all, space commercialization that transformed space activities into an
economic mainstream has serious consequences for national and global security. First,
outer space commercialization means an increasing participation of commercially
motivated actors in outer space activities, including private actors. Space activities thus
become more and more influenced by interests of commercial and private actors, making
their calculations based on market incentives, and less by governments’ politically
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motivated calculations.190 As a corollary, space activities become more and more
affected by market forces of supply and demand, their fluctuations and incentives.191
As space competition becomes tougher on the international market, the desire to
succeed has lead commercial actors to turn to the states for help. Under the conditions
when World Trade Organization’s rules restrict subsidies to industries and services, some
commercial space actors have to obtain help under the “umbrella” of defense, thereby
fueling again the militarization of space activities.192 At the same time, the reality of
technology-based competition has led many space firms to form multiple, complex
international strategic alliances with foreign firms.193 This has raised concerns with
technology transfers—technology that often just recently was in the exclusive province of
the military.194
Second, the commercialization of space activities allows states not only to make
returns on their huge investments in space research and development as well as industries
but also to promote technological progress of their economies and economic prosperity of
their domestic societies. In the 1990s, the global space industry became one of the
world’s vital economic engines stimulating developments in important high-tech sectors,
such as software and hardware development, sophisticated electronics,
190 See, for example, Klotz, Space, Commerce, and National Security, 1998, 14; and Watts, The Military
Use o f Space, 2001, 73.
191 Because space industry provides vital infrastructure for the global economy and thus is tightly
integrated into it, global economics directly affects space industry. It was the case during the Asian
financial crisis o f 1998, and during the global economic recession began in 2001. See, for example, on the
effects o f the Asian financial crisis The 1998 State o f the Space Industry, 1998, 10.
192 Commercial space activities remain highly dependent on various forms o f government assistance,
including subsidies. WTO rules restrict subsidies, leaving states with just a few options to help out its
national firms. See, for example, Hansson and McGuire, 1999, 199-205. See also Haller and Sakazaki,
Commercial Space and United States National Security, 2001. See Patrick A. Salin, “Privatization and
Militarization in the Space Business Environment,” Space Policy 17 (February 2001): 19-26. For the
period under consideration, the WTO’s influence affected only the United States, as Russia is not yet a
member o f the WTO and China only recently joint the organization.
193 Haller and Sakazaki, Commercial Space and United States National Security, 2001.
194 Ibid.
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telecommunications, advanced materials research, which in their turn contributed to a
whole range of other industries.195 Thus, the commercialization of space also means that
there are greater incentives for various states, and non-state actors, to obtain their own
space capabilities, firstly, because of the benefits that space activities would bring to their
economies, and secondly, because it may be easier now, as some technological
components can be acquired in the global space market. Given the inherent dual-use
nature of space technology, this proliferation of space technology and capabilities raises
serious security concerns. Furthermore, security concerns also arise with proliferating
and becoming more available and affordable commercial space services, such as accurate
timing, navigation data and other critical information that are generated by satellites,
since they may be used towards hostile ends.
Third, the more modem economies depend on space services, the more they
become vulnerable to threats from hostile acts against space assets. The global economy
as a whole has grown to depend on satellite networks. The world financial system would
probably come to a halt if, for example, timing data from GPS ceases.196
The commercialization of outer space activities coupled with the reduction of
military budgets in the 1990s has also led to a significant reliance of the military on
commercial space service providers.197 Furthermore, commercialization means that the
locus of control over technological innovation shifts from the governments to commercial
actors, making states more dependent on the market for advanced technology and the

195 See, for example, the effect on software industry, and news, entertainment, communications, and
consumer electronics in 1998 State o f the Space Industry, 1998, 10-12.
196 William C. Martel and Toshi Yoshihara, “Averting a Sino-U.S. Space Race,” Washington Quarterly 26
(autumn 2003): 20.
197 See, for example, Todd, 2002.
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direction it takes.198 And finally, outer space commercialization means increasing
economic and security interdependence of states. Thus, the commercialization of space
activities profoundly affects national and international security.

198 See, for example, Watts, The Military Use o f Space, 2001,1.
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CHAPTERV
THE UNITED STATES’ SECURITY STRATEGY AND SPACE INTERESTS IN THE
POST-COLD WAR ERA

The task of this chapter is to examine the evolution of the United States’ grand
strategy and American space security interests in the post-Cold War era. The analysis is
based on the official pronouncements of the U.S. security strategies from the George
Bush Administration to the George W. Bush Administration. It is argued in this chapter
that during 1992-2002 the U.S. strategy transformed from what can be called a hesitant
primacy into an assertive primacy. American security interests in space grew together
with a greater reliance on the military and commercial uses of space. Progressively, the
U.S. military and commercial interests were integrated into the overall U.S. strategy of
primacy, with space activities becoming a crucial component of this strategy.

U.S. GRAND STRATEGY AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Organization and then the collapse of
the Soviet Union itself, the United States as the sole remaining superpower has been
formulating its national interests and security strategy for an emerging world order that is
quite different from the previous era. Under these new international conditions, the
United States has been leading with overwhelming military capability and an
unparalleled ability to project its power globally, and it has been dominating
economically with its large consumer market and corporations in the vanguard of
technological progress in many key areas.1 Early in the post-Cold War era, however, the

1 Kapstein and Mastanduno, Unipolar Politics, 1999, 14.
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perception was—at least for a while—that bipolarity has been transformed into a
multipolarity. In the National Security Strategy o f the United States, issued in March
1990, the transformation in the East was seen as hopeful but its future and consequences
uncertain. Some of the Bush Administration’s main questions were: “How can we ensure
continued international stability as U.S.-Soviet bipolarity gives way to global
interdependence and multipolarity? What will be America’s continuing leadership role—
and the new roles of leadership assumed by our allies?”2 Even when it became clear that
the world has become unipolar, there were wide spread expectations that unipolarity
would be transformed into multipolarity rather shortly.3
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, main tasks for the United States
were to manage a peaceful decline of the Soviet Union and transition from bipolarity to
unipolarity. While these tasks inevitably became a U.S. responsibility, building a new
world order in place of a bipolar one required a choice, as well as a vision and a grand
strategy. The United States faced four strategic options: (1) neo-isolationism; (2)
selective engagement; (3) cooperative security; and (4) primacy.4 According to the neo
isolationist strategy the United States would not need to use its power to build a new
world order. Protected from potential hostile powers by geography and overwhelming
military power, the United States would simply withdraw from its Cold War

2 White House, National Security Strategy o f the United States, Washington D.C., March 1990, 7.
3 See, for example, Christopher Layne, “Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,”
International Security 17 (spring 1993): 5-51. Layne defines unipolarity as a structure o f the international
system, in which “single power is geopolitically preponderant because its capabilities are formidable
enough to preclude the formation o f an overwhelming balancing coalition against it.” See Ibid, 5, note 2.
He predicted that unipolarity would give way to multipolarity between 2000-2010. See Ibid., 7. See also
Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond, A Multipolar Peace Great Power Politics in the
Twenty-First Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994).
4 Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” in Michael E.
Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller eds., A m erica’s Strategic Choices
(Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1997), 1-49.
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commitments in Europe and Asia, leaving them to their own devices. Beyond this
option, however, the United States faced a formidable task of building a new security
order in Europe and in the world as a whole, and managing an open world economy
under the conditions of accelerating globalization. A strategy of selective engagement
would call for the use of U.S. power when and where the United States would find it in
its interests, such as, for example, to prevent wars among world’s great powers or to stop
nuclear proliferation. A strategy of cooperative security called for preserving world’s
peace via international institutions with the support of other democratic states.
International institutions would coordinate international military actions against aggressor
states, manage the arms control process, and maintain confidence-building regimes. A
strategy of primacy would require the United States to maintain a preponderance of world
power and prevent the rise of any great powers that could compete with the United States.
According to this strategy, the United States would need to maintain forces around the
world and be prepared to contain any potential hegemon, such as China or Russia, or
both.5
Throughout the 1990s, the U.S. strategy appeared to be hesitant and uncertain.6
This hesitation and uncertainty materialized in U.S military intervention policy, as
evident in cases of Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. These features were also apparent in
U.S. attitude towards the United Nations. In its relationship with Russia, the U.S.
proclaimed a cooperative relationship with Russia but also pursued NATO enlargement
strongly opposed by Russia. In U.S.-China relations, the United States tried to develop

5 Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” in Brown, Cote, Lynn-Jones, and Miller,
eds., Am erica’s Strategic Choices, 1997, 32.
6 This opinion is not shared by all scholars. Some see U.S. strategy in the 1990s as a consistent strategy o f
preeminence. See, for example, Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment,” 1997,55.
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extensive economic ties with China and, at the same time, considered China its main
potential adversary. In the absence of pronounced and clearly identified threats to the
United States’ interests, its strategy represented a mixture of selective engagement,
cooperative security, and primacy. Unipolarity also imposed lesser constrains on the
United States’ behavior compared to the bipolar structure that preceded it, leaving much
greater room for the choice of action for the United States. This situation changed
dramatically with the terrorist attacks of September the 11th, 2001. In fact, the post-Cold
War period can be divided into two distinct historic periods: the period between 1992 and
2001, which represents a post-Cold War transitional phase; and the period since 2001, the
beginning o f which was marked by the tragic events of September the 11th in New York
City and Washington D.C. During the first period the U.S. strategic priorities in official
pronouncements shifted gradually from containment to engagement. During the latter,
they changed swiftly from engagement to “embracement,”8 with an overriding goal of
maintaining American preeminence in the international system and preserving the
“unipolar moment” for the sake of providing U.S. security and a stable and more peaceful
world.
In August 1991, when the Cold War was over but a new world order was an
aspiration rather than a fact, the George Bush Administration’s National Security
Strategy (NSS) called for the United States to take responsibility and lead the world in
building a new world order:
We cannot be the world’s policeman with responsibility for solving all the
world’s security problems. But we are the country to whom others turn when in
7 See, for example, Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment,” 1997, 55.
8 Gregory S. Martin, “U.S. National Security Strategy and the Imperative o f ‘Geopresence, A i r & Space
Power Journal, Summer 2003, Online publication, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/
airchronicles/apj/apj03/sum03/martin.html (accessed 11.25.03).
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distress... In the 1990s, as for much of this century, there is no substitute for
American leadership. Our responsibility, even in a new era, is pivotal and
inescapable.9
This strategy acquired further development and more concrete features in the then
much-discussed Bush Administration’s draft Defense Planning Guidelines (DPG), leaked
to the press in March 1992.10 This draft provided a blueprint that outlined measures for
precluding the rise of any great power capable of challenging the United States’ position
in the international system:
Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival, either on the
territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order
posed formerly by the Soviet Union... [Aside from the former USSR,] there are
other potential nations or coalitions that could, in the further future, develop
strategic aims and a defense posture of region-wide or global domination. Our
strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future
global competitor.11
The goal of America’s preeminence was to achieve “real peace—not the illusory
and fragile peace maintained by a balance of terror, but an enduring democratic peace
based on shared values,” to make the end of the 20th Century the beginning of an “Age of
Democratic Peace.”12 This objective came from the Bush Administration’s realization
that there was a dividend of peace, an opportunity for the United States—no longer
burdened by the enormous military requirements of containment—not only to defend the
interests of the United States but to promote them and shape America’s future at home
and abroad. Moreover, the domestic imperatives and international opportunities became
seen as interdependent. The 1993 NSS report stated: “Our economic future lies more

9 White House National Security Strategy o f the United States, Washington D.C., August 1991, 2.
10 See, for example, Robert Jervis, “International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?” International
Security 17 (spring 1993): 54.
11 “Excerpts from Pentagon’s Plan: ‘Prevent the Re-Emergence o f a New Rival,’” New York Times, March
8, 1992, 14, quoted in Jervis, “International Primacy,” 1993, 54.
12 White House, National Security Strategy o f the United States, Washington D.C., January 1993, ii.
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than ever in the global marketplace... ”13 And the global marketplace, in its turn,
depended upon the United States to provide an overarching security order in which
international trade can prosper. Thus, addressing domestic economic and social issues,
promoting open global economy, and spreading democracy around the world became the
main U.S. security priorities. The demise of the strategy of global containment, as the
Cold War ended, led to a shift in the U.S. defense strategy to a “new regional defense
strategy,”14 relying on American leadership, old alliances, new partners, and collective
security institutions. This new defense strategy included four elements: (1) strategic
deterrence and anti-ballistic missile defense, (2) forward presence, (3) crisis response—
the capability to project power across the world to respond to a crisis, and (4)
reconstitution—the ability to reestablish a global war-fighting capability.
The Clinton Administration in its National Security Strategy report formulated a
grand strategy of “engagement and enlargement” that continued to shift the focus towards
broader security goals. The document stated:
Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market
democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our
allies and our interests. The more that democracy and political and economic
liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic
importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are
likely to prosper.15
The report, published in 1995, used a broader definition of security than in the NSS
reports of the previous administration and shifted the emphasis from defending the
United States and its interests against a new class of “dangers” to exploiting “the

13 White House, National Security Strategy o f the United States, 1993,2, 9.
14 Ibid., p. 13.
15 White House, A National Security Strategy o f Engagement and Enlargement, Washington D. C.,
February 1995, 2, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss-95.pdf (accessed 07.12.04).
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opportunities to make the nation more safe and prosperous.”16 As the Cold War threats
faded into the background, there seemed to be little evidence of a consensus, and as the
result, there was less clarity in the priorities of national security strategy. There was less
attention to military aspects of security and more to “enlarging” existing and creating
new security institutions, promoting democratization around the world and engaging with
key democratizing countries to ensure success and irreversibility of this process, and
engaging and integrating other key nations, such as China, into the global economy and
international institutions.
Restoring America’s economic vitality took an important, if not the central, place
in the new strategy. In the 1996 National Security Strategy, the “long-term health and
competitiveness of the American economy” and “ efficient and environmentally sound
use of our resources” were made “a major priority.”17 The way to improve America’s
competitiveness included not only reducing the federal deficit, but also encouraging
integration of the commercial and military industrial sectors and restructuring of research
and development efforts to place an emphasis on dual-use technologies. A prosperous
American economy would need open international markets and economic growth around
the globe. This became one of the three central elements of U.S. national security
strategy formulated in the 1996 NSS document. These included: (1) maintaining strong
defense capabilities and employing diplomacy to promote cooperative security measures;
(2) open markets and global economic growth; and (3) promoting democracy abroad.

16 Ibid., i.
17 White House, A National Security Strategy o f Engagement and Enlargement, February 1996, Chapter II
“Advancing our Interests Through Engagement and Enlargement,”
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm (accessed 11.11.03).
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The 1996 NSS report clearly stated the Clinton Administration’s position on the
use of military force: “We must use military force selectively, recognizing that its use
may do no more than provide a window of opportunity for a society—and diplomacy—to
work. We therefore send American troops abroad only when our interests and our values
are sufficiently at stake.”18 It called on the United States to continue playing the global
leadership role, stressing preventive diplomacy through such steps as support for
democracy, economic assistance, an overseas military presence, interaction between U.S.
and foreign militaries and involvement in multilateral negotiations on important security
issues around the world “in order to reduce tensions and defuse conflict before they
become crises.”19 Maintaining a strong capability was stated as the foundation of U.S.
military security. In the new international environment, however, this capability was no
longer seen as a global war-fighting capability, it was aimed instead at regional
contingencies. Arms control was perceived as an effective tool for reducing the danger
o f nuclear, chemical, biological and conventional conflict and promoting stability. The
report stressed achievements, such as strengthening of the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) by bringing in it such key states as Russia, Brazil, and South Africa and
securing compliance with the regime by China; ensuring the accession of Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus to the NPT as non-nuclear states and indefinite extension of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); entrance into force of the START I treaty and a move
towards bringing about ratification of the START II treaty; progress made in the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations; creation of the Wassenaar
Agreement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
18 Ibid.
19 White House, A National Security Strategy o f Engagement and Enlargement, 1996, Chapter II
“Advancing our Interests Through Engagement and Enlargement.”
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Technology, replacing the old Cold War Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade
(CoCom); progress made in negotiations to update the ABM Treaty by establishing an
agreed demarcation between strategic and theater ballistic missiles. These successes
were seen as important contributions to the U.S. security. The significance of arms
control to the Clinton Administration’s security strategy was also seen in its expected
contribution to the economic objectives formulated in the NSS report by allowing the
United States to “reduce the size of national defense industry establishment and thus
permit the growth of more vital, nonmilitary industries.”20
The threat of WMD was identified as one of the most urgent threats and the key to
success in dealing with it, as well as to obtaining other U.S. security objectives, was seen
in international cooperation.21 Therefore, the emphasis was put on seeking to ensure U.S.
influence over and participation in “collective decision-making” at the international
stage, as opposed to pursuing primarily unilateral solutions.
The main features of the strategy of engagement and enlargement were reiterated
in the NSS reports during the second Clinton Administration. The 1998 report titled A
National Security Strategy for a New Century, published shortly after the financial crisis
in Asia, clearly shifted further an accent to global economic stability as its major security
concern. In the opening paragraphs, the document stated that without harnessing global
forces the United States would not sustain its predominant position in the world:

20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Globalization, defined in the document as “the process o f accelerating economic, technological, cultural
and political integration”, is one o f the global forces mentioned by the document. Along with instability o f
global economic processes, the document identifies other threats such as spread o f weapons o f mass
destruction, terrorism, transnational crime, extreme nationalism, rapid population growth, uncontrolled
refugee migration, resource depletion, new infection diseases, and environmental damage. See White
House, A National Security Strategy fo r a New Century, Washington D.C., October 1998, iii, 1.
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As we approach the beginning of the 21st century, the United States remains the
world’s most powerful force for peace, prosperity and the universal values of
democracy and freedom. Our nations challenge—and our responsibility—is to
sustain that role by harnessing the forces of global integration for the benefit of
our own people and people around the world.
The United States has profound interests at stake in the health of the global
economy. Our future prosperity depends on a stable international financial
system and robust global growth.23
Engagement with the world and leadership were perceived as an imperative: in
order to be secure and prosperous at home, the United States must lead abroad. While the
military component of security strategy remained important for meeting new challenges,
the document put the development of U.S. military forces within the parameters that
would meet the requirement o f balancing the U.S. budget. This strategy envisioned a
continuous American commitment to international cooperation via a network of
international institutions, such as the United Nation and NATO, and arrangements with
key countries, such as Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the NATO-Russian Permanent
Joint Council, and via arms control process for providing the foundations of security and
prosperity in the 21st century. International cooperation was considered as vital for
building security due to accelerating globalization and transnationalization of threats.24
In the 1999 National Security Strategy report the new emphasis was added to the U.S.
support of regional security cooperation when other countries had taken their initiative
and led to resolve regional security crises, such as Europeans in the Balkans, Asians in
East Timor, and Africans in Sierra Leon. The argument in favor of this support was
grounded on the realization that the U.S. strategy of “selective engagem ent” must allow

for other countries to lead security cooperation while the United States would play a
supporting role, otherwise it would be left with a dilemma of either leading in every
23 Ibid., iii, iv.
24 Ibid., 7.
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international effort of resolving a regional crisis or doing nothing.25 This was an
acknowledgement of some limitations of the Clinton Administration strategy, indicating
that the mixture o f “selective engagement,” “cooperative security” and “primacy”
strategies was problematic for the United States.
The September 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) report, the first report by
the new Bush Administration, represented the first statement of the American security
strategy in the post-September 11th world, opening a new era in the U.S. pursuit of
security.26 The new document, thoroughly ridded off of old Cold War rhetoric and
concepts, offered a clear identification of the main threats and ways to deal with them:
... [SJhadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our
shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to
penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modem technologies against us.
To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal—military
power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous
efforts to cut off terrorist financing. The war against terrorists of global reach is
a global enterprise of uncertain duration.
We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the
peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the
peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.27
When the gravest threat “lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology” at
the hands of a few hidden enemies, the old Cold War strategies of containment and
deterrence cannot work. Moreover, while the use of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) was considered as the last resort by the states possessing them during the Cold
War, the new enemies would likely prefer them to other means once they are available.

25 White House, A National Security Strategy fo r a New Century, Washington D.C., December 1999, iv.
26 See, for example, John L. Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy o f Transformation,” Foreign Policy, NovemberDecember, 2002, Online Publication, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_novdec_2002/gaddis.html
(accessed 11.25.03).
27 White House, National Security Strategy o f the United States o f America, Introduction, Washington
D.C., September 17, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html (accessed 03.18.04).
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Therefore, the threat of proliferation of WMD and the means of their delivery became the
focus of the U.S. security strategy and led the George W. Bush Administration to make a
strong commitment to build defenses against ballistic missiles and protect the homeland,
U.S. friends and allies, and its forces abroad. The Bush Administration also declared its
commitment to multilateralism—to cooperation with other countries in order to prevent
dangerous technologies and WMD from falling into the hands of terrorists and tyrannical
regimes. Furthermore, the NSS asserted that the United States would act preemptively
against emerging threats—that is, before they are fully formed.

Preemption was added

to deterrence and defense as the third important component of the U.S. security strategy
under the new conditions and represented the most dramatic difference, setting this NSS
sharply apart from the earlier U.S. security strategies of the Cold War and post-Cold War
eras.29 In order to legitimize the preemptive strategy, the NSS report suggested adapting
the concept of “imminent threat” to fit the new conditions of global war on terrorism.30
The U.S. strategy relying on deterrence, defense and preemption necessitated
preeminence. The 2002 NSS called for the U.S. military supremacy:
The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by
an enemy - whether a state or non-state actor - to impose its will on the United
States, our allies, or our friends. We will maintain the forces sufficient to support
our obligations, and to defend freedom. Our forces will be strong enough to
dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of
surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.31

28 White Hosue, National Security Strategy o f the United States ofAmerica, Introduction and Chapter 5
“Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons o f Mass
Destruction,” 2002.
29 Ibid. See also Thomas M. Nichols, “How Really New is the New Bush National Security Strategy?”
George Mason University, Online Publication, October 14,2002, http://hnn.us/articles/1031.html (accessed
11.25.03).
30 White House, National Security Strategy o f the United States ofAmerica, Introduction and Chapter 5
“Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons o f Mass
Destruction,” 2002.
31 Ibid., Chapter 9 “Transform America’s National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and
Opportunities o f the Twenty-First Century.”
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The U.S. strategy rested on military supremacy was expected to lead to more cooperation
on the part o f other great powers in the international system, such as Russia and China,
on the full spectrum of issues, and not only on the war on terrorism. In fact, cooperative
relations with the other centers of power was a proclaimed component of George W.
Bush’s NSS.
Another distinct feature of the 2002 NSS had to do with the argument about the
commitment to spread democracy around the globe. According to the Bush
Administration’s assessment, the cause of terrorism, America’s greatest threat, was not so
much in poverty but in resentment of the various groups of people in response to the lack
of representative institutions in their own countries. Therefore, in the new document the
task of democratization acquired a very specific security purpose— it became one of the
important components of the war on terrorism. Furthermore, unlike Clinton’s
“engagement” policy, it became no longer enough to assume that the movement towards
democratization around the world was irreversible and simply required the United States
to “engage” with the rest of the world and “enlarge” this process via inviting nations to
participate in global economy and international institutions. The task now amounted to
transforming the Muslim Middle East, including ridding this region of tyrannical regimes
who were pursuing weapons of mass destruction, supporting terrorism directly or
radicalizing their populations by denying them opportunities, freedom, and political
representation.32 The 2002 NSS committed the United States to “actively work to bring
the hope of democracy, development, free market, and free trade to every comer of the
world.”33

32 Ibid., Chapters 4-5. See also Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy o f Transformation,” 2002.
33 White House, National Security Strategy o f the United States o f America, Introduction, 2002.
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The 2002 George W. Bush Administration’s NSS report represented the most
important and far-reaching reformulation of the U.S. security strategy since the end of the
Cold War.34 It left no doubt that the international system has become unipolar and that
the United States would actively reshape the world in accordance with its security
interest,35 leaving behind the vestiges of the Cold War, including the arms control process
and arms control treaties standing in the way of the U.S. military supremacy. Thus, it can
be concluded that in the post-Cold War era, the U.S. grand strategy evolved in response
to dramatic and sometimes tragic events from a hesitating primacy to an assertive
primacy. The balance between economic and security priorities changed from the
Clinton Administration’s security through economic strength to the George W. Bush
Administration’s economic strength through security.

U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN OUTER SPACE
In the post-Cold War era, the role of space in U.S. security interests evolved along
with the changing grand strategy. The first major correction of U.S. interests and plans
with respect to the military uses of space was undertaken by the George H. W. Bush
Administration. The 1988 Reagan NSS report envisioned a transformation of military
uses of outer space prompted by a revolution in military technology:
Space will also become a more prominent area of activity, not least because of its
growing importance for air, ground, and naval warfare. We expect that this
revolution in military technology will continue well into the next decade and
necessitate the adaptation both o f m ilitary doctrines and o f national security

strategies.36
34 Gaddis argues that the 2002 NSS report is the most important and fundamental reformulation o f the
U.S. grand strategy in half a century. See Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy o f Transformation,” 2002.
35 See also Robert Jervis, “The Compulsive Empire (U.S. Hegemony),” Foreign Policy, July-August,
2003, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issuejulaug_2003/jervis.html (accessed 05.05.04).
36 White House, National Security Strategy o f the United States, Washington D.C., January 1988, 9.
Following the NSS report, the Reagan Administration issued National Space Policy in February 1988. This
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In light of the growing military importance of space, the 1988 NSS called for U.S. “space
leadership” that would be based on preeminence in key areas of space activities,
including communication, navigation, early warning, and surveillance. President
Reagan’s space policy included the development of those space capabilities that were
needed for performing critical strategic deterrence functions, those capabilities that
directly supported military forces on the ground and increased their effectiveness, and
■jn

capabilities for defense o f space assets.

The Reagan Administration’s plans also

included a program for the development of a defense system against ballistic missiles,
prospectively including stationing of weapons systems in outer space. By developing
such anti-ballistic missile defense, the Reagan Administration sought to maintain
deterrence and move away from reliance on retaliation and towards making ballistic
missiles obsolete.38 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) would allow the United States to
shift deterrence to “a safer and more stable basis through reliance on strategic defense”
document replaced President Reagan’s first space policy statement NSDD-42 o f July 4, 1982. The 1988
document reflected a number o f significant changes: the policy implications o f the Challenger tragedy,
increased commercial uses o f space, and the report o f the blue ribbon National Commission on Space. The
new Department o f Defense Space Policy was promulgated a year earlier. Secretary o f Defense Casper W.
Weinberger signed the new Department o f Defense Space Policy on February 4, 1987. The unclassified
summary o f this policy was published on March 10, 1987. The new DoD Space Policy recognized military
space activities critical to the U.S. national security, called for support o f the Presidents’ Strategic Defense
Initiative, support o f the development o f new technologies improving access to space, exploration o f the
potential use o f military man-in-space, and the development and deployment o f systems for space control at
the earliest date, including a comprehensive anti-satellite capability. See U.S. Department o f Defense,
Secretary o f Defense Memorandum, Department o f Defense Space Policy (unclassified), March 10, 1987,
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/defense/87/memo.htm (accessed 01.14.04).
37 President Reagan dramatically changed the longstanding U.S. view o f space as a sanctuary. However, it
was president Carter who took the first step, setting the stage for President Reagan’s space policy.
President Carter issued PD-37 “National Space Policy ” on May 11, 1978, in which, among other things, a
dual track policy on the ASAT issue was adopted and the Secretary o f Defense was assigned a task to
develop a plan to use civil and commercial space systems for military purposes during declared national
emergencies. This was the first step towards weakening the dominance o f the sanctuary school o f thought
on space. See U.S. President, Presidential Decision Directive PDD/NSC 37, “National Space Policy,” May
11,1978, http://www.fas.org.spp/military/docops/national/nsc-37.htm (accessed 05.09.04). See also
Matthew J. Mowthorpe, “The United States Approaches to Military Space During the Cold War,” Air and
Space Power Chronicles, March 2001, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicels/
cc/mowthorpe.htmp (accessed 11.20.03).
38 White House, National Security Strategy o f the United States, 1988, 10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

208
and at the same time was seen as facilitating Soviet acceptance of significant arms
reduction agreements.39 Thus, the 1988 U.S. Space Policy formulated four requirements
for U.S. military space utilization: (1) deterring, or if necessary, defending against enemy
attack; (2) assuring that forces of hostile nations cannot prevent the use of space by the
United States; (3) negating, if necessary, hostile space systems; and (4) enhancing the
space operations of the United States and its allies.40 This directive outlined measures
that would have amounted to the next step in the military utilization of space: a move
from the use of space for space support and force enhancement to space support, force
enhancement, space control and force application 41 This program was perceived by the
Soviet Union as an American commitment to qualitative strategic superiority and overall
military supremacy.
Besides military uses of outer space, space activities were seen by the Reagan
Administration as important for obtaining economic, technological and scientific benefits
and for international cooperation on space issues as one of the significant components of
U.S. foreign policy. The Reagan Administration also formulated the U.S. policy o f space
commercialization, particularly the task of attracting commercial investment into outer
space.42
The Bush 1990 NSS report continued the Reagan Administration’s course
towards military uses of space. It also stated a commitment to the further development of
SDI, pointing not only to its value as a defense system, but also to its deterrent value.
SDI was seen as affecting the calculations and confidence of potential aggressors already

39
40
41
42

Ibid., 15.
Ibid., 22.
Mowthorpe, “The United States Approaches,” 2001.
White House, National Security Strategy o f the United States, 1988, 22.
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possessing ballistic missiles and those who had hopes to develop ballistic missiles in
order to deter the United States. At the same time, President Bush pledged to conduct
SDI activities within the limits specified by the ABM Treaty.43 The 1990 strategy
followed President Bush’s statement of the new U.S. National Space Policy NSPD-1
issued on November 2, 1989. In this document the incoming Bush Administration
elaborated more fully the U.S. space policy, reiterating many of the elements of Reagan’s
1988 National Space Policy. The fundamental objective of U.S. space policy remained
“space leadership.”44 Like its predecessor, it called for American preeminence in the key
areas of space activities that would guarantee the achievement of the U.S. national
security, scientific, technical, economic, and foreign policy goals. It also called for a
greater contribution of private investment in space development. In order to encourage
commercial activities in space, the U.S. government was to become a customer
purchasing commercially provided space services and goods to “the fullest extent
feasible.”45 With respect to national security issues, the 1989 document repeated
positions of the 1988 National Space policy, including support for the SDI program,
development of force enhancement and space control capabilities.46
If Bush’s 1989 National Space Policy and 1990 NSS report represented continuity
of the U.S. space strategy, the 1991 NSS made the first significant departure from the
previous space strategy. In the 1991 NSS report, the Bush Administration declared that
the Cold War was over and modified plans for the development of SDI program 47 As

43 White House, National Security Strategy o f the United States, 1990,25.
44 U.S. President, National Security Presidential Directive 1, “National Space Policy,” November 2, 1989,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nspdl.htm (accessed 11.13.03).
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 White House, National Security Strategy o f the United States, 1991, 1.
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the relationship with the Soviet Union improved and fundamental changes in Eastern
Europe were taking place, the possibility of a nuclear conflict was considered as
“markedly reduced.” At the same time, the threat from ballistic missiles developed by
third countries or an accidental launch remained. The 1991 document, thus, reported that
the SDI program was redirected to pursue a system providing Global Protection Against
Limited Strikes (GPALS). This defense system would provide protection against a
limited ballistic attack against the United States as well as its forces and allies around the
world. It would be based on technologies developed within the SDI project, but would be
smaller and less expensive than the original SDI plan.48
The overall space policy, as reflected in the 1991 NSS, made a shift in its focus
towards non-military space activities. A plan developed by the National Space Council
envisioned space as a medium for discovery and commerce and included such key
elements as: (1) developing space launch capability as a national resource; (2) expanding
human presence by developing a manned space station and extending space exploration
beyond earth orbit, including manned missions to the Moon and establishing permanent
human settlements on the Moon and putting men on Mars; (3) developing commercial
applications, such as satellite communication, energy production, and material
manufacturing, and civil applications, such as environmental monitoring; (4) encouraging
private investment in space that would create jobs, boost the economy and strengthen
science, engineering and industry, making the American economy more competitive on
the international market. The new space policy also stressed the importance of
preserving freedom of access to space and, in this context, called for a healthy military
space program that would allow the United States to monitor events in space, warn of
48 White House, National Security Strategy o f the United States, 1991, 26.
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threats and protect important space assets, including the development and deployment of
anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities.49
The 1993 Bush NSS report restated the U.S. commitment to the development of
the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) in order to defend the United
States from an accidental launch of ballistic missiles or an attack by a “rogue” state and
protect the U.S. forces and allies abroad. In contrast to its predecessor, the 1993
document reflected a shift towards international cooperation in developing anti-ballistic
missile defenses—a remarkable move that symbolized the end Cold War rivalry between
the United States and Russia. At the June 1992 Summit, President Bush and Russian
President Yeltsin agreed to work together in developing a concept o f a Global Protection
System against a limited ballistic missile attack. The 1993 report hailed this commitment
to cooperation on the part of the two leaders as a landmark in U.S.-Russian relations.50
The Clinton Administration’s policy towards space moved the accent further
away from military uses of space towards greater international cooperation and the
commercialization o f space activities. The 1996 Clinton NSS report identified two major
space-related threats: a growing threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and their delivery vehicles and a threat of intrusions into U.S.
military and commercial information systems. The document stated that greater efforts
have been put into preventive measures, such as detecting proliferation activities via
intelligence capabilities and stemming proliferation by limiting the spread of weaponsrelated materials and technologies via international regimes such as the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export

49 Ibid., 22-23.
50 White House, National Security Strategy o f the United States, 1993, 18.
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Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technology, but that
developing the capability to defend against this kind of threats was also important. The
report asserted:
Although the intelligence community does not believe that an intercontinentalrange missile threat to our homeland is likely to emerge from rogue state in the
foreseeable future, we are developing a national missile defense deployable
readiness program so we can respond quickly (within 2-3 years) should a soonerthan-expected threat materialize.51
To this end, the Clinton Administration, confirmed its commitment to “full and faithful
implementation” of the ABM Treaty and, at the same time, pushed forward negotiations
with Russia on an agreed demarcation between strategic and theater ballistic missiles
defenses to allow the United States to develop and deploy theater anti-ballistic missile
systems.
The 1996 space policy called for U.S. leadership in space through “its technical
expertise and innovation.” The NSS report emphasized the maintenance of an
international legal regime for space, similar to the concept of freedom of the high seas as
especially important. In fact, continuous freedom of access to and use of space was
identified by the 1996 NSS report as one of the main U.S. security objectives in space.
The document also put forth such objectives as “maintaining the U.S. position as the
major economic, political, military and technological power in space, deterring threats to
U.S. interests in space and defeating aggressive or hostile acts against U.S. space assets if
deterrence fails, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction to space, and

51 White House, A National Security Strategy o f Engagement and Enlargement, Chapter II “Advancing
our Interests Through Engagement and Enlargement,” 1996.
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enhancing global partnership with other space-faring nations across the spectrum of
economic, political and security issues.”

S '?

In September 1996, the Clinton Administration replaced President George H. W.
Bush’s National Space Policy of 1989 with a new National Space Policy. The new
document reaffirmed the commitment o f the Clinton Administration to maintain U.S.
leadership role in space—not by striving to “preeminence in the key areas of space
activity” as in the 1989 Bush National Space Policy—by “supporting a strong, stable and
balanced national space program that serves our goals in national security, foreign policy,
economic growth, environmental stewardship and scientific and technical excellence.”
On the list of goals of U.S. space activities, the national security objectives were moved
to the second place in the 1996 National Space Policy from the first place in the 1989
National Space Policy.54 Similarly to the 1989 document, the new National Space Policy
directed the United States to develop and operate space control capabilities in order to
ensure freedom of action in space. Unlike its predecessor, it suggested enhancing these
capabilities with “diplomatic, legal or military measures to preclude an adversary’s
hostile use of space systems and services.”55 With regard to anti-ballistic missile defense,
the new National Space Policy also differed from the 1989 National Space Policy, which
had pledged to develop SDI. The new document made a commitment to develop a
theater missile defense capability, a national missile defense deployment readiness
program, and an advanced technology program to provide options for improvements to

52 Ibid.
53 White House, National Space Policy Fact Sheet, September 19, 1996,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/sep96.htm (accessed 11.13.03).
54 The 1996 document put on top o f the list enhancement o f knowledge o f the Earth, the Solar system and
the Universe through human and robotic exploration. See U.S. President, NSPD-1, “National Space
Policy,” 1989, and White House, National Space Policy Fact Sheet, 1996.
55 White House, National Space Policy Fact Sheet, 1996.
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planned and deployed defenses.56 It represented a major roll back of the SDI project,
which had envisioned, among other things, placing weapons in outer space.57
While the 1996 National Space Policy sharply differed from the 1989 National
Space Policy on the national security approach, it embraced all the important elements of
the Bush’s policy towards commercial space activities. As the commercialization of
space had progressed significantly since the end o f the Cold War, the enhancement of
U.S. economic competitiveness in space activities in the face o f emerging commercial
space competitors became the fundamental U.S. goal. International cooperation in space
activities was expanded in the 1996 National Space Policy to include Russia and other
former republics of the Soviet Union and was envisioned not only to support American
national security and foreign policy objectives, but also to create new opportunities for
U.S. commercial space activities. All in all, the objectives of the Clinton
Administration’s space policy amounted to a cooperative, liberal approach to space issues
in accordance with the grand strategy of engagement and enlargement. This approach
found its further development in later NSS documents of the Clinton Administration.
The 1998 and 1999 NSS reports reiterated the main positions of the 1996 National
Security Strategy. A major development reported in the documents was the signing by
the United States, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan of five agreements relating
to the ABM Treaty. These agreements on demarcation between national and theater

56 Ibid.
57 The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) established in April 1984 released its first study
o f the architecture for the strategic defense in October 1985. The study favored a design that contained 7
layers o f defenses and thousand o f defense satellites, targeting incoming missiles at different stages o f their
flight: boost, post-boost, midcourse, and terminal phase. Later architectures also included emplacement o f
space weapons. See, for example, Crockett L. Grabbe, Space Weapons and the Strategic Defense Initiative
(Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1991), 13, 151.
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ballistic missile defenses reaffirmed the commitment of all sides to the ABM regime.
The signing of these agreements, however, suggested not only the five countries’
commitment to the ABM treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability,59 but also a
weakening of the ABM regime. The new agreements would allow the United States to
deploy a theater missile defense (TMD) while remaining in compliance with the modified
ABM treaty.
The 1998 document acknowledged that in the 1990s space emerged “as a new
global information utility with extensive political, diplomatic, military and economic
implications for the United States.”60 There was an “ever-increasing migration of
capabilities to space as the world seeks to exploit the explosion in information
technology.”61 Some of the uses of space assets included telecommunication,
telemedicine, international financial transactions, global entertainment, news, education,
weather forecasting and satellite navigation. The document reported that over 500 U.S.
companies were engaged in the space industry with revenues of $77 billion in 1996.
Space became an important commercial medium upon which many sectors of the
American economy had grown to depend. The growing importance of outer space was
also reflected in the Clinton Administration’s White Paper on Critical Infrastructure
Protection.62
The shift of focus in U.S. space policy towards commercial uses of space did not
mean a diminished importance for the security aspects of space activities. The main
objectives of the 1998 space policy were identified as: (1) maintaining the U.S.
58
59
60
61
62

White House, A National Security Strategy fo r a New Century, 1998, 10.
White House, A National Security Strategy fo r a New Century, 1999, 7.
White House, A National Security Strategy fo r a New Century, 1998, 25.
Ibid.
See U.S. President, PDD 63, “White Paper on Critical Infrastructure Protection,” 1998.
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leadership in space by promoting development of the full range of space based
capabilities, (2) protecting U.S. national security, including by maintaining a capability to
counter space systems and services that could be used for hostile purposes against U.S.
ground, air and naval forces, command and control system or other capabilities critical to
national security, and (3) promoting U.S. prosperity and well-being.
From the 1998 President’s report on U.S. national security strategy to the 1999
report, an important shift in characterization of U.S. space interests occurred. The 1998
document stated: “Unimpeded access to and use of space is essential for protecting U.S.
national security, promoting our prosperity and ensuring our well-being in countless
ways.”63 In the 1999 National Security Strategy, outer space was recognized as U.S. vital
national interest: “Unimpeded access to and use of space is a vital national interest—
essential for protecting U.S. national security, promoting our prosperity and ensuring our
well-being.”64 According to the National Security Strategy, there are three categories of
national interests: vital interests, important national interests, and humanitarian and other
interests. Vital interests are “those of broad overriding importance to survival, safety and
vitality o f our nation.”65 Thus, the importance of outer space was recognized as one of
the highest U.S. national interests.
While the significance of space was highlighted in the official security
documents, the pronouncements of military space activities were toned down in the
President Clinton’s NSS reports. Plans for further military uses of space continued
developing at the Department of Defense. In 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff issued a new conceptual guide Joint Vision 2010 for the future building of U.S.
63 Ibid.
64 White House, A National Security Strategy fo r a New Century, 1999, 12.
65 Ibid., 1.
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military forces. The task of this document was to incorporate—at the conceptual level—
the potential of unfolding revolution in information and communication technology into
future military capabilities. The four main concepts espoused by the document—
“dominant maneuver,” “precision engagement,” “full dimensional protection,” and
“focused logistics” providing for the achievement of “ full spectrum dominance”— called
for greater reliance on space-based capabilities.66 The document also contained a
commitment to the development of a theater missile defenses as one of the joint warfighting capability objectives.67 These concepts were further elaborated in Joint Vision
2020 published in 2000. The goal of this document was to transform the U.S. military
into a force that would be dominant “across the full spectrum of military operations persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.”68 The
document stated that due to the changes in the information environment information
superiority became a “key enabler of the transformation of the operational capabilities of
the joint force and the evolution of joint command and control.”69
Simultaneously, the document drew attention to the fact that commercialization of
space activities made available satellite images over the Internet widely available, giving
potential adversaries new capabilities at relatively low cost. Asymmetric approaches
aimed at exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities were identified as possibly “the most serious
danger the United States faces in the immediate future.” The danger included long-range
ballistic missiles and other direct threats to the U.S. citizens and territory.

70

Therefore,

66 U.S. Department o f Defense, Office o f the Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, Joint Vision 2010,
1996,20-27, http://www.dtic.mil/jv2010/jv2010.pdf (accessed 01.19.04).
67 Ibid., 23.
68 U.S. Department o f Defense, Office o f the Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, Joint Vision 2020,
June 2000, 1, http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jv2020.doc (accessed 01.19.04).
69 Ibid., 4.
70 Ibid., 6.
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the main goal of the U.S. forces was identified as creation and maintenance of
capabilities necessary to deter, defend against, and defeat any adversaries, including those
pursuing asymmetric advantages. This is what in the document is referred to as the
strategy of “full spectrum dominance.” Full spectrum dominance called for freedom of
operation for U.S. forces in all domains— space, sea, land, air, and cyberspace—and for a
capability to project power rapidly worldwide.71 As one of the operational objectives, the
Joint Vision 2020 requested theater missile defenses and “possibly limited missile
defense of the United States.”72
Joint Vision 2020 was preceded by another important pronouncement of U.S.
defense space policy—the Department of Defense Directive 3100.10 signed by the
Secretary of Defense on July 9,1999. This document replaced the 1987 DoD Space
Policy o f the Reagan Administration. The new DoD Space Policy took into account
dramatic changes that had taken place in the security environment, including not only the
end of the East-West confrontation but also the global spread of space systems,
technology, and information, commercial space activities, increased international
cooperation in space, and technological advances and changes in the force structure they
brought about since 1987.73 The Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense
accompanying the DoD Space Policy clearly stated the position of the Department of
Defense on the importance of military space activities:
Space is a m edium like the land, sea, and air w ithin w hich military activities w ill
be conducted to achieve U .S. national security objectives. T he ability to access
and utilize space is a vital national interest because m any o f the activities
conducted in the medium are critical to U .S . national security and econom ic w ell71 Ibid., 8.
72 Ibid., 33.
73 U.S. Department o f Defense, Department o f Defense Directive No. 3100.10, Department o f Defense
Space Policy, July 9, 1999, 1, http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/defense/dodspcpolicy99.pdf
(accessed 01.19.04).
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being. The globally interdependent information- and knowledge-based economy
as well as information-based military operations make the information lines of
communication to, in, through, and from space essential to the exercise of U.S.
power.
Space power is as important to the nation as land, sea, and air power. It is a
strategic enabler of the National Military Strategy and Joint Vision of 2010.
Space forces support the execution of strategy and the realization of doctrine by
enabling information superiority through domination of the collection,
generation, and dissemination of information. The command, control,
communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR)
capabilities provided by space forces are necessary to maintain military
readiness, enable implementation of the operational concepts of dominant
maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimension
protection, and support the planning and conduct of military operations.74
The 1999 DoD Space Policy incorporated space as the fourth medium for military
operations of vital importance for the United States’ security. It is noteworthy that it
pointed out not only the possibility, but also the desirability of international cooperation
in military uses of space. U.S. space forces were considered as an enhancer of U.S.
forward presence, providing a means to support commitments, while minimizing risk to
the U.S. troops on the ground. In other words, integration of space capabilities into
international operations was seen as a means of strengthening U.S. defense relationships
and alliances’ structures, and therefore, strengthening national security.
The Department of Defense Directive 3100.10 also reflected another important
aspect of the Clinton Administration’s military space policy—the expanding relationship
between military space activities and the growing commercial space sector. The
document directed the DoD long-range planning of military space activities to ensure that
comm ercial capabilities would be used “to the maxim um extent feasible and practical

(including the use of allied and friendly capabilities, as appropriate)”75 and clearly stated
the preference for commercial acquisition of space goods and services for national
74 Ibid., 2.
75 U.S. Department o f Defense, Department o f Defense Space Policy, 1999, 8.
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security purposes.76 The document also called on the Department of Defense to facilitate
access for the U.S. private space sector to “appropriate DoD space-related hardware,
facilities, and data.”77 Furthermore, outsourcing and privatization of space and spacerelated tasks and functions were to be pursued “aggressively.”78 The twofold purpose of
this space policy was to foster an internationally competitive, vibrant U.S. commercial
space sector and provide for effective space military activities within the limits of a
balanced budget.
With respect to space arms control, DODD 3100.00 confirmed the U.S.
commitment to compliance with existing international law and named the MTCR as U.S.
primary tool in preventing or limiting the spread of missile technology and minimizing
the threat of WMD via such proliferation.79
All in all, the Clinton Administration’s space policy was characterized by less
visible pronouncements of military space activities at the level of the U.S. national
security strategy and by the important steps taken at the level of the Department of
Defense towards further incorporation of space into U.S. military structure and
operations. It was also marked by the recognition of the importance of commercial space
activities and an increasing reliance of the U.S. military space activities on U.S.
commercial space sector.
The George W. Bush 2002 National Security Strategy, in contrast to the earlier
documents issued by the Clinton Administration, contained limited reference to space
issues. In the introduction, it stated:

76
77
78
79

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

11.
10.
12.
15.
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We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means o f delivery. We
will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies’
efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as a matter o f common sense
and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are
fully formed.80

This was a concise statement of a far-reaching change in the U.S. policy towards outer
space. As the global war on terrorism required, the new space policy envisioned greater
reliance on space for security purposes,81 protection against ballistic missiles, defense of
space assets, and transition to real action towards realization o f this policy.
The George W. Bush’s space policy contained in the 2002 NSS report was issued
after the Rumsfeld Commission assessing United States’ National Security Space
Management and Organization had published its report and recommendations with
respect to space security activities.82 The Commission concluded that the U.S. security
and well-being depended on the ability of the United States to operate in space and
recommended to elevate space to the top of the national security agenda.

It identified

three main U.S. security interests in space: (1) promoting the peaceful use of outer space,
(2) using the U.S. potential in space in support of domestic, economic, diplomatic and
national security objectives, and (3) developing and deploying the means to deter and
defend against hostile acts directed at U.S. space assets and against the uses of space to
threaten U.S. interests. The Commission envisaged space as a crucial medium, that
would allow the United States to transform its military into a modem force able to deter
and defend against evolving threats to the U.S. homeland, its forces and allies abroad and
80 White House, National Security Strategy o f the United States o f America, Introduction, 2002.
81 Ibid., Chapter 9 “Transforming America’s National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and
Opportunities o f the Twenty-First Century,” 2002.
82 Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Report,
Executive Summary, 2001. The Commission was chaired by Donald Rumsfeld from its inception until
December 28, 2000, when he was nominated for the position o f Secretary o f Defense by President-elect
George W. Bush.
83 Ibid., 9.
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U.S. interests in space. The Commission found that problems of growing dependence on
outer space, burgeoning opportunities, and threats from space were not adequately
addressed and that, as a result, the United States was vulnerable to a “Space Pearl
Harbor.”84 It called on the U.S. government to revise national space policy, support
commercial space activities so that the United States would remain the world’s leader in
space, and suggested the consideration of weapons in space in order to defend the United
States and its interests:
The Commissioners believe that the U.S. Government should vigorously pursue
the capabilities called for in the National Space Policy to ensure that the
President will have the option to deploy weapons in space to deter threats to and,
if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests.5

Extending deterrence and defense in outer space would require the development and
deployment of military capabilities for operation to, from, in and through space. The
report directly pointed out that the capability of projecting power through and from space
in response to events anywhere in the world would not only provide for a much stronger
deterrent but also would give the United States an “extraordinary military advantage” in a
possible conflict.86 Simultaneously, the report recommended establishing “rules of the
road” for military uses of space.87
It was after this report and the tragic events of September the 11th, 2001, that
President Bush gave Russia a six-month notice of his intent to withdraw from the ABM
oo

Treaty and proceed with plans to develop and deploy a National Missile Defense.

This

84 Ibid., 15.
85 Ibid., 12.
86 See Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization,
Report, 2001, Chapter III “U.S. Objectives for Space,” 33.
87 Ibid., Executive Summary, 13.
88 Under Article XV o f the ABM Treaty the Treaty was o f unlimited duration but Parties could withdraw
from the treaty “if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter o f this Treaty have
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notice was given on December 13,2001 and by June 13, 2002 the six-month period
_

expired, opening the door for the weaponization of outer space.

89

In the National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-23, issued on December 16,
2002, the new policy of the U.S. government on ballistic missile defense was
promulgated. In response to the changed security environment after the September 11th
events, the Bush Administration pledged to develop and deploy ballistic missile defense
with the date for the beginning of the deployment of a set of missile defense capabilities
scheduled for 2004. Ballistic missile defense was envisaged in the document as a part of
a “new triad composed of long-range conventional and nuclear strike capabilities, missile
defenses, and a robust industrial and research development infrastructure.”90 The
document reported that the artificial distinction between “national” and “theater” missile
defenses was eliminated. According to the document, the capabilities planned for
operational use in 2004 and 2005 included ground-based interceptors, sea-based
interceptors, additional Patriot (PAC-3) units, and sensors based on land, at sea, and in
space. Possible improvements of these components included the option of developing
and testing of space-based defenses. Missile defense cooperation was envisioned for the
closest allies and as a vehicle for building new relationships with states like Russia. In

jeopardized its supreme interests.” See “Treaty between the United States o f America and the Union o f
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation o f Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,” Article XV.
89 The ABM Treaty prohibited development, testing and deployment o f space-based components as part o f
an ABM system “to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their flight elements in flight trajectories”. It did
not prohibit space-based anti-satellite weapons, for which the door was open even during the period
covered by the ABM Treaty. Acceptance o f the principal and practice o f satellite reconnaissance reflected
in the treaty’s non-interference clause supported conditions in which ASAT weapons were not seen as a
necessity by the two superpowers. Thus the utility o f the ABM Treaty for preventing o f the weaponization
o f space was o f a limited nature, possibly more symbolic than real. See “Treaty between the United States
o f America and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation o f Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems,” Article II. On the limited role o f the ABM Treaty in averting an arms race in outer space see von
Kries, 2002, 175-178.
90 See U.S. President, National Security Presidential Directive 23, “National Policy on Ballistic Missile
Defense,” December 16, 2002, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-23.htm (accessed 11.13.03).
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order to stimulate cooperation, the United States pledged to implement the MTCR in a
manner that would not impede missile defense cooperation.91 The MTCR, no longer seen
as a primary tool for dealing with the threat of proliferation of missile systems and
technology, was nonetheless considered as playing a helpful role in reducing the threat of
missile proliferation complementary to the role that would be played by missile defenses.
All in all, the evolution of the U.S. space security interests has made almost a full
circle from the Reagan’s SDI and leadership in space to George W. Bush’s National
Ballistic Defense project and plans for development of space capabilities to fulfill space
support, force enhancement, space control and space force application missions.
Thus, the following overall conclusions follow from the present analysis: First, in
the post-Cold War decade, under the conditions of unipolarity U.S. security strategy
evolved form a hesitating primacy to an assertive primacy, with the balance between
economic and security priorities changing from the Clinton Administration’s security
through economic strength to the George W. Bush Administration’s economic strength
through security and introduction of preemption in addition to deterrence and defense as
a component of U.S. security strategy. Second, the U.S. space security interests in the
post-Cold War decade also transformed from President Bush’s commitment to SDI to
President George W. Bush’s NMD and plans for space control and development of space
war-fighting capabilities within the strategy of “full spectrum dominance.” Third, the
commercialization of outer space launched by the Reagan Administration as a top-down
policy led in the 1990s to the emergence of a dynamic commercial space sector. U.S.
commercial space systems became a part of the U.S. vital infrastructure, on which the

91 White House, Fact Sheet on Missile Defense, May 20, 2003, Online Publication,
http://acronym.org.uk/docs/03/05/docl6.htm (accessed 10.29.03).
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U.S. economy, government and military became increasingly dependent. 92 Fourth, the
Clinton Administration’s dual space policy that fostered an internationally competitive,
vibrant U.S. commercial space sector and effective space military activities resulted in
expanding relationship between the U.S. military and the commercial space sector: in
1998, outer space was identified “as a new global information utility with extensive
QT

political, diplomatic, military and economic implications for the United States;” in
1999, outer space was incorporated as the fourth medium for military operations of vital
importance for the United States’ security and was recognized as a vital U.S. interest;94
in 2000, commercial space activities were recognized as raising serious security concerns
and, finally in 2001, the U.S. government was advised to take measures to prevent a
“Space Pearl Harbor,” including via the weaponization of space. Fifth, the U.S. uses of
outer space—both for commercial and military purposes—became an integral part of the
overall U.S. strategy aimed at maintaining its dominant position in the world both
economically and militarily. And finally, an important shift occurred in U.S. attitude
towards arms control as an instrument of security policy: the United States became more
willing to take unilateral steps in defending its vital interests in space, and in providing
for its security more generally. In sum, the United States increasingly came to consider
the command of outer space as a foundation of its dominant position in the world.

92 Doerer, 2000.
93 White House, A National Security Strategy fo r a New Century, 1998, 25.
94 White House, A National Security Strategy fo r a New Century, 1999, 12.
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CHAPTER VI
RUSSIA’S SECURITY STRATEGY AND SPACE INTERESTS IN THE POST-COLD
WARERA

The goals of this chapter are, first, to evaluate Russia’s shift in security strategy
after the end of the Cold War and show that it evolved over time to become more in line
with the security approaches of the liberal democracies, at least as reflected in official
writings; and second, to analyze how Russia’s security interests in general, and in regard
to outer space in particular, have changed since the end of the Cold War. This analysis is
based on official Russian security-related documents and pronouncements—the Russian
Federation Law “On Security” of 1992, the 1993 Military Doctrine of the Russian
Federation, the 1997 National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, the 2000
National Security Concept and Military Doctrine— and some other important policy
publications. This chapter asserts that although it is difficult to discern grand strategy
throughout most of the period that followed the end of the Cold War in Russia, Russia’s
transition to a new security approach is a significant enough development to have an
effect on Russia’s security interests. Furthermore, it is argued that, as Russia’s economic
and social conditions deteriorated, the sources of its security concerns and, therefore, its
focus became increasingly inward-oriented. Over time Russia increasingly put an
emphasis in its security strategy on the improvement of domestic economic conditions as
the foundation of all other security-related solutions, including its space security.
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RUSSIA’S CHANGING SECURITY APPROACH AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE
SOVIET UNION: TOWARDS A LIBERAL SECURITY CONCEPT AND NATIONAL
SECURITY INTERESTS
Russia emerged from the collapsed Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics in
December 1991 as the heir to the large part of the Soviet military and Soviet space
program. At that time, Russia faced the fundamental task of reforming its political
system and its centrally planned economy, and a task of finding a new national identity
and new place in the international community. The new Russia had to reassess its
security environment, deal with some old security issues, meet new challenges, and
reform its military.
Even as Russia was undergoing a dramatic transformation in the aftermath of the
collapse o f the Soviet Union, its first post-Cold War official assessment of the new
security environment appeared in 1992.1 The emergence of the Russian republic set the
stage for revolutionary changes to take place in the security and military fields. For the
first time since 1917, both civilian and military leaders could reassess Russia’s security
interests in general, and military security in particular, free of ideological constraints and
Soviet dogmatism. The task they faced, however, was immense: new security interests
had to be formulated based on Russia’s national interests—something that previously was
largely missing. During the Soviet era security interests were based on the premises of
the Marxist theory of class struggle. The then Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei
Kozyrev, admitted:

1 The last Soviet draft military doctrine was issued in 1990. The end of the Cold war and the dissolution
o f the Warsaw Pact and then o f the Soviet Union itself made the reformulation o f the security and military
doctrines an urgent necessity but more pressing political issues postponed the commencement o f the
deliberations. A draft o f the new military doctrine emerged in May 1992. See Mark E. Kipphut, “ReClawing the Bear, Russia’s New Military Doctrine,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/library/report/1993/KME.htm (accessed 06.25.04).
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It is particularly difficult for us to return to “normality.” Our country was
hostage to messianic ideas before, especially in the 20thcentury, ideas that
eclipsed and replaced our national interests. The communist idea led to
expansion and instinctive confrontation with the surrounding world and imposed
ideological models on it.2

Despite the difficulties of this task, the new federal law “On Security” that for the
first time tried to define the very notion of Russia’s national security and outlined
Russia’s security concept in basic terms was adopted in 1992. The document also
defined the threats to the newly established Russian Federation and described various
military means available for its defense, organizational aspects of the provision of
Russia’s security and its legal foundations. In sharp contrast to the Soviet documents on
security the notion of security relied on individual and national values:
Security is the situation whereby the vital interests of the individual, society, and
state are secure from internal and external threat. The following are ranked as
fundamental objects o f security: the individual— his rights and freedoms;
society— its material and spiritual assets; the state— its constitutional system,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity.3

The 1992 Federal Law “On Security” created a National Security Council whose
task was to assess changing security environment, formulate strategy to provide security
of the Russian Federation and, when appropriate, issue changes to security doctrine. The
Council was to include representatives from the Russian Parliament, and the Council of
Ministers and to be chaired by the President. The new legislation codified the key role of
civilian officials in defining objectives for national defense. The law entrusted the
Supreme Soviet with the responsibility to oversee the formulation of military policies and
doctrine o f the Russian Federation.4 It envisaged that the President would submit the

2 Andrei Kozyrev, “Main Tasks,” Trud, February 28, 1992, 3. Translated in Daily Reports, Central
Eurasia, FBIS-SOV-92-0-40, February 28, 1992, 29-30.
3 Russian Federation, Public Law, “On Security,” Russian Federation Law No. 2646-1, 1992, Rossiyskaya
Gazeta, May 6, 1992, 5. See Daily Reports, Central Eurasia, FBIS-SOV-92-088, May 6, 1992, 34-38.
4 Ibid.
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military doctrine to the Russian parliament for consideration. The role of the Defense
Ministry was limited to preparing proposals regarding military policies and doctrine for
the Supreme Soviet and the President, and participating in discussions and further
deliberations. Thus, the role of the military was circumscribed and a new relationship
between the military and the civilian leadership was established. Furthermore, Russia’s
democratic transformation laid the foundation for a wide spectrum of ideas and opinions
to be expressed and discussed with the unprecedented participation o f civilian strategists,
academicians, journalists, politicians, and the broad public.
In May 1992, the newly formed Security Council presented the first draft of the
military doctrine—three weeks after the announcement of the new security concept. The
new draft doctrine dealt with the dramatically changed security environment o f the early
1990s and represented a major step forward in identifying Russia’s new threats.
International challenges were seen as coming from potentially provocative actions such
as (1) efforts by some states to dominate the world community; (2) the presence of
powerful armed forces in a number of states, and especially their concentration near
Russia’s border; (3) instability of the international military-political situation and (4)
efforts to use economic or military blackmail against Russia.5 After months of debates,
in November 1993, a revisited document the “Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine
5 In late May 1992, the new Russian Defense Minister, General o f the Army Pavel Grachev, chaired a
four-day conference at the General Staff Academy in Moscow, in which leading military theorists took
part. The results o f this conference were made public in July 1992 when presentations made at the
conference were published in one o f the leading journals o f armed forces Voennaya M ysl’. It was the first
attempt in the post-Cold War era to define the current and emerging threats, political-military doctrine, and
structure o f the armed forces for the new Russia. See Pavel Grachev, “Basic Content o f Russia’s Military
Doctrine and o f the Russian Armed Forces Organizational Development Concept,” Voennaya Mysl ’, July
10, 1992. See translation in FBIS/JPRS, Central Eurasia Reports, September 30, 1993, 58-62. Shortly, a
conference was held at the Russian Academy o f Science on Russia’s security issues, in which civil experts
took part in order to make a civilian input on security matters. See A. Yegorov, “A Conference in the
Russian Academy o f Science: There were more Declarations than Recommendations,” Krasnaya Zvezda,
July 4, 1992, 2. See translation in JPRS Reports, JPRS-UMA-92-026, July 15, 1992,46. It took seventeen
months to complete the work and the debate on the new military doctrine.
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of the Russian Federation” was finally adopted.6 This document was envisioned as an
integral part of the security concept of the Russian Federation for a transitional period—
the period of establishing the new Russian statehood, the period of domestic democratic
reforms and the restructuring of the whole system of international relations after the end
of the Cold War.7 This document included all major issues in Russia’s security and
defense agenda and, despite the fact that it raised much controversy and diverging views
on the significance and interpretation of particular trends in Russia’s security policy, it
represented Russia’s first attempt to free its security thinking of ideological approaches,
analyze new security environment from a national perspective and formulate clear
national security priorities.
First, the 1993 Doctrine promulgated key political principles on which military
security should rely and elaborated on “the prevention of wars and armed conflicts, on
military organizational development, on country’s defense preparation, on the

6 The Security Council o f the Russian Federation considered Basic Provisions o f the Military Doctrine o f
the Russian Federation at its sessions on 3 and 6 October 1993. The Russian Federation Security Council
approved the finalized document on November 2, 1993. Basic Provisions o f the Military Doctrine o f the
Russian Federation was then adopted by edict No. 1833 o f the President o f the Russian Federation on 2
November 1993. Only exerpts o f the document were published for the public. The document consists o f
an introduction and three sections: the political foundations; the military foundations; and the militarytechnical and economic foundations o f the military doctrine, and a conclusion,
http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/russia/russia-mil-doc.html (accessed 11.25.03). Term “doctrine” has
different defitions in the Russian and American usage. The official Russian defention o f military doctrine
is “a nation’s officially accepted system o f scientifically founded views on the nature o f modem wars and
the use o f armed forces in them, and also on the requirement arising from these views regarding the country
and its armed forces being made ready for war.” Miliatary doctrine answers the following five questions:
(1) Who is the enemy in a probable war? (2) What is the probable character o f a war, and what will be its
aims and tasks? (3) What forces will be necessary to fulfill these tasks, and what direction will military
development follow? (4) How should preparation for war be carried out? (5) What will be the means o f
warfare?
7 The transitional period was not defined but efforts in organizational development cover a period until the
year 2000. The reference to the transitional character o f the document suggests that many o f the issues put
forth in it are open for discussion and further development. According to James F. Holcomb, this makes
the new doctrine more akin to a “white paper” than to a traditional Soviet “military doctrine.” See James F.
Holcomb, “The Implications o f Russia’s Military Doctrine,” in James F. Holcomb and Michael M. Boll,
Russia’s New Doctrine: Two Views, Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, July 20, 1994, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/rusnudoc/pdf (accessed 11.26.03).
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organization o f countermeasures to threats to state’s military security, and on the
utilization of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops for the defense of the
A

Russian Federation’s vitally important interests.” The new doctrine attempted to deal
with the consequences of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Its goals included the following: to restructure, withdraw from territories of other states,
and reduce the armed forces, during the first phase; and in the second phase, to create a
new military infrastructure. It affirmed Russia’s commitment to the principles of
peaceful settlement of international disputes, respect for sovereignty and the territorial
integrity of states, noninterference in their internal affairs and announced that the Russian
Federation “regards no state as its enemy” and that its military posture is defensive. It
concluded that the immediate threat of direct aggression being launched against the
Russian Federation considerably declined under the new international conditions, but did
not disappear completely. Armed conflicts arising from social, political, territorial,
religious, national-ethnic conflicts, including those within Russia itself or neighboring
states were seen as posing a particular danger to Russia’s security. It stated that ensuring
military security o f the Russian Federation and its vitally important interests depended
first and foremost on the domestic reforms of economic, political, and social spheres.
The 1993 document listed a number of external “military dangers” that included a
danger of the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction against the Russian
Federation, a danger from strategic instability caused by violations of international arms
control accords and agreements, expansion of military blocs and alliances, and

8 President o f the Russian Federation, “Basic Provisions o f the Military Doctrine o f the Russian
Federation,” Edict No. 1833 o f the President o f the Russian Federation, 2 November 1993, published in
Rossiiskie Vesti, No. 18, November 19, 1993: 1-2, in FBIS-Sov-93-222-S, November 19, 1993: 1-11,
http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/russia/russia-mil-doc.html, accessed 11.25.03.
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international terrorism. In order to safeguard the military security of the Russian
Federation, the 1993 Doctrine set out a course for international cooperative approaches:
on development of bilateral and multilateral accords among states renouncing power
politics and rejecting the use of threat of force among states involved in such accords, on
wide participation in collective security structures, on international collaboration for the
creation of a mechanisms effectively dealing with proliferation o f weapons of mass
destruction and means o f their delivery; on promotion of the “multilateralization” of talks
on nuclear disarmament; and on broadening of confidence-building measures in the
military security realm and preservation, and the strengthening of the body of arms
control treaties.9
The issue at the center of the debate on the 1993 military doctrine was Russia’s
new nuclear weapons posture. The new doctrine abandoned Soviet “no-first use” and
non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.10 It became clear quite early in
the post-Cold War transformation that, while Russia reformed its political, economic and
social systems and the military, its conventional forces would not be fully able to provide
Russia’s security and, therefore, Russia would have to rely more on its nuclear arsenal as

9 President o f the Russian Federation, “Basic Provisions o f the Military Doctrine o f the Russian
Federation,” Part 2 “Political Bases o f the Military Doctrine, 1993.
10 The Doctrine states that the Russian Federation will not use its nuclear weapons against any state-party
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons which does not have nuclear weapons except:
(a) when there is an armed attack against the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces and other
troops, or its allies by any state which is connected by an alliance agreement with a state that does possess
nuclear weapons: and (b) when there are joint actions by such a state with a state possessing nuclear
weapons in the carrying out or in support o f any invasion or armed attack upon the Russian Federation, its
territory, Armed forces and other troops or its allies. In other words, according to this new nuclear policy,
Russia can use its nuclear weapons against any nuclear power, any non-nuclear ally o f a nuclear power, any
non-nuclear non-aligned state, acting militarily together with a nuclear power, and any non-nuclear nonaligned state, not acting together with a nuclear power, if that state is not a party to the 1968 NPT. See
President o f the Russian Federation, “Basic Provisions o f the Military Doctrine o f the Russian Federation,”
Section 2 titled “Political Bases o f the Military Doctrine,” 1993. See also Nikolai Sokov, “An Assessment
o f the Draft Russian Military Doctrine,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, October 1999, Online Publication,
http://www/nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/doctrine.htm (accessed 11.25.03).
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a means of deterring military attacks against its territory or its vital interests.11 Although
this shift in Russia’s nuclear posture aroused great concerns abroad, it was simply put in
line with that of NATO’s nuclear posture. This posture was supposed to recognize and
reflect the fact that the primary role of nuclear weapons was deterrence. However,
according to some security experts, it could indicate a step backward from the previously
practiced norm of “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons—a step towards actual use of
nuclear strategic arsenal against a conventional attack. The timing of this shift has been
attributed to lessons Russia drew from the first Gulf War.

10

The provision for the use of

nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack was a response to the threat posed
by highly accurate long-range conventional weapons.
As a corollary of this fundamental shift in Russia’s nuclear weapons policy, the
1993 doctrine identified “the actions of other countries which hinder the functioning of
Russian systems for the support of the strategic nuclear forces and of state and military
command and control, above all, their space component” as one of the factors that
transform a military danger into an immediate military threat.13 Therefore, in the first
public statement on its military security, Russia identified a threat to its space assets as
one of the primary threats and announced as one of the military-technical priorities for
the provision of military security of the Russian Federation “the development and
production of highly efficient systems for the command and control of troops and

11 This was considered a controversial policy shift. It is beyond the scope o f this study to analyze the new
Russian nuclear posture adopted in the 1993 military doctrine. See critique o f Russia’s new nuclear posture
by Alexei Arbatov, “Russian Military Doctrine and Strategic Nuclear Forces to the Year 2000 and
Beyond,” Paper presented at the conference “Russian Defense Policy Towards the Year 2000,” Naval
Postgraduate School. Monterey, California, March 26-27, 1997, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/
russia/doctrine/arbatov.htm (accessed 11.26.03). See also Holcomb and Boll, 1994.
12 James F. Holcomb, “The Implications o f Russia’s Military Doctrine,” in Holcomb and Boll, 1994.
13 President o f the Russian Federation, “Basic Provisions o f the Military Doctrine o f the Russian
Federation,” Section 2 “Political Bases o f the Military Doctrine,” 1993.
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weapons, communications, intelligence, strategic warning, electronic warfare, and
precision, mobile, non-nuclear weapons, as well as systems for their information
support.”14 This reflected Russia’s growing reliance on space for security in parallel with
its increasing reliance on nuclear forces. At the same time the military space activities
were to be confined—according the law “On Space Activity ” and “On the Priorities of
the Federal Space Policy” adopted in 1993—to “the use of space systems for military
command and control, communications, intelligence, and other types of backup for the
Armed Forces.”15
The new security concept and military doctrine of the early 1990s ushered in a
revolution in Russia’s security approach to match the fundamental changes that had
occurred in the country and abroad after the end of the Cold War. Russia transformed its
security approach from being based on ideological principles of Marxist class struggle to
being based on Russian national interests: military doctrine became a part of the overall
national strategy. In the documents of the early 1990s, Russia outlined measures that
could be construed as aimed at bringing Russia into the community of liberal
democracies. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and then the Soviet Union itself, as
well as the lessons learned from the first Gulf War led to the shift in Russia’s nuclear
posture and an increase in the importance of Russia’s military space segment as reflected
in Russia’s first official promulgations of its security concept and military doctrine in the
post-Cold War era.

14 President o f the Russian Federation, “Basic Provisions o f the Military Doctrine o f the Russian
Federation,” Section 4 “Military-Technical and Economic Foundations o f Military Doctrine,” 1993.
15 Russian Federation, Supreme Soviet, “On the Priorities o f Russian Federation Space Policy,”
Resolution o f the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet No. 4878-1, April 27, 1993. Space activities for
military purposes were more clearly defined by the Law o f the Russian Federation “On Space Activity,”
Article 4 “The Principles o f Space Activity,” August 20, 1993.
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RUSSIA’S SECURITY APPROACH UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF DEEPENING
CRISIS: “FIRST USE” AND PREEMPTIVE STRIKES
The need to revise Russia’s security concept became apparent by the mid-1990s,
when the euphoria that had followed the end of the Cold War and overly optimistic hopes
for a new emerging world order and Russia’s own political, economic and social reforms
had dissipated. The new Security Concept was signed by President Yeltsin on December
17,1997. It acknowledged rapid changes, taking place in the international arena, and
identified two major, mutually exclusive trends shaping the emerging new world order:
(1) the trend towards a multipolar world and integrational processes with multilateral
approaches to governance of international affairs, and (2) the trend towards the creation
of the international system based on unilateral, and even military-coercive approaches to
international affairs, with the first trend being the dominant one.16 While the overall
international conditions were favorable for “demilitarization” of international relations
•

•

•

•

•

and a threat of direct aggression against the Russian Federation was seen as diminished,
a number of developments within Russia and in the international system raised security
concerns.
The 1997 Security Concept emphasized that the economic crisis in the Russian
Federation was the main source of Russia’s security threats. It described it as:
... [T]he significant contraction in the manufacturing sector, decline in
investment and innovation activities, destruction of the scientific and technical
potential, stagnation in the agricultural sector, disarray in the financial and
monetary systems, the decline of the federal budget’s income, increase o f the
federal debt... an increase o f the share o f the fuel and energy sector, formation o f
the economic model based on the exports o f fuel and raw materials and imports
o f equipment, food, and consumer goods..., the outflow o f capital from Russia
and strategically important resources under the conditions o f extremely
16 See President o f the Russian Federation, “National Security Concept o f the Russian Federation,”
Adopted by the Presidential Decree No. 1300, December 17, 1997, Section I “Russia in the World
Community,” http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/docs/snconold.htm (accessed 11.07.03).
17 Ibid., Section III “Threats to National Security o f the Russian Federation.”
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inefficient or criminal utilization o f profits, outflow of highly skilled cadres and
intellectual property from Russia...1

It maintained that ensuring Russian national interests was possible only on the basis of
stable domestic economic growth. Thus, by the mid-1990s, it became clear that Russia’s
key security concerns and interests lay in the economic sphere.
Among the main “external dangers,” the new concept identified attempts by
“some states” to preclude, or impede, Russia’s becoming one of the influential centers in
a mutlipolar international system. The document expressed a clear preference for a
multipolar world order and considered a trend towards uniplority— an international
system “based on domination of some Western countries under the leadership of the
United States and aimed at unilateral, above all military-coercive solution of key
problems in world politics in circumvention of fundamental norms of international
law”19—as a negative development that contradicted with its national interests. The 1997
Concept still considered the world order as evolving and the trend towards unipolarity
existing alongside a more positive trend towards a multipolar international system with
interstate relations based on economic and political cooperation and integration, and
improvements in the mechanism of international governance.
The proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the formation
of new military coalitions near Russia’s borders or the expansion of existing military
alliances towards Russia’s borders, above all the expansion of NATO to the East, the
growing threat o f terrorism, and the low efficacy o f the international m echanism s

supporting international security were also listed as external threats.20 It furthermore

18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., Section I “Russia in the International Community.”
20 Ibid., Section III “Threats to National Security o f the Russian Federation.”
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pointed out that military threats had increased due to the technological advances of some
developed industrial countries and the emergence of a new generation of weapons,
creating conditions for the new round of arms race and fundamental change in the forms
and means of militarized conflicts. Accordingly, the new concept called for the creation
of a new 21st century model of international relations for providing global, regional, and
sub-regional security based on the principals of equality and indivisibility o f security for
all.21 This required the establishment of a new system of Euro-Atlantic security in which
a leading coordinating role would be played by the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe. The new model also envisioned greater efforts for creation
multilateral structures for security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and South Asia,
and greater role for the UN Security Council, strengthening of the non-proliferation
regime for weapons of mass destructions and the means of their delivery. Russia
reaffirmed strong allegiance to the existing arms control agreements and to the reduction
of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons, to confidence building
measures and stability enhancing measures, to international export control of goods,
technologies, and military and dual-use services. This commitment to multilateral
cooperative approaches to security reflected Russia’s tendency to compensate for its own
weakness with international security arrangements. With a deepening economic and
social crisis and ongoing military reform, Russian leadership did not want or could not
afford to take part in the emerging revolution in military affairs.
Thus, Russia’s dependence on its nuclear forces continued to grow through the
1990s. The 1997 document confirmed that the most important task of the military forces
of the Russian Federation was to deter a nuclear, as well as large scale or regional
21 Ibid., Section IV “Provision o f National Security o f the Russian Federation.”
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conventional war and to protect its allies. Thus, the 1997 security concept stipulated that
“The Russian Federation must possess nuclear forces capable of guaranteed delivery of
predetermined damage to any aggressor-state or a coalition of states” and its Armed
Forces, under the conditions of peacetime, must be able to defend against an air and
space attack.22 According to the concept, the Russian Federation would use its nuclear
weapons when in the course of a military aggression against it “there would be a threat to
the very existence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state.”

This

represented another step towards lowering the threshold on the use of nuclear weapons.
The work on the concept of Russia’s security continued and, as the economic
situation in Russia continued to deteriorate further throughout the later half of the 1990s,
the new Concept concentrated even more on Russia’s internal problems. So much so that
the new Security Concept signed by the acting Russian President Putin on January 10,
2000, was overwhelmingly introverted, devoting most of its attention to the economic
crisis, domestic social and political instability as the main threats to Russia’s national
security.24
Despite continuous negative trends in Russia and, thus, further deterioration of
Russia’s security situation, some experts pointed out, as a positive development in the
new document in comparison with the 1997 doctrine, a further expansion and elaboration
on the liberal component. It became more consistently formulated, with the individual
and its rights and interests put at the top of the priority list, then civil society, and

22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., Section IV “Provision o f National Security o f the Russian Federation.”
24 The new 2000 National Security Concept represents an edited version o f the Draft Concept adopted by
the Russian Security Council on October 5, 1999. The Draft Concept in its turn was not an entirely new
document but a revisited 1997 National Security Concept. The work on the new document was headed by
Vladimir Putin. The then Prime Minister, Putin was in charge o f amending the Concept since October
1999.
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democratic governance, with the state providing law, order, and favorable conditions for
the development of the individual and society.

9^

At the same time, the new concept

emphasized social inequality and the lack of law and order as internal threats more
strongly than its predecessor and envisaged a greater role for the state, as a result.
However, the state was not only to provide and oversee the fair application of “rules of
the game,” but also to become the engine of the economic growth. Turning the economic
situation around and achieving prosperity for the people, and the country as a whole, was
made an overriding priority.26 The concept made clear that the deteriorating economic
situation in the country would not allow Russia to provide adequate security.
Among military threats, the 2000 document directly pointed to the protracted
process of reforming Russia’s military organization and defense complex, and under•

•

financing of national defense.

97

•

•

As in its predecessor, the 2000 Concept reaffirmed that,

while the goal of military security was to provide military forces adequate for the
challenges of the 21st century, national defense spending must be within rational limits.28
In the 2000 Concept, the optimism of the earlier versions concerning positive
trends in the world and the friendly security environment was largely absent. Resulting
from the analysis of deteriorating internal and external conditions and drawing lessons
from Kosovo, the new document continued to relax the conditions for the use of nuclear

25 See, for example, Nikolai Sokov, “Putin’s Russia: New Priorities in the Kremlin, Russia’s New Concept
o f National Security,” East European Constitutional Review 9 (winter/spring 2000),
http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol9num_onehalf/feature/nationalsecurity/html (accessed 11.06.03).
26 President o f the Russian Federation, “National Security Concept o f the Russian Federation,” Adopted
by the Presidential Decree No. 24, January 10, 2000, Section III “Threats to the Russian Federation’s
National Security,” http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/RussiaEurope/russiastrat2000.html (accessed
11.07.03).
27 Ibid., Section I “Russia’s National Interests.”
28 President o f the Russian Federation, “National Security Concept o f the Russian Federation,” 1997,
Section IV “Provision o f National Security o f the Russian Federation,” and “National Security Concept o f
the Russian Federation,” 2000, Section IV “Provision o f National Security o f the Russian Federation,”
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weapons. The 1997 Concept stated that the goal of Russia’s Armed Forces was nuclear
deterrence in order to prevent both a nuclear war or large-scale conventional war and that
Russia might use nuclear weapons when “there is a threat to the very existence of the
Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state,” the 2000 concept envisioned “the
use of all available means, including nuclear weapons to repel an armed aggression if all
other measures to resolve the crisis have been exhausted or have turned out to be
inefficient.” If the 1997 Concept required the Russian Federation to posses a nuclear
arsenal “capable of guaranteeing an infliction of damage to the desired extent on any
aggressor state or a coalition of states,” the 2000 concept called for nuclear forces that
“are capable o f guaranteeing the infliction of damage to the desired extent on any
aggressor state or a coalition of states in any conditions and circumstances.”
Furthermore, the 2000 variant of the security concept lacked explicit negative assurances
to non-nuclear weapons states. The new military doctrine developed on the basis of the
2000 security concept filled this gap with the following statement:
The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against states who are
parties to the non-proliferation treaty and who do not possess nuclear weapons,
except in those cases when these states attack Russian Federation, Armed Forces
o f the Russian Federation or other forces, its allies or a state, with which she has
agreements concerning security, while being aligned with or supporting the
attack o f a state possessing nuclear weapons.29

The description of principal characteristic of global trends, including the expansion of
NATO to the East and adoption by the alliance of its new strategic doctrine and real
practice o f using force outside the zone of their responsibility and without UN Security

29 President o f the Russian Federation, “Military Doctrine o f the Russian Federation,” adopted by the
Presidential Decree on April 21, 2000, Section 1 “Military-Political Foundations,” Information Bulletin,
Press Service o f the President o f the Russian Federation, http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/
russia/r_mil_doctrine_2000.html (accessed 11.05.03).
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Council sanctions,30 and modernization o f the U.S. conventional forces that started to
create a large military gap between the United States and the rest of the world, resulted in
the conclusion that the level and scope of the military threat were increasing and, hence,
the importance of nuclear weapons for provision of Russian security also increased. In
the meantime, the threshold for their use declined.31
As in the previous concept, the 2000 document repeated that the proliferation of
WMD and the means for their delivery continued to be one of the external threats Russia
faced in the international arena. In order to deal with this threat, Russia was to work
towards strengthening of the nonproliferation regime.

It is characteristic of this

document that as a means of provision of Russia’s security, besides greater reliance on its
nuclear arsenal, it devoted considerable attention to international cooperation and arms
control as an effective form of collective international management of security affairs.
Four out of twelve national objectives reiterated in the document dealt with the arms
control issues such as: (1) achieving progress in nuclear arms control and maintaining
strategic stability in the world on the basis of full implementation by all states of their
international commitments in this area; (2) fulfilling mutual obligations to reduce and
eliminate WMD and conventional arms, promoting confidence-building and
strengthening stability, ensuring international export controls over dual-use and military
goods, technologies and services; (3) adjusting the existing agreements on arms control
and disarmament to the new international conditions, working out new agreements if
necessary, on confidence-building and security; and (4) promoting the establishment of
30 President o f the Russian Federation, “National Security Concept o f the Russian Federation,” 2000,
Section III “Threats to the Russian Federation’s National Security.”
31 Ibid., Section I “Russia in the World Community” and Section III “Threats to the Russian Federation’s
National Security”.
32 Ibid., Section IV “Ensuring the National Security o f the Russian Federation.”
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nuclear-free zones. A new point in this list is the provision to “adapt the existing armscontrol and disarmament agreements to the new conditions of international relations, as
well as to develop, as necessary, new agreements, first of all with respect to confidence
building measures.” This provision indicated Russia’s shift in attitude towards arms
control: on the one hand, Russia wanted more of arms control, but on the other hand, it
wanted to revisit those agreements that no longer met its security requirements. In
particular, the ban on ICBMs with Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicles
(MIRVs), as established by the START process, was no longer considered in Russia’s
interests and, as START II became void after the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty,
Russia is believed to have taken the direction of MIRVing those ICBMs that under the
START II would have been prohibited. There is also a debate on the acceptability of
Russia’s self-imposed restrictions on tactical nuclear weapons.33
Five more objectives identified in the document called for greater cooperation via
global or regional international organizations for providing Russia’s security and greater
international stability.34 Thus, facing internal difficulties and greater external threats
from horizontal proliferation of WMD and means of their delivery by countries seeking
greater influence on international affairs and vertical proliferation o f weapons and their
systems by a number of developed countries, Russia turned greater attention to arms
control and reliance on collective governance of international security.
Thus, as a result of Russia’s domestic transformation and changes in the
international system in the post-Cold War era two features of Russia’s security approach
became pronounced: increasing reliance on Russia’s nuclear forces and progressive
33 Sokov, “Putin’s Russia,” 2000.
34 President o f the Russian Federation, “National Security Concept o f the Russian Federation,” Section IV
“Ensuring the National Security o f the Russian Federation,” 2000.
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lowering of the nuclear threshold, and greater attention to arms control. The former trend
was developed still further in Russia’s new draft military doctrine. In October 2003, the
Ministry of Defense presented a new draft military doctrine of the Russian Federation
until the year 2030 at a meeting in the Kremlin between President Putin and the Armed
Forces’ leadership. Although this is outside the timeframe of this study, it is an important
development that emphasizes the important features of Russia’s security strategy. The
new document is a revised version of the military doctrine adopted in April 2000. This
new version no longer referred to multipolarity as the dominant trend and no longer
identified NATO and its expansion as one of the Russia’s main security concerns.35 The
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, however, pointed out in his oral presentation of the new
draft military doctrine: “If NATO is preserved as a military alliance with its existing
offensive military doctrine, this will demand a radical reconstruction of Russian military
planning.. .including changes in Russian nuclear strategy.”36 He also identified the
possible direction of such reconstruction, saying that Russia would not rule out a
preemptive attack anywhere if national interests demand it. The necessity of this measure
was partly explained in Ivanov’s presentation. While nuclear deterrence remained
Russia’s foundation for military security, the document emphasized that it was no longer
efficient without modem conventional forces. At the meeting President Putin announced
that Russia would start replacing Russia’s aging nuclear arsenal that was currently in
service with a considerable arsenal of new MIRVed ICBMs (SS-19 Stiletto) that are

35 The document has not yet been published. Information about the content o f the document is based on
the published reports o f the representatives o f media who were invited to the meeting.
36 See Paul Ames, “NATO to Quiz Minister Over Threat,” RANSAC Nuclear News, October 9, 2003,
http://www.ransac.org/Project%20and%20Publications/News/Nuclear%20News%/
1092003123008PM.html (accessed 12.04.03).
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capable o f penetrating Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).37 According to President Putin,
this arsenal will allow Russia to provide for its military security till approximately the
mid-21st century, while giving Russia’s Armed Forces an opportunity to develop and
deploy modem weapons systems to supplement its nuclear arsenal. The new draft
military doctrine put upgrading of the Russian Federation’s conventional forces on the
top of the priority list. It also required the Russian Armed Forces to defend against air
and space attacks and, after strategic mobilization, to be able to fight two local wars
simultaneously. President Putin reaffirmed Russia’s readiness to resort to preemptive
strikes during the interstate Russian-German consultations held in Yekaterinburg later in
October 2003. These declarations were made in reaction to the United States’ new
security strategy that added preemption as an important component of U.S. security
strategy. They reflected the overall direction of Russia’s still emerging security approach
and indicated that Russia, even after a decade after the end of the Cold War and liberal
reforms, did not consider itself to be a part of the U.S. led community of liberal
democracies.

RUSSIA’S SECURITY INTERESTS IN OUTER SPACE
Russia’s official pronouncements of national security and military doctrines only
indirectly reflected Russia’s concerns and interests with respect to outer space. Similar to
the previous edition of the Russia’s security concept, the 2000 Security Concept did not
mention the ABM Treaty, Russia’s main battleground for its security interests with
regard to outer space as well as Russia’s overall security since it became increasingly
37 See “Military Doctrine till the year 2030: Ministry o f Defense Decided With Whom War is Needed.
Putin Shares a State Secret with the Public. Align with the USA?” OPEC.RU, Expert Channel “Open
Economy,” News, October 3, 2003, http://www.opec.ru/news_doc.asp?d_no=42352 (accessed 10.28.03).
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dependent on the nuclear strategic forces. Throughout the 1990s, Russia continued to
insist that the ABM Treaty was “the cornerstone of strategic stability” and that the U.S.
deployment of missile defenses would undermine stability and upset the whole body of
arms control that had emerged in the past three decades.

•5 0

There were a number of reasons for Russia’s support of the 1972 ABM treaty.
First, and likely the most important, its insistence on the preservation of the ABM Treaty
came from the desire to postpone the onset of an arms race in outer space and
forthcoming problems with Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I)
in the context of Russia’s domestic economic difficulties. According to some estimates,
ensuring the effectiveness and reliability of the C3I alone would require Russia to spend
at least as much on this in the next decade as all strategic weapons development and
procurement for the same period combined.

There were no estimates what would it

take to engage in an actual arms race in outer space.
Second, Russia’s official reason for support of the ABM Treaty appealed to the
logic of strategic deterrence during the Cold War. The ABM treaty, banning nation-wide
ballistic missile defense systems in the United States and Soviet Union, provided the
foundation for the Cold War model of strategic deterrence under which neither the United
States nor the Soviet Union could threaten an attack on the other without facing an
38 Russia insisted on this vision o f the ABM Treaty and it was reflected in a number o f joint U.S.-Russian
statements. See, for example, U.S.-Russian Joint Statement Concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,
March 21, 1997, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/s970321at.htm (accessed 03.19.04); see also
“Second Agreed Statement Relating to the Treaty Between the United States o f America and the Union o f
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation o f Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,” May 26, 1972, September
29, 1997, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/abm_scc2.htm (accessed 03.19.04); and also U.S.Russian Joint Statement on Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative Between the United States o f America
and Russian Federation, September 6, 2000, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/090600js.htm
(accessed 03.19.04).
39 Vladimir Baranovsky, “Changing Perceptions o f the Military Roles in Post-Soviet Russia,” in Sergey
Oznobishchev and James H. Brusstar, eds., U.S.-Russian Partnership: Meeting the New Millennium.
National Defense University Press, 1999, Online Publication, http://issuisse.ifrance.com/
emmaf2/USRUS/usrp 19.html (accessed 11.29.03).
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overwhelming retaliatory strike. This model of deterrence, the so-called Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD), meant that the strategic balance was stable—neither side had an
incentive to attack first no matter how far the confrontation went between the two
superpowers in a crisis. The deployment of a nation-wide ballistic missile defense
system in the United States, as opposed to the limited anti-ballistic defense allowed by
the ABM Treaty, would undermine the foundation for this type of deterrence. If the
United States had a capability to intercept ballistic missiles and, therefore, it did not fear
retaliation, it would have an incentive to attack first. Facing nuclear devastation or a
highly accurate conventional attack against its strategic forces that would leave Russia
with very little to retaliate with, Russia would have an incentive to launch a preemptive
strike. Based on this argument, Russia opposed steps that would undermine the ABM
treaty. This opposition only deepened in the 1990s, when Russia’s dependence on
nuclear strategic forces increased as a result of the significantly deteriorated domestic
economic and social conditions and prolonged reforms of the military.
Third, Russian military officials expressed doubts that the U.S. National Missile
Defense (NMD) system would be aimed at defending against missile attacks by “rogue
states” and believed that it was the Russian nuclear forces against which such defense
would be primarily directed. The then Defense Minister Sergeev said:
The results o f our military-technical analysis indicate that the threat o f the
carrying out o f a strike against the USA by intercontinental ballistic missiles
launched by so-called “problem” states, which the USA sets forth as the primary
reason for the development o f its national ABM system, is, in reality, not being
considered [i.e., it is not the real reason for the development o f the national ABM
system]. We do not see any [real] motives for the deployment o f this national
ABM system other than the striving o f the USA to acquire strategic domination
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in the world. We are deeply convinced that such a deployment would be
primarily directed against Russia.40

Fourth, Russia’s opposition to the U.S. plans to modify or abandon the ABM
Treaty and deploy ballistic missile defense was founded not only on the assumption that
it would destroy the foundation of bilateral stability between the United States and
Russia, but also on the expectation that it would undermine global strategic stability.
Russia was particularly concerned with China’s potential response to the U.S. global antiballistic missile defense. China, who had a rather limited arsenal of ICBMs, would feel
its deterrent undermined. If the United States were to deploy a global Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD), China’s security interests would be significantly damaged in the context
of the situation with Taiwan, where China wanted to have an option of using force in
order to uphold the principle of sovereignty and integrity of its territory. In its turn,
Russia’s security might be seriously undermined, if China was to modernize and build up
its nuclear forces. Russian security experts pointed out that in order for China to
maintain the credibility o f its deterrent in case of the U.S. deployment of its NMD, it
would have to significantly expand its missile force. Russian analyst Alexander Pikayev
asserted: “Currently, the predominance of Chinese conventional weapons vis-a-vis the
vast but sparsely populated Russian Far East is balanced by Moscow’s superiority in
nuclear weapons. China’s nuclear build-up might considerably erode this superiority,
further weakening Russia’s position in the Far East.”41 Moreover, this buildup may
prompt other countries near Russia’s territory to react with nuclear buildups.

40 Igor’ Sergeev on “Military Reform, Chechnya, ABM Defense,” Vek, Febraury 23, 2001, cited in Amy
F. Woolf, “National Missile Defense: Russia’s Reaction,” Report for Congress, Congressional Research
Service, June 14,2002, CRS-7.
41 Alexander Pikayev, “ABM Treaty Revision: A Challenge to Russian Security,” Disarmament
Diplomacy 44, March 2000, Online publication, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd44/44abm.htm (accessed
06.06.04).
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Furthermore, the BMD capabilities that the United States plans to deploy to
protect its homeland against a ballistic missile attack are intimately connected in
technology and in a military-strategic sense with anti-satellite capabilities.42 Even
without a BMD space-based component, BMD would impinge on space security and,
therefore, is bound to set off an arms race in outer space. China would feel particularly
compelled to develop its own AS AT capabilities and space weapons in response to the
U.S. deployment of a space-based NMD.43
Former Defense Minister Sergeev, speaking about the Clinton Administration’s
limited NMD maintained that such a system would be the “first step towards the future
emergence of a multifunctional global system for combating all types of ballistic,
aerodynamic, and space targets and subsequently also surface and land targets. This
comprehensive defense system will be directed first and foremost against potential of the
Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China.”44 Plans of the George W. Bush
Administration have already started to evolve towards creation of such a comprehensive

42 See, for example, Weber and Drell, in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin,
eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation, 1988,418.
43 China acquired space technology from its foreign commercial partners that could be used for the
development o f ASAT capability and provide a great assistance in this development. It is argued that with
technology and technical assistance that China acquired from Russia, it could develop direct ascent anti
satellite weapons. It is believed that China has already developed space and ground-based anti-satellite
laser weapons and space based anti-satellite weapons called “parasitic satellites.” See U.S. Department o f
Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power o f the People's Republic o f China, Report to Congress o f
the United States, Chapter II “Developments in Chinese Doctrine and Force Structure,” Segment C
“Advanced Technologies Which Would Enhance Military Capabilities, Section 2 “Space Development,”
June 2000, http://www.fas.org/news/china/2000/china06222000.htm (accessed 8.19.02); see also Cooper
and Contant, in Jimerson and Williamson, Space and Military Power in East Asia, 2000.
44 Vitaliy Tret’yakov, “SShA Rasrushayut Strategicheskuyu Stabil’nost’” (The USA is Destroying
Strategic Stability. Interview with Russian Federation Defense Minister Igor’ Sergeev), Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, N o.l 13 (2175), June 22, 2000, http://ng.ru/world/2000-06-22/6_pro_sergeev.html (accessed
06.26.04).
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system by eliminating the “artificial” distinction between a “theater” and “national”
ballistic missile defense.45
Russian officials insisted that, instead of relying on missile defenses and upsetting
strategic stability and arms control agreements, the United States and Russia should
engage in establishing an international space security regime that would address the
threat of missile proliferation. In June 1999, Russia proposed the establishment of a
Global Missile and Missile Technology Non-Proliferation Control System (GCS) under
U.N. auspices. It outlined the regime’s principal components at a G-8 meeting in
Cologne, Germany. The idea was not new: on January 29, 1992, the then Russian
President Yeltsin proposed Global System for Protecting the International Community
Against Missile Attack in his speech given at the UN Security Council46 This idea was
further developed at two international conferences held in Moscow in March 2000 and
February 2001. According to this evolved version, the regime would include two blocks:
(1) a missile non-proliferation block that includes the MTCR, its Code of Conduct,
incentive mechanisms, security assurances, national and multinational measures to
enhance missile non-proliferation; and diplomatic and economic enforcement measures;

45 President Bush revealed his NMD plans on May 1 2001, which included a multi-tired and layered
missile defense “system o f systems” that was to be based on “all available technologies and basing models
for effective missile defenses that could protect the United States.” See U.S. President, President Bush’s
Speech on National Ballistic Missile Defense, Speech by President George W. Bush at the National
Defense University, Washington D.C., The White House transcript, May 1, 2001,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/news/010501bush.html (accessed 03.19.04). See also U.S.
President, NSPD-23, “National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense,” 2002.
46 On June 17, 1992, President Bush and President Yeltsin issued a joint statement on a global protection
system (GPS), in which they confirmed that they agreed “that their two nations should work together with
allies and other interested states in developing a concept for such a system as part o f an overall strategy
regarding the proliferation o f ballistic missiles and weapons o f mass destruction.” See U.S.-Russian Joint
Statement on A Global Protection System, June 17, 1992, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/
b92061m.htm (accessed 03.19.04).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

250

and (2) a missile transparency regime, including pre- and post-launch notifications.47 The
United States, however, met Russia’s proposal with suspicion and did not take part in the
Moscow conferences of 2000 or 2001. By 2001, the GCS was transformed into a
comprehensive concept, combining various multilateral, bilateral, and national efforts
into an integrated international response to missile proliferation. The United States did
not make contributions to the development of this concept.
In June 2000, Russian President Putin proposed cooperation with European
nations on developing defenses against theater ballistic missiles shortly after his summit
meeting with President Clinton. This proposal was followed by meetings between
NATO officials and Russian Defense Minister, Igor’ Sergeev, later in June. In February
2001, in a paper titled “Phases of European Missile Defense,” Russia proposed to the
then NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, a European anti-missile defense system
(AMD) against non-strategic ballistic missiles to address the emerging missile
proliferation threat. Moscow offered its anti-missile research and development facilities,
tests ranges, and existing S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air interceptors.48 This proposal
was treated with suspicion, as an attempt to split the U.S. allies in Europe away from the
United States.49

47 Alexander Pickayev, “The Global Control System,” in Missile Proliferation and Defense: Problems and
Prospects, Occasional Paper No. 7, Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey, California, 2001, 22.
48 Ibid., 23.
49 On November 21, 2002, during the Prague Summit, NATO committed its member states to a NATO
Missile Defense Feasibility Study in order to examine options for addressing an increasing missile threat to
alliance’s territory, population and forces. A working group on missile defense was established under the
auspices o f the NATO-Russia Council, which was to “focus initially on missile defense terminology,
concepts, and system capabilities in order to develop procedures that could facilitate protection o f forces in
a joint, non-Article V crisis response operation.” See Rebecca Johnson, “Introduction: Ballistic Missile
Defense and the Weaponization o f Space,” Space Without Weapons, Acronym Institute, September 2003,
http://www.acronym.org.uk/space/index.htm (accessed 05.12.04). The Theater Missile Defense A d Hoc
Working Group created under the aegis o f the NATO-Russia Council conducted the first joint NATORussia TMD Command Post Exercise (CPX) at the United States Joint National Integration Center in
Colorado Springs, Colorado, from 8-12 March 2004. The purpose o f the CPX was to validate the
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The issue of the ABM treaty and non-weaponization of space was so important
for Russia that it launched a world-wide public relations campaign in order to hasten the
international consensus on non-weaponization of space and to rally support for the ABM
Treaty.50 Russia joined China on various occasions to criticize the U.S. plans for the
deployment of missile defenses as a threat to international stability and a trigger for an
arms race in outer space.51 Russia sought support for its cause from the U.S. allies in
Europe and issued declarations with many nations in support of the ABM Treaty and in
opposition to the U.S. NMD plans. The UN General Assembly adopted resolutions—
cosponsored by Russia and China as well as other countries—calling for the preservation
of and compliance with the ABM Treaty.52
Furthermore, in April 2001, in commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the first
human space flight, Russia held an international conference in Moscow under the slogan
“Space Without Weapons: An Arena for Peaceful Cooperation in the 21st Century,” that
Experimental Concept and associated Experimental Concept o f Operations developed over the past year by
the joint NATO-Russia TMD A d Hoc Working Group. Thus, the joint NATO-Russia work on NATO
TMD began despite the initial skeptical reception. See NATO Press Release (2004) 031, “NATO-Russia
Council Theater Missile Defense Command Post Exercise (TMD CPX), March 5, 2004,
http://globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/03/mil-040305-nato01htm, accessed 05.21.04. See
also Woolf, 2002, CRS-16.
50 According to the Eisenhower Institute’s publication “The Future o f Space: the Next Strategic Frontier”,
Russia considers keeping outer space free o f weapons as a crucial goal, an ultimate stand— its“21 Century
Stalingrad.” See Eisenhower Institute, Project “The Future O f Space: The Next Strategic Frontier,” Online
Publications, 2003, http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/globalpartnerships/fos/newfrontier/
weapons.htm (accessed 10.20.03). See also a survey o f reactions on President Putin’s diplomatic initiatives,
Katherine L. Starr, “Missile Defense: Putin’s Crusade Against NMD; Defying U.S. Hegemony,” FAS
Project, Online publication, http://www.fas.org/news/
russia/2000/russia-000721b.htm (accessed 07.12.04).
51 For example, the Russian and Chinese leadership announced their common positions on the ABM treaty
in the Joint Statement on Russo-Chinese Relations at the Turn o f the 21 Century approved at the summit
level on November 23, 1998; in the Russo-Chinese Information Communique on Consultations on
Questions Pertaining to the ABM Treaty issued on April 14, 1999; and the Russo-Chinese Joint Statement
approved at the summit level on December 10, 1999. On July 18, 2000, Russian President Putin and
Chairman o f the People’s Republic o f China Jiang Zemin signed a joint statement on the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty that was sent to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to be circulated as an official
document on August 1, 2000.
52 The UNGA Resolutions on the Preservation o f and Compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,
cosponsored by Russia, China, and other countries were adopted at the 54th, 55th, and 56th Sessions o f the
UN General Assembly.
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President Putin had originally proposed to hold at the UN Millennium Summit in New
York. Delegates from 105 countries jointed the commemoration of the 40th anniversary
of the first human flight in Moscow, while the United States and the United Kingdom
boycotted the forum, indicating that disagreements ran deep and disapproval of Russia’s
international initiatives with respect to space military security issues was serious.53 The
Conference framework included five thematic symposia focusing on a number of space
issues, including the prevention of an arms race in outer space.54
In a statement during a commemorative ceremony, President Putin visiting Star
City, Russian cosmonauts’ training center, explained the importance of outer space
activities for Russia. He maintained that Russian space program was vital for the
country, for it served as “the locomotive that will pull forward all other industry spheres”
and pledged to support Russian space industry.55
In a greeting message to the Moscow conference read by the Deputy Chairman of
the Government of the Russian Federation, Il’ya Klebanov, President Putin publicly
iterated to the representatives of the international community—national space

53 See presentation by Lt. General Mikhail S. Vinogradov for the Eisenhower Institute, Mikhail
Vinogradov, “Future o f Space: Prevention o f Arms Deployment in Space,” the Eisenhower Institute,
Online publication, January 17, 2002, http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/
globalpartnerships/fos (accessed 06.06.04). Vinogradov reports that not only did the United States decide
to ignore the conference in Moscow, it appealed to other nations to do the same. The boycott was
important as a sign o f profound disapproval o f Russia’s actions. Previously, the United States boycotted
the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.
54 According to the April 22nd Russian Foreign Ministry special information bulletin, the symposium on
the prevention o f an arms race in outer space included the following issues: (1) implications o f deploying
weapons in outer space on strategic stability and international security; (2) political and legal aspects o f the
prevention o f an arms race in outer space, including ways to improve and develop the international legal
mechanisms for regulating military activities in outer space; (3) measures to build confidence and to ensure
transparency and predictability in conducting outer space activities; (4) international cooperation to prevent
an arms race in outer space, including cooperation within the framework o f the UN General Assembly and
the Conference on Disarmament; and (5) conversion o f space technology. See Sergei Rogov, “Space
Without Weapons: An Arena for Peaceful Cooperation in the 21st Century,” Report on the International
Conference held in Moscow, April 11-14, 2001, 8, http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/
globalpartnerships/fos/newfrontier/weapons.htm (accessed 03.19.04).
55 Ibid.
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administrations officials, officials from foreign and defense ministries, members of the
academic communities, businessmen, members of various international non
governmental organizations dealing with outer space issues, representatives of insurance
companies and banks involved in space business, cosmonauts and astronauts from around
the world—Russia’s attitude towards further militarization of outer space and called for
action:
The w h o le international experience in space activities confirm s the necessity o f a
careful and responsible approach to the exploration o f outer space. B y join t
efforts w e are obliged to keep it peaceful for ourselves and succeeding
generations. I am convinced that there should be no w eapons in space.
M ost o f the m em bers o f the U N currently stand for averting an arms race in outer
space. It is necessary to m ove to practical steps in this direction. R ussia is ready
to begin, even from today, to elaborate them. I am appealing to the other space
pow ers to jo in in this initiative.56

The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, addressing the audience of the
Moscow conference further explain Russia’s position on the issue of weaponization of
space:
W e are convinced that aspirations in the direction o f the so-called
“w eaponization” o f space are incom patible w ith the very essen ce o f the concept
o f strategic stability. Their realization w ould sign ify not only the expansion o f
spheres o f m ilitary rivalry, but also its qualitative spurt, fraught w ith
unpredictable consequences.
R ussia is saying “no” to the deploym ent o f w eapons in space not on ly because
w e w ant to avoid a n ew and unnecessary m ilitary-technological com petition, but
also because having survived the enorm ous costs o f the C old War and global
confrontation, w e are against a return to the tim es o f unrestrained siphoning o f f
o f colo ssa l funds and resources for purposes incom patible w ith the true
requirem ents o f our people and all hum anity.57
W h ile still try in g to p r e se r v e th e A B M T reaty an d p re v en t w e a p o n iz a tio n o f o u ter

space throughout the 1990s, Russian leadership tried to prepare the Russian military for
the U.S. steps towards the deployment of the BMD system and moving ahead with other
56 Ibid., 10.
57 Ibid., 12.
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military space plans. By the late 1990s, Russia restructured its military space activities.
Military space forces responsible for the development, launching, and maintenance of
military satellites and missile space defense were merged into strategic missile forces in
order to meet the new challenges and rationalize the organization and structure of
Russia’s space related forces.

In June 2001, the Space Forces of the Russian Federation

was created. This step was taken to reflect the growing role of national space systems in
the support of activities of Russia’s armed forces and was meant as a step in improving
Russia’s security in general and space security in particular.59 This measure completed
the process of consolidation of Russia’s military space activities under centralized
management of Space Forces, as Russia prepared for outer space to become a sphere of
military competition.60
In an interview with a Russian newspaper, the Commander of Space Forces,
Colonel General A. N. Perminov, explained the creation of Space Forces as a necessary
response to the emerging security situation in outer space: the situation when space
became a sphere of major nations’ vital interests—the medium vital for providing
economic well-being as well as security. This new situation was characterized, according
to Perminov, by the toughening competition for orbital positions, radio frequencies and
other space resources, and by the increasing use of space for military purposes, including
for supporting military operations on the ground, in the sea and in the air. Russia created
its Space Forces in order to defend Russia’s security interests in outer space. Perminov
58 This attempt at the restructuring and integration o f different military space activities was largely
unsuccessful. See Russian Federation Ministry o f Defense, “Main Milestones o f the Space Forces,”
Official Website o f the Ministry o f Defense o f the Russian Federation,
http://www.mil.ru/index.php?menu_id=697 (accessed 11.05.03).
59 See Russian Federation Ministry o f Defense, “Historic Note,” Official Website o f the Ministry o f
Defense o f the Russian Federation, http://www.mil.ru/index.php?menu_id=387 (accessed 11.05.03).
60 Anatolii Dokuchaev, “Russian Space Shield,” Official Website o f the Ministry o f Defense o f the
Russian Federation, http://www.mil.ru/print.php?menu_id=711 (accessed 11.05.03).
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noted that Russia’s first choice for solving security problems with regard to outer space
would be the creation of an international legal security regime prohibiting the
emplacement of weapons in space and the use of force in space, but the increasing
importance of space for economic well-being and national security of the leading states,
including Russia, necessitated the defense of national interests in outer space “by all
means, including force.”61
All in all, in the course of its transformation throughout the 1990s and early 2000s
Russia fundamentally reformulated its security interests and policies on the basis of a
liberal model and put its security priorities and policies in line with those of the West, at
least in writing. Russian leadership has been reforming the military structure,
organization and military culture with varying degree of success throughout this postCold War period.62 There is a debate as to what direction this reform has taken and
whether there is any improvement at all. However, the slow pace of the military reform
itself can be considered, to some degree, as a sign of a “liberal transition,” whereby the
country is not willing to throw all its resources into military-building, subordinating all
other needs and well-being of its people in order to satisfy military security requirements:
economic issues and reforms have been put ahead of military requirements on the list of
national priorities.
Russia’s internal conditions, above all, its economic conditions, did not allow
Russia to keep up with the United States, and as the gap in capabilities and in military
61 Russian Federation Ministry o f Defense, “Interview o f the Commander o f Space Forces Colonel
General A. N. Perminov to the Red Star Newspaper,” Official Website o f the Ministry o f Defense o f the
Russian Federation, http://www.mil.ru/print.php?menu_id=708 (accessed 11.05.03).
62 In a report titled “On Main Results o f Russia’s Armed Forces Development in 2003,” Russia’s Defense
Minister Sergei Ivanov finally announced that “the most painful military reform stage is now behind.” He
made clear that there was still a long way to go to complete the transition. See “Defense Ministry Ready to
Discuss Army Reform with Society,” Pravda.Ru, November 18,2003, http://newsfromrussia.com/
main/2003/11/18/51330_.html (accessed 03.21.04).
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technology increased, Russia felt its security vis-a-vis the United States and its allies
significantly undermined. Russia’s hopes for security cooperation remained largely
unfulfilled. As a result, over the past decade since the end of the Cold War, Russia has
grown to rely more on its strategic nuclear arsenal, progressively lowering its nuclear
threshold.
Despite the new security pronouncements, Russia’s security interests with respect
to outer space remained remarkably persistent throughout the post-Cold War transition
era. Although Russia’s space security interests did not find an adequate reflection in
Russia’s public official documents related to security, Russia’s actions and occasional
statements of the civil and military leadership made them clear. In the new international
environment and with the new security approach, Russia consistently opposed U.S. plans
to develop and deploy National Ballistic Missile Defenses as a step to outer space
weaponization. In the post-Cold War era, this opposition, in large part, came from
Russia’s unwillingness to engage in a space arms race when its domestic reforms needed
major resources. There was a rather clear understanding that during this difficult period,
engaging in a space arms race would bring the country back into the grip of militarism
when every aspect of the nation’s life would again be subordinated to military goals.
Recognizing the vast economic potential of space and having mastered advanced
space technology, Russia actively pursued commercial space activities and grew to
depend on the global space market for the survival of its space industry and its space
/r-3

program.

Its leadership considered commercial space activities as one of the important

63 Russia’s dependence on commercial resources for financing the rebuilding o f GLONASS constellation,
the Russian global navigation system, for example, is estimated to be 60 percent. Only 40 percent o f cost
for rebuilding a 24-satellite constellation is planned to come from the federal and regional budgets. See
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avenues, integrating the country into the world economy and bringing real benefits to the
Russian economy as well as the world through the provision of space goods and
services.64 Russia considered weaponization of space a serious threat not only to its
security but also to the global space market and commercial space activities.65 However,
Russia responded to the deteriorating space security situation by preparing to defend its
interests in space, by force if necessary. Commercial considerations have probably been
important in the Russian stance towards space security, but strategic concerns seem to
have had an overwhelming weight.

“Rossiya Sozdaet Global’nuyu Navigazionnuyu Sistemu” (Russia Creates Global Navigation System),
Lenta.Ru, August 1, 2001, http://www.lenta.ru/Russia/2001/08/-l/space/_Printed.htm (accessed 08.01.01).
64 According to the head o f the Russian Aerospace Agency, Yurii Koptev, the economic benefits o f space
activities are very significant: every dollar invested in space research brings 10 dollars in profit. See Rogov,
2001, 15.
65 According to the Russian space experts that took part in a seminar held by the Eisenhower Institute at
the Space Research Institute (IKI) in Moscow in January 2002, in order to gain a Russian perspective on
the U.S. plans for military uses o f outer space, weaponization o f space threatens commercial activities via
the destruction o f the entire regulatory regime for international space activities. One o f the participants
expressed his opinion that from the position o f its superiority in outer space the United States will have full
control over other nations’ military and commercial activities in space and will dictate who can have what
satellites and what frequency may or may not be used for what purposes. Another Russian expert
suggested that a collective security-type regime would be a more appropriate approach to space security
challenges: “Those who would attack a satellite are the enemies o f all o f us... We must together determine
what measures we can introduce to make the situation more stable for us all.” See Eisenhower Institute,
Project “The Future o f Space: the Next Strategic Frontier,” Report on the Seminar at the Space Research
Institute (IKI) with the Eisenhower Institute, Moscow, Russia, January 17, 2002, Project “The Future o f
Space: the Next Strategic Frontier,” http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org (accessed 03.20.04).
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CHAPTER VII
CHINA’S SECURITY STRATEGY AND SPACE INTERESTS IN THE POST-COLD
WAR ERA

The goal of this chapter is, first, to evaluate China’s security strategy and factors
that influenced it after the end o f the Cold War, and then, to analyze the evolution of
China’s security interests regarding outer space in this period. In the post-Cold War era,
China published a number of official documents on its national security strategy in order
to declare its security interests and policies and elicit an understanding and favorable
attitude from the international community: the 1995 White Paper on Arms Control and
Disarmament, the 2000 White Paper on China’s Space Activities, the 1998, 2000, and
2002 White Papers on China’s National Defense.1 Examination of China’s officially
promulgated security policies should help to answer two central questions of the present
analysis: (1) whether China’s security interests in the issue area of outer space have
converged with those of the two other main space-faring states—the United States and
Russia; and (2) how its commercial space activities contributed to this evolution.
This chapter argues that after the end of the Cold War the security strategy of the
PRC continued to be based on a non-liberal concept of security—the communist concept
of “peaceful coexistence.” Its main goal was to provide a favorable, peaceful
international environment for China’s economic and social development and achieving
“comprehensive national strength”—that is, to provide for China’s ascendance as a major
1 In 1991, China published the White Paper on “Human Rights in China,” in 1992— “Tibet - Its
Ownership And Human Rights Situation,” in 1994— “Situation o f Chinese Women,” in 1995— “The
Progress o f Human Rights in China,” in 1996— “Environmental Protection in China,” and in 2003— White
Paper on “China’s Nonproliferation Policy” and others. See, for example, People’s Republic o f China,
Embassy o f the People’s Republic o f China in the State o f Israel, List o f White Papers issued by the State
Council o f the People’s Republic o f China, Official Website o f the Embassy o f the People’s Republic o f
China in the State o f Israel, http://chinaembassy.org.il/eng/cl2921.html (accessed 12.12.03).
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player in the international system. Cooperative approaches to security, including arms
control process, grew to be increasingly used by China in the pursuit of its security
interests. This chapter also maintains that space activities, including commercial space
activities, became an integral part of a comprehensive developmental strategy and
military modernization. The military aspects of space security became China’s prime
concern in the context of reunification with Taiwan—the issue that increasingly
dominated China’s security concerns in the post-Cold War decade. While in its
commercial space activities China grew to rely more and more on the U.S. and, generally,
on Western markets, as the situation with Taiwan deteriorated it progressively perceived
the United States as its potential adversary in a conflict over Taiwan. And finally, this
chapter concludes that China’s security interests concerning outer space security
progressively converged with those of Russia: both states opposed the U.S. plans for the
deployment of NMD system as a step towards weaponization of space that would set off
a space arms race, as well as other plans for further uses of outer space by the U.S.
military, while increasingly cooperating on missile non-proliferation issues.

FOUNDATIONS OF CHINA’S SECURITY STRATEGY
Although China’s grand strategy has not been comprehensively elaborated in
Chinese official documents, experts on China’s strategy believe that it has been aimed at
achieving three key objectives: first and foremost, preservation of domestic order and
well-being; second, defense against external threats to national sovereignty and territory;
and third, attainment of geopolitical influence as a major, or primary, state.2 The

2 Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future
(St. Monica: RAND, 2000), x, Online publication, http://www.rand.org/publications/
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supremacy of the first objective was rooted in the historical Chinese perception that
social chaos, political fragmentation, and economic collapse made deterrence of and
defense against external threats infeasible and the weakness of China’s state often invited
foreign aggression.
While these three objectives lingered nearly unchanged over a long historical
period—at least during the modem period since approximately 1850— security strategies
that were to deliver a realization of these objectives varied considerably depending on a
number of factors, including the strength of China’s state, the level and origin of
resources available to the state for national defense versus internal security and social
welfare, and the capabilities of China’s rivals and foes. In 1949, a new Chinese state
emerged which was founded on Communist principles and ideology. A new era in
China’s history began—an era of China’s dramatic transformations from the Great Leap
Forward through the Cultural Revolution to the Four Modernizations.
The Common Program o f the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
(CPPCC) was adopted in 1949 and served as a provisional constitution for the People’s
Republic of China.3 This foundational document promulgated the basic principles and
objectives of China’s security strategy and foreign policy. It stipulated that the
fundamental objectives of People’s Republic of China were to guarantee independence,
freedom and territorial integrity of the state, to support lasting world peace and friendly
cooperation among peoples of all countries in the world, and to oppose imperialist

MR/MR 1121/ (accessed 12.12.03).
3 The Constitution o f the CPPCC was adopted at the First Session o f the Second CPPCC National
Committee on December 21-26, 1954. According to the document, the Common Program was to be
replaced by the country’s constitution. See National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference, Official Website, http://www.china.org.cn/english/archiveen27750.htm (accessed
12.16.03).
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policies of aggression and war. Pursuing these objectives, China opposed what it called
the “hegemonism” of the two superpowers during the Cold War and declared her
solidarity with the developing countries in resisting imperialism and colonialism. China
became a formal observer of the nonalignment movement and cooperated with the group
o f Seventy-Seven and the South Pacific Forum. After a period of self-imposed isolation,
China also sought to establish fruitful relations with the developed countries for the sake
of achieving economic and technological progress, as economic autarky came to be
perceived as a bankrupted and unsustainable policy for economic development.
Normalization of China-U.S. relations in the 1970s was a breakthrough in China’s
diplomacy and brought about dramatic improvement of its external security
environment.4 It is after this shift in China’s security situation that the country embarked
on economic and military reforms aimed at development and achievement of
“comprehensive national strength.”5 Economic reforms and successful economic
development were seen as being instrumental for: (a) achieving domestic order and
survival of the Communist regime, (b) restoration of China’s international status as a
great power with participation in international governance and real influence over
international affairs, and (c) technological progress for managing both further economic
development and emerging security order.
The reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s led to modification of
China’s security strategy. The new, “calculative” security strategy was characterized by
4 In his greeting statement on the occasion o f President George W. Bush visit to China to celebrate the 30th
anniversary o f the release o f the 1972 Shanghai Communique in February 2002, President Jaing Zemin
stated: “The release o f the China-U.S. Shanghai Communique is an epoch-making milestone in the history
o f China-U.S. relations.” See People’s Republic o f China, Embassy o f the People’s Republic o f China in
the United States o f America, “Jiang, Bush Swap Greetings on Anniversary o f Shanghai Communique,”
Official Website o f the Embassy o f the People’s Republic o f China in the United States o f America,
03.01.02, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zysj/bsfh/t36198.htm (accessed 05.07.04).
5 Swaine and Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy, 2000, 98-99.
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highly pragmatic approach that emphasized the primacy of domestic economic growth
and stability, the fostering of cooperative and friendly international relations, the relative
restraint in the use of force, while its military was being modernized, and the search for
asymmetric gains internationally, including via participation in international regimes.6
At the first Plenary Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress in 1993, the
Chinese Constitution of 1982 was amended for the second time.7 Although the Cold War
had ended and a new era in international relations begun, the Preamble of the
Constitution reiterated a concept for China’s security strategy and foreign policy that
Chinese leadership had professed since the early days of the Communist state:
China adheres to an independent foreign p olicy as w ell as to the five principles o f
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression,
non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and
peaceful coexisten ce in developing diplom atic relations and econom ic and
cultural exchanges w ith other countries; China consistently opposes im perialism,
h egem onism and colonialism , w orks to strengthen unity w ith the people o f other
countries, supports the oppressed nations and the developing countries in their
ju st struggle to w in and preserve national independence and develop their
national econom ies, and strives to safeguard w orld peace and prom ote the cause
o f human progress.8

Thus, throughout the second half of the 20th century, China followed a Communist, statecentric model of security strategy similar to that espoused by the Soviet Union during the
Cold War and then abandoned by Russia after the end of the Cold War.9
A number of features of China’s security strategy need to be emphasized as
important for this study. First, China professed “peaceful coexistence” as a preferable
model of international relations. This was a non-liberal concept developed particularly

6 Ibid., 97-98.
7 The 1982 Constitution o f the PRC was first amended in 1988.
8 Constitution o f the People’s Republic o f China, Preamble,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/consitution.htm (accessed 12.16.03).
9 The principles o f “peaceful coexistence” were developed by V. I. Lenin and laid in the foundation o f
Soviet security strategy and foreign policy. See A. M. Prokhorov, chief ed., Soviet Encyclopedia (Moscow:
Soviet Encyclopedia, 1989), 821.
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for the maintenance of peaceful international relations between countries with different
political and economic systems. The bedrock of this concept was strict respect to state’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The “mutual non-aggression” principle, as one of the
five principles o f “peaceful coexistence” advocated by the Chinese government, stood for
non-use of force or a threat of use of force in relations between countries. The principles
of “non-interference in each other’s internal affairs” and the right of people to choose
their own destiny were understood as a necessary conditions of cooperative and peaceful
interstate relations. The principle of “equality and mutual benefit” meant political
equality and respect of differences between the countries, economic equality and
cooperation in pursuit of common interests and mutual benefits. These principles were
seen as a foundation for building a peaceful multipolar world order, in which China could
prosper and be one of the poles.10
As a result of perceiving itself as a victim of imperialist aggression and
oppression for over 100 years before the founding of the PRC, China attached a particular
weight to independence as the main objective of its security strategy and resisted any
infringements upon its national sovereignty and interference in its internal affairs. So
much so that, in order to maintain its independence, China declared that it would neither
enter into an alliance with any other country or a group of countries, nor establish a
military bloc, join in the arms race or seek military expansion.
Second, Chinese extensive borders make it vulnerable to external attacks. As a
result of the political and economic decline of the Chinese Empire under the Manchu
rulers and the revolutionary turmoil and political fragmentation that followed it, China

10 See John W. Garver, “China’s Response to the Strategic Defense Initiative,” Asian Survey 26
(November 1986), 1232.
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lost substantial territories to the Europeans and the Japanese in the 19th and early 20th
centuries. In 1949, as a result of the split between the Communist Party and the
Kuomintang (KMT, or Nationalist Party), who retreated to Taiwan with the help of the
United States, China was divided into mainland under the rule of the Chinese
Communists and the island under the control of the KMT. Since the rise of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China,
reunification of the motherland became one of the main national goals pursued under the
leadership of the CCP. In the 1990s, after rounds of negotiations, Hong Kong and Macao
were reunited with the People’s Republic of China,11 leaving reunification with Taiwan
as the most important outstanding issue of reunification. In its Constitution China
reaffirmed that: “Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People’s Republic of China.
It is the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to
accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland.”12 Chinese leaders have
resolutely opposed any Taiwan’s movements towards independence from the mainland
and called on Taiwan’s authorities to enter into political negotiations with the mainland at
an early date in order to end the state of hostility, improve relations between the two
sides, and work together towards reunification. However, the Chinese leadership has
pointedly not excluded the use of force, if needed, to reunify the island with the
mainland. In its 1993 White Paper “The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China,”
the Chinese government reiterated:

11 After 22 rounds o f talks, the Chinese and British governments reached an agreement and signed the
Joint Declaration on the Question o f Hong Kong and three appendixes. Hong Kong reunited with the PRC
on July 1, 1997. The Chinese and Portugal governments signed the Joint Declaration on the Question o f
Macao and two appendixes in 1984 after 4 rounds o f talks. China resumed sovereignty over Macao on
December 20, 1999.
12 Constitution o f the People’s Republic o f China, Preamble.
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Peaceful reunification is a set policy of the Chinese Government. However, any
sovereign state is entitled to use any means it deems necessary, including military
ones, to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Chinese Government
is under no obligation to undertake any commitment to any foreign power or
people intending to split China as to what means it might use to handle its own
domestic affairs.13
Third, in its official pronouncements the Chinese government emphasized its
opposition to arms races and during the Cold War condemned the two superpowers for
engaging in all-out military build-ups. In contrast, against the backdrop of thousands and
thousands o f nuclear warheads in the two-superpowers’ arsenals, China developed a
rather small nuclear strategic force consisting of a few dozens of missiles.14 It obtained a
strategic retaliatory force in accordance to what is known as “minimal deterrence.”
According to this concept, a small credible strategic retaliatory force would deter an
attack by a nuclear superpower, which would not risk even a small nuclear retaliation. At
the same time, “minimal deterrence” comported well with China’s reforms aimed at
achieving economic growth and development. It allowed the Chinese government to
save the nation’s resources from being wasted on nuclear buildups.15 However, a
security strategy that is based on the concept of “minimal deterrence” is vulnerable, for a
deterrent effect from a small retaliatory force can be neutralized or minimized by antiballistic missile defenses. It is for this reason that China’s security is particularly
sensitive to the United States’ plans to develop and deploy a National Missile Defense.16

13 People’s Republic o f China, State Council, ’’The Taiwan Question and Reunification o f China,” White
Paper issued by the State Council o f the People’s Republic o f China, August 1993, Section III “The
Chinese Government’s Basic Position Regarding Settlement o f the Taiwan Question,”
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/taiwan/ (accessed 06.06.04).
14 It is believed that China obtained an operational nuclear retaliatory force o f several dozens nuclear
armed medium-range rockets by early 1970s. See Garver, 1986, 1222.
15 Ibid., 1221.
16 Ibid., 1223.
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China realized its security vulnerability in the context of the U.S. Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) project in the mid 1980s, when Chinese analysts and media
started to criticize Reagan’s SDI as an attempt to take an arms race into outer space after
the two superpowers had failed to achieve a decisive advantage over one another on the
ground.17 The dominant Chinese view on the SDI during the Cold War was that the SDI
program was more malevolent than the Reagan administration led the world to believe. It
was seen by the Chinese as an attempt by the United States to gain strategic superiority in
outer space over the Soviet Union, meaning by that the achievement o f a first strike
capability with its implications for stability and peace in the international system.
Furthermore, it was interpreted as revived U.S. aggressiveness and hostility to socialism
and to “communist-ruled countries” in general, and as an attempt to dominate and control
the Third World.18 It was recognized by the Chinese experts that development and
deployment of space weapons would reshape the “international political map:”
weaponization of outer space was seen as profound a step as the beginning of the Nuclear
Age itself.19
In the fall of 1985, the top Chinese leaders began calling on the two superpowers
to cease their military rivalry in outer space and to sign an agreement prohibiting the
placement of weapons in outer space.20 Even though the argument against the
weaponization of outer space was sometimes put in moral terms and seen as a violation
of the status of outer space as the common heritage of all mankind,21 the bottom-line

17 Ibid., 1986, 1229, 1230
18 Ibid., 1228.
19 Ibid., 1229-1230.
20 Ibid., 1230, 1231.
21 Beginning in 1984, China started to propose to the United Nations General Assembly draft resolutions
on preventing an arms race in outer space. China maintained that outer space belonged to all mankind and
should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and should be kept free o f weapons. See People’s
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calculation on the part of China was that the deployment of missile defenses by the two
superpowers would undermine credibility of Chinese retaliatory capability vis-a-vis both
the Soviet Union and the United States. It was also realized that attempts to compensate
for this deteriorating security situation might undermine China’s goals of economic
reforms and development.

CHINA’S SECURITY STRATEGY AFTER TIANANMEN
There are a number of factors that influenced China’s security strategy and
affected its interests in the post-Cold War era. Firstly, with the end of East-West
confrontation, China found itself in a significantly altered security environment. The
Sino-Russian relations that had started to improve significantly during the Gorbachev’s
perestroika,

00

went on to develop into a “strategic partnership” between the two countries

after the demise of the East-West rivalry. Withdrawal of the Soviet forces from
Mongolia, as had been promised by Gorbachev, was completed in 1992. In 1994, Russia
and China agreed on measures that would reduce the risk of dangerous military incidents.
Russia and China agreed to observe a “no first use” pledge in their bilateral relations23
and to de-target nuclear warheads that were aimed at each other. They significantly

Republic o f China, State Council, “China: Arms Control and Disarmament,” White Paper issued by the
State Council o f the People’s Republic o f China, November 1995, Section VI “Actively Promoting
International Arms Control and Disarmament,” http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/army/, (accessed
11.07.03).
22 According to some experts, a major shift in Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union occurred in 198283 when Beijing dropped solution o f the “three obstacles” as a precondition for improvements in SinoSoviet relations. See Garver, 1986, 1234. During Gorbachev’s perestroika, the bilateral relations received
a boost and rapidly improved in many areas. In 1991, after nearly three decades o f border contentions, the
Soviet Union and China successfully concluded negotiations on delimitation o f their borders and signed the
first agreement legally establishing their borders along a 4,300-kilometer stretch. More agreements
resolving the two countries border issues followed later in the 1990s.
23 See People’s Republic o f China, State Council, “China’s National Defense,” White Paper issued by the
State Council o f the People’s Republic o f China, July 1998, Section V “Arms Control and Disarmament,”
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/whitepaper/2(5).html (accessed 11.07.03).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

268

expanded military-to-military contacts, arms sales, and military-technical cooperation.24
In 1996, the leaders of Russia, China and three Central Asian states—Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—established a framework for security cooperation and agreed
to a set of confidence-building and transparency measures. In 1997, at the summit of the
Shanghai Five, Russia agreed to reduce the size of its armed forces in the border area in
the Far East by 15 percent, thereby significantly relieving China’s concerns with its
security along the northern border.25 Furthermore, Russia supported China’s position on
Taiwan and Tibet and was not apparently concerned with the methods China used in
pursuing its internal security and its human rights record.

Throughout the 1990s and

the early 2000s, while Russia helped to fill some gaps in China’s defense via arms
sales,27 China relied on Russia to keep U.S. plans for anti-ballistic missile defenses within
the constraints specified by the ABM treaty.
Secondly, shortly after the New York Times proclaimed the end of the East-West
confrontation on April 2,1989, and the Wall Street Journal exclaimed “We Won!” on
May 24, 1989, soldiers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) took control of

24 The organized transfer o f Russian defense technology to China began in 1992. Pursuing military
modernization, China needed improvements in its air force, command, control and communications, naval
power projection, and space technology. It was willing to buy Russian technology and arms, while Russia
was willing to sell its technology. Arms sales and other military technology transfers to China provided
important foundation for the improving Sino-Russian relations through the 1990s. See Sherman W.
Garnett, “Limited Partnership” in Sherman W. Garnett, ed., Rapprochement or Rivalry? Russia-China
Relations in a Changing Asia (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), 12.
25 In April 1997, China and Russia, as well as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, signed the
Agreement on Mutual Reduction o f Military Forces in the Border Areas, in which a number o f confidencebuilding measures were agreed upon.
26 Garnett, “Limited Partnership” and Dmitrii Trenin, “The China Factor: Challenge and Chance for
Russia,” in Sherman W. Garnett, Rapprochement or Rivalry? 2000, 11, 52.
27 The Annual Report on the Military Power o f the P eople’s Republic o f China, issued in accordance with
the requirements o f Section 1202 o f the United States’ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000, Public Law 106-65, asserted that China’s force modernization program was “heavily reliant upon
assistance from Russia and other states o f the Former Soviet Union.” See U.S. Department o f Defense,
Annual Report on the Military Power o f the P eo p le’s Republic o f China, Report to Congress o f the United
States, Executive Summary, July 30, 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/20030730chinaex.pdf
(accessed 12.18.03).
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Central Beijing, crushing demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. Many protestors were
shot or crushed to death. The massacre at the Tiananmen Square was an event of great
consequence for China and its relationship with the world community, including its
security environment. Suettinger, in the opening of his book commemorating the tragedy
in Tiananmen Square, characterizes the international resonance this event had:
...[T]he United States and Western countries recoiled from China in horror and
disgust, expelling it from the company of modem civilized nations through
sanctions of various kinds.... [T]he relationship between the United States and
China went instantly from amity and strategic cooperation to hostility, distrust,
and misunderstanding.28
In the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen tragedy, China’s relations with the United
States and other Western countries deteriorated significantly. China had to work hard to
improve its international image and restore damaged relations with the United States and
the international community in order be integrated into international economic structures,
on which China had grown to rely for its economic growth and development in the course
of her market transformation. Through the Tiananmen tragedy, China discovered that
economic interdependence imposed its limits on ways China could pursue its security
interests.
Thirdly, in the 1990s, the situation with Taiwan worsened considerably, as
Taiwan moved to democratize its political system and progressively developed its own,
national identity distinct from the mainland. Throughout the 1990s and on, Taiwan
progressively drifted closer to its independence from the People’s Republic of China.
Seemingly in response to the U.S. decision to issue a visa to Taiwan’s President Lee
Teng-hui to allow him a visit in the United States, Chinese government conducted missile

28 Robert L. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: the Politics ofU.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000 (Washington
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 1.
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tests and military exercises in the East China Sea in 1995. And in 1996, missile tests—
conducted even closer to the island—were apparently intended to intimidate Taiwan’s
residents and dissuade them from voting for pro-independence candidates in advance of
Taiwan’s first direct presidential elections. The United States sent two aircraft carriers
battle groups to the region to warn China against using force to attack Taiwan.
Nonetheless, China continued to increase its missile forces along the cost across from the
island and tried to fill gaps in its air and naval forces,

Taiwan responded with its own

build-ups and moved towards supporting participation in Theater Missile Defense with
the United States.

Deployment of such a system on Taiwan, according to Chinese

leadership would seriously violate the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China.
Furthermore, after North Korea fired its ballistic missile in 1998, Japan—China’s long
term regional rival—moved towards joint development of anti-ballistic missile defense
with the United States. Under a Japanese Defense Ministry plan, Japan would spend
$4.62 billion between years 2004 and 2008 and start introducing the system in 2007 to
become fully operational by 2012.

o 1

Thus, if Japan and Taiwan deploy anti-ballistic

missile defense systems, China will not only find itself considerably constrained in
deterring Taiwan from declaring independence from the mainland, she will not be able to
deter Japan from acting military against China or in support of others against China.

29 China purchased from Russia advanced air superiority aircraft such as the Su-27, advanced air defense
systems such as the SA-10 and SA-25, new surface and subsurface capabilities such as Sovremennyi
destroyers and Kilo submarines. See Sweine and Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy, 2000,126.
30 See Mumin Chen, “Theater Missile Defense and Cross-Strait Relations,” Paper for presentation at the
98th Annual Meeting o f the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 29-September 1, 2002,
http://www.comw.org/cmp (accessed 12.12.03).
31 See “Report: Japan Seeks Missile Shield,” CNN.com, Decmeber 4,2003, http://www.cnn.com/
2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/12/04/japa.us.missile.defence.reut/ (accessed 06.26.04); and “Japan to
Introduce Missile Defense System,” China Daily, December 4, 2003, Online publication,
http://www.china.org.cn/ (accessed 12.16.03). See also Michael Swaine, Rachel Swanger, Takashi
Kawakami, Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense (StMonica: RAND, 2001, Online publication,
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1374/ (accessed 06.26.04).
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Fourthly, the economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s
resulted in impressive economic growth throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s. China
became one of the most economically dynamic countries in the world, successfully
modernizing both its economy and military on the basis of international economic and
technological cooperation. China’s dependence on the international market for economic
development and technological know-how significantly progressed over the past two
decades or so. China, aware of this dependence, pursued a “calculative” strategy in the
post-Cold War era that was characterized by a pragmatic approach to international
affairs— an approach that was designed to help China improve its domestic social and
economic conditions, increase the legitimacy of its governing regime, enhance its
technological and economic capabilities, and eventually strengthen its military power,
while not causing serious concerns of other major actors in the region and the
international system. This approach could be characterized as “constrained
maximization.”32
As China’s economic and military power grew, however, the United States’
strategic focus shifted from Europe to East Asia in recognition of PRC’s growing
economic and strategic importance in the world. The prospect for war in the Taiwan
Strait emerged as one of the main concerns of the American leadership.33 In turn,
preserving its country’s territorial integrity by preventing Taiwan’s unilateral move
towards independence, and eventually reuniting the island with the mainland—including
by force, if necessary—became one of China’s top national security priorities, shaping, to

32 Swaine and Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy, 112-113.
33 Robert S. Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China
Relations,” International Security 27 (fall 2002): 48.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

272

a high degree, China’s foreign and defense policies.34 In its foreign policy China used
“cooperation” and “prevention” as two important elements of its strategy—with
cooperation focusing on developing and maintaining friendly relations with the United
States and other major powers in order to encourage their continuous support for China’s
economic ascendance, and with prevention focusing on minimizing those attempts that
hinder growth of China’s status and influence, or attempts to “contain” China.35 In its
defense efforts China proceeded towards objectives formulated under the concept of
“local wars under modem high-technology conditions,” which was developed after the
first Gulf War in the early 1990s and focused on information warfare, high-resolution
imagery, satellite technology, and high precision weapons.36
Fifthly, China’s security situation deteriorated after the September 11th terrorist
attacks in the United States. The U.S. response to these terrorist attacks led to a
considerable expansion of the U.S. presence, including the U.S. military presence, in the
regions where China had managed to increase its own influence and considerably secure
its positions over the past decade or so: China’s Central Asian neighbors and Russia drew
closer to the United States to cooperate in a war against terrorism. With the U.S. troops
in South Korea, Japan, and Central Asia, China began to find herself in “encirclement.”37
Thus, China emerged as one of the major players with security interests growing
from regional to global. Furthermore, as China continues to grow economically its
34 This opinion was expressed in the Annual Report on the Military Power o f the People's Republic o f
China. See U.S. Department o f Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power o f the P eople’s Republic o f
China, Report to Congress o f the United States, Executive Summary, July 2003. See also Chen, 2002
35 Swaine and Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy, 2000, 114-115.
36 M. Ehsan Ahrari, “U.S. Military Strategic Perspectives on the PRC: New Frontier o f Information-Based
War,” Asian Survey 37 (December 1997): 116-118.
37 Kerry Dumbaugh, “China-U.S. Relations: Current Issues for the 108th Congress,” CRS Report for
Congress, Order Code RL31815, September 15, 2003. See also Dan Ewing, “Changing Security Calculus,”
the Nixon Center, Online publication, reprinted from Korea Herald, January 21, 2002,
http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/Reality%20Chek/011602, (accessed 12.12.03).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

273

demand for resources, particularly energy resources, will likely increase on a global
scale, requiring the kind of military that could back it up in a competition with other
players in the international system, including in outer space. In the 1990s, China had to
reevaluate its security approaches, its security relations with two major players in the
international system—the United States and Russia—and to catch up with ongoing
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

CHINA’S NEW SECURITY CONCEPT AND SPACE SECURITY INTERESTS
In its 1995 White Paper “China: Arms Control and Disarmament,” China put
forth a security strategy that emphasized arms control as an important component of its
national security. The document acknowledged that China needed a peaceful
international environment for its “socialist modernization.” Arms control was
characterized as an “effective measure to reduce the danger of war.”38 According to the
China’s leadership, it also comported well with the five principles of “peaceful
coexistence” espoused by China and reiterated in this document. Along with these
positive characteristics of arms control, the document pointed out that despite great
achievements in the reduction of nuclear weapons in the two former rivals of the Cold
War and arms control agreements in other areas, there were still negative developments
that evidenced the continuous development of nuclear weapons and outer space weapons,
and the spreading of advanced weapon systems via international market of arms. This
was seen by China as a fundamental unfairness of the existing arms control— arms
control that, on the other hand, was used by the developed countries as a lever against
developing countries to justify discriminative anti-proliferation and arms control
38 People’s Republic o f China, State Council, “China: Arms Control and Disarmament,” Foreword, 1995.
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measures. The White Paper directly called for “fair, rational, comprehensive and
balanced arms control and disarmament” with the ultimate goal of “complete prohibition
and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction
(including chemical and biological weapons), the complete prohibition of outer space
weapons.. ..”39 This document emphasized that the non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction was not an ultimate goal of arms control: without complete prohibition and
thorough destruction of such weapons proliferation could not be effectively prevented. It
also warned against using efforts at preventing proliferation for denying the developing
countries opportunities in obtaining technology and scientific knowledge for peaceful
uses and economic and technological progress. Thus, China expressed an attitude
towards existing arms control that was rather ambivalent.
A large portion of this document was devoted to China’s unilateral actions at
reducing its military forces and military spending, and conversion of military facilities
and technologies to civilian and commercial uses as real deeds towards unilateral arms
control and disarmament. This document presented China as more of an outsider than an
active participant of the international arms control process, but it also indicated that
China’s security strategy embraced the idea o f cooperative security approaches and
China’s willingness to participated in arms control process.40 It also demonstrated a
growing problem of proliferation of military technologies under the conditions of market

39 Ibid., Section I “Promoting Peace and Development for All Mankind,” 1995.
40 China was restored to its seat in the United Nations in 1971 and assumed participation in activities
relevant to international arms control. China formally joined the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in
1980.
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reforms that were extended to the enterprises of military-industrial complex in China in
the context of Four Modernizations.41
In the 1995 White Paper on arms control China declared its opposition to the
extension of arms race into outer space. A more elaborate position with respect to outer
space was formulated in a separate White Paper titled China’s Space Activities published
in November 2000. In this document, China identified development of space technology
and applications as “an integral part of the state’s comprehensive development strategy”
aimed at satisfying growing economic and national security demands, at protecting
China’s national interests and at building up “the comprehensive national strength.”42
International cooperation in the field of space activities—commercial as well as non
commercial— and cooperation within international regimes governing space activities
were presented as crucial aspects of China’s space strategy. The document pointed out
that cooperation should be conducted for peaceful uses of outer space and on the basis of
equality and mutual benefits.
In the second half o f the 1990s and early 2000s, China’s attitude towards arms
control underwent an important transformation. The 2003 White Paper on “China’s NonProliferation Policy,”43 in which China returned to the issues of arms control, still
contained the old call for “fair, rational and non-discriminatory non-proliferation
regime,” but it also emphasized international nonproliferation efforts as an issue of great
significance for both international security and for China’s own security and stressed the

41 People’s Republic o f China, State Council, “China: Arms Control and Disarmament,” Section IV
“Peaceful Uses for Military Industrial Technologies,” 1995.
42 See People’s Republic o f China, State Council, “China’s Space Activities,” Introduction, 2000.
43 This document was published in 2003, which is outside the timeframe o f this study. However, the
document is important as it indicates important features o f a transformation that China’s security strategy
underwent in the second half o f the 1990s and early 2000s.
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value of universal participation of all countries in a strengthened non-proliferation regime
and prevention of “any country from engaging in proliferation under the pretext of
peaceful utilization.”44 This was in sharp contrast to China’s statement in the 1995
document where it declared that:
.. .China holds that preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons should not
proceed without due regard for the just rights and interests of all countries in the
peaceful use of nuclear energy, particularly in the case of developing country.
There must not be a double standard whereby anti-nuclear proliferation is used as
a pretext to limit or retard the peaceful use of nuclear energy by developing
nations.45
China’s promise to “constantly increase consultations and exchanges with multinational
nonproliferation mechanisms, including the Nuclear Supplier Group, the MTCR, the
Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Agreement” also represented a sharp turn in non
proliferation policy: previously China criticized these multilateral export control
arrangements for their exclusive and discriminatory features.
Furthermore, the 2003 document focused on presenting concrete measures and
achievements in China’s policy of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
means of their delivery of the past few years. It elaborated in a great detail China’s new
export controls system. According to this paper, China introduced stricter export
controls, including “catch-all” principle. The 2003 White Paper became the first official
document to clarify and comprehensively lay out the procedures and consultative process
within the export control system.
The 1995 and 2003 W hite Papers demonstrate the distance that China traveled

within the past decade in its attitude towards international security affairs. In the earlier
44 People’s Republic o f China, State Council, “China’s Non-Proliferation Policy,” White Paper issued by
the State Council o f the People’s Republic o f China, December 2003,
http://nti.org/db/china/engdocs/nprolwp_03.htm (accessed 12.18.03).
45 See People’s Republic o f China, State Council, “China: Arms Control and Disarmament,” Section V
“Strict Control over the Transfer o f Sensitive Materials and Military Equipment,” 1995.
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papers, China saw itself as a victim of an unfair international order and criticized the
United States for its hegemonism. The new document was written in a balanced manner
and avoided targeting the United States in its rhetoric. Instead, it was designed to show
China’s new attitude and new role in arms control process—the role of an active
participant in international non-proliferation efforts, even if not an active member o f all
the non-proliferation regimes. This evolution also shows that China’s official security
pronouncements are reflective of the changing security environment and reveal evolution
of China’s security perception and thinking.
At the same time, it is important to note that the degree of China’s integration into
the international community’s non-proliferation efforts remained limited. While China
acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1992,
signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, and participated in the work
of the UN Group o f Governmental Experts on Missiles and in discussions on proposals of
Global Control System and the draft of the International Code of Conduct Against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation, China did not become a formal member of the MTCR
regime and did not subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct.46 Beijing’s policy remained
to be one of reservation. China’s leadership did not want to join the MTCR until its
concerns regarding Taiwan and the U.S. national missile defense system were
addressed.47
Recognizing a need for a positive alternative vision of international security and
the world order more broadly, as well as a need for concrete steps for providing

46 International Code o f Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, List o f Subscribing States to the
International Code o f Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, November 2002, Official Website,
http://www.minbuza.nl/ (accessed 12.19.03). Both the United States and the Russian Federation subscribed
to the Code on November 25, 2002.
47 Sibing He, “What Next for China in Space after Shenzhou?” Space Policy 19 (August 2003): 183-189.
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international security, China launched an effort to prevent an arms race in outer space and
its weaponization. The PRC made the prevention of an arms race in outer space one of
the main issues of its security policy at the global level by addressing its initiatives to the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In February 2000, the Chinese delegation at the
Conference on Disarmament submitted a paper titled “China’s Position on and
Suggestions for Ways to Address the Issue of Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space,” and in June 2001—“Possible Elements of the Future International Legal
Instrument on the Prevention of the Weaponization of Outer Space.” In cooperation with
Russia, China presented to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva a “Joint Paper by
the Delegation of China and the Russian Federation Outlining the Possible Elements of
an International Agreements for Space” in May 2002.

This initiatives demonstrate not

only that China’s interests in space was importantly affected by recent developments in
space security issue area, but also the fact that China was prepared to take a lead on arms
control at the international level.
Thus, pursuing its security after the end of the Cold War, China increasingly put
an emphasis on international cooperation. The PRC leadership directed its attention
toward regional multilateral cooperation and international cooperation under the aegis of
the United Nations in contrast to the international cooperation under the direct leadership
of the United States. This increased interest in multilateralism became an important
feature of China’s new security strategy often referred to as “new concept of security,”
and should be understood in the context of China’s desire for a mutlipolar world order.

48 These initiatives will be further analyzed in Chapter IX. See Eisenhower Institute, Project “The Future
o f Space: the Next Strategic Frontier,” List o f China’s initiatives at the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva, Official Website, http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/globalpartnerships/
fos/newffontier/weapons.htm (accessed 10.20.03).
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The Chinese leadership announced its “new concept of security” in the 1998
White Paper “China’s National Defense:”
Under the new situation, especially, enlarging military blocs and strengthening
military alliances run counter to the tide of times. Security cannot be guaranteed
by an increase in arms, nor by military alliances. Security should be based on
mutual trust and common means and strive for common development. To obtain
lasting peace, it is imperative to abandon the Cold War mentality, cultivate a new
concept of security and seek a new way of safeguarding peace.4
The “new concept of security” promulgated in the document was founded on the China’s
long-held five principles of “peaceful coexistence.”50 According to this document,
China’s economic development was announced the top priority, and international
cooperation, including arms control and disarmament—important instrument for
achieving both national well-being and security. The document stated:
China being at the primary stage of socialism, the fundamental task of the state is
to concentrate its strength on the socialist modernization program... China is
now confronted with the extremely heavy task of economic construction, so the
work in defense must be subordinate to and in the service of the nation’s overall
economic construction.51
China strongly condemned continuous practice of the deterrence policy and the U.S.
plans to develop and deploy anti-ballistic missile defense and anti-satellite weapons. The
document putting forth China’s alternative vision for the international security order
consisted of the following elements:
A complete ban on weapons of any kind in outer space, including anti-missile
and anti-satellite weapons so as to keep outer space free of weapons; a ban on the
49 See People’s Republic o f China, State Council, “China’s National Defense,” White Paper issued by the
State Council o f the People’s Republic o f China, July 1998, Section I “International Security Situation,”
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/whitepaper/2(l).html (accessed 11.07.03).
50 In the literature, there is no unanimous agreement on the components o f China’s New Security Concept.
According to some experts, it includes along with the five principles o f “peaceful coexistence,” economic
cooperation via international markets, security cooperation via international organizations, and “strategic
partnerships” with key nations. The latter component, however, was not directly formulated in the White
Paper. See, for example, David Finkelstein and Michael McDevitt, “Competition and Consensus: China’s
‘New Concept o f Security’ and the United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,”
PacNet, No. 1, January 8, 1999, http://nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/Finkelstein010999.html (accessed 12.12.03).
51 See People’s Republic o f China, State Council, “China’s National Defense,” Section II “National
Defense Policy,” 1998.
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use of force or conduct of hostilities in, from or to outer space; and all countries
should undertake neither to experiment with, produce or deploy outer space
weapons nor to utilize outer space to seek strategic advantages on the ground, for
example, using disposition of the important parts of ground anti-missile systems
in outer space for the purpose of developing strategic defense weapons.52
In the document, China called for holding negotiations at the earliest possible time for the
conclusion of a legally binding international agreement consisting of these elements.
At the same time, as one of the goals of military modernization, the 1998
document clearly formulated China’s task “to adapt to profound changes in the world’s
military sphere,” to make “proper preparations for defensive combat in the situation
where modem technology, especially high technology prevails.”53 In this document,
China also pledged that “no effort will be spared to improve the modernization level of
weaponry, reform and perfect the army system and setup, and improve the training of
troops and curricula and teaching methods of military academies.”54
The 2000 China’s National Defense White Paper continued to condemn efforts of
a “certain country” to develop and deploy the National Missile Defense (NMD) and
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems, for they undermined the efforts of the
international community “to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to
promote disarmament.”55 It drew attention to the importance of the preservation of the
ABM treaty as the “cornerstone of global strategic stability and international security.”
Moreover, the paper warned of an emerging danger of a space arms race and placed the
prevention of such an arms race at the top of its priorities in the international arms control
fora, making it an issue as urgent as the negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
52 Ibid., Section V “Arms Control and Disarmament.”
53 Ibid., Section I “International Security Situation.”
54 Ibid., Section II “National Defense Policy.”
55 See People’s Republic o f China, State Council, “China’s National Defense in 2000,” White Paper
issued by the State Council o f the People’s Republic o f China, October 2000, Section I “The Security
Situation,” http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/features/NDpaper/ndl.html (accessed 10.23.03).
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(FMCT).56 The goal of arms control process, according to the document, was to maintain
outer space free of weapons and its exclusively peaceful utilization for “the sole purpose
of promoting economic, scientific and cultural development of all countries, and
benefiting all mankind.”57 Calling on the international community to take active steps to
stop the militarization of space, the paper insisted not only on strict compliance with the
then existing legal instruments, such as, the ABM Treaty, but also on urgent negotiations
of a new legal instrument or instruments that would include a ban on testing, deployment
of use of weapons, weapon systems or their components in outer space.
Analyzing other factors negatively affecting the security situation in the world,
the document pointed to “hegemonism,” power politics, and “neo-interventionism” of
“certain big powers” as damaging national sovereignty, independence and developmental
interests of “many countries” and threatening world peace and security.

In the analysis

of regional security, the document identified new negative security developments in the
Asia-Pacific region: “The United States is further strengthening its military presence and
bilateral military alliances in this region, advocating the development of the TMD system
and planning to deploy it in East Asia.”

The situation with Taiwan was characterized in

the paper as “complicated and grim” and China’s concerns with the security situation in
Asia Pacific as “profound.” In this context, the United States was identified as an active
contributor to the deteriorating relations between Taiwan and the mainland. A strong
opposition was expressed to plans to include Taiwan in any form into a TMD system by
any country.

56
57
58
59

Ibid., Section VI “Arms Control and Disarmament.”
Ibid.
Ibid., Section I “The Security Situation.”
Ibid.
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As an alternative to the policies pursued by the United States, the document called
for abandoning “the Cold War mentality” and adopting a “new security concept.” At the
heart of this “new security concept,” the document again placed “mutual trust, mutual
benefit, equality, and cooperation.”60 The call for a “new security concept” became
China’s leitmotif in the official pronouncements and discussions of security issues. In
statements addressing the United Nations General Assembly, China’s foreign minister
Tang Jiaxuan reiterated that security had become “multifaceted and globalized,” with
countries “getting more dependent on one another in security.”61 He appealed to other
countries to “rise above their differing ideologies and social systems, abandon the ColdWar mentality and power politics mindset,” to “respect the security interests of others,
while pursuing the interests of its own,” and to “refrain from interfering in each other’s
internal affairs, so that international relations will become more democratized.”

AO

The

idea of “democratization” of international relations, understood as mutlipolarization,
received greater emphasis and further developed in China’s later statements on
international security issues.63
In the 2002 White Paper on national defense, China dramatically changed its
rhetoric, emphases, and conclusions. It stated that rapid and drastic changes in the
military field fundamentally altered the global balance of military power:

60 Ibid.
61 United Nations, Statement by H.E. Mr. Tang Jiaxuan, Minister o f Foreign Affairs and Head o f the
Delegation o f the P eo p le’s Republic o f China at the 56,h Session o f the UN General Assembly, New York,
November 11,2001, http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/56/statements/01111 lchinaE.htm (accessed 03.26.04).
62 United Nations, Statement by H.E. Mr. Tang Jiaxuan, Minister o f Foreign Affairs and H ead o f the
Delegation o f the P eo p le’s Republic o f China at the 57th Session o f the UN General Assembly, New York,
September 13,2002, http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/57/statements/0120913chinaE.htm (accessed 03.26.04).
63 Untied Nations, “To Enhance the Role o f the United Nations in Promotion o f Peace and Development,”
Statement by H.E. Mr. Li Zhaoxing, Minister o f Foreign Affairs o f the Republic o f China at the 58th Session
o f the UN General Assembly, New York, September 24,2003, ttp://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/
chineng030924.htm (accessed 03.26.04).
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The extensive applications in the military field of new and high technologies led
by IT have stretched the battlefield into multidimensional space which includes
the land, sea, air, outer space and electron... As far as military technology is
concerned, the gap between the developed and developing countries is wider than
ever before. The developing countries are facing a serious challenge in their
efforts to safeguard sovereignty and security.64
Although the document continued to promote China’s “new security concept,” according
to which security would be provided through international dialogue and cooperation, its
main attention was devoted to military aspects of security with an emphasis on
consolidation o f national defense and military modernization fully geared towards
“winning local wars under modem, especially high-tech conditions... under most
difficult complex circumstances.” Increasing defense spending was to help People’s
Liberation Army to improve training, research and development of new modem weapon
systems and equipment, while the military-industrial complex was to be restructured to
compete more successfully on the global market. The new document, in comparison to
the previous papers, put a stronger stress on the importance of the goal of reunification of
the country.
Another point of sharp difference between the 2000 and 2002 White Papers was
in the attitude towards plans for deploying missile defenses. While still calling for urgent
negotiations on the prohibition of anti-missile and anti-satellite weapons and the
weaponization of outer space, the new document expressed an understanding of the need
for missile defense in the “relevant country” and a hope for prudent actions. However,
the document stated clearly China’s firm opposition to the deployment of a theater
missile defense (TMD) in Taiwan or inclusion of Taiwan in a TMD system of any
country.
64 See People’s Republic o f China, State Council, “China’s National Defense in 2002,” White Paper
issued by the State Council o f the People’s Republic o f China, Section I “The Security Situation,”
December 2002, http://english.people.com.cn/features/ndpaper2002/ndl.html (accessed 11.07.03).
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Besides voicing its opposition to national and theater missile defenses and
weaponization of outer space, China actively prepared for a potential conflict in the
Taiwan Strait. Preparations for a conflict over Taiwan and efforts to adopt and, where
necessary, to counter effects of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) were the
primary drivers of China’s military modernization in the second half of the 1990s and
early 2000s. The 2002 White Paper reflected China’s greater stress on the role of air and
air defense operations, electronic and information warfare, and long-range precision
weapons. China placed a major emphasis on the development of space technology,
particularly in space based reconnaissance and surveillance systems, including in
cooperation with other countries. China was believed to be developing its own and
acquiring foreign technologies, which could be used for building anti-satellite
capabilities—both ground-based and space-based.65 It became apparent from official
Chinese pronouncements and actions that the issue of anti-missile defenses and
weaponization of space became an issue on which the future security landscape, at a
minimum in Asia, and world order in general became dependent.66
The remarkable economic growth and market-oriented reforms that led to China’s
participation in international commercial space cooperation contributed significantly to
the development of China’s space technology and capabilities, including its military

63 U.S. Department o f Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power o f the P eople’s Republic o f China,
Section IV “PRC Military Modernization,” 2003, 36.
66 The Stimson Report argues: “... [M]issile defenses can fortify or weaken international cooperation,
diminish or rekindle big power rivalry, provide more certainty or less in a world challenged by regional
unrest and global terrorism. The manner in which the United States interacts with China over the course o f
the development and deployment o f National Missile Defense (NMD) will be important to the Asian
security landscape, writ large, and a major factor in the overall U.S.-China strategic relationship over the
longterm.” See Henry L. Stimson Institute, “China and Missile Defense: Managing the U.S. PRC Strategic
Relations,” Report, Online publications, http://www.stimson.org,=/pubs.cfm?ID=73 (accessed 02.07.04).
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space capability.

International commercial cooperation also played an important role in

progress of China’s manned space program.68 These efforts are believed to have lead to
improvements in China’s military space systems: China’s manned space program is run
by the military and military goals of the program are not denied by the Chinese. The
arguments for the development of manned space program included two exclusively
military goals: (1) the necessity to prepare for future wars over natural resources,
including those located in outer space, and (2) to improve the country’s military,
including nuclear, capabilities in the context o f the RMA.69
Thus, China continued to oppose the development of missile defense and anti
satellite weapons, but China’s position became more moderate and pragmatic. China
seemed to accept the fact—and the challenge— of revolutionary changes in military
affairs and the changes in the system of international relations that they brought about.
China’s security strategy acquired a stronger military component and clearer emphasis on
achieving national reunification, while still clinging to the hope of providing security via
international cooperation rather than military competition with the United States. In the
2002 White Paper on National Defense, China started to position itself for a possible
confrontation, while still trying to cooperate on mutually beneficial international issues
via international organizations that China found as supporting Chinese national interests
and a multipolar, more equitable world order.

67 Phillip Saunders, Jing-Dong Yuan, Stephanie Lieggie and Angela Deters, “China’s Space Capabilities
and the Strategic Logic o f Anti-Satellite Weapons,” Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Online
publication, July 22, 2002, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs.week/020722.htm (accessed 10.29.03).
68 After over a decade o f active work on its manned space program, China finally launched its first
manned flight on October 15,2003. China is also believed to have plans for its own space station by 2007
and its own expedition to the Moon by 2010.
69 See D. Regentov, “Podnebesnaya— ‘Nebesnay’ Strana,” Novosti Kosmonavtiki 13 (November 2003):
13.
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All in all, China’s security strategy in the post-Cold War era, despite China’s
remarkable economic growth and integration into the world economy, remained to be
based on a non-liberal concept of security. China’s strategy was aimed at achieving three
main goals: (1) to provide for China’s security as a sovereign state, with reunification
with Taiwan increasingly becoming one of the top priorities; (2) to provide overall
favorable conditions for China’s economic development and ascendance as a major
player on the international stage; (3) support and promotion of cooperative approaches to
security, including arms control, whose particular importance was seen in preventing the
weaponization of outer space and avoiding an arms race into outer space. China’s
interests with respect to outer space were overwhelmingly dictated by China’s strategic
calculations.

SECURITY STRATEGIES AND CONVERGING AND DIVERGING SECURITY
INTERSTS IN OUTER SPACE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. grand strategy evolved from a hesitating
primacy to an assertive primacy, while the international system transitioned from
bipolarity to unipolarity. The U.S. economic and security priorities changed from the
Clinton Administration’s belief that security must be provided through the strength o f the
U.S. economy and economic leadership at the global level to George W. Bush
Administration’s belief that security must be provided above all else, while economic
prosperity was believed to follow. In the meantime, the evolution of the U.S. space
security interests made almost a full circle from the Reagan SDI and leadership in space
to George W. Bush’s National Ballistic Defense project and plans for development of
space war-fighting capabilities. The U.S. commercial space systems became a part of
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American vital infrastructure, on which the U.S. economy, government and military
became increasingly dependent for economic well-being and national security. The U.S.
uses of outer space—both for commercial and military purposes—became an integral
part of the U.S. overall strategy aimed at being the world’s hegemon: an economic and
military sole superpower.
As a result of the ongoing revolutionary transition from a communist state to a
liberal democracy, Russia’s security approach after the end of the Cold War changed to
become more in line with security approaches of the liberal democracies. Russia’s
internal conditions, and above all its economic conditions, did not allow Russia to keep
up with the developing security challenges, while its hopes for security cooperation
remained largely unfulfilled. As a result, over the past decade since the end of the Cold
War, Russia grew to rely more on its strategic nuclear arsenal and progressively lowered
its nuclear threshold.
Despite the new security pronouncements and this realignment, Russia’s security
interests with respect to outer space remained persistently in opposition to the U.S. plans
for deployment of the NMD system as a step towards weaponization and extension of
military capabilities to outer space. Russia’s unwillingness to engage in a space arms
race can be explained by the needs of domestic reforms, requiring major resources for
productive purposes. Russia actively pursued commercial space activities and grew to
depend on the global space market for the survival of its space industry. Russian leaders
considered commercial space activities as one of the important avenues for integrating
the country into the world economy and for benefiting the Russian economy. Russia
considered weaponization of space as a serious threat not only to its security and its
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position in the international system, but also to the global space market and commercial
space activities.
China’s security strategy continued to be based on a non-liberal concept of
security—the communist concept of “peaceful coexistence.” Its main goal was to
provide a favorable, peaceful international environment for the country’s economic and
social development and ascendance as a major player in the international system.
China’s space activities, including commercial space activities, became an integral part of
a comprehensive development strategy and military modernization. Military aspects of
space security became China’s prime concern in the context of reunification with Taiwan.
Although China grew to rely more and more on the United States as a commercial
partner, including in its space endeavors, as the situation with Taiwan deteriorated the
PRC progressively perceived the United States as its potential adversary in a conflict over
Taiwan. Thus, in the post-Cold War era, China’s security interests concerning outer
space security increasingly converged with those of Russia: like Russia, China opposed
American plans for the deployment of NMD system as a step towards weaponization of
space and setting off an space arms race; and similarly to Russia, China increasingly
cooperated on missile non-proliferation issues, while preparing for the consequences of
further militarization of outer space. But unlike Russia, China seems to be more prepared
to take on military challenges in space. This is because, unlike the situation with Russia,
it is not simply a matter of economic development, technological progress and integration
into the global economy. China’s ability to provide for its security in general rests on a
small nuclear strategic arsenal that is particularly vulnerable to the effects of U.S. missile
defenses. Likewise, China’s fundamental goal of reestablishing sovereignty over Taiwan
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has forced Chinese planners to develop more explicit plan for confronting American
military capabilities.
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CHAPTER VIII
SPACE SECURITY AND BILATERAL RELATIONS: THE UNITED STATESRUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES-CHINA, AND RUSSIA-CHINA RELATIONS

The previous three chapters analyzed the evolution of security strategies and
space security interests relying on the official promulgations of the three spacepowers—
the United States, Russia, and China. By the time the Cold War ended all three
spacepowers had managed to improve their overall security relations and were pursuing
the commercialization of their space activities under the relaxed security conditions of the
post-Cold War era. In all three cases, the importance of outer space in overall security
strategies increased over time. The United States, Russia, and China became dependant
on space both militarily and for their economic well-being. Because of this dependency,
all three grew increasingly concerned about space security. They, however, developed
different visions of security in outer space: the United States increasingly considered
space as the fourth medium for its military operations for providing the United States
security and economic well-being; Russia and China considered collective arrangements
for space security that would preserve space free of weapons as their first choice.
The task of this chapter is to examine the dynamics of the bilateral interaction
between these three spacepowers: the United States-Russia, the United States-China, and
Russia-China. Since these three spacepowers are either former, potential or latent rivals,
their bilateral interaction in the issue area of outer space is of particular importance. The
bilateral dimension is crucial, for it is at this level that states’ interests and security
strategies—formulated at the domestic level—play out and generate interstate conflict
and cooperation. Space cooperation at the bilateral level is represented by a whole
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spectrum of interstate activities: from security and military space cooperation to
commercial space cooperation, such as trade and commercial joint ventures, to civil space
cooperation. These activities are often intertwined.
This chapter addresses the three hypotheses formulated in this study: (1) the first
realist hypothesis that contends that the commercialization of outer space leads to non
converging security interests, (2) the second realist hypothesis that assumes the reverse
causality—that is, converging security interests lead to greater commercial cooperation,
and (3) the liberal hypothesis asserting that greater commercialization and commercial
cooperation lead to converging security interests. Three questions are of a particular
interest in this chapter: (1) What was the timing of the improved overall security relations
vis-a-vis commercialization of the space activities and bilateral commercial space
cooperation? (2) How did the three states’ space interests and perceptions of each other
change as commercialization of space activities proceeded in the post-Cold War era? (3)
Did the spacepowers manage to put bilateral security arrangements in place to address
their security concerns as the Cold War space security regime continued to erode?
This chapter argues that the improvement of overall security relations between the
spacepowers was an important condition for space commercialization and commercial
cooperation to take off in all three dyads. For the U.S.-Russia dyad, space security, the
overall strategic relationship, and commercial space issues had to be resolved in a
complex, since outer space played a major role in their bilateral relationship as an arena
of competition. It is shown that in the U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese cases, space
commercialization and commercial space cooperation did not lead to non-converging
security interests with regard to outer space, while converging security interests led to
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both greater commercial and security cooperation in space in the Sino-Russian bilateral
relationship.

U.S.-RUSSIA BILATERAL RELATIONS AND SPACE SECURITY INTERESTS
During the Cold War, cooperation in space security emerged between the United
States and Soviet Union rather promptly after the dramatic beginning of the Space Age,
as the two superpowers came to realize that a security regime to regulate their military
uses of space was in their mutual interests. Within a few years after the beginning of the
Space Age, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the legally binding international treaty relating to
outer space, was signed that for the first time restricted the use of force in outer space by
outlawing nuclear explosions in outer space. Other arms control agreements regulating
space activities followed that helped to make the superpower relationship more
transparent and more stable. Under the conditions of the bipolar confrontation the two
spacepowers managed to build a multifaceted security regime that was remarkably
successful during the Cold War. Although outer space was militarized, it was not
weaponized and military confrontation was not extended to outer space during the years
of the East-West bipolar rivalry. Instead, outer space was used by both superpowers as
an arena of peaceful competition.
The two superpowers were caught in a fierce space race and space occupied an
important place in their overall security relations. Nonetheless, space was also used as an
arena for superpower cooperation in space activities. The famous Soyuz-Apollo project
and the “handshake in space” of 1975 followed President Nixon’s 1972 visit to Moscow
and signing o f the landmark arms control agreements within the Strategic Arms
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Limitation Talks I (SALT I)—the ABM agreement and the Interim Agreement on
strategic offensive arms.1 The U.S.-Soviet cooperation in civil space activities was meant
to symbolize a turning tide in their bilateral relations, their overall political detente. This
space cooperation was used by the two states for political purposes and, being a highly
politicized program, it suffered a major setback after the end of the superpower detente of
the 1970s.2 However, it paved the way to post-Cold War space cooperation between the
United States and Russia within the Mir-Shuttle program and International Space Station
(ISS) program. The Soyuz-Apollo project also led to practical, but less visible and less
politicized, space cooperation that survived through the worst years of deteriorating U.S.Soviet relations—the time of the “Evil Empire” and “Star Wars” of the early 1980s and
uncertain transitions of the post-Cold War era: the COSPAS-SARSAT program. It was
cooperation on the search and rescue satellite-aided tracking system with the United
State, the Soviet Union, Canada, and France as partners that served to save people’s lives
all around the world.3 Thus, even at the time of bipolar confrontation, the United States

1 The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I) extended from November 1969 to May 1972. In a
summit meeting in Moscow the first round o f talks was concluded, with President Nixon and General
Secretary Brezhnev signing the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on strategic offensive arms.
2 In May 1977 the leaders o f the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Soviet
Academy o f Science signed an agreement that called for “Study o f the Objectives, Feasibility and Means of
Accomplishing Joint Experimental Flights o f the Long-Duration Station o f the Solyut-type and a Reusable
‘Shuttle’ Spacecraft.” The agreement was not implemented because the Carter Administration decided to
abandon close cooperation with the Soviet Union in outer space in response to Soviet violations o f human
rights and the 1979 invasion o f Afghanistan. In 1982, the Reagan Administration continuing high animosity
towards the Soviet Union allowed the 1977 agreement for U.S.-Soviet space cooperation to lapse.
3 The COSPAS-SARSAT negotiations resulted in signing o f a COSPAS-SARSAT Memorandum o f
Understanding in late 1979 that laid out the foundation for a multilateral experimental work. The Soviet
Cospas 1 was launched in 1982 and the first rescue took place two months later when three men were
rescued in the mountains o f British Columbia in Canada after their single-engine plane crashed. The Sarsat
1 was launched in 1983. On July 11, 1988, formal transition from experimental to operational status was
codified in an intergovernmental agreement. Later the same year, the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) incorporated COSPAS-SARSAT into plans for the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
(GMDSS) as an indication o f greater commitment to the development o f the system. See Richard J. H.
Barnes and Jennifer Clapp, “COSPAS-SARSAT: A Quiet Success Story,” Space Policy 11 (November
1995): 261-268. Over the years the COSPAS-SARSAT expanded the space segment to include instruments
in geostationary orbits. It also expanded its membership to 34 countries in all regions o f the world.
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and the Soviet Union developed cooperation at the bilateral level in the security realm as
well as in civil space activities.
As advances in space technology were revolutionizing space applications, above
all in the military realm, the Cold War space security regime began to erode in the late
1970s-early 1980s. On May 11,1978, President Carter signed the National Space Policy
PD-37 that outlined the “two track” policy towards the use of space for national security.4
The new policy indicated the U.S. intent to conduct further research and development of
ASAT capabilities and initiate a long-term program to provide greater survivability of
U.S. military space systems on the one hand, and on the other, to pursue cooperative
approaches with respect to ASAT issues. The significance of PD-37 was that it contained
the first sign of a shift in the national security establishment’s view on outer space. Up
until PD-37 the U.S. policy of keeping outer space peaceful and free of weapons reflected
U.S. space security interests based on calculations regarding relative national security
advantage.5 The 1978 document alluded to the fact that space was beginning to be
viewed as a potential medium for war-fighting.
The idea of negotiations on the ASAT arms control issues was suggested by
President Carter to the Soviet Union earlier. During a press briefing in March 1977 he
announced:
I have proposed both directly and indirectly to the Soviet Union, publicly and
privately, that we try to identify those items on which there is relatively close
agreement—not completely yet, because details are very difficult on occasion.

Betweenl982 and 2002 the COSPAS-SARSAT assisted in the rescue o f over 13,000 people. See Kenneth
Hodgkins, “International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses o f Outer Space,” Remarks on Agenda Item 75
“International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses o f Outer Space” in the Fourth Committee, the United
Nations, New York, October 9, 2002, http://www.state.gOv/g/oes/rls/rm/2002/14362.htm
(accessedl0.23.03).
4 U.S. President, Presidential Directive 37, “National Space Policy,” 1978.
5 Handberg, Seeking New World Vistas, 2000,21.
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But I have for instance, suggested we forgo the opportunity to arm satellite
bodies, and also to forgo the opportunity to destroy observation satellites.6
In this concise form, President Carter captured the formula of a possible new
security regime for outer space. The Soviet Union responded positively to President
Carter’s proposal on ASAT negotiations and in March 1978 the two sides reached an
agreement to have an exploratory meeting on the issue. Three rounds of ASAT
limitations talks were held between 1978 and 1979. After the Soviet Union’s invasion of
Afghanistan, the U.S. refusal to ratify the SALT II Treaty, and the end of the superpower
detente, the U.S.-Soviet discussions that were temporarily adjourned never resumed. The
ASAT issue remained unresolved between the two superpowers, indicating the increasing
difficulty of reaching cooperation on space security issues.
By the mid-1980s, it became apparent that unresolved space security-related
issues started to impede progress in negotiations on nuclear strategic forces reductions
and became one of the main issues of contention between the United States and the
Soviet Union. At the end of 1983, U.S.-Soviet START negotiations stalled. The Soviet
Union declared suspension of its participation in the START talks due to “a change in the
strategic environment,” following President Reagan’s March 1983 speech on SDI and
NATO’s deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe. On
September 24,1984, President Reagan—in a speech, addressing the United Nations
General Assembly—proposed to reinvent the U.S.-Soviet relationship and put forth a
wide spectrum o f measures: to upgrade the hotline com m unication facility, to redouble

efforts for achieving real results in reducing stockpiles of conventional armaments and

6 Press Conference o f Jimmy Carter, Washington D. C., 9 March 1977, quoted in Stares, The
Militarization o f Space, 1985, 181.
7 See Federation o f American Scientists, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) Chronology,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/startl/chron.htm (accessed 01.27.04).
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chemical weapons, to embark on periodic consultations at all policy levels and regular
meetings of experts and officials on a wide range of security issues, including issues
related to the militarization of space.

Q

Following President Reagan’s invitation to reinvent the U.S.-Soviet bilateral
relationship and return to the negotiating table, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met in early 1985 in Geneva in order to set an
agenda for new Nuclear and Space Talks (NST). These talks were to be separate from
the Conference on Disarmament negotiating body, and would cover strategic nuclear
arms, intermediate-range nuclear forces, and defense and space security issues. The
Nuclear and Space Talks, which commenced shortly after the initial meeting between
Shultz and Gromyko, went in parallel to the discussions at the A d Hoc Committee on the
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) established in 1985 at the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, to which the Soviet Union submitted two draft
treaties, trying to outlaw the weaponization of outer space and the use of force in outer
space after the U.S.-Soviet negotiations failed to resume on the ASAT issues.9
During the NST talks, it became apparent that the U.S. and Soviet perceptions and
goals differed significantly with respect to space security. The Soviet Union saw its
security best served by preserving space free of weapons. It sought to stem the
weaponization of outer space by not only preserving the 1972 ABM Treaty as it was, but

8 U.S. President, President Reagan’s Address to the 39lh Session o f the United Nations General Assembly
in New York, September 24, 1984, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/cpeeches/1984/92484a.htm
(accessed 01.28.04).
9 “Draft Treaty on the Prohibition o f the Stationing o f Weapons o f Any Kind in Outer Space” (August
1981, A/36/192), and “Treaty on the Prohibition o f the Use o f Force in Outer Space and From Space
Against the Earth” (August 1983, A/38/194) were submitted first to the United Nations, and then in 1982
and 1984, respectively, to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. See U.S. Congress, Office o f
Technology Assessment, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control, OTA-l.S(;-281
(Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1985), 96-99.
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further strengthening it and putting in place a legal regime prohibiting the weaponization
of outer space. The United States, on the other hand, pursued these talks in order to
facilitate a cooperative transition towards more stable deterrence, which would
increasingly rely on anti-ballistic missile defense, including its space-based components.
The United States also sought to free some ABM components from the limitations
imposed by the ABM Treaty in order to allow for testing and development that would
ensure the future deployment of space weapons and components necessary for the
strategic defense.10 Therefore, the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union
with respect to space issues diverged fundamentally in the closing years of the Cold War.
In October 1985, U.S. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane introduced a
new “broad” interpretation of the ABM Treaty on national television and a few days later
President Reagan determined that the “broad” definition was justified.11 At the
Reykjavik summit a year later, the sharp division over SDI and the new interpretation of
the ABM Treaty prevented an agreement between President Reagan and General
Secretary Gorbachev on a significant reduction of offensive ballistic missiles. In
conjunction with a 10-year commitment to the ABM Treaty, Gorbachev also sought to
ban the testing of space-based “elements” of a missile defense system outside of
laboratories. President Reagan rejected this proposal due to its impact on the SDI
program.

10 Pericles Gasparini Alves, Prevention o f an Arms Race in Outer Space: A Guide to the Discussion in the
Conference on Disarmament (New York: United Nations, 1991), 50-51.
11 The “broad” interpretation o f the ABM Treaty would allow the United States to develop and test spacebased and mobile ABM systems and components based on “other physical principles,” such as lasers and
piratical beams. See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution o f Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, Second Addition, 1997), 416. See also Walter Stutzle, Bhupendra Jasani and Regina Cowen, eds.
The ABM Treaty: To Defend or Not to Defend? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 6-8.
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Despite this divergence of interests, the U.S.-Soviet interaction within the
framework of the NST was productive. The United States was successful in the pursuit
of its goals to the extent that, in May 1986, the Soviet Union abandoned its previous
refusal to negotiate reductions in offensive strategic weapons until the United States
would agree to renounce its SDI program. Instead, the Soviet Union introduced a new,
two-part proposal, offering to reduce strategic offensive forces if both sides would agree
not to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty for 15-20 years. The renewed negotiations
eventually led to the signing of the START Treaty in July 1991, after the George H. W.
Bush Administration declared its plans to reformulate the SDI program and develop a
1

system providing Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) in March 1991.
To the extent that these changes in U.S. strategic plans were attributable to the Soviet
actions within the NST framework, as well as outside of it, the Soviet Union was
successful in slowing down the development of the SDI program, which it perceived as a
threat to its own security, and as a threat to international stability via escalation o f an
arms race and its extension into outer space.
However, on the same day that the United States and the Soviet Union signed the
START Treaty, the U.S. Senate adopted a plan, the Missile Defense Act of 1991, calling
for the construction o f a single treaty-compliant ABM site by 1996 as the initial step
towards a nation-wide missile defense incorporating “one or an adequate additional
number” of ABM sites and ABM interceptors, space-based sensors, ground-based antiballistic missile battle management radar, and a relaxation of the limits on ABM testing.

12 White House, National Security Strategy o f the United States, 1991, 26.
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It was indicated that if the Soviet Union did not agree to amend the ABM Treaty, the
United States could consider other options available under the 1972 ABM Treaty.

1^

As a result of the bilateral agreements reached with the United States on space
security issues and reductions of strategic nuclear arsenals, the Soviet Union managed to
buy itself time and free up resources for comprehensive reconstruction, or perestroika, of
its political, economic, and social systems. The reforms started by the Soviet leader
Michail Gorbachev went, however, much further than anyone expected. The Soviet
Union dissolved in December 1991, and a new Russia emerged as its successor and a
“strategic partner” of the United States in a new world order. Thus, space security issues
occupied one of the central places in the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship during the
Cold War and were crucial for the reductions of strategic nuclear arsenals and the
resolution of the Cold War conflict more broadly: the compromises that the two
superpowers reached with respect to outer space security allowed them to agree on the
reductions of the offensive nuclear arsenals and contributed to the peaceful end of the
Cold War itself.
The Soviet Union achieved significant progress in space technology in the two
initial decades of the Space Age, and by the early 1980s began exploring the possibilities
of international “commercial” cooperation in outer space activities. In 1982, the Soviet
Union carried out its first quasi-commercial launch by placing in orbit an Indian
indigenously developed remote-sensing satellite IRS-1. In 1985, when Gorbachev’s
perestroika was just begun, the Glavkosmos agency was created with the task of
coordinating space efforts and putting space technology in service of the Soviet economy.

13 See National Missile Defense Act o f 1991, 102nd Cong, H.R. 2100,1991, became Public Law No. 102190, December 1991, http://www.missilethreat.com/law/federal/nmdact91.html (accessed 05.11.04).
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A year later, the new agency started its marketing efforts in the West, just as the United
States had begun to commercialize its space activities. But it was not until 1992 that a
breakthrough in space commercial cooperation between the two spacepowers emerged.
By this time a whole range o f agreements had already been signed between the United
States and the Soviet Union that laid to rest the Cold War and established a new
relationship between the United States and Russia.
During the June 1992 summit in Washington, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin signed
the Joint Understanding on further reductions in strategic offensive arms, the so-called
De-MIRVing Agreement, according to which following the entry into force of the 1991
START Treaty, the two sides would within a seven-year period reduce their nuclear
forces to an overall total of 3800-4250 warheads each and by the year 2003 all MIRVed
ICBMs would be eliminated. The two presidents also made a joint statement on U.S.Russian cooperation on a Global Protection System against ballistic missiles.14 The list
of the documents signed between the two countries also included those agreements that
established the foundation for Russia’s entrance in the Western space market.
During the 1992 Bush-Yeltsin summit, a new U.S.-Russian Space Cooperation
Agreement was signed. The agreement called for: (1) going beyond the 1991
cosmonauts-astronauts exchange agreement; (2) conducting a technical study on the
possibility of using Russian space technology for U.S. missions including the Space
Station Freedom; (3) steps to encourage private companies to expend their search for new
commercial space business; and (4) support for Russia’s entrance into the international
space launch market by allowing INMARSAT 3 satellite to be launched aboard the
Russian Proton. Thus, in the U.S.-Soviet and then U.S.-Russian bilateral relations
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improvements resulted after years of negotiations that brought about in a complex
significant reductions of strategic nuclear arsenals, rollback of the SDI program,
preservation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, and cooperation in civil and commercial space
activities.
The balance of compromises reached on the complex of nuclear arsenals, space
security and commercial issues set the stage for the U.S.-Russian relations for remaining
part of the 20th century and the early 21st century. The post-Cold War period saw
unprecedented U.S.-Russian civil space cooperation within the world’s most grandiose
international cooperative scientific project—the International Space Station—and the
U.S.-Russian military space cooperation. Throughout this transition decade, Russia
collaborated with the United States on the Russian-American Observation Satellite
(RAMOS) Project—a joint technology demonstration program that potentially could
assist both states in developing effective early warning and missile defense technologies.
The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization—transformed under the George W. Bush
administration into the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)—began discussions on the
subject with Russian officials in 1992, leading to the 1997 agreement between Presidents
Clinton and Yeltsin on the Russian-American Observation Satellite Program. The
original idea of cooperation on missile defense technology between the United States and
the then Soviet Union was expressed by President Reagan after he unveiled his Strategic
Defense Initiative. He pledged to share missile defense technology with the Soviet Union
as a means of eliminating of threat of the nuclear ballistic missiles.15 Russia responded
positively to the U.S. invitation to take part in a cooperative project in the area of military
See U.S.-Russian Joint Statement on a Global Protection System, June 1992.
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space applications because, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia realized it
could no longer support the full burden of development of space military technology with
its small market-oriented economy up to the world highest standards across the whole
spectrum o f military space activities without international cooperation. Thus,
international cooperation in the area of military space activities became an integral part of
Russia’s plans to keep its position in military space technologies under the conditions of
market competition. In addition, Russia had hopes that military space cooperation would
contribute to further improvement of U.S.-Russian bilateral relations and facilitate
international cooperation on space security issues.16 The RAMOS project, however,
despite early success led to rather more confusion and distrust in space military
collaboration than mutual confidence, as the United States repeatedly changed plans,
funds and schedules and marginalized Russian participation over the years.17
Throughout the 1990s, as the U.S.-Russian commercial cooperation emerged and
gradually expanded, accompanied by their collaboration in civil and even military space
activities, Russian and U.S. security interests continued to diverge. Even as the United
States significantly reduced its efforts on the development of anti-ballistic missile
defenses shortly following the end of the Cold War, it increasingly envisioned control
and domination of outer space as a foundation—both in economic and military realms—
of its dominant position as the sole superpower in the international system. The U.S.
See, for example, Mark W. Davis, “Reagan’s Real Reason For SDI,” P olicy Review, No. 103, October
2000, http://www.policyreview.org/octOO/davis_print.html (accessed. 05.10.04).
16 Alexander Pikayev, “U.S.-Russian Missile Defense Cooperation: Limits and the Possibilities,”
PONARS Policy Memo 315, November 2003, http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/
policymemos/pm_0315.pdf (accessed 06.07.04).
17 The Missile Defense Agency dropped the Russian-American Observation Satellite Program (RAMOS)
in its Fiscal Year 2005 budget request. See Center for Defense Information, CDI Missile Defense Update,
2004. See also Pavel Podvig, “U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Missile Defense: Is it Really Possible?”
PONARS Policy Memo, April 2003, http://www.russianforces.org/podvig/eng/publications/misc/
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grand strategy evolved through the 1990s and early 2000s to an assertive primacy, with
outer space occupying an increasingly important place in U.S. grand strategy.
Russia, in the meantime, undertook major efforts in a transition from a communist
state with a centrally planned, closed and militarized economy to a liberal, democratic
state via economic liberalization and political democratization. Throughout the 1990s
and early 2000s, Russia looked for its new national identity and a place in the
international system, trying to reformulate its national security interests and national
strategy to be more in line with those of the liberal democracies of the West. However,
despite this fundamental transformation, Russia’s space security interests remained
remarkably unchanged: Russia stayed opposed to space weaponization and considered
the U.S. plans for NMD and space force applications as a threat to its security and global
strategic stability. Russia continued to strive for the preservation of the ABM Treaty as
the cornerstone of strategic stability in the world. She negotiated and finally agreed on
modification of the 1972 ABM Treaty in order to preserve the treaty, while allowing the
United States to continue its efforts to develop theater missile defenses.

1ft

Security cooperation on outer space issues at the bilateral level between the
United States and Russia continued in the post-Cold War era despite their differences.
As the international legal regime governing space security deteriorated and as their
security concerns with respect to outer space increased over the course of the post-Cold
War transition era, the two spacepowers attempted to address some of their security
20030425ponars.shtm (accessed 04.04.04).
18 See Joint Communique on the Signing o f the ABM Treaty Documents, New York, September 26, 1997,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/commuuniq.htm (accessed 03.19.04). The list o f documents
signed modifying the 1972 ABM Treaty include: (1) Memorandum o f Understanding on
“multilateralization o f the ABM Treaty; (2) a first agreed statement, or “low-speed agreement” covering
theater defenses whose interceptors have speeds o f 3 km/sec or lower; (3) a second agreed statement, or
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concerns at the bilateral level. However, due to their fundamentally differing security
interests and strategies regarding space security this cooperation was of a rather limited
nature. In 1998, the United States and Russia signed an agreement on cooperative
monitoring via the establishment of a mechanism permitting the exchange of data from
national missile early warning systems on launches of ballistic missiles and space
vehicles in order to “significantly reduce the danger that ballistic missiles could be
launched inadvertently on the basis of false warning of attack.”19 In June 2000, the
United States and Russia agreed to continue implementation of the measures agreed to in
the Joint Statement of September 1998 and decided to establish a Joint Data Exchange
Center (JDEC) in Moscow, thereby taking another step towards joint monitoring of space
launches.20
Unsatisfied with the progressing deterioration of the international space security
regime and in order to demonstrate a commitment to a cooperative security approach,
Russia put forth a number of initiatives related to space security during the post-Cold
War decade. In June 1999, Russia proposed the establishment of a Global Missile and
Missile Technology Non-Proliferation Control System (GCS) under U.N. auspices.
Russia outlined the regime’s principal components at the G-8 meeting in Cologne,
Germany. The concept originated from President Yeltsin’s earlier proposal on Global

“high-speed agreement,” covering theater defenses with interceptors that have speed faster than 3 km/sec;
and (4) an agreement on confidence-building measures.
19 See USIS Washington File, Exchange o f Information on Missile Launches, Fact Sheet, September 2,
1998, http://www.fas.org/news/russia/1998/98090208_tpo.html (accessed 05.11.04). This cooperation was
prompted by al995 accident when the Russians mistook the launch o f a Norwegian meteorological rocket
for a launch o f a military missile, and for the first time after the end o f the Cold War, the black case o f the
Russian President was activated. See Alexander Pikayev, “The Global Control System,” 2001,25.
20 “Memorandum o f Agreement Between the United States o f America and the Russian Federation on the
Establishment o f a Joint Center for the Exchange o f Data From Early Warning Systems and Notification o f
Missile Launches,” June 4, 2000, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/jdec/text/
000604-wam-wh3.htm (accessed 05.12.04).
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System for Protecting the International Community Against Missile Attack made in his
speech given at the UN Security Council on January 29,1992.

91

Russia held two

international conferences in Moscow in March 2000 and February 2001 in order to
further develop this international space security regime.22 The United States, however,
did not take part in either Moscow conferences.
In order to prevent the collapse of the ABM Treaty, Russia also made a
determined effort, trying to cooperate with the United States and its European allies on
the development of sub-strategic anti-missile defense. In February 2001, Russia
submitted a proposal for a European anti-missile defense system (AMD) against nonstrategic ballistic missiles to Lord Robertson, the then Secretary General of NATO. For
the development of such a system Russia offered its anti-missile research and
development facilities, test ranges, and the existing S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air
missiles 23 The Clinton Administration concluded that the idea proposed by Russia could
not substitute for United States’ National Missile Defense.24

21 Later, on June 17, 1992, President Bush and President Yeltsin issued a joint statement on a global
protection system (GPS), in which they confirmed agreement “that their two nations should work together
with allies and other interested states in developing a concept for such a system as part o f an overall
strategy regarding the proliferation o f ballistic missiles and weapons o f mass destruction.” See U.S.Russian Joint Statement on A Global Protection System, June 1992.
22 The new regime was envisaged as consisting o f two main components: (1) a missile non-proliferation
component that included the MTCR, a Code o f Conduct, incentive mechanisms, security assurances,
national and multinational measures to enhance missile non-proliferation; and diplomatic and economic
enforcement measures; and (2) a missile transparency regime, including pre- and post-launch notifications.
See Pickayev, “The Global Control System,” 2001, 22.
23 Ibid., 21-27.
24 See Woolf, 2002, CRS-16. On November 21, 2002, during the Prague Summit, NATO committed its
member states to a NATO Missile Defense Feasibility Study in order to examine options for addressing an
increasing missile threat to the alliance’s territory, population and forces. A working group on missile
defense was established under the auspices o f the NATO-Russia Council, which will “focus initially on
missile defense terminology, concepts, and system capabilities in order to develop procedures that could
facilitate protection o f forces in a joint, non-Article V crisis response operation.” See Rebecca Johnson,
2003. On March 5, 2004, NATO Press Release informed that the Theater Missile Defense Ad Hoc
Working Group created under the aegis o f the NATO-Russia Council conducted the first joint NATORussia TMD Command Post Exercise (CPX) at the United States Joint National Integration Center in
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In April 2001, Moscow hosted a conference “Space Without Weapons: An Arena
for Peaceful Cooperation in the 21st Century” held in commemoration of the 40th
anniversary of the first human space flight. The Conference consisted of five thematic
symposia focusing on a number of space issues, including the prevention of an arms race
in outer space.25 Delegates from 105 countries joined the celebration of the 40th
anniversary of the human flight in Moscow, while the United States and the United
Kingdom boycotted the forum, indicating deep disagreement and disapproval of Russia’s
international initiatives with respect to space security issues.26 Russia, on its part, did not
feel constrained to displease its major commercial partner in space activities by hosting
such international gathering aimed at rallying an international support for preservation of
the ABM Treaty and non-weaponizaiton of outer space. The United States considered
the conference to be a part of Russia’s international public campaign against the U.S.
plans to build a National Ballistic Missile Defense system and therefore found it
necessary to boycott the event.
Symbolically, according to the original scenario, the Russian cosmonaut and two
American astronauts aboard the International Space Station were supposed to welcome
the Conference’s participants via satellite connection, but Washington did not allow
James Voss and Susan Helms to greet the delegates from orbit because of the U.S.

Colorado Springs, Colorado. See NATO Press Release (2004) 031, “NATO-Russia Council Theater
Missile Defense Command Post Exercise (TMD CPX).”
25 According to the April 22nd Russian Foreign Ministry special information bulletin, the symposium on
the prevention o f an arms race in outer space included the following issues: (1) implications o f deploying
weapons in outer space on strategic stability and international security; (2) political and legal aspects o f the
prevention o f an arms race in outer space, including ways to improve and develop the international legal
mechanisms for regulating military activities in outer space; (3) measures to build confidence and to ensure
transparency and predictability in conducting outer space activities; (4) international cooperation to prevent
an arms race in outer space, including cooperation within the framework o f the UN General Assembly and
the Conference on Disarmament; and (5) conversion o f space technology. See Rogov, 2001, 8.
26 Vinogradov, 2002.
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boycott of this conference. Moreover, the Russian cosmonaut, the ISS crew commander
Yurii Usachev, was also prevented from greeting the conference from aboard the station
•

because the American side switched off the communication link.

11

Despite the apparent disagreements on the vision of space security regime and
ways of arriving at it, in November 2002, Russia did subscribe to the Hague Code of
Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)—a U.S.-led initiative to
strengthen missile non-proliferation regime in view of the erosion of the MTCR. The
HCOC, which was joined by 111 states accepting politically binding commitments to
curb the proliferation of WMD-capable ballistic missiles, introduced transparency
measures such as annual declaration and pre-launch notification regarding ballistic
missile and space launch programs—a confidence-building measure long-advocated by
Russia—but fell far short of a security regime that Russia would like to see for outer
space.
A few months prior to this, Russian President Putin and U.S. President Bush
signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), committing the two states to
reduce the number of their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the total
numbers of such warheads of 1,700-2,200 on each side by December 31,2012.28 The
United States was initially reluctant to codify these reductions in a legally binding
agreement but later went ahead with signing the accord with Russia, who favored the
formal arms agreement. Although this was hailed as a beginning of a “new strategic

27 Rogov, 2001, 5.
28 Presidents Bush and Putin first pledged to carry out deep cuts o f their strategic nuclear forces at a
November 2001 summit meeting. The Moscow Treaty was then signed on May 24, 2002. See “U.S.Russian Treaty on Nuclear Arms Reductions,” May 2002, http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/
2002summit/treaty.htm (accessed 07.10.04).
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relationship” between the Untied States and Russia,29 the treaty was perceived as
implicitly confirming the notion that the United States’ nuclear forces were still planned
AA

with the view of Russia as a potential adversary.

President Putin expressed his

concerns with the emerging security relationship speaking in regard to the then just
appeared U.S. Nuclear Posture Review at a press conference in April 2002, before
President Bush’s visit to Moscow for signing the treaty on the bilateral reductions of
strategic nuclear forces in May:
What you have mentioned [regarding the U.S. nuclear strategy] cannot but worry
us for the following reason. ... [W]e hear statements and proposals for
developing low-yield nuclear charges and their possible use in regional conflicts.
This, to a very low bar, to a dangerous line, lowers the threshold of possible
nuclear weapons use. The very approach to this problem may change, and then it
will be possible to speak of a change of strategy. In this case nuclear weapons
from weapons of nuclear deterrence go down to the level of weapons of
operational use, and, in my opinion, this is very dangerous.31
This shows that Russia considered U.S. nuclear plans as being of concern to its security,
particularly with respect to the potential shift of the strategic balance away from
deterrence-dominance towards offense-dominance. Therefore, throughout the post-Cold
War transition decade the United States and Russia managed to maintain some level of
cooperation in security realm. The dynamics of the U.S.-Russian relationship in the early

29 Joint Declaration by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on the New Strategic
Relationship Between the United States o f America and the Russian Federation, May 2002,
http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/2002summit/declaration.html (07.10.04).
30 The new Nuclear Posture Review released by Pentagon to U.S. Congress on December 31, 2001,
contained direct reference to Russia as a country o f concern. Excerpts were leaked and published by
Globalsecurity.org on January 8, 2002. According to Globalsecurity.org, the document stated: “Russia
maintains the most formidable nuclear force, aside from the Untied States... Russia’s nuclear forces and
programs, nevertheless, remain a concern. Russia faces many strategic problems around its periphery and
its future course cannot be charted with certainty. U.S. planning must take this into account.” See
“Excerpts from the Nuclear Posture Review,” Globalsecurity.org, January 8, 2002,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm (accessed 07.12.04).
31 See Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “Bush-Putin Summit and the Nuclear Posture
Review: What Russian Officials Are Saying,” Briefing Book on the Push-Putin Summit and the U.S.
Nuclear Posture Review, May 2002, http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/2002summit/chapter9/html
(accessed 07.10.04).
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2000s, however, continued to exhibit a close interconnection of the space security and
nuclear issues.
All in all, as Russia continued to reform its political, social, and economic
structures and its military, it became more dependent on its strategic nuclear arsenal and
had not only abandoned its “no-first-use” nuclear policy, but also consistently lowered
the threshold of the use of its nuclear weapons throughout the 1990s. As Russia became
more dependent on its strategic nuclear forces, it became more dependent on its military
space segment as well. Its economy, however, remained too weak to support a major
overhaul of its space assets in order to prepare for the consequences of space
weaponization, let alone to take an active part in a major space arms race. For the
development of its economy, as well as for the development of its military space
segment, Russia became dependent on space commerce. As the United States proceeded
with its plans for ballistic missile defense and for developing a space war-fighting
capabilities, Russia increasingly perceived these developments as a threat to global
strategic stability, its own security, and the commercial order under which Russian space
activities could thrive.
As a result of the commercialization of its space activities, Russia grew to depend
on the global space market, and therefore also on the United States, for the survival and
revitalization of its space activities, yet Russia still chose to oppose the U.S. NMD and
plans for extending war-fighting capabilities into outer space and to challenge the
legitimacy of these plans through various international fora.
32 At a seminar organized by the Eisenhower Institute at the Space Research Institute (IKI) in Moscow on
January 17, 2002, in order to gain a Russian perspective on the U.S. military plans for outer space, a
Russian expert asserted that the U.S. plans would lead to destruction o f the entire regulatory regime for
international space activities and that the United Sates from its position o f superiority would dictate to all
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Thus, within this bilateral relationship, the commercialization of outer space did
not lead to converging security interests. The peaceful resolution of the Cold War
conflict laid the foundation for commercial cooperation between the United States and
Russia and postponed American plans for the nation-wide anti-ballistic missile defenses
originally envisioned by the Reagan Administration, and thereby deferred the resolution
of U.S.-Russian conflictual security interests with respect to outer space. The bilateral
security cooperation on space issues proved to be of a limited nature and did not address
all space security concerns of the two spacepowers. The hope for space
commercialization to bridge the gap in the diverging space security interests of the two
states did not materialize.
Therefore, with regard to the U.S.-Russian space security relations, the
proposition that asserts that the commercialization of outer space should lead to non
converging security interest in outer space is supported by the evidence provided within
the timeframe of this study. The proposition that converging security interests should
lead to greater commercial cooperation does not apply as the United States and Russia’s
security interests continued to diverge during the time period under consideration.
However, the improved overall relations between the United States and Russia in the
context of the ended East-West confrontation and the fragile balance that was reached in
the U.S.-Soviet negotiations leading up to the end of the bipolar confrontation related to
outer space issues did provide the foundation for the commercial cooperation between the
two states. The U.S.-Russian commercial cooperation expanded over time despite
continuous divergence of their space security interests. And finally, the proposition that

others what types o f satellites to launch and what frequencies to use. See Eisenhower Institute, “The Future
o f Space: the Next Strategic Frontier.”
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the commercialization and greater commercial cooperation would lead to converging
security interests cannot be supported in this case.

U.S.-CHINA BILATERAL RELATIONS AND SPACE SECURITY INTERESTS
After 23 years of estrangement between the United States and Communist
China,33 progress in normalization of the bilateral relationship began with President
Nixon’s 8-day visit to Beijing in February 1972. The visit ended with the leaders of the
two states singing the Shanghai Communique, pledging to work “to further the
normalization of relations between the two countries.”34 This historic communique laid
the roadmap for Sino-American cooperation: the two states agreed that neither the United
States nor China would seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, that neither China nor
the United States would cooperate with the Soviet Union against each other,35 and both
would oppose any attempts to achieve domination in Asia-Pacific by any other country or
a group of countries. The Shanghai Communique also provided the foundation for U.S.China bilateral trade.
This document marked the beginning of a new era in the U.S.-China relations.
The improved security environment after 1972 allowed China to undertake major
economic and military reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s. Bilateral

33 Between 1954 and 1972, Chinese and American representatives conducted negotiations at the
ambassadorial level for 15 year meeting 136 times. On April 7, 1971, Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong
m ade a decision to invite the U nited States table tennis team to visit China. On April 14, Premier Zhou
Enlai met with the U .S. ping-pong players, the first visiting American guests since 1949. A few hours later
after Zhou’s welcome words to the American table tennis players, the U.S. President Richard Nixon
announced initiatives for trade and travel between the U.S. and the People’s Republic o f China.
34 Joint Communique o f the United States o f America and the P eople’s Republic o f China, February 28,
1972, http://www.china.org/cn/english/china-us/26012.htm (accessed 04.03.04).
35 This was not stated directly in the communique. Instead it was put in more ambiguous terms: “Both
sides are o f the view that it would be against the interests o f the people o f the world for any major country
to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of
interests.” See Ibid.
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trade between the United States and China flourished over time and military contacts and
sales between the two countries followed.36 Bilateral trade and opposition to the Soviet
Union’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region provided a foundation for Sino-American
relations during the Cold War, despite the divergent interests with regard to Taiwan.
The progressive growth of U.S.-China bilateral relations, however, was
interrupted in 1989 by the June 4th Tiananmen Square massacre. On June 5, 1989, the
United States imposed sanctions on China that encompassed suspension of high-level
exchanges between the two countries and the cessation of sales of all military equipment,
weapons and some other items, including communications satellites—which were on the
State Department’s Munitions List—to China.37
Satellite export licenses became an important issue in U.S.-China bilateral
relations with regard to outer space. The United States was interested in bringing China
into the space launch market in the aftermath of the Challenger tragedy because of the
shortage of space launchers,38 and because the United States hoped that if China—who
already emerged as a potential commercial player with the space capabilities to offer—
were integrated into the international commercial space market it would make it a
responsible member of the commercial space community playing by the rules of the
West, rather than being unconstrained proliferator of missile technology. In 1988, when

36 On January 1, 1979, full diplomatic relations were finally reestablished between the United States and
China. In January 1980, the U.S. Secretary o f Defense Harold Brown visited China, becoming the first
U.S. Secretary o f Defense to visit China since 1949. Vice-Chief o f the General Staff o f the People’s
Liberation Army Liu Huaqing and Vice-Premier Geng Biao led a Chinese military delegation in a visit to
the United States in 1981. This visit formally established U.S.-China military relations.
37 Marcia S. Smith, “Space Launch Vehicles: Government Activities, Commercial Competition, and
Satellite Exports, Issue Brief for Congress, IB93062, April 17,2003.
38 Another important aspect contributed to the U.S. decision to involve China in the space launch market:
facing increasing competition from European satellite manufacturing firms, the United States hoped to
improve its position by using China’s cost-effective launch services. See van Fenema, The International
Trade in Launch Services, 1999, 183, 188.
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the issue was considered by the Reagan Administration, the United States also wanted to
increase its influence in the Asia-Pacific to counter some advances of the Soviet Union in
the region. In December 1988 and January 1989, the United States and the PRC signed a
number of documents specifying China’s participation in international commercial space
activities: the “Memorandum of Agreement on Satellite Technology Safeguards,
Memorandum of Agreement on Liability for Satellite Launches,” and “Memorandum of
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the People’s Republic of China Regarding Trade in Commercial Launch
Services.”39
Thus, shortly after suspending export licenses for the U.S.-built satellites and
components in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre, Congress specified in the FY 1990
Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary appropriations and the 1990-91 Foreign Relations
Authorization Act that the export of U.S.-built satellites to China was prohibited unless
the President reported to Congress that (1) China had achieved certain political and
human rights reforms, or (2) it was in the national interests of the United States. In
December 1989, President Bush reported to Congress that export of the satellites AsiaSat1 and two Optus communications satellites to China for launch was in the U.S. interests
and the suspended licenses were reinstated for those satellites. AsiaSat-1 was launched in
1990 and became China’s first commercial satellite launch, formally marking the
entrance o f China into the international satellite launch market.40 The two Optus

39 Ibid., 198-212.
40 Between 1987 and 1989, Chinese space industry provided its first commercial space launch services,
flying microgravity experiments. China’s first commercial contract for putting in orbit microgravity
experiments utilizing a converted capsule from China’s reconnaissance satellite FSW as a platform was
with the French company Matra. See Lawrence Cooper and Corinne Contant, “The People’s Republic o f
China— Consolidating its Space Power, Enhancing its Military Might,” in Rebecca Jimerson and Ray A.
Williamson eds., Space and Military Power in East Asia, 2000.
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satellites were launched in 1992. The export control licenses, however, became an
important tool for the United States to influence China’s behavior. After these incidents,
the United States started to use export licenses on its satellites and components for
stimulating China’s adherence to non-proliferation regimes.41 In 1992, under U.S.
pressure, China agreed to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime. Thus, by
the early 1990s, China emerged as a U.S. commercial space partner and a missile
technology proliferation concern.
For China, however, space security concerns were more extensive. In its official
pronouncements during the Cold War, the Chinese government emphasized its opposition
to arms races and condemned the two superpowers for engaging in all-out military build
ups. In contrast, against the backdrop of thousands and thousands of nuclear warheads in
the two-superpowers’ arsenals, China developed a small nuclear strategic force consisting
of a few dozen missiles.42 It obtained a strategic retaliatory force in accordance with
“minimal deterrence” and adopted a “no-first-use” policy. The “minimal deterrence”
concept, while supporting China’s goal of achieving economic growth and development
and providing for China’s security, would leave China vulnerable to threats from a
superpower possessing an operational anti-ballistic missile defense. The U.S. antiballistic missile defenses would probably neutralize China’s small nuclear deterrent and
thereby significantly circumscribe China’s options in the resolution of the Taiwan issue,
while stimulating Taiwan’s move towards independence.

41 On July 17, 1991, the U.S. State Department identified China Great Wall Industry Corporation
(CGWIC) as one o f the entities engaged in missile technology proliferation activities that required the
imposition o f the trade sanctions in accordance o f the Arms Export Control Act, including rejection o f
license applications for items covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). See Marcia
Smith, “Space Launch Vehicles,” 2003.
42 China obtained an operational nuclear retaliatory force o f several dozens nuclear-armed medium-range
rockets by 1970s. SeeGarver, 1986, 1222.
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China recognized the potential threat posed by the U.S Strategic Defense
Initiative in the mid-1980s, when Chinese analysts and media started to criticize
Reagan’s SDI as an attempt to take the arms race into outer space after the two
superpowers had failed to achieve a decisive advantage over one another on the ground.43
The Chinese perceived SDI as an attempt by the United States to use outer space to gain
strategic superiority in outer space over the Soviet Union, meaning by that the
achievement of the first strike capability with its implications for stability and peace in
the international system. They also interpreted it as revived U.S. aggressiveness and
hostility to socialism and to “communist-ruled countries,” and as an attempt to dominate
and control the Third World 44 They recognized that development and deployment of
space weapons would reshape the “international political map:” the weaponization of
outer space was seen as profound a step as the beginning of the Nuclear Age itself.45
The Chinese top leaders began calling on the two superpowers to cease their
military rivalry in outer space and sign an agreement prohibiting placing weapons in
outer space in the fall of 1985.46 The PRC believed that the emplacement of weapons in
space would violate the status of outer space as a common heritage of all mankind 47
More importantly, China saw a threat to its own security: with the deployment of missile
defenses by the two superpowers, it would lose its credible retaliatory capability vis-a-vis
both the Soviet Union and the United States. Furthermore, it was realized by the PRC

43 Ibid., 1229, 1230
44 Ibid., 1228.
45 Ibid., 1229-1230.
46 Ibid., 1230, 1231.
47 Beginning in 1984, China started to propose to the United Nations General Assembly draft resolutions
on preventing an arms race in outer space. China maintained that outer space belonged to all mankind and
should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and should be kept free o f weapons. See People’s
Republic o f China, State Council, “China: Arms Control and Disarmament,” Section VI “Actively
Promoting International Arms Control and Disarmament,” 1995.
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leadership that attempts to compensate for this deteriorating security situation might
undermine China’s efforts in economic reforms and development.
Immediately after the end of the Cold War, China’s concerns with space
weaponization slightly diminished in parallel to the United States’ reduction and
reformulation of its ballistic missile defense program. However, the PRC leadership’s
concerns with further militarization of outer space increased in the aftermath of the 1991
Gulf War that provided the first glimpse of the military advantages that space capabilities
offered apart of the BMD: China recognized that the swift U.S. victory in Iraq was due to
U.S. superior command and control, intelligence, and communications systems relying
largely on satellite networks.

AO

China’s concern with American plans for the military

uses of space increased progressively, as China became more and more dependent on
space for its economic well-being.
In 2000, China recognized space activities as one of its top national priorities.
The State Council summarized China’s guiding principle with respect to space in the
following:
Adhering to the principle o f long-term, stable and sustainable developm ent and
m aking the developm ent o f space activities cater to and serve the state’s
com prehensive developm ent strategy. The C hinese governm ent attaches great
importance to the significant role o f space activities in im plem enting the strategy
o f revitalizing the country w ith science and education and that o f sustainable
developm ent, as w ell as in econom ic construction, national security, science and
tech nology developm ent and social progress. The developm ent o f space
activities is encouraged and supported by the governm ent as an integral part o f
the state’s com prehensive developm ent strategy.49

48 See Martel and Yoshihara, 2003,22-23.
49 People’s Republic o f China, State Council, “China’s Space Activities,” Part I “Aims and Principles,”
2000 .
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China had only begun to utilize domestic and foreign telecommunication satellites
in the mid-1980s,50 but by the early 2000s China’s booming economic development of
the past two decades led to steep demand for communications services that was
increasingly met by communications satellites. In accordance with the PRC policy
recognizing the importance of space activities as “an integral part of the state’s
comprehensive development strategy,” the Chinese government encouraged investment
in space activities and development of comprehensive scientific and industrial base
capable of producing satellites and providing commercial space launches. Thus, not only
did China’s demand for space services grew but her space capabilities developed as well,
and commercial cooperation, including with the West in general, and with the United
States in particular, contributed significantly to China’s progress in space technology of
the past decade or so.
In the post-Cold War era, China formally restated its opposition to the extension
of an arms race into outer space in the 1995 White Paper on Arms Control and returned
to elaborate its position in the 2000 White Paper on “China’s Space Activities.” China’s
raised concerns with space security issues developed in response to a number of the U.S.
publications, such as Spacecast 2020 and Vision 2010,51 envisioning outer space as a new
crucial military high ground. Its concerns with space security continued to increase over
the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, when PRC called increasingly for a legally
binding international agreement banning the weaponization of space.

50 Ibid., Part II “Space Applications.”
51 Spacecast 2020 is a study produced by the Air University, AL, in compliance with the directive from
the Air Force Chief o f Staff. The study was presented in June 1994. See Spacecast 2020, Executive
summary, June 1994, Space Policy, August 1995, 193-202.
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China’s concerns became particularly elevated in the context o f the worsening
situation with Taiwan and later after the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in
May 1999 that led to a significant deterioration of Sino-American relations. The situation
with Taiwan remained the one bearing the greatest potential for a major confrontation
between the United States and China.52 The 1998 North Korean launch of its three-stage
Taepo Dong-1 missile that flew over Japan, further spurred the United States plans for a
theater missile defense (TMD) in East Asia. China’s Premier Zhu Rhongii expressed his
opinion in no uncertain terms on this matter:
We are against TMD.
We are especially firm in our opposition to include Taiwan under TMD.
TMD would constitute a violation against international agreements on missiles
as well as an encroachment on China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and an
interference in China’s internal affairs.53
In a broader context, China condemned efforts of a “certain country” to develop
and deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD), as well as Theater Missile Defense
(TMD) systems, for they undermined the efforts of the international community “to stem
the proliferation of weapons o f mass destruction and to promote disarmament.”54
Moreover, in the U.S. handling of international affairs, China considered as
representation of “hegemonism,” power politics, and “neo-interventionism” negatively
affecting security situation in the world and damaging national sovereignty,
independence and developmental interests of “many countries.”55 China began attaching

52 Martel and Yoshihara, 2003,24.
53 Arms Control Association, Chinese Views on Theater and National Missile Defense, Fact Sheet, July
1999, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ch_tmd.asp (accessed 10.08.03).
54 People’s Republic o f China, State Council, “China’s National Defense in 2000,” Section I “The
Security Situation.” See also Arms Control Association, Chinese Views on Theater and National Missile
Defense, Fact Sheets, 1999.
55 People’s Republic o f China, State Council, “China’s National Defense in 2000,” Section I “The
Security Situation,” 2000.
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greater significance to the ABM Treaty and voicing its support for preservation of this
“cornerstone of global strategic stability and international security.”56
China became increasingly concerned with space security and warned of an
emerging danger of a space arms race and placed prevention of such an arms race in
space at the top of its priorities at the international arms control fora. The goal of the
arms control process, according to China, was to maintain outer space free of weapons
and its exclusively peaceful utilization for “the sole purpose of promoting economic,
scientific and cultural development of all countries, and benefiting all mankind.”57
Calling on the international community to take active steps to stop further militarization
o f space in its official security pronouncements, China insisted not only on strict
compliance with the then existing legal instruments such as the ABM Treaty, but also on
urgent negotiations of a new legal instrument that would include a ban on testing,
deployment and use of weapons, weapon systems or their components in outer space.
Thus, by the late 1990s, China increasingly considered the United State’s plans
for the deployment of National Missile Defense and further military space uses as a threat
to its economic well-being, national security, and global stability and peace, despite its
growing participation in commercial space activities, including within commercial joint
projects and ventures with the Western and U.S. firms.
In reaction to the U.S. plans to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty, China
changed its rhetoric and emphases in its security strategy. The PRC leadership
recognized that rapid and drastic changes in the military field fundamentally altered the
global balance of military power. In its official pronouncements, China began to put

56 Arms Control Association, Chinese Views on Theater and National Missile Defense, Fact Sheet, 1999.
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more emphasis on the military aspects of security and on consolidation of national
defense, gearing military modernization towards “winning local wars under modem,
especially high-tech conditions... under most difficult complex circumstances” and
putting even stronger stress on the importance of the goal of reunification of the
country.58
China actively prepared for a potential confrontation in the Taiwan Strait.59
Preparations for a possible conflict over Taiwan and efforts to adopt and, where
necessary, to counter the effects of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) were the
primary drivers o f China’s military modernization in the second half of the 1990s and
early 2000s. Adherence to the MTCR was a precondition to China’s entrance into the
West-dominated international space market. While China promised to adhere to the
MTCR guidelines, Beijing continued to refuse a formal membership in the MTCR until
its concerns regarding Taiwan and the U.S. national missile defense system were
addressed.60
As China’s space presence and capabilities increased and became technologically
more sophisticated, the United States began to consider China as a potential rival in
space, presenting certain security threats— security threats far beyond those of a missile
technology proliferator, in contrast to the U.S. main concern of the early 1990s.61
Growing U.S. security unease with regard to China materialized in the Pentagon’s annual

57 People’s Republic o f China, State Council, “China’s National Defense in 2000,” Section VI “Arms
Control and Disarmament,” 2000.
58 People’s Republic o f China, State Council, “China’s National Defense in 2002,” 2002.
59 McCabe argues that the status o f Taiwan could lead to war between the United States and China and
analyzes in detail how China prepared for such a war at the level o f PRC’s military doctrine that shaped
China’s objectives, strategy, force structure, procurement and training. See Thomas R. McCabe, “The
Chinese Air Force and Air and Space Power,” Air and Space Power Journal, fall 2003,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchmicles/apj/apj03/fal03/mccabe.html (accessed 04.16.04).
60 See Sibing, 2003, 183-189.
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reviews o f China’s military capabilities, which began in 1998. The 2003 Annual Report
on the Military Power o f the People’s Republic o f China indicated that China was
improving its Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I),
even though China continued to lag behind the West and “did not adequately assimilate
new C4I into the plans and operations required to train and fight in a modem
battlespace.” China pursued a robust research and development program for laser
weapons and was believed to be developing its own and acquiring foreign technologies,
including and perhaps overwhelmingly, through its commercial cooperation.62 Some of
the technology China acquired via commercial cooperation could be used for building
£ •3

anti-satellite capabilities—both ground-based and space-based.

Thus, while China

called on the international community to prohibit the weaponization of space and outlaw
the use of force in outer space, the United States increasingly saw China improving its
military space capabilities, including the development of ASAT capabilities.
Increasingly concerned with the fact that China’s military space program might
have benefited from China’s commercial joint ventures via technology transfers and
espionage, the Cox Commission investigated the matter and issued its report concluding
that China stole a number of key weapons designs, including those of ballistic missiles, as
well as space technology, that could improve the PRC’s intelligence capabilities and
allow it to attack U.S. satellites.64 The 2001 Rumsfeld Report specifically identified a

61 Martel and Yoshihara, 2003,24.
62 See, for example, Richard D. Fisher, “Commercial Space Cooperation Should Not Harm National
Security,” The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder, No. 1198, June 26, 1998,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/ NationalSecurity/BGl 198.cfm (accessed 05.21.04).
63 U.S. Department o f Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power o f the P eople’s Republic o f China,
Section IV “PRC Military Modernization,” 2003, 36.
64 U.S. Congress, House, U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the P eople’s
Republic o f China (Cox Committee Report on Chinese Espionage), Report by the Select Committee o f the
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conflict in the Taiwan Strait as a threat to U.S. space systems, as China was expected to
try to launch a preemptive attack against U.S. space systems prior to the outbreak of a
military conflict with Taiwan.65 In the Nuclear Posture Review that was submitted to the
U.S. Congress on December 31,2001, the Pentagon identified military conflict with
China over Taiwan as on of the “immediate contingencies” for which the United States
should plan its nuclear strike capabilities.66 It clearly follows from the DoD’s annual
reports, the 1999 Cox Report on China’s Espionage, the 2001 Rumsfeld Report and the
new Nuclear Posture Review that recent developments in China’s space capabilities were
considered progressively as a threat to the U.S. space assets and security, which
potentially could merit a nuclear response.67
As both the United States and China increasingly considered each other’s space
activities as a threat and both moved towards adopting the doctrine of preemption,
security in space became increasingly fragile. With the old space security regime eroded,
there seemed to be a serious lack of bilateral space security understanding between the
United States and China that would allow the two countries to avoid a military clash in
case o f a serious conflict. Trying to restore their bilateral relations after the fallout from
the Tiananmen massacre when high-level exchanges between the United States and
China were suspended, the two spacepowers began their annual consultations between
defense departments in 1997, and held arms control discussions, including on the issues

United States House o f Representatives, released on April 25, 1999, http://www.houswe.gov/coxreport/
(accessed 05.13.04).
65 Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Report,
2001,22-24.
66 “Excerpts from the Nuclear Posture Review,” 2002. See also Dumbaugh, 2003, CRS-9.
67 Dumbaugh, 2003, CRS-9.
68 U.S. Department o f Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power o f the People's Republic o f China,
Introduction, B. “Key Development,” 2003, 4. The United States put forth its concept o f preemption in the
2002 National Security Strategy o f the United States.
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of non-proliferation and anti-missile defenses.69 However, unlike the relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union, and later Russia, who created quite
extensive bilateral cooperative transparency regimes, the United States and China largely
failed to put in place similar arrangements in the post-Cold War era. Both spacepowers
tried to keep their military space programs under strict secrecy.70 The disparity in the
technological levels o f their space capabilities made their cooperation on creating
transparency regimes difficult: the United States was so far ahead in almost every area of
space applications that its concerns with China’s space capabilities were not strong
enough to be willing to expose its military programs to China’s scrutiny, while China was
rather eager to conceal its relative inferiority in space capabilities.71 In outer space,
however, China does not necessarily need to match the U.S. space capabilities or reach
parity with the United States to be able to significantly affect U.S. interests and
operations in space. Instead, China may pursue asymmetric approaches.72 Without a
cooperative security framework this situation remains volatile.
The two spacepowers also did not have a chance to build mutual trust and
confidence in space via cooperation in major civil space activities, such as the
International Space Station, because China did not take part in this international project.

TX

69 See People’s Republic o f China, Embassy o f the People’s Republic o f China in the United States o f
America, “China, U.S. Hold Sixth Round o f Defense Consultation (10.02.04),” http://www.chmaembassy.org/eng/zmgx/zmgx/Military%20Relationship/t64217.htm (accessed 05.07.04).
70 Martel and Yoshihara, 2003,29.
71 Martel and Yoshihara argue that China and the United States are on a threshold o f a space race and that
at the same time both spacepowers are not pursuing transparency in their space military programs. See
Ibid.
72 See McCabe, 2003.
73 In 1992, China began to actively pursue a manned spaceflight program and in 1999 successfully
launched its first unmanned experimental spacecraft, “Shenzhou.” In October 2003, China finally launched
its first man in orbit, thereby joining the exclusive club o f the space-faring states. See State Council o f the
People’s Republic o f China, “China’s Space Activities,” Part II, Section “Space Technology,” 2000. China
expressed interest in the ISS project but pursued its interests by approaching individual ISS partners. See
Sibing, 2003, 183-189.
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At the same time, the U.S.-China commercial cooperation created frictions and raised
security concerns on the part of the United States. The blurry line between China’s
commercial enterprises and the military, in the U.S. perception, allowed China to make
significant improvements in China’s military space technology. In the mid-1990s, for
example, after a series of China’s commercial launch failures, Loral Systems, a U.S.
satellite company, lent technical assistance to the Chinese by releasing sensitive technical
information that was judged in the subsequent investigation as potentially helping China
to improve its guidance capabilities. The Cox Report and other investigations identified
numerous other violations of the U.S. export restrictions by a number of U.S. space firms
providing technical assistance to the Chinese that could potentially benefit China’s
military space program.74
Thus, China’s security interests with respect to outer space continued to diverge
from those of the United States. Despite this divergence of security interests with regard
to outer space, the United States and China developed commercial cooperation. China
benefited from international space commercial cooperation by expanding its space
activities and benefiting from increasing access to space technology via the global space
market. Commercial space activities helped China’s economic development as well as its
military space program. Over time, however, the two states increasingly perceived each
other as potential adversaries in a space conflict in the post-Cold War era. They
progressively considered each other’s space activities as a threat to their interests in space
and to their overall security and saw a conflict in the Taiwan Strait as an increasingly
possible occurrence.

74 Martel and Yoshihara, 2003, 30.
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All in all, the overall improvement of Sino-U.S. relations preceded
commercialization of their space activities and provided favorable conditions for
commercial cooperation in space. Some common security interests that existed with
respect to outer space in the closing years of the Cold War and early in the aftermath of
the bipolar confrontation did allow the United States and China to pursue
commercialization of their space activities and commercial cooperation. However,
within this bilateral relationship, commercialization of space activities did not lead to
converging security interests in outer space. On the contrary, over time China and U.S.
interests further diverged as the two spacepowers moved closer to the brink of a military
space race, even though commercialization of space activities probably was not a leading
factor in this development.

RUSSIA-CHINA BILATERAL RELATIONS AND SPACE SECURITY INTERESTS
The Sino-Russian relationship has a long history. There have been eras of
cooperation and of confrontation with occasional militarized disputes along their long
shared border, but in over 300 years there has never been an openly declared war between
the two neighbors.

7c

After a short period of extensive interstate cooperation between the

Soviet Union and the newly established People’s Republic o f China in the 1950s when
the Soviet Union made its contribution to the emerging Chinese space program, the SinoSoviet split resulted in decades of confrontational relations accompanied by the border
clashes between the two militaries.

75 Alexei D. Voskressenski, “Russia’s Evolving Grand Strategy toward China,” in Sherman W. Garnett
ed., Rapprochement or Rivalry? Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia (Washington D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2000), 119.
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Sino-Soviet relations began to show signs of improvement in 1982 when the
negotiations on normalization of bilateral relations were initiated and China relaxed
somewhat its demands to the Soviet Union.76 The real improvements, however, in SinoSoviet relations began under General Secretary Gorbachev who took an active course
towards normalization of international relations on the Eastern border as he
simultaneously set on improving relations with the West. The new line toward China and
initiatives to address China’s concerns with the “three obstacles” to normalization of the
relationship were announced by Gorbachev in July 1986. The “three obstacles” that
blocked normalization of the two Communist neighbors were: (1) the Soviet troops in
Afghanistan; (2) Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia; and (3) the
massive Soviet build-up on the border with China. Gorbachev initiated a military detente
with China a year earlier by beginning reductions in the Soviet Armed Forces in the
border area and halting buildup of Soviet nuclear capabilities designated for a potential
conflict with China. In his 1986 Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev announced a reduction
in the Soviet military presence in Mongolia, a partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan, and expressed a favorable attitude towards normalization of SinoVietnamese relations. Gorbachev’s line for a new relationship with China was a part of a
Soviet leader’s plan to create regional ’’collective security” arrangements in order to
•

provide for security in East Asia.

77

China, satisfied with the Soviet unilateral concessions, was willing to improve
relations with the Soviet Union, for its leadership was wary of the improving U.S-Soviet
relations and of the possibility that this would lead to the establishment of a U.S.-Soviet

76 Hung P. Nguyen, “Russia and China: The Genesis o f an Eastern Rapallo,” Asian Survey 33, (March
1993): 287.
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condominium and the isolation of China, particularly after the Tiananmen crisis of 1989.
China also saw improved relations with the Soviet Union as useful for countering “U.S.
hegemonism.” Thus, both the Soviet Union and China sought rapprochement based on
70

their strategic calculations.
The bilateral relations between China and Russia improved progressively from the
late 1980s onward. Their security interests and vision of the post-Cold War world order
converged over time. Both China and Russia saw multipolarity as a preferable structure
of the international system in which each of them considered themselves as one of a
number of poles.79 Both became interested in participating in the expanding global
commercial markets as a way of promoting development and modernization of their
economies and societies, while both became increasingly concerned with U.S. economic
domination and its overwhelming military power.80 Both saw the gap in military
capabilities between the United States and their own capabilities increased dramatically
over time as the United States made a leap into the era of the Revolution in Military
Affairs. They both grew increasingly concerned with geo-political developments. The
United States enhanced its position vis-a-vis Russia with the eastward expansion of
NATO. The United States also entered into bilateral anti-terrorist alliances with states all
around Russia and China’s peripheries, including the U.S. military presence in a number

77 Ibid., 289.
78 If the August 1991 coup had succeeded, the establishment o f a military alliance between China and the
Soviet Union, according to Nguyen, would have been very likely. China saw the Soviet retreat from its
position as a superpower leaving the United States as the sole superpower as detrimental to its interests.
See Nguyen, 1993,285-301.
79 In their joint statement, Russia and China pledged to “strive to promote the multipolarization o f the
world and the new international order” that should be “just and equitable” and “based on peace and
stability.” See Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment o f a New
International Order, April 23, 1997, http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/chru0497.htm (accessed
05.13.04).
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of neighboring states. They also realized the extent to which potential U.S. military
domination of outer space could threaten their security interests in space, their national
security on Earth, and global stability more generally. Both states took active steps to
cooperate and oppose the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and plans to deploy a
National Missile Defense and weaponize space.81
This growing convergence of security concerns, perceptions and interests led the
two states to establish collective security-type arrangements to address their common
security issues in the region, the so-called Shanghai-Five, consisting of China, Russia,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan.

The goal of this forum was to collectively

manage their border issues and build confidence in the region in the aftermath of the
collapse of the Soviet Union. The role of this loose organization, however, increased
over time, as it began to include humanitarian, educational, cultural, scientific missions
and economic cooperation and trade. In June 2001, the Shanghai-Five was transformed
into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), with Uzbekistan joining the five as a
co-founder of the new security organization with increased functions.83
.

--

The Joint Declaration stated: “No country should seek hegemony, practice power politics or monopolize
international affairs.” See Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the
Establishment o f a New International Order, 1997.
81 In a joint statement, Russian President B. N. Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin reemphasized
that they consider the 1972 ABM Treaty a “cornerstone o f strategic stability” which “must be strictly and
fully implemented.” According to their statement, creation o f national anti-ballistic missile defense would
violate this treaty. See Joint Statement Made by President Jiang Zemin and President Boris Yeltsin on
December 10, 1999, http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/chrul299.htm (accessed 05.13.04). Presidents
Jiang Zemin, and Vladimir Putin reaffirmed their position on the importance o f preservation o f 1972 ABM
Treaty. They warned that “any damage to the ABM Treaty could trigger a new round o f arms race.” See
Joint Statement Made by President Jiang Zemin and President Vladimir Putin on Anti-Missile System, July
18, 2000, http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/jpjac.htm (accessed 05.13.04).
82 China initiated creation o f the Shanghai-Five. The forum was established in Beijing in 1996. Members
o f this forum signed “Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions and the Treaty on Reduction
o f Military Forces in Border Regions.” The annual meetings o f the member-states became a regular
practice. See People’s Republic o f China, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Official website,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.htm (accessed 05.13.04).
83 Since the establishment o f the Organization, the member states signed a number o f documents,
including the “Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism,” the “Charter o f
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Moreover, this growing security cooperation between China and Russia finally
culminated in an unprecedented Sino-Russian treaty—the Treaty of Good
Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation signed in Moscow on July 16, 2001.84 This
treaty covered nearly all areas of their bilateral interactions, above all their security
issues. It contained such provisions as non-resort to the use of force or the threat of
force, “no-first use” o f nuclear weapons and non-targeting of strategic nuclear missiles
against each other, support for each other’s policies aimed at preserving the territorial
integrity o f their countries and others. It called for regular consultations and other
confidence-building measures and committed the two states to “work together for the
maintenance of global strategic balance and stability.”

Thus, the treaty was envisioned

as a pillar of the Sino-Russian “strategic cooperative partnership,” and yet it fell short of
•

•

•

actually establishing a Sino-Russian alliance, at least on paper.

fiA

Article VIII of the

Treaty specified:
The contracting parties shall not enter into any alliance or be a party to any bloc
nor shall they embark on any such action, including the conclusion o f such treaty
w ith a third country w hich com prom ises the sovereignty, security and territorial
integrity o f the other contracting party.87

The progressively improving Sino-Russian relations in the post-Cold War era
were accompanied by Russia’s arms sales to China and the sharing of high technology

the SCO,” the “Agreement on Anti-Terrorist Agency and the Declaration o f the Heads o f States o f the SCO
Member Countries.” The new organization was to promote a “new security concept,” a “new pattern o f
regional cooperation,” and state-to-state relations o f a “new type,” characterized by trust and cooperation in
the military field and a commitment to fight terrorism, extremism and separatism, and to peaceful
resolution o f international conflicts. See Ministry o f Foreign Affairs o f the People’s Republic o f China
84 “Treaty o f Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic o f China and
the Russian Federation,” July 16, 2001, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/tl5771.htm (accessed
05.13.04).
85 Ibid., Article XII.
86 Article IX shows how close the two states came to establishing an alliance: “When a situation arises in
which one o f the contracting parties deems that peace is being threatened and undermined or its security
interests are involved or when it is confronted with the threat o f aggression, the contracting parties shall
immediately hold contacts and consultations in order to eliminate such threats.” See Ibid., Article 9.
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with China, including in such fields as space technology.

The 1999 Cox Report

identified Russia as China’s main supplier of high technology and modem arms.
Although the Selective Committee’s main focus was on Chinese activities with regard to
U.S. military and dual-use technology, it concluded that:
R ussia, for exam ple, has provided the PRC w ith extensive military assistance and
related techn ologies, including a number o f com plete military system s. The
S elect C om m ittee has been advised that the sheer number o f transfers o f military
equipm ent and technology to the PRC from Russia, m ost o f w hich have been a
product o f dramatically increased PRC-Russian military cooperation since 1992,
is vastly greater than the number o f transfers from the U nited States, m ost o f
w h ich are the result o f PRC espionage.89

China and Russia reestablished their cooperation in the area of outer space in
1993. Over time this cooperation increased quite impressively—perhaps not so much in
terms of the volume as in what they cooperated on. Most of this cooperation was on a
commercial basis. A formal agreement on cooperation between the Russian Space
Agency (RSA) and the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA) was reached in
May 1994. Later, Chinese taikonauts underwent training in the Russian Star City training
center.90 In March 1995, Chinese space experts return to Moscow for the first time since
the Sino-Soviet split of 1960 in order to negotiate and sign a contract for purchasing
Russian space products and technology. They were particularly interested in space
systems for a manned flight, such as environmental control systems and docking and
emergency systems. The Chinese also bought some Russian RD-120 rocket engines.
After a reciprocal visit of the Russian delegation to China, the Chinese bought an entire

87 Ibid., Article VIII.
88 U.S. Department o f Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power o f the P eople’s Republic o f China.
July 2002, 5, http://defenselink.mil/news/Jul2002/d20020712.china.pdf (accessed 06.25.04).
89 U.S. Congress, House, U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's
Republic o f China (Cox Committee Report on Chinese Espionage), Overview, 1999, xxxv.
90 On August 20, 1996, a group o f Chinese visitors— according to some estimates, from 20 to 50 taikonaut
trainees and future instructors— arrived in Star City led by Shen Jungjun. See Harvey, The Chinese Space
Programme, 1998, 147-148.
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spacecraft life support system, an Energiya docking module and the Kurs rendezvous
system, used to dock supply crafts with the Mir space station.
During Russian President Putin’s visit to China in December 2002 the Chinese
media reported that Russia had agreed to lease room on the ISS to China for a scientific
experiment. At a meeting between Yurii Koptev, the director of the Russian Space
Agency, who accompanied Putin to Beijing, and Zhan Qingwei, the general manager of
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, both parties expressed their
intention to explore the opportunity to expand existing collaboration.91
Earlier trade relations between China and Russia already expanded from manned
space flight into other areas of space activities. During an official visit of the then
Russian head of the government, Michael Kasyanov, to China in early November 2000,
the Chinese and Russians negotiated on the joint exploitation of the Russian satellite
navigation system GLONASS.92
Over time, parallel to the development of their bilateral relationship, Sino-Russian
space cooperation deepened. In July 2001, Moscow and Beijing signed a five-year space
cooperation agreement, according to which China and Russia would establish special
departments on joint development of a regional missile defense system. Furthermore, the
2002 DoD report on China’s military capabilities alleged that this agreement envisaged
Sino-Russian cooperation on the development of a new generation of high-tech weapons

91 Sibing, 2003, 183-189.
92 Korotchenko, 2000. Before that, China was reported as expressing interests in acquiring GLONASS.
See Cooper and Contant, “The People’s Republic o f China— Consolidating it Space Power, Enhancing its
Military Might,” in Rebecca Jimerson and Ray A. Williamson, Space and Military Power in East Asia,
2000. China plans to build and deploy its own regional satellite navigation system, the Beidou Navigation
System. On October 31, 2000, China’s Long March 3 rocket successfully put the first navigation satellite,
the Beidou Navigation Testing Satellite, into orbit. See “China Puts 1st Navigation Positioning Satellite
into Orbit,” SpaceRef.com, 2000.
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and equipment for space warfare.93 Proliferation of Russian-Chinese cooperation in outer
space raised a suspicion that Russia and China were planning to establish a “space
alliance” not only for commercial development, but for strategic military purposes.94
In its interactions with Russia, China played the role of an active importer of
Russian space technology, while Russia an eager exporter, as it sought opportunities to
gain financial resources to keep its space industry alive.95 Their commercial relationship
was based on mutual benefit. China, benefiting from its soaring international trade,
earned hard currency to become a large buyer of Russia’s high technology, including
space technology, and modem arms, as it embarked on a major modernization plan for its
ballistic missiles and space forces.96 By establishing commercial relations with China,
including in the area o f space technology and hardware, Russia found a large market for
its space industry.
Even though the two states continued to compete on space launch market for
Western customers, the China-Russia commercial relationship, showed a great potential
for growth, particularly in light of their growing strategic cooperation and China’s desire
to obtain a whole spectrum of modem space capabilities. During his first visit to Russia,
93 U.S. Department o f Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power o f the P eople’s Republic o f China,
2002, 5.
94 A spokesman for NASA confirmed to WorldNetDaily the ongoing Sino-Russian “cooperative space
efforts.” These cooperative efforts encompassed applied space research, long-term programs for manned
flight research, fundamental research and development o f spacecrafts. Greg May, assistant director for the
Nixon Center, voiced concerns that Sino-Russian cooperation may include development o f technology to
defeat U.S. satellites in orbit. See Dougherty, 1999.
95 Mowthorpe asserts that Russia’s assistance provides “the greatest source o f space cooperation for
China” and this is mostly because “Russia does not place significant restrictions on its cooperation.” See
Mowthorpe, The Militarization and Weaponization o f Space, 2004, 97.
96 The 1999 Cox Committee Report on Chinese Espionage specifically stated: “The PRC has indeed used
the profits from its burgeoning commercial economy to purchase a number o f advanced weapons systems.
The most notable o f these include the purchase from Russia o f 50 Sukhoi Su-27 jet fighters and the
production rights for 200 more, two Kilo attack submarines, and two Sovremenniy missile destroyers.” See
The Cox Committee Report on Chinese Espionage, 1999. The report also alleged that China’s military
modernization program encompassed exploitation o f space-based military reconnaissance and
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the new President of the People’s Republic of China, Hu Jintao, and Russian President
Putin made a joint statement, in which they reaffirmed their commitment to expand
further their bilateral relations, including in the area of trade and space cooperation:

07

P olitical trust betw een the tw o countries is increasing, practical interaction is
constantly expanding, friendship and mutual understanding betw een the peoples
o f R ussia and China are stren gth en in g....
R ussia and China intend to continue to strengthen their partnership and strategic
interaction and join tly solve practical questions o f bilateral ties in the interests o f
national security o f both states, the prosperity o f the Russian and C hinese people,
stability and calm in the neighboring regions.
The Parties w ill strengthen existing structures, w h ile expanding other conduits
for exchanges and consultations at all levels and in all spheres 8

The two leaders pledged to continue working towards the creation o f a Russian-Chinese
interstate mechanism of security consultations and, in order to further strengthen the
material foundation of their relationship, to invigorate cooperation in the economic
sphere in general, and in space industry, information technology, military-technical
matters, among other areas. The joint statement declared that the relations of partnership
and strategic interaction between Russia and China had a “key importance as a major
factor of international relations for the future of world politics, preservation of peace,
maintenance of global security and stability.”99 This statement indicated that after the
transition to the new leadership, China remained committed to the already established

communication satellites and space-based weapons. Russia and China were said to cooperate on the
developing o f space- and ground-based lasers.
97 Joint Statement by Presidents o f the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and People's Republic o f
China, Hu Jintao, May 27, 2003, Paragraph III, http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/putinhu_03.htm
(accessed 03.11.04). Chinese and Russian Presidents committed to increase overall trade from $12 billion
in 2002 to $ 20 billion in the next four to five years. See also CNN report “China, Russia Pledge Trade
Boost,” May 27, 2003, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/BUSINESS/05/27/china.oil.biz/ (accessed 03.11.04).
98 Joint Statement o f the President o f the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and the President o f the
People's Republic o f China, Hu Jintao, 2003.
99 Ibid.
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framework of the bilateral relationship—a relationship characterized as “strategic
cooperative partnership.”
All in all, in case of the Sino-Russian relationship, the two states began to
improve their relations during the Cold War based on their strategic calculations. Their
common security interests led China and Russia to resolve many contentious issues that
were impeding their bilateral cooperation and establish vigorous commercial space
cooperation across the spectrum of space activities. As their political relationship grew,
their space cooperation expanded, including possibly into the realm of military space
technology. Proliferation of Russian-Chinese cooperation in outer space raised concerns
that Russia and China were establishing a “space alliance”—and not only for mutual
commercial development, but for strategic military purposes as well.100
Thus, in this case, the proposition that commercialization of outer space would
lead to non-converging security interests is not supported: commercialization of space
activities in Russia and China did not lead to non-converging space security interests of
the two states. At the same time, it cannot be confirmed that greater convergence of their
security interests was primarily caused by commercialization of space activities and
commercial cooperation. Their converging security interests led to commercial
cooperation, rather than vice versa. The proposition that commercialization and
commercial cooperation would lead to converging security interests cannot be rejected,
for the evidence suggests that commercial cooperation did develop further for the most
100 A spokesman for NASA confirmed to WorldNetDaily the ongoing Sino-Russian “cooperative space
efforts”. These cooperative efforts encompassed applied space research, long-term programs for manned
flight research, fundamental research and development o f spacecrafts. However, any military components
o f their cooperation cannot be said as being supported by any real evidence and remains more o f a
speculation. Greg May, assistant director for the Nixon Center, voiced concerns that Sino-Russian
cooperation may include development o f technology to defeat U.S. satellites in orbit. See Jon E.
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part of the period under study in parallel with increasing convergence of the two states’
security interests in space.

BILATERAL RELATIONS AND CONVERGING AND DIVERGING SECURITY
INTERESTS IN OUTER SPACE
This analysis of the dynamics of bilateral interactions between the United States,
Russia, and China indicated that, first, outer space occupied a significant place in bilateral
relations, and its significance increased over time as the commercialization of space
proceeded within the time period under the study; second, the improvement of overall
relations was an important condition for the establishment of commercial space
cooperation in all three dyads, but particularly so in the U.S.-Russia dyad; third,
expanding commercial interactions did not bring closer the differing perceptions of
security interests between the United States on the one hand, and Russia and China, on
the other. While the United States and Russia managed to establish bilateral
arrangements to address some of their security concerns despite the diverging security
interests in space, the United States and China failed to put in place similar arrangements
as their security concerns escalated over time.
With regard to the three hypotheses formulated in this study, the present analysis
bears the following results. With regard to the U.S.-Russian space security relations, the
proposition that commercialization of outer space leads to non-converging security
interest in outer space should be considered as supported by the evidence provided within
the timeframe of this study. The proposition maintaining that converging security
interests lead to greater commercial cooperation does not apply in this case: the United

Dougherty, “Russia, China forming Space Alliance,” WorldNetDaily, Wednesday, November 10, 1999,
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States and Russia’s security interests continued to diverge in the post-Cold War era.
However, the improved overall relations between the United States and Russia in the
context of the ended East-West confrontation and the fragile balance that was reached in
the U.S.-Soviet negotiations leading up to the end of the bipolar confrontation related to
outer space issues did provide the necessary foundation for the commercial cooperation
between the two states. U.S.-Russian commercial cooperation expanded over time
despite continuous divergence of their space security interests. And finally, the
proposition that commercialization and greater commercial cooperation would lead to
converging security interests cannot be supported in this case.
The overall improvement of Sino-U.S. relations preceded commercialization of
their space activities and provided favorable conditions for commercial cooperation in
space. Some common security interests that existed in the closing years of the Cold War
and early in the aftermath of the bipolar confrontation did allow the United States and
China to pursue commercial space cooperation. China benefited from participation in
international space commercial cooperation: she expanded its space activities into new
areas and gained greater access to space technology via the global space market.
Commercial space activities helped China’s economic development and its military space
program. However, within this bilateral relationship, the commercialization of space
activities and commercial space cooperation did not lead to converging security interests
in outer space. On the contrary, over time China and U.S. interests further diverged and
their commercial cooperation began to create frictions and raise suspicions. They
perceived each other’s space activities as a threat to their interests in space and to their
overall security. They both began to consider a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait as
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article/asp?ARTICLE_ID=l5230 (accessed 10.07.03).
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an increasingly possible occurrence and as they did so, they also moved closer to the
brink of a military space race. The commercialization of space activities probably was
not a leading factor in this development.
In the case of the Sino-Russian relationship, the two states began to improve their
relations amidst the Cold War based on their strategic calculations. Their common
security interests led China and Russia to resolve many contentious issues that were
hampering their bilateral cooperation. In the post-Cold War era, they established
vigorous commercial space cooperation across the spectrum of space activities. As their
political relationship grew, their space cooperation increased and expanded into new
areas. In this case the proposition that commercialization of outer space would lead to
non-converging security interests is not supported: the commercialization of space
activities in Russia and China did not lead to non-converging security interests of the two
states. At the same time, the greater convergence of their security interests was not
primarily caused by commercialization and commercial cooperation. Based on temporal
precedence it can be concluded that converging security interests led to commercial
cooperation, rather than vice versa. The proposition that commercialization and
commercial cooperation would lead to converging security interests cannot be rejected on
the basis of the evidence provided: commercial cooperation did develop for the most part
of the period under study in parallel with increasing convergence of the two states’
security interests in space.
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CHAPTER IX
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND SPACE SECURITY
COOPERATION IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA: THE UNITED STATES,
RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN
GENEVA

Globalization may be an over-used and under-defined
term but if ever there was an appropriate area for a global
approach, it is surely in seeking to prevent outer space
becoming humankind’s next battlefield.
Ambassador Anderson o f Ireland
2001

The purpose of this chapter is to examine to what extent the United States, Russia,
and China have been successful at the international arena within the framework of an
international organization in bridging their differences and reaching compromises in
order to achieve their common goal—secure free access and use of outer space for the
purposes of national security and economic well-being in the post-Cold War era.1
Although space-related issues are dealt with in a number of intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs) such as, for example, the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU); the United Nations Disarmament Commission and its First Committee, and the
United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), the main
focus of this chapter is on the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the international
body designated to conduct consultations and negotiations on arms control and
disarmament issues, including in the area of outer space. As was shown in the previous
1 At the same time as the U.S. plans for outer space include development o f space and ASAT weapons,
the U.S. national interest are also aimed at “peaceful uses o f outer space.” The Rumsfeld Report stated that
in the U.S. interests is to “promote the peaceful uses o f space, use the nation’s potential in space to support
domestic, economic, diplomatic and national security objectives; and develop and deploy the means to
deter and defend against hostile acts directed at U.S. space assets and against the uses o f space hostile to
U.S. interests.” See Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and
Organization, Report, Executive Summary, 2001, 7.
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chapters, although the three space powers commercialized their space activities and grew
to depend on the global space market for their economic well-being, as well as their
national security, their security interests with respect to outer space, as reflected in their
official national security documents, did not universally converge. Moreover, U.S.
interests, on the one hand, and China’s and Russia’s interests, on the other, continued to
grow increasingly apart in the post Cold War era. The weaponization o f outer space
emerged as the real next step in progressive militarization of outer space in the light of
the U.S. plans to develop and deploy a National Missile Defense system and to achieve
“full spectrum dominance.” Russia and China opposed space weaponization as a step
undermining their security and economic well-being. As an issue of contention, space
weaponization has been used as a litmus test for determining the extent to which the
security interests converged or diverged with respect to security in outer space.
The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva became the international forum at the
heart of the debate over weaponization of space and prevention of an arms race in outer
space between the three main spacepowers - the United States, Russia and China. By
following the CD discussions relating to the efforts aimed at prevention of an arms race
in outer space, the present chapter tries to find answers to the following questions: (1)
What were the United States, Russia and China’s positions towards the existing regime
regulating military uses of outer space shortly after the end of the Cold War and how did
they change over time? (2) Did a consensus between the three spacepowers emerge
concerning the expansion or strengthening of the existing regime or establishing a new
one and, if not, where did the dividing lines lie? To what extent did the interests
converge, if any? (3) What was the role of the CD in bringing about cooperation? It is
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argued that in the course of work of the Conference on Disarmament in the post-Cold
War era, Russia and China’s interests converged to such a degree that the two countries
jointly produced and proposed to the Conference a draft treaty prohibiting the use of
force in outer space and emplacement of weapons in space. The Conference on
Disarmament provided the necessary venue for the discussion of the outer space security
issues and facilitated convergence of their views with respect to the arrangements that
would be necessary to provide security in space. The United States, on the other hand,
continued to prefer the existing regime in outer space and no progress was made towards
the beginning of negotiations on any change of this regime. The use of issue linkages not
only failed to produce favorable results concerning issues of security in outer space, it
paralyzed the work o f the Conference on all other issues on its agenda.

DO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MATTER?
The debate on the role of international institutions has been one of the major
debates in International Relations.2 A number of definitions of institutions have been

2 In the course o f this debate a vast literature on the subject has been produced. All major schools o f
thought have participated in the debate and advanced their own approaches to international institutions and
to evaluating their role in international relations. On the history o f the scholarly discourse see Lisa L.
Martin and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories and Empirical Studies o f International Institutions,” International
Organization 52 (autumn 1998): 729-757; see also Abbot and Snidal, 1998, 3-32; Vinod K Aggrawal,
“Building International Institutions in Asia-Pacific,” Asian Survey 33 (November 1993): 1029-1042;
Axelrod and Keohane, 1985,226-254; Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power,
and Pathologies o f International Organizations,” International Organization 53 (autumn 1999): 699-732;
Thomas Bemauer, “The Effect o f International Environmental Institutions: How We Might Learn More,”
International Organization 49 (spring 1995): 351-377; Liliana Botcheva and Lisa L. Martin, “Institutional
Effects on State Behavior: Convergence and Divergence,” International Studies Quarterly 45 (2001): 1-26;
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics, London: Macmillan, 1977; Barry
Buzan, “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet
the English School,” International Organization 47 (1993): 327-352; Andrew P. Cortell and James W.
Davis, Jr., “How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact o f International Rules and
Norms,” International Studies Quarterly 40 (1996): 451-478; Martha Finnemore, “International
Organizations as Teachers o f Norms: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
and Science Policy,” International Organization 47 (autumn 1993): 565-597; Martha Finnemore, “Norms,
Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism,” International Organization 50
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used in this debate: from institutions being defined as a “general pattern or categorization
of activity” to institutions as “particular human-constructed arrangements.”

In this

chapter, a narrow definition of international institutions is used: an international
institution is a “formal, continuous institution established by treaty or other agreement
between governments, long-range in nature, multilateral, with a secretariat and more-orless regular meetings, and an ‘international legal personality’ with legal standing.”4
Although the debate on international institutions has shifted since the 1980s from
the polemic between adherents of neorealism and neoliberalism on whether international
institutions “matter” to the discussion o f how institutions exert their influence and what
determines the main features of their designs, the question of whether international
institutions significantly change states’ behavior and promote more cooperative and
peaceful relations between states continues to be raised.5 The neorealist position in the
debate has been that international institutions do not ameliorate the anarchy of the

(spring 1996): 325-347; Geoffrey Garrett, “International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The
European Community’s Internal Market,” International Organization 46 (spring 1992): 533-560; Geoffrey
Garrett and Peter Lange, “Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change,” International
Organization 49 (autumn 1995): 627-655; Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture o f National Security: Norms
and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Christian Reus-Smit, “The
Constitutional Structure o f International Society and the Nature o f Fundamental Institutions,” International
Organization 51 (autumn 1997): 555-589; Charles A. Kupchan, and Clifford A. Kupchan, “The Promise o f
Collective Security,” International Security 20 (summer 1995): 52-61; James Morrow, “Modeling the
Forms o f International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information,” International Organization 48
(1994): 387-424; John G. Ruggie, “The False Promise o f Realism,” International Security 20 (summer
1995): 62-70; Wayne Sandholtz, “Institutions and Collective Action: The New Telecommunications in
Western Europe,” World Politics 45 (January 1993): 242-270; Cheryl Shanks, Harold K. Jacobson, Jeffrey
H. Kaplan, “Inertia and Change in the Constellation o f International Governmental Organizations, 19811992.” International Organization 50 (autumn 1996): 593-627; Alexander Wendt, “Constructing
International Politics,” International Security 20 (summer, 1995): 71-81. See also Symposium on
International Institutions, International Organization 55 (autumn 2001): 761-1103.
3 Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” International Studies Quarterly 32
(December 1988): 382.
4 Russett, Oneal, and Davis, 1998,441-467. Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal suggest a similar definition:
“explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize
behavior.” See Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, “The Rational Design o f
International Institutions,” International Organization 55 (autumn 2001): 762.
5 For example, Mearsheimer argues that “institutions have minimal influence on state behavior, and thus
hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world.” See Mearsheimer, 1994/95, 7.
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international system and are reflections of the distribution of power in the international
system and, thus, have only marginal independent effect on state behavior and cannot
“cause peace.”6 Neoliberals have posited that international institutions matter because
they facilitate cooperation among states when they have mutual interests. International
institutions promote cooperation by providing information, including information about
the distribution of gains from cooperation; reducing transaction costs; making
commitments more credible; creating issue linkages; establishing focal points for
coordination; facilitating in general the operation of reciprocity; making cheating less
appealing by making punishment more feasible and providing early warnings of cheating
for the victims; and lessening the implications of cheating.7
Two important functional characteristics of international organizations—
centralization and degree of autonomy and independence—set these vehicles of
international cooperation apart from other forms of international institutions. Formal
intergovernmental organizations provide stable negotiating fora that enhance iteration in
interstate relations and reputational effects. They make cooperative responses to urgent
developments easier and help to establish and reinforce norms, legitimize or de-legitimize
certain activities, and shape the agenda of interstate discourse. These international bodies
often provide information and expertise on the issues at hand and influence political
context in which interstate interactions take place. They also strengthen issue linkages
and stimulate trade-offs, monitor state activities and adherence to their commitments,
thereby stimulating compliance with existing agreements. International organization can
play the role of an arbiter and conduct interventions in interstate relations that help

6 Ibid., 47.
7 Keohane and Martin, 1995,42,47.
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overcome bargaining deadlocks and issue legally binding decisions with the consent of
the parties involved. Operational organizations manage a variety o f collective activities
that influence states’ capabilities, understandings, and interests via the pooling of
resources and/or risks.
Institutionalists have argued that international organizations have grown
remarkably in number and in the functions they perform in the post-World War II era.
They now help to manage many important areas of interstate relations from international
trade (WTO) and international monetary policy (IMF) to international security (UN
Security Council), affecting performance and the nature of the international system by
enabling states to achieve goals that they would not have achieved otherwise.
Performing these various functions international intergovernmental organizations make
an important contribution to reducing the occurrence of interstate conflicts, including
militarized conflicts.9
Russet, Oneal and Davis emphasize six functions that help reduce interstate
conflict: (1) coercing norm-breakers, (2) mediating among conflicting parties, (3)
reducing uncertainty by conveying information, (4) problem solving via creating
conditions for diffuse reciprocity, issue linkages, permitting trade-offs and side payments
to facilitate agreements, (5) socialization and shaping norms via serving as fora where
interstate discourse and deliberations take place, which provide legitimacy for collective
decisions and promote adherence to the collectively produced pronouncements and
resolutions, and (6) generating narrative of mutual identification via building a shared
sense of values and identities. Results of their study support the claim that international

8 Abbott and Snidal, 1998, 3-32.
9 Russett, Oneal, and Davis, 1998,445-449.
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intergovernmental organizations, along with economic interdependence and democracy,
reduce interstate militarized conflict. According to the study conducted by Russett,
Oneal and Davis in which probit analysis of dyadic data for trade and interstate conflict is
used for the period of 36 years (1950-85),10 an increase in one standard deviation in the
number of common IGO memberships cuts the probability of a dispute by 23 percent
from the baseline rate for a typical dyad.11 In a more recent study, Russett and Oneal
analyze data for politically relevant dyads over the period of 1886-1992 and find that
international intergovernmental organizations reduce the likelihood of a dispute by 24
percent.12 International governmental organizations, both economic- and security-related
ones, clearly matter and together with two other legs of the “Kantian tripod for peace”—
economic interdependence and democracy—account for over 70 percent of the pacifying
effect when all three are increased simultaneously by one standard deviation in Russett
and Oneal’s model.

1^

Although these findings and the logic behind them hold great hopes and raise
expectations for more cooperative and peaceful interstate relations, as the number of
intergovernmental organizations increases, the same expectations cannot be applied to
any particular intergovernmental organization dealing with the particular issue under
consideration. Thus, there is a need for a thorough examination of the extent to which the
three space-faring states—the United States, Russia and China—succeeded in achieving
cooperation on space security issues at the level of global governance within a framework
of a major intergovernmental organization. This chapter is devoted to the test of the
10 Probit analysis is a form o f multiple regression that is used for dichotomized dependent variables. See
Russett, Oneal, and Davis, 1998, 449.
11 Russett, Oneal, and Davis, 1998,457.
12 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 2001, 172.
13 Ibid., 172.
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neoliberal hypothesis formulated in this study. The hypothesis states that greater
commercialization and commercial cooperation may not lead to converging security
interests, but conflicting interests are reconciled via international institutions. The issue
of space weaponization—one of the most debated issues within the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva in the post-Cold War era—is used as a point against which
converging and non-converging security interests of the three spacepowers are evaluated.

THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT AND SPACE SECURITY ISSUES: THE
STARTING POINT
Until the late 1950s, there was no international body specifically designated to
cope with space security issues. Proposals related to outer space, including proposals for
countering possible arms race in outer space, were dealt with by the United Nations
General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission. The institutional framework for
the discussion of space security issues emerged only by the early-1960s: the Committee
on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space charged with fostering international cooperation in the
peaceful uses of outer space and building legal framework for outer space was
established in 1959,14 and the Eighteen-Nation Conference on Disarmament (ENCD),
was founded in 1962. The ENCD incorporated space security issues in its agenda when it
received two proposals, one from the Soviet Union and another from the United States,

14 The A d Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses o f Outer Space was created in 1958 after the UNGA
adopted Resolution 1348 (XIII) on December 13, 1958. The Committee on the Peaceful Uses o f Outer
Space was established a year later in accordance with UNGA Resolution 1472 (XIV). See United Nations,
International Agreements and Other Available Legal Documents Relevant to Space-Related Activities, A
List o f International Agreements and other Available Legal Documents relevant to Space-Related Activities
(and Where They Might be Found), Prepared as a Reference Document for Member States o f the United
Nations (Vienna: United Nations, 1999), 2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

346

dealing with space security issues among other disarmament issues.15 The ENCD also
received the final draft of the tripartite treaty between the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom, and the United States limiting nuclear weapons testing that in 1963 became the
first international legal instrument containing specific steps for arms limitations in outer
space, the Partial Test Ban Treaty.16
Bilateral and multilateral efforts at managing space activities and producing
arrangements to reduce the possibilities of interstate conflict in space also continued
outside this institutional framework. But, until the early 1980s, there was no international
consensus on whether space military security issues deserved the attention they were
given and which forum was more appropriate for the discussion of these issues.17 In
1981, two UNGA resolutions requested the Conference on Disarmament,18 the successor
of the ENCD, to embark on negotiations with the view to reach an agreement on the text
of an international treaty preventing spread of the arms race to outer space, thereby
confirming the importance and urgency of space security issues and establishing the CD
as the main forum for this task.19

15 The Soviet Union submitted a document titled “Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under
Strict International Control, and the United States submitted Declaration on Disarmament: Programme for
General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World.” See Alves, Prevention o f an Arms Race in
Outer Space, 1991, 3.
16 “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water” was
signed by the United States, the United Kingdom o f Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Moscow on
August 5, 1963. It entered into force on October 10, 1963. See “Treaty Banning Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,” 1963. The Treaty was joined by other states with total
membership reaching 131 countries. Although the People’s Republic o f China actively participated in
deliberations and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it never joined the Partial Test Ban Treaty.
See Status o f Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements available at
http://disarmament2.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf (accessed 01.26.04).
17 Alves, Prevention o f an Arms Race in Outer Space, 1991, 5.
18 Then, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) was called the Committee on Disarmament (CD).
19 United Nations, “Conclusion on a Treaty on the Prohibition o f the Stationing o f Weapons o f any Kind
in Outer Space,” United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/36/99, December 9, 1981,
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r099.htm (accessed 09.16.02), and “General and Complete
Disarmament,” United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/36/97, December 9, 1981,
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r097.htm (accessed 01.26.04).
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The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva was founded in 1979 as the single
multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community after Member
States reached an agreement at the first special session of the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) devoted to the disarmament issues in 1978.

9n

The Conference was

establish to deal with a number of arms control and disarmament issues and together with
its predecessors successfully negotiated some crucial multilateral arms control and
disarmament agreements: the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Environmental
Modification and Seabed Treaties, the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention
(BTWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Comprehensive NuclearTest Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Prevention of an arms race in outer space became an agenda item of the
Conference on Disarmament in 1982 but an agreement on the objectives and scope of the
work of an Ad Hoc Working group was not reached until a few years later. The
discussion on space security issues acquired an added urgency after President Reagan’s
speech on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in March 1983. Although matters
relating to anti-ballistic missile systems were dealt with by the United States and the
Soviet Union on a bilateral basis within the framework o f the ABM regime, the SDI plan

20 The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva became a successor for a series o f intergovernmental
organizations dealing with disarmament issues: the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (TNDC,
1960), the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC, 1962-68), and the Conference o f the
Committee on Disarmament (CCD, 1969-78). See Conference on Disarmament, “History o f the Conference
on Disarmament,” Official Website, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cd-backgnd.html (accessed
07.11.04). At its creation, the CD had 40 members. Until 1995, only 38 members took part in the sessions
o f the CD due to the reunification o f Germany and the breakup o f the Yugoslavia. On June 17, 1995, the
CD admitted 23 new members. See Conference on Disarmament, Report o f the Conference on
Disarmament to the General Assembly o f the United Nations, CD/1436, September 12, 1996, 6,
http://disarmament.un.org8080/cd/cd-yrrep.html (accessed 01.24.04). Although the Conference has its own
rules and procedures and adopts its own agenda, it has a special relationship with the United Nations: the
CD takes into account recommendations made by the UNGA and the proposals presented by its members;
it presents annual reports on its work to the UNGA; the budget o f the CD is included into the budget o f the
United Nations; the CD is held on UN premises in Geneva and is served by the UN personnel.
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caused a growing concern on the part of the international community due to its
implications to the arms race in outer space and for international security more generally.
There was an understanding that requirements for an effective strategic defense against
ballistic missile would inevitably lead to the development, testing, and deployment of
systems capable of disabling or destroying space objects. In other words, it would entail
the development of ground, air, and space-based anti-satellite weapons as well.

9

1

Furthermore, it would lead not only to the development of new weapons and weapon
systems, which would be directed against space objects from the surface and air or used
in and from space, but also to a quantitative expansion of offensive missile forces in
attempts to overcome opponent’s BMD systems and to buildups of non-ballistic missiles.
In the light of these prospects, an agreement was finally reached on the mandate
of the A d Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) in
1985 but the Committee was not made a permanent body of the Conference on
Disarmament. The United Nations General Assembly requested the CD to establish, and
later re-establish, the Ad Hoc PAROS Committee in its annual resolutions since 1984 “...
with the view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or
agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space.”22
Following the UNGA recommendations, the CD reestablished the Ad Hoc PAROS
Committee at its plenary session each year between 1985-1994, with the mandate of the
Committee falling short o f the UNGA requests. The mandate of the A d Hoc PAROS

21 Alves, Prevention o f an Arms Race in Outer Space, 1991, 5-6.
22 The first UNGA resolution calling on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to establish the A d
Hoc Committee on the Prevention o f an Arms Race in Space at the beginning o f its session in 1985 was
adopted in 1984. See United Nations, “Prevention o f an Arms Race in Outer Space,” December 12, 1984,
Paragraph 8, A/RES/39/59, http://www/un/org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r059.htm (accessed 01.26.04).
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Committee encompassed identification of the issues relevant to the prevention of an arms
race in outer space and involved no negotiations of any space-related agreements.
During the Cold War years, the work of the Committee was characterized by the
significantly diverging assessments of the space-related issues by two large groupings of
delegations at the CD. On the issue of the mandate of the Ad Hoc PAROS Committee,
for example, there were differences between those delegations associated with the Group
of Western countries, on the one hand, and those associated with the Group of 21 and the
Group of Socialist countries, on the other, with the latter grouping favoring a negotiating
mandate for the Committee, and the former generally opposing this change of status.
The Group of the Western countries generally adhered to the view that the launching of
negotiations on issues related to arms race in outer space was premature, as there were
still problems with interpretations of basic concepts.

Characteristic of this position is a

statement made by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany:
A s long as the prevailing substantive and m ethodological divergences prevail, it
does not make sense to call for ‘negotiations’ without know ing w ith precision the
real objective, need, purpose and prospect for any o f the intended conventions,
treaties, am endm ents or regulations that are being urged. M oreover, it w ould not
make sense to hurry into regulations w hich could contain troublesom e
am biguities generated by superficial com prom ises, unbalanced approaches, lack
o f technical and juridical precision and im precise definitions.24

Most delegations associated with the Group of 21 or the Group of Socialist countries
considered it important to make real steps in updating the space security regime with a
legal and organizational framework that would allow the international community to deal
with the developments in space technology and applications.
23 There were, for example, problems with defining outer space and its boundaries, “peaceful purposes,”
“space weapons,” and the concept o f “militarization o f space.” See Alves, Prevention o f an Arms Race in
Outer Space, 1991, 10-20.
24 Conference on Disarmament, Statement Submitted by the Federal Republic o f Germany to the
Conference on Disarmament, CD/PV 502, April 11, 1989, 3, cited in Alves, Prevention o f an Arms Race in
Outer Space, 1991, 8.
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Thus, by the time the Cold War came to its unexpected end in 1991, the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva had nearly a decade of dealing with military
space security and a little over half a decade of working on the issues related to military
space security under the agenda item titled “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space”
within the A d Hoc PAROS Committee. Although the Committee’s mandate did not
allow for any negotiations on the military space issues, the Ad Hoc PAROS Committee
made a significant contribution in laying the groundwork necessary for establishing a
new security regime for outer space. Within its mandate the Committee tried to develop
agreed definitions of a “space object,” “peaceful uses of outer space,” “militarization” of
outer space, “space weapons,” and “space weapon system.” It argued for the importance
of determining the boundaries of outer space and identification of deficiencies in the
existing legal framework from the standpoint of prevention of an arms race in outer
space. The Committee discussed a number of proposals for regulating military activities
in space, for confidence-building measures, and institutional framework necessary for the
task of preventing an arms race in outer space. It examined and discussed a number of
working papers, drafts of new treaties and draft amendments to the Outer Space Treaty
and the Registration Convention, as well as proposals for mulitlateralization of the ABM
Treaty, submitted by a number of delegations in efforts to mend the eroding space
security regime and covering issues from prohibition of placing any weapons in space
and the use of force or a threat of the use of force in space to immunity of artificial
satellites, “space code o f conduct” and “rules of the road,” to creation of international
monitoring and verifications inspectorate to ensure compliance with non-weaponization
of space.25
25 A French Working Paper, for example, proposed introduction o f “rules o f the road” that would
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THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, AND THE CONFERENCE
ON DISARMAMENT BEFORE THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Among the three spacepowers—the United States, Soviet Union, and China—the
Soviet Union seemed to be the most concerned with the issue of the further militarization
of outer space, pressing for the multilateral discussion of arrangements for preventing a
space arms race.26 In 1981, the Soviet Union put forward a Draft Treaty on the
Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in Outer Space to the General
Assembly of the United Nations.27 The main provision of the 1981 Draft Treaty was
directed at prohibiting of placing objects with weapons of any kind into orbit and
deployment of “weapons in outer space in any other way, including also on piloted space

strengthen both the Registration Convention and the establishment o f a trajectory center for monitoring
flights o f satellites. The delegations from Italy, Peru, and Venezuela submitted proposals at various times,
suggesting amendments to the Outer Space Treaty. In 1990, the Argentine delegation submitted a
comprehensive proposal for strengthening the Registration Convention with the purpose o f making it an
instrument in preventing an arms race in space. The Pakistani delegation proposed multilaterization o f the
ABM Treaty and called on the A d Hoc PAROS Committee and the CD to start appropriate negotiations in
order to achieve an early agreement on this measure. See Alves, Prevention o f an Arms Race in Outer
Space, 1991, 89-94, 104.
2 The Soviet Union conducted a series o f ASAT tests in 1968-71 and 1976-78. In March 1978, the Soviet
Union responded positively to the Carter Administration’s proposal for ASAT negotiations. The two sides
conducted three rounds o f exploratory meetings in 1978-79. Although neither the Soviet Union nor the
United States officially withdrew from the negotiations, after the Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan in 1979
and the U.S. refusal to ratify the SALT II Treaty, the bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated and
discussions o f the ASAT weapons did not result in any arms control agreement. Besides the political
circumstances— the Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan and the end o f the superpowers’ ddtente— the perceived
by the U.S. unequal status o f the U.S. and Soviet ASAT programs impeded the progress o f bilateral
negotiations. At that time the United States considered the Soviet ASAT system to be operational, while
the U.S. ASAT system still needed testing. After the breakdown o f the bilateral ASAT negotiations, the
United Nations General Assembly and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament were the only two
international bodies where the discussion o f the space military security issues could be held and the Soviet
Union considered the matter o f military space developments to be important and the current situation
favorable to pursue an international discussion within these fora. The U.S. experts did not agree on the
interpretation o f the steps undertaken by the Soviet Union in attempts to prevent further militarization o f
space. One o f the theories posited that the Soviet Union decided to use this issue for propaganda purposes,
trying to shift international discussions away from the Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan and portray the
United States as being responsible for the escalation o f the arms race. Another theory suggested that the
Soviet interest in limiting ASAT developments was genuine and originating from Soviet calculations that
the U.S. would be able to outperform the Soviet Union in ASAT technology over time. The United States
refused to participate in multilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union.
27 United Nations, Letter dated 10 August 1981 from the Ministry fo r Foreign Affairs o f the Union o f
Soviet Socialist Republics Addressed to the Secretary-General, Official Records o f the United Nations
General Assembly, A/36/192, August 20, 1981.
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vessels of multiple use.”28 It also sought to proscribe the destruction, damage or
disturbance of the normal functioning of satellites and alteration of flight trajectories of
satellites put in orbit by other states.29 After consideration of this draft treaty, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution that called on the CD to embark on the
negotiation of an appropriate international treaty in order to prevent the spread of an arms
race into outer space and announced its decision to include in its provisional agenda of
the thirty-seventh session of the UNGA the item titled “Conclusion of a treaty on the
prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.”30 The United States
was among the twenty-one countries of the Western bloc who abstained in voting on this
resolution.

o1

Despite the lack of support on the part of the West, the issues of prevention of an
arms race in outer space became an annual item at the United Nations General Assembly.
The 1981 UNGA resolution also established the Conference on Disarmament as a
multilateral negotiating body on the issue of preventing a space arms race. After
consideration of the Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of Any
Kind in Outer Space at the UNGA, the Soviet Union presented its proposal to the
Conference on Disarmament a year later.32 At the Conference, the Soviet proposal was
met favorably by delegations from the Group of the Socialist countries. This draft
28 United Nations, “Draft Treaty on the Prohibition o f the Stationing o f Weapons o f any Kind in Outer
Space,” Article I, A/36/192, August 20,1981.
29 Ibid., Article III.
30 United Nations, “Conclusion on a Treaty on the Prohibition o f the Stationing o f Weapons o f any Kind
in Outer Space,” 1981. Since 1982, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions on prevention o f an
arms race in outer space became annual.
31 United Nations, United Nations General Assembly, Thirty-Seventh Session, 91st Plenary Meeting,
A/36/PV.91, December 9, 1981, 1627.
32 Conference on Disarmament, Letter dated 6 April 1982from the Representative o f the Union o f Soviet
Socialist Republics Addressed to the Chairman o f the Committee on Disarmament Transmitting the Draft
Treaty on the Prohibition o f the Stationing o f Weapons o f Arty Kind in Outer Space Submitted to the Thirtysixth Session o f the General Assembly, CD/274, 7 April, 1982, cited in Alves, Prevention o f an Arms Race
in Outer Space, 1991, 97.
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addressed not only the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space but also the
pressing issue of ASAT developments.

By contrast, the reaction of some delegations

from the Group of Western countries was critical of the Soviet draft, particularly those
aspects related to ASAT weapons.34
In 1983, the Soviet Union presented a new proposal entitled “A Draft Treaty on
the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and from Space Against the Earth” to
both the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament.35 In
this document, after taking into account many criticisms expressed during the multilateral
discussions of the 1981 draft, the Soviet Union suggested a ban on the use of force in
outer space, the atmosphere, and on the Earth through the utilization of space objects as
instruments of destruction and the use or threat of force against space objects.

Article 2

of the Draft Treaty prohibited development and testing of new ASAT systems and
requested destruction of the existing ASAT systems.37 It also proposed a prohibition on
the testing and use o f manned spacecraft for military purposes, including against
satellites. If the Draft Treaty were to be made into the law, this provision would have

33 Alves, Prevention o f an Arms Race in Outer Space, 1991, 98.
34 Ibid., 98-99.
35 United Nations, Letter dated 19 August 1983 from the First Vice-Chairman o f the Council o f Ministers
o f the Soviet Socialist Republics, Minster o f Foreign Affairs o f the USSR, U.N. Document A/38/194,
August 23, 1983, also available at http://www.nasda.gojp/lib/space-law/chapter_3/3-2-l-2_e.html (accessed
01.28.04); and Conference on Disarmament, Letter D ated 20 March 1984 Addressed to the President o f the
Conference on Disarmament from the Representative o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics,
Transmitting the Text o f a Draft Treaty on the Prohibition o f the Use o f Force in Outer Space andfrom
Space Against the Earth, CD/476, March 20, 1984, cited in Alves, Prevention o f an Arms Race in Outer
Space, 1991,99.
3 Article 1 o f the draft treaty states that (1) space objects are not to be used to threaten objects in outer
space, the atmosphere, and on the surface o f Earth, and (2) space objects themselves are not to be
threatened. This article would outlaw threats from space-based capabilities, such as space-based ASAT
and BMD systems. See United Nations, “Draft Treaty on the Prohibition o f the Use o f Force in Outer
Space and from Space Against the Earth,” Article 1, August 1983.
37 Ibid., Article 2.
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directly affected the United States’ Shuttle, which was designed to carry out civil as well
as military mission and could be thought as having some ASAT capability.
In 1988, the Soviet Union put fourth a comprehensive proposal for establishing an
International Space Monitoring Agency (ISMA) as a confidence-building measure for
outer space, as well as for strengthening European and international security via
monitoring compliance with a number of international treaties and for monitoring and
providing warning of natural disasters.38 Additionally, in March 1988, the Soviet Union
proposed to establish an International Space Inspectorate (ISA) the main task of which
would be to monitor states’ compliance if a treaty on prohibition of weaponization of
space was to be adopted by the Conference on Disarmament.39 All in all, not only did the
Soviet Union take an active part in the discussions of the military space security issues at
the Conference on Disarmament but it also actively contributed to the work of the
conference by providing its expertise and producing a number of comprehensive
proposals, covering a wide spectrum of space security issues and aimed at the creation of
a new security regime that would preserve space free of weapons.
The U.S. position on the matters of prevention of an arms race in outer space at
the Geneva Conference throughout the 1980s was one of reservation. The U.S.
delegation held the view that the existing space security regime was sufficient and did not
require negotiations on new international agreements or amendments of the existing ones.
For example, the United States expressed little support for the “Draft Treaty on the

38 Alves, Prevention o f an Arms Race in Outer Space, 1991, 121 -122.
39 Conference on Disarmament, Letter dated 1 7 March 1988from the Representative o f the Union o f
Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President o f the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the
Text o f a Document entitled “Establishment o f an International System o f Verification o f the NonDevelopment o f Weapons o f Any Kind in Outer Space, CD/817, March 17, 1988, cited in Alves, Prevention
o f an Arms Race in Outer Space, 1991, 122.
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Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and from Space Against the Earth”
submitted to the CD by the Soviet Union in 1984. Moreover, the U.S. delegation
considered this treaty detrimental for the existing international law.40 The United States
did not support proposals to revision of the Registration Convention with the view of
transforming it into an instrument of arms control, believing that such a step was outside
the competence o f the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.41 The United States
delegations also did not support proposals for comprehensive prohibition of ASAT
weapons, explaining its position with difficulties of defining ASAT weapons:
Another problem w ith a com prehensive A S A T ban concerns legal issue o f how
anti-satellite w eapons are to be defined and categorized. In addition to system s
that a State w ould ch oose to identify as an anti-satellite w eapon, there are m any
different types o f w eapon system s that could be used to destroy, dam age or
disable satellites.42

In response to the 1988 Soviet proposal for the creation of an International Space
Inspectorate (ISI) for verifying compliance with treaty obligations that included on-site
inspections before the launch of space objects, the United States expressed its opinion
that this proposal could be more destabilizing, than stabilizing.43
By the mid-1980s, unresolved space security-related issues began to hamper
further progress in negotiations on nuclear strategic forces reductions between the United
States and the Soviet Union. In 1984, President Reagan suggested to embark on periodic
consultations at policy level and regular meetings of experts and officials on a wide range
of security issues, including issues related to “militarization of space.”44 The Soviet
Union responded positively to the U.S. proposal. However, instead of taking the issue to
40 Alves, Prevention o f an Arms Race in Outer Space, 1991, 100.
41 Ibid., 1991,96.
42 See statement quoted in Alves, Prevention o f an Arms Race in Outer Space, 1991, 103.
43 Ibid., 124.
44 U.S. President, President Reagan’s Address to the 39,h Session o f the United Nations General Assembly
in New York, 1984.
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the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the two held a bilateral organizational meeting
in Geneva in early 1985 in order to set an agenda for new Nuclear and Space Talks
(NST), a separate from the CD negotiating body, which was to cover strategic nuclear
arms, intermediate-range nuclear forces, and defense and space security issues. The NST
had a significant impact on the discussions at the A d Hoc PAROS Committee in that most
of the members of the letter acknowledged that any progress for multilateral negotiations
on prohibitions or limitations of space weapons could be achieved only if the two
superpowers agreed upon and supported these measures.
The NST negotiations demonstrated the necessity of discussing strategic offensive
arms in connection with strategic defensive arms and space security issues. They also
showed that the United States preferred to discuss space security matters on a bilateral
rather than multilateral level. While taking part in the meetings of the A d Hoc PAROS
Committee, the U.S. placed its priority on the bilateral negotiations arguing that
fundamental framework must be first established on a bilateral level before multilateral
negotiations may begin. Until the end of the Cold War, the United States did not put
forth any proposals in the multilateral forum in the area of space security, adhering to the
view that the existing legal framework was sufficient.45
The Soviet position was, by contrast, that multilateral talks were important. This
view came from the recognition that multilateral arrangements were necessary due to the
rapid emergence of new space players. In its 1990 statement the Soviet Union suggested
that the discussions at the Ad Hoc PAROS Committee could serve as a vehicle:
... [T]o build up experience w ith constructive multilateral work as regards the
outer space dim ension o f security and stability. H ow ever important the bilateral

45 Alves, Prevention o f an Arms Race in Outer Space, 1991, 52.
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Soviet-American negotiations are, multilateral efforts are vital here, because an
increasing number of States are becoming involved in space activities.46
As became apparent during the NST talks, the United States and Soviet Union
pursued different goals with respect to space security: the Soviet Union sought to stem
the weaponization o f outer space by preserving and strengthening the 1972 ABM Treaty,
and the United States pursued these talks in order to facilitate cooperative transition
towards more stable deterrence that would increasingly rely on anti-ballistic missile
defense, including its space-based components.47
China, who formally jointed the Conference on Disarmament in 1980, expressed
its opposition to a possible extension of an arms race in outer space on numerous
occasions throughout the 1980s. Since 1984, for example, China repeatedly proposed to
the United Nations General Assembly draft resolutions on the prevention of an arms race
in outer space. During a meeting in Beijing in 1985, Deng Xiaoping shared China’s
concern and clear opposition to an arms race in outer space with the former U.S.
President Nixon. He stated:
We are very concerned about the escalation of the nature of the arms race and are
opposed to any arms race in outer space. We are against whoever goes in for the
development of outer space weapons.48
Although the People’s Republic of China became a member of the Conference on
Disarmament and had great concerns with respect to military space developments and the
prospect of an arms race in outer space, it played a limited role in the work of the
conference on space security issues through the 1980s, seeing prevention of an arms race

46 Conference on Disarmament, Statement submitted by the Union o f the Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Conference on Disarmament, CD/PV 560, June 28 1990, 11-12. See Ibid., 1991, 52.
47 Alves, Prevention o f an Arms Race in Outer Space, 1991, 50-51.
48 See Nuclear Threat Initiative, “China, Outer Space/Space Weapon-Related Statements and
Development,” NTI Official Website, http://www.nti.org/db/china/spacechr.htm (accessed 09.28.02).
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in space as being mostly the responsibility of the two superpowers.49 In 1990, assessing
progress of work on prevention of an arms race in outer space, in a statement before the
United Nations First Committee, Hou Zhitoung avowed:
It is disappointing that the two superpowers, which possess the biggest space
capabilities, have failed to make headway so far in prohibiting space weapons,
and the research and development of space weapons have led to a qualitative
escalation of the arms race.
The complete prohibition and thorough destruction of space weapons represent
the most fundamental and effective means of preventing an arms race in outer
space. China shares with the world community a strong expectation for the
countries with the greatest space capabilities to undertake fully their special
responsibility for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, to speed up in
earnest their bilateral negotiations to this end, and to conclude an agreement at an
early date on halting the development and deployment of space weapons and
destroying all such weapons.50
In the same statement, Hou Zhitong called on the Conference on Disarmament and the Ad
Hoc PAROS Committee to start negotiations promptly on “an agreement to prevent an
arms race in outer space in all its aspects, to prohibit and destroy all space weapons, and
to ensure the de-weaponization of outer space.”51
Thus, this was the distribution of interests within the Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva by the end of the Cold War, with the Soviet Union trying to play a role of a
leading player in a quest to prevent the weaponization of outer space, the United States
staying aloof, and China keeping a distance and waiting for the superpowers to resolve
their issues at a bilateral level, while in principal sympathizing with the Soviet Union’s
initiatives to prohibit the emplacement of weapons in space.
49 The Chinese delegation to the Geneva Conference submitted its position paper on the issue of
prevention o f an arms race in outer space (CD/579) in 1985. In this paper, China iterated its position on
space security issues, reaffirmed its adherence to the concept o f outer space as the common heritage o f
mankind. The paper emphasized China’s view that exploration o f outer space should serve economic,
scientific and cultural development o f all countries and benefit all mankind. The paper also expressed
China’s opposition to any kind o f arms race in outer space.
50 See Nuclear Threat Initiative, “China, Outer Space/Space Weapon-Related Statements and
Development.”
51 Ibid.
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THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE CONFERENCE ON
DISARMAMENT AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR
The end o f the Cold War meant the end of the East-West confrontation that, on
the one hand, opened new opportunities for cooperation and reaching unprecedented
agreements, including on the space security issues, and on the other hand, let the urgency
of such agreements decrease precipitously as the menace of nuclear Armageddon faded
into historic background. For the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the end of the
Cold War brought about a number of urgent tasks and opportunities for making a
breakthrough in nuclear arms control and disarmament. Throughout the 1990s and early
2000s, the Conference’s agenda included such items as cessation of the nuclear arms race
and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war; effective international arrangements
to assure non-nuclear weapons states against the use or threat o f use of nuclear weapons;
prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices; new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such
weapons; radiological weapons; a comprehensive program of disarmament; transparency
of armaments; and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

With the significant

modification of the U.S. plans for the development of anti-ballistic missile defense under
the George H. W. Bush and Clinton Administrations the prevention of a space arms race
further decreased in its urgency. At the same time, the commercialization of space
activities that accelerated after the end of the Cold War blurred military and non-military
space applications, further complicating the task of making multilateral arrangements for
military space security. More and more countries became willing to join the ranks of the
established spacepowers and also to have a say in the multilateral decision making with
52 See the annual reports o f the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Conference on Disarmament
Official Website, http://disarmament.un.org8080/cd/cd-yrrep.html (accessed 01.24.04).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

360

respect to space security arrangements. The CD increased its membership but decided to
continue to operate under the principle of consensus.
As a result of these developments and despite the United Nations General
Assembly annual calls to reestablish the A d Hoc PAROS Committee, the Conference on
Disarmament managed to follow the UN recommendations only up until 1994 when the
Ad Hoc PAROS Committee was reestablished for the last time. In the early part of the
1990s, the Committee continued its substantive work on legal and terminological issues
and on confidence-building measures in outer space. It also carried on its work trying to
identify whether the existing outer space regime was sufficient to prevent an arms race in
space and, if it was not, what measures would be needed to fill the gaps. It explored a
number o f options such as drafting new legal instruments, amendments, and additional
protocols to the existing agreements. Considerable attention was devoted to the
discussion of confidence-building measures (CBMs) in outer space, with Russia leading
the efforts in this issue area. During the 1991-1994 sessions, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc
Committee, for example, appointed Friends of the Chair to conduct open-ended
consultations on this issue.

Proposal consisting of three clusters of CBMs—measures

improving transparency of pre-launch activities, “rules of the road” measures, and
measures required for monitoring purposes with the proposed Code of Conduct—were

53 The so-called “Friends o f the Chair” was appointed during this time to deal with three issues: (1)
terminological aspects related to prevention o f an arms race in outer space, (2) issues related to verification
o f ASATs, and (3) confidence-building measures. In 1991, A. Artuykhin o f the Delegation o f the USSR
was appointed a Friend o f the Chair on confidence-building measures; from 1993-1994, Colonel G.
Diachenko and then succeeded by Colonels Y. Novosadov and V. Sukharev, Mr. Alexander Vorobiev o f
the Russian Federation’s delegation. See Conference on Disarmament, Report o f the Conference on
Disarmament to the General Assembly o f the United Nations, CD/1111, September 4, 1991, Report o f the
Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly o f the United Nations, CD/1173, September 3, 1992,
Report o f the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly o f the United Nations, CD/1222,
September 3, 1993, and Report o f the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly o f the United
Nations, CD/1281, September 13, 1994.
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prepared and presented to the Committee over the years.54 The 1994 “Draft Guidelines
Regarding Measures on Confidence-Building and Predictability in Outer Space
Activities,” a consolidated document or a resume of the existing proposals on the CBMs
and the previously held discussions on them prepared by the Friend of Chair, was
discussed by the Committee members but no agreement was reached on whether to treat
the document as the foundation of further considerations.55 The Friend o f the Chair
appointed in 1994 suggested returning to the discussion of the issues of CBMs in outer
space at a later time when a better understanding on the substance of the CBMs was
reached. Apparently, the Friend of the Chair, the member of the Russian Federation’s
delegation, expected convergence of views to emerge with some passage of time and
further work within the conference.
The overall focus of work within the Ad Hoc PAROS Committee in its last years
of work shifted from attempts to draft and discuss international treaties prohibiting space
weapons towards greater attention to the CBMs in outer space. However, consensus on
the set of measures and their substance did not emerge, with a number of countries,
including China, expressing their dissatisfaction with the emphasis on the CBMs at the
expense of the work on the legal instruments prohibiting the weaponization of outer
space. The 1993 Report stated:
The delegation of China emphasized that while CBMs contributed to the positive
development in international relations, their role was limited for the objective of
this Committee. CBMs, on their own, could not eliminate the danger of
54 Over the years o f work on the issue, a number o f proposals on CBMs in outer space that were aimed at
reinforcing the existing regime and putting in place new mechanisms encouraging peaceful uses o f outer
space were submitted by delegations from Argentina, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and
USSR/Russia. See Alves, Building Confidence in Outer Space Activities, 1996, 60.
55 Conference on Disarmament, “Draft Guidelines Regarding Measures on Confidence-Building and
Predictability in Outer Space Activities,” CD/OS/WP.69, July 1, 1994, listed in the Report o f the
Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly o f the United Nations, CD/12 81, September 13,
1994, 128.
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weaponization in outer space. Therefore, the discussions on CBMs should not
obstruct or delay indefinitely the process of formulating an effective legal
instrument banning all space weapons and preventing an arms race in outer
space.56
Consensus was also unattainable on the long-discussed issues such as the
adequacy of the existing legal regime for preventing space arms race. Members of the
Group of 21 and China maintained that the existing legal instruments were “far from
effective in preventing an arms race in outer space.”57 These delegations pointed out that
the existing legal regime permitted launches into and testing of conventional weapons
and weapons based on new physical principles in outer space. Moreover, not only did the
delegations from the Group of 21 and China disagree with the opinion that the current
legal regime for preventing space arms race was sufficient, they also expressed
dissatisfaction with the existing space security situation more generally, calling on the Ad
£Q

Hoc PAROS Committee to take steps towards demilitarization of outer space.

These

delegations believed that the international political situation was favorable for concluding
a universal, comprehensive, legally-binding, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty
banning an arms race in outer space. They insisted that legal foundation developed
within the Ad Hoc PAROS Committee on the issue since the establishment of this body
in 1985 was adequate as a basis for rapid elaboration of a new legal regime to prevent an
arms race in outer space.59 Some of the delegations called for amending Article IV of the
1967 Outer Space Treaty to include the prohibition of all types of space weapons. Some
delegations suggested a ban on the testing, developm ent and deploym ent o f A SA T

56 Conference on Disarmament, Report o f the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly o f the
United Nations, September 3,1993, 32.
57 Conference on Disarmament, Report o f the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly o f the
United Nations, September 13, 1994, 129.
58 Ibid.
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systems. There was also a call for concrete steps to set up international agencies under
the auspices of the United Nations for monitoring space activities, referring to proposals
submitted by France, the former Soviet Union, and Canada.
An opposing view was expressed by some delegations of the Western Group who
maintained that the Charter of the United Nations and existing multilateral and bilateral
arms control agreements together with customary international law and national space
laws provided a sufficient basis for peaceful uses of outer space.60 They also held the
opinion that there was no arms race in outer space or any significant developments of
space weapons by any states and therefore there was no need to negotiate on any new
legal instruments. This view also led them to conclude that there was no need for a
negotiating mandate for the A d Hoc PAROS Committee. Although numerous ideas and
concepts of space arms control were brought to the discussion at the committee and some
progress was achieved, after the 1994 session the CD failed to reestablish of the Ad Hoc
PAROS Committee altogether, despite the annual UN resolutions calling on the CD to
continue its work within the Ad Hoc PAROS Committee.

THE SPACE ARMS CONTROL DEBATE WITHOUT THE AD HOC PAROS
COMMITTEE: THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA, AND CHINA
Between 1994 and 1998 the work on the PAROS item of the CD agenda ceased
and no new documents were submitted for consideration by the Conference, except for a
working paper from the Canadian delegation entitled “Working Paper Concerning CD

60 The treaties related to space security often referred to in this context are the following: the 1963 Partial
Test Ban Treaty, the 1972 ABM Treaty, the 1977 ENMOD Convention, the 1986 Convention on
Assistance in Case if a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the 1992 International
Telecommunication Constitution and Convention, and the 1993 START II Treaty. See Conference on
Disarmament, Report o f the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly o f the United Nations,
September 13,1994, 129.
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Action on Outer Space.”61 In 1998, however, the issue of prevention of an arms race in
outer space began to be raised again in the light of the new developments: firstly, military
plans and forecasts released by the U.S. Department of Defense; secondly, political
momentum in the U.S. Congress in favor of the development and deployment of a
ballistic missile defense; and thirdly, bilateral agreements signed by the United States and
Russia that opened the door for the deployment of non-strategic ballistic missile defense
systems.
In 1995, the U.S. Air Force Board published its vision of the military uses of
space in a report titled New World Vistas: Air and Space Power fo r the 21st Century with
a forecast envisioning the development and utilization o f space weapons.

fO

In 1996, the

U.S. Department of Defense released its Joint Vision 2010 with further plans for the
weaponization of space.63 In January 1997, U.S. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and
25 co-sponsors introduced the National Missile Defense Act o f 1997 requesting the
deployment of a national missile defense system by the end of the year 2003.64 In
January 1997, Senator Richard Lugar introduced the Defend the United States o f America
Act o f 1997, calling for the development of an NMD system capable of being deployed

61 Conference on Disarmament, “Working Paper Concerning CD Action on Outer Space,” CD/1487,
January 21, 1998, listed in the Report o f the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly o f the
United Nations, CD/1557, September 8, 1998, http://disarmament.un.org8080/cd/cd-yrrp.html (accessed
01.25.04).
62 U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, New World Vistas: Air and Space Power fo r the 21st
Century, Summary Volume, Chapter II “Capabilities and Technologies,” December 1995,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/vistas/vistas/html (accessed 03.25.04).
63 U.S. Department o f Defense, Office o f the Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, Joint Vision 2010,
1996.
64 National Missile Defense Act o f 1997, introduced in the Senate on January 21, 1997,
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1997/s7.htm (accessed 03.25.04). This Bill was approved by the
Senate Armed Services Committee on April 24, 1997, but no further action was taken on it. See “National
Missile Defense: An Overview o f Alternative Plans,” Arms Control Today, January/February 1998,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_01-02/factnmd.asp (accessed 03.25.04).
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by the end of 2003 with a congressional vote in 2000.65 On September 26,1997, the
United States and Russia signed a range of documents modifying the ABM Treaty to
allow the United States to develop and deploy “effective systems to counter ballistic
missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles.”66
In 1998, in response to these developments, China’s Ambassador to the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva Mr. Li addressed the Conference after it
established an A d Hoc Committee on Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and
expressed his regret for the failure of the CD to reestablish the A d Hoc PAROS
Committee. He criticized the opinion of “some delegations” that there was no arms race
in space. He argued to the contrary that preventing an arms race in outer space had
become a “present and pressing issue for the international community.”

ft7

According to

Li, the end of the Cold War, despite the significant relaxation of political tensions
between the former Cold War rivals, did not result in the demise of the “Star Wars” plan
and technologies developed within the SDI project has found their way into the current
space weapons programs. Li asserted that the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems—
the Navy Area Defense System and Theater High Altitude Area Defense System
(THAAD)—represented reincarnations of the weapons programs of SDI and alleged that
65 Defend the United States o f America Act o f 1997, 105th Cong., 1st sess., S. 64. Introduced by Senator
Richard D. Lugar, January 21, 1997, http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1997/lugar_l.htm (accessed
03.25.04).
66 These agreements include “Standing Consultative Commission First Agreed Statement Related to the
Treaty Between the United States o f America and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation
o f Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems o f May 26, 1972;” “Standing Consultative Commission Second Agreed
Statement Relating to the Treaty Between the United States o f America and the Union o f Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation o f Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems o f May 26, 1972;” “Agreement on
Confidence-Building Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic
Ballistic Missiles;” “Standing Consultative Commission Joint Statement on the Annual Exchange o f
Information on the Status o f Plans and Programs With Respect to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles
Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles.” See Federation o f American Scientists, List o f ABM Treatyrelated documents, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/index.html (accessed 03.19.04).
67 See Conference on Disarmament, Final Record o f the Eight Hundred and Third Plenary Meeting,
CD/PV.803, August 13, 1998, http://www.unog.ch/disarm/pvs/pv803.htm (accessed 01.15.04).
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these systems were capable of intercepting missiles not only within the atmosphere but
also in outer space. He also expressed his concern with the accelerating development of
space-based laser weapons capable not only of intercepting ballistic missiles but also
attacking satellites in orbit. All these, in his view, constituted a solid ground for a serious
concern with a space arms race:
The w eapons system s under developm ent are o f various types. Som e are
dep loyed entirely in outer space or targeted at objects in outer space; som e are
space-based but provide target inform ation for ground-based w eapon system .
H ow ever, they all serve one purpose: They seek to procure absolute strategic
m ilitary superiority and absolute security for the country concerned. There can
be o n ly one consequence: to turn outer space into a base for w eapons and a
battlefield. This prospect w ill upset regional and global strategic stability, trigger
a n ew arms race and undermine international peace and security. The
international com m unity cannot but be deeply concerned and on its guard against
this prospect.68

Li also argued that the existing legal regime governing military uses of space was
“inadequate to prevent an arms race in outer space” and that the recently signed
agreement by the United States and the Russian Federations on modifications of the
ABM Treaty led to further serious deterioration o f the existing regime, for now the
United States could develop and deploy space-based TMD systems.69 He called for an
immediate action in order to prevent weaponization of outer space, to ban the testing,
deployment and use of any weapon systems in outer space, and to prohibit the use of
outer space for striking at targets on the ground.70 The year 1998 marked the reopening
of the debate on military aspects of space security when PAROS became again an
important issue at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
In January 1999, President Clinton approached Russian President Yeltsin with a
request for further modification of the ABM Treaty in order to allow the United States to

69

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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deploy a limited National Missile Defense. In July 1999, President Clinton signed the
Missile Defense Act o f 1999, setting out a course for the development and deployment of
a missile defense system.71 Against this background, the concern over the issue of a
space arms race at the Conference on Disarmament continued to grow. Both China and
Canada submitted proposals relating to the action of the CD on outer space under the
PAROS agenda item, trying to restart multilateral discussions of the PAROS issues.

TJ

Furthermore, under the item of “Consideration of Other Areas Dealing with the Cessation
of the Arms Race and Disarmament and other Relevant Measure,” a number of space
security-related papers were submitted to the Conference on Disarmament. Russia
expressed its concerns in connection with the adoption by the Senate of the United States
of the National Missile Defense Bill.73 Russia’s Permanent Representative at the CD and
China’s Acting Head of the Delegation sent a letter with their joint communique on the
issue of the ABM Treaty.74 The joint Russian-Chinese press release was a result of the

71 The National Missile Defense Act o f 1999 (Public Law 106-38) was signed into law on July 22, 1999.
This law stated: “It is the policy o f the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible and
effective National Missile Defense system capable o f defending the territory o f the United States against
limited ballistic missile attack (when accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to the
annual authorization o f appropriations and the annual appropriation o f funds for National Missile Defense”.
See National Missile Defense Act o f 1999, H.R.4/P.L. 106-38, 106th Congress, 1999, Section 2,
http://missilethreat.com/law/federal/nmdact99.html (accessed 06.08.04).
72 Canada submitted its paper entitled Proposal concerning CD action on outer space, CD/1569, February
4, 1999; and China submitted Draft decision on the reestablishment o f an A d Hoc Committee on the
prevention o f an arms race in outer space and its mandate, CD/1576, March 18, 1999, cited in Conference
on Disarmament, Report o f the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly o f the United
Nations, CD/1595, September 7, 1999, http://disarmament.un.org8080/cd/cd-yrrp.html (accessed 01.25.04).
73 Letter dated 25 March 1999from the Permanent Representative o f the Russian Federation addressed to
the S e c re ta ry -G e n e ra l o f th e C o n feren ce tra n sm ittin g th e tex t o f an o fficia l sta te m e n t m a d e b y th e

representative o f the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs o f the Russian Federation on 18 March 1999 in
connection with the adoption by the Senate o f the United States ofAmerica o f a bill on deployment o f a
national missile defense system, CD/1580, March 26, 1999, listed in Conference on Disarmament, Report
o f the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly o f the United Nations, 1999.
74 Conference on Disarmament, Letter dated 28 April 1999from the Permanent Representative o f the
Russian Federation and the Acting H ead o f Delegation o f China to the Conference on Disarmament
addressed to the Secretary-General o f the Conference transmitting a join t press communique on issue
related to the ABM Treaty, CD/1584, April 28, 1999, listed in Report o f the Conference on Disarmament to
the General Assembly o f the United Nations, 1999. See Conference on Disarmament Press Release
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bilateral consultations conducted between the Russian Federation and People’s Republic
of China in Moscow on the issue of the ABM Treaty on April 14, 1999. At the
Conference on Disarmament, Mr. Sidorov of the Russian delegation addressing the
Conference drew attention to this Sino-Russian press communique. He emphasized that
implementation of the existing plans for deployment of national anti-missile defense
systems would constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty. Mr. Li of the Chinese
delegation expressed his country’s view on the recent NMD plans. He said that such a
system would have a profound negative influence on global and regional strategic
stability and would trigger an arms race in space.
These developments signified three important trends that gained further
development. First, although the A d Hoc Committee was not reestablished during the
1999 session of the CD, the debate on the space security issues acquired renewed
attention. Second, China emerged as one of the major players in this debate. And third,
signs of a forming “alliance” between China and Russia on the space security issue
became apparent.75 The 1999 National Missile Defense Bill prompted a change in
Russia’s approach to space security issues at the Conference on Disarmament when
Russia started actively supporting China’s calls for concrete steps towards prevention of
an arms race in outer space. Russia finally came to the conclusion that it could no longer
contain the U.S. development of anti-ballistic defenses and decided to side with China’s
position within the multilateral arms control body.

DCF/367, May 11, 1999, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990511.DCF367.html (accessed
03.26.04).
75 The term “alliance “is used here to indicate not a traditional alliance involving commitments o f states’
military capabilities to achieving a common goal, but coordinated or joint actions o f states within an
international organization in order to achieve a common goal within the framework o f the organization.
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The 2000 session of the Conference on Disarmament was the second deadlocked
session in a row, during which member states did not reach a consensus on the program
of work, with such major issues as the FMCT and PAROS being the stumbling blocks.
The 2000 session became the arena for one of the most heated exchanges. It was
reminiscent of the Cold War debates and indicative of the depth of disagreement between
the delegations of the United States, on the one hand, and China and Russia, on the other,
on the issues of outer space security. During the meeting at the beginning of the 2000
session, the Russian representative reaffirmed Russia’s position on the ABM Treaty and
emphasized that a reduction of strategic offensive arms would not be possible if the
Treaty were not preserved and strengthened.76 He also put forth Russia’s position in
favor of speedy negotiations and conclusion of agreements that would establish a new
international legal regime, prohibiting the introduction of strike weapons in outer space
and of reestablishing for this purpose of the Ad Hoc PAROS Committee with the
negotiating mandate. This was also the position of the Chinese delegation. In a speech to
the Conference, the Chinese Representative Hu Xiaodi argued that the U.S. plans to
develop and deploy ballistic missile defense represented U.S. plans for strategic
dominance in outer space and that this plan would inevitably lead to the introduction of
weapons into space and to the transformation of outer space into a battlefield.77
Ambassador Robert Grey of the United States responded to these charges with a
speech in which he restated the long-held American position on the current legal regime,

76 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Sidorov o f the Russian Federation at the Meeting
on March 23, 2000, CD/PV.847, March 23,2000, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/
cd/cd-mtngs2000.html (accessed 01.29.04).
77 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Hu o f the P eople’s Republic o f China at the
Meeting on June 22, 2000, CD/PV.852, June 22, 2000, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmtngs2000.html (accessed 01.29.04).
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characterizing it as being sufficient. He argued that multilateral negotiations on any new
legal instruments in the area of outer space would be premature and unnecessary.
According to Grey, there was no arms race in space, rather an “unprecedented
cooperation.”78 However, the situation in which the Conference failed to produce a
program of work because the issue of negotiations on the Fissile Materials Cut-Off
Treaty was linked to the progress on the issue of prevention of an arms race in outer
space, Ambassador Grey characterized as a “crisis of credibility” for the 66-nation
Conference.79 As the United States held great interest in the Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty, he called on the CD to begin the FMCT negotiations immediately.80
In response, China’s Representative Hu Xiaodi turned his attention back to the
“dire consequences of NMD.” In his view, China had all the reasons and the right to be
concerned with the U.S. plans for the NMD. Firstly, the deployment of NMD would
undermine global strategic balance and, as a result of this, the world could face “the
blackmail of nuclear war.”81 Secondly, NMD would obstruct the arms control and
disarmament process and trigger a new arms race. Thirdly, it would threaten
international non-proliferation efforts. In China’s view these reasons were sufficient for
starting negotiations on legal instruments for preventing an arms race in space. Hu
strongly defended his country’s right to stand up for its interests by linking the
negotiations on FMCT with PAROS negotiations.
78 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Grey o f the United States ofAmerica at the
Meeting on August 31, 2000, CD/PV.858, August 31 2000, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmtngs2000.html (accessed 01.29.04).
79 Ibid.
80 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Grey o f the United States ofAmerica at the
Meeting on September 5, 2000, CD/PV.859, September 5, 2000, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmtngs2000.html (accessed 01.29.04).
81 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Hu o f the P eople’s Republic o f China at the
meeting on September 14, 2000, CD/PV.860, September 14, 2000, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmtngs2000.html (accessed 01.29.04).
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Ambassador Grey vehemently rejected China’s allegations that actions or plans of
the United States were based on a “desire for hegemony, of any intent to carry out
nuclear blackmail, or any supposed quest for absolute freedom to use force or threaten to
«

•

use force in international relations.”

RO

•

•

Thus, not only did the two positions diverge

fundamentally, but the debate over time became highly charged and prospects for
reaching compromises considerably deteriorated.
During the 2000 session of the Conference on Disarmament, China submitted a
position paper, suggesting ways to address the issue of prevention of an arms race in
outer space at the CD

0-3

and, together with Russia, presented the Sino-Russian joint

statement made by the Presidents of the PRC and the Russian Federation in July 2000
concerning the development and deployment of an anti-missile defense system.84 In the
former paper entitled “China’s Position on and Suggestions for Ways to Address the
Issue of Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the Conference on Disarmament,”
submitted on February 9, 2000, China argued that prevention of an arms race in space
was an urgent and important matter that should be dealt with by the Geneva Conference
on a priority basis. The document stated:
82 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Grey o f the United States ofAmerica at the
Meeting on September 14, 2000, CD/PV.860, September 14,2000, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmtngs2000.html (accessed 01.29.04).
83 Conference on Disarmament, Letter dated 9 February 2000from the Permanent Representative o f
China to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General o f the Conference
transmitting a working paper entitled ‘China’s position on and suggestions fo r ways to dress the issue o f
prevention o f an arms race in outer space at the Conference on Disarmament, ’ CD/1606, February 9, 2000,
listed in Conference on Disarmament, Report o f the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly
o f the United Nations, CD/1627, September 22,2000, http://disarmament.un.org8080/cd/cd-yrrp.html
(accessed 01.25.04).
84 Conference on Disarmament, Letter dated 1 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative o f China
to the Conference on Disarmament and the Permanent Representative o f the Russian Federation addressed
to the Secretary-General o f the Conference transmitting the Chinese and Russian texts o f the Joint
Statement made by the Presidents o f the People's Republic o f China and the Russian Federation on 18 July
2000 concerning anti-missile defense, CD/1622, August 4, 2000, listed in Conference on Disarmament,
Report o f the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly o f the United Nations, CD/1627,
September 22, 2000, http://disarmament.un.org8080/cd/cd-yrrp.html (accessed 01.25.04).
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As the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, the Conference on
Disarmament (Conference) should concentrate on the most pressing and
prominent issues in international arms control and disarmament, the ones that
have the greatest bearing on global peace and security in the twenty-first century.
PAROS is one such important issue, and should therefore be a top priority at the
Conference. The Conference should play a primary role in the negotiations to
prevent any form o f arms race in outer space.85

The urgency of the matter was dictated, according to the Chinese paper, by the “new
developments”—developments that “if unchecked, may lead to the weaponization of
outer space in the near future or even to a multilateral arms race in outer space.”

At the

same time, it was argued that the Conference on Disarmament, which had been
conducting various discussions and consultations on the PAROS issues since 1982,
accumulated considerable expertise and laid the necessary foundation for future work.
The paper suggested, first, to reestablish the A d Hoc PAROS Committee and to begin
negotiations on the legal instrument prohibiting testing, deployment and use of weapons,
weapon systems and components in outer space. Second, as the preparatory phase, the
Committee should review present and future proposals on PAROS and current military
activities in outer space. The paper also argued that the present legal regime was
ineffective at preventing the weaponization of outer space, as it contained a number of
loopholes and ambiguities, and no longer reflected the most recent developments in space
technology. In conclusion, the paper put forth ideas for a new international legal
instrument, including its main elements: purpose, basic obligations, definitions,
verification, mechanism for consultations and resolving disputes. According to the paper,

85 See “China’s Position on and Suggestions for Ways to Address the Issue o f Prevention o f an Arms Race
in Outer Space at the Conference on Disarmament,” CD/1606, Working Paper contained in Conference on
Disarmament, Letter dated 9 February, 2000 From the Permanent Representative o f China to the
Conference on Disarmament Addressed to the Secretary-General o f the Conference Transmitting a
Working Paper Entitled “China’s Position on and Suggestions fo r Ways to Address the Issue o f Prevention
o f an Arms Race in Outer Space at the Conference on Disarmament, " CD/1606, February 9,2000.
86 Ibid.
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China would be open to suggestions and ideas, while “striving unremittingly to prevent
the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space and to ensure the continued
07

peaceful use of outer space for the benefit of all mankind.”
The second document, submitted by the representatives of China and Russia to
the Conference on Disarmament in August 2000, transferred a joint statement by
President Jiang Zemin and President Vladimir Putin made during their bilateral meeting
in Moscow on July 18, 2000. The two leaders jointly reiterated that they continued to
consider the ABM Treaty “the cornerstone of global strategic stability and international
security,” serving as the foundation for the key international arms control agreements
designed to reduce and limit strategic offensive weapons and prevent proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.88 Condemning further attempts to amend the ABM Treaty
and placing “the full responsibility” for “the gravest adverse consequences for security”
on “those countries pressing for an amendment,” the statement outlined an alternative
approach to dealing with the emerging security challenges:
The proper response to the n ew challenges in the field o f international security,
the m aintenance o f w orld peace and the safeguarding o f the legitim ate security
interests o f all countries should not be to scrap the A B M Treaty, but instead to
prom ote the establishm ent o f a new , ju st and equitable international political
order, to spurn the practice o f pow er politics and the ex cessive use o f m ilitary
force in international affairs and further to strengthen regional and international
•
89
security.

This statement represented the growing convergence of the two countries’ positions with
respect to security issues in outer space. It drew upon a series of previous statements

87 Ibid.
88 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Hu, CD/PV.860, September 14, 2000.
89 Conference on Disarmament, Letter dated 1 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative o f China
to the Conference on Disarmament and the Permanent Representative o f the Russian Federation Addressed
to the Secretary-General o f the Conference Transmitting the Chinese and Russian Texts o f the Joint
Statement Made by the Presidents o f the P eople’s Republic o f China and the Russian Federation on 18 July
2000 Concerning Anti-Missile Defense, CD/1622, August 4, 2000, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cddocs2000.html (accessed 03.26.04).
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issued by the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China: the Sino-Russian joint
statement made on November 23,1998, the Chinese-Russian press communique of April
14,1999, and the statement adopted at the summit meeting on December 10, 1999.
In the meantime, the United States made an effort to ensure Russia’s cooperation
on strategic issues at a bilateral level, trying to prevent an emerging political tandem
between China and Russia. Following the meeting of President Clinton and President
Putin in New York on September 6,2000, the representatives of the United States and
Russia at the CD sent the letter to the Conference with a joint statement on a “Strategic
Stability Cooperation Initiative” made by the two presidents during this meeting.90 In
this statement, a whole range of measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening bilateral
cooperation in the field of strategic security issues was delineated, including plans for
further reduction of nuclear arsenals, establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of
Data from Early Warning Systems and Notification of Missile Launches, strengthening
the MTCR, and various confidence-building measures as “an element o f facilitating
compliance with, preservation and strengthening the ABM Treaty.”91
On the same day as the U.S.-Russian joint statement, Russia’s President Putin,
addressing the opening session of the United Nations Millennium Summit of World’s
Leaders in New York, stated that plans for the militarization of outer space were
“particularly alarming” and proposed an international conference on the prevention of
militarization of outer space in Moscow to coincide with the 40th Anniversary of the first
90 Conference on Disarmament, Letter dated 19 September 2000from the Permanent Representative o f the
Russian Federation and the Permanent Representative o f the United States ofAm erica to the Conference
on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General o f the Conference transmitting the English and
Russian texts o f the Joint Statement ‘Strategic Stability Initiative ’ and Implementation Plan issued at the
meeting in New York on 6 September 2000, CD/1626, September 20, 2000, listed in Conference on
Disarmament, Report o f the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly o f the United Nations,
CD/1627, September 22, 2000, http://disarmament.un.org8080/cd/cd-yrrp.html (accessed 01.25.04).
91 Ibid.
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human space flight.92 Strongly opposing U.S. plans for the development of a national
ballistic missile defense, Russia attempted to bring new life to the discussion of the ways
to prevent an arms race in space by launching it at a new forum and appealing to the
wider international community.
During the 2001 session of the Conference on Disarmament, the member
countries failed to make compromises and agree on the program of work. The
Conference remained deadlocked.93 At the heart of contention at the Conference lay the
issue of the United States’ national ballistic missile defense. At an opening plenary
meeting, the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov addressed the Conference, reiterating
Russia’s vision of the new international security and the role of arms control and
disarmament in general, and the Geneva Conference in particular, in international
security. He stated that in the era o f globalization, international security, as well as the
arms control and disarmament process, had become global and indivisible. He also
stressed that security must be equal for all states in the international community and that
the key for global security was in “the collective upholding of strategic stability in the
world.”94 In order for the arms control and disarmament process to succeed, he
emphasized, each state needed to be confident that its security was “closely linked to that
of the whole international community” and that this was “underpinned by political
arrangements and international legal instruments.” Furthermore, significant success of
the arms control and disarmament process could only be achieved on the condition that
92 See United Nations Press Release, “Putin Comments on the Militarization o f Space,” September 6,
2002, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/paros/news/treaty-paros-000906a.htm (accessed 01.29.04).
93 Conference on Disarmament, Report o f the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly o f the
United Nations, CD/1653, September 13, 2001, 6, http://disarmament.un.org8080/cd/cd-yrrp.html
(accessed 01.25.04).
94 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov at the opening
plenary meeting on February I, 2001, CD/PV.864, February 1, 2001,
http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cd-mtngs2000.html, (accessed 01.29.04).
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the 1972 ABM Treaty was not only preserved but strengthened. Ivanov said: “In our
opinion, this treaty even now remains one of the pillars of today’s architecture in the area
of arms control and disarmament.”95 He called for the resumption of the ABM dialogue
between the United States and Russia. In order to address “new missile threats” while
still preserving the ABM Treaty, Ivanov recounted measures previously suggested by the
Russian Federation, which included: (1) transparency and confidence building via the use
on a multilateral basis of the Moscow-based missile launch data exchange center,
established by the United States and Russia; (2) global missile and missile technology
non-proliferation control system; and (3) broad international cooperation open to all
states in the area of theater missile defense.
Echoing the themes of the Ivanov’s address, Chinese representative Hu Xiaodi
outlined the PRC’s vision of a “new security concept” for the 21st century:
The old security concept, w hich w as based on m ilitary alliances, operated
through the build-up o f armaments and has as its aim the quest for one country’s
absolute security to the detriment o f other countries’ interests, should be
discarded. The tw enty-first century needs a n ew security concept w hich should
be centered on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, cooperation and resolving
disputes through dialogue.96

According to Hu, progress in nuclear disarmament could be achieved only if
global strategic balance and stability were preserved and the security of all states ensured.
He emphasized that “the most urgent and imperative task” facing the international
community was to “preserve the ABM Treaty and check the trend of weaponization of
outer space.” Hu reiterated that China considered the ABM Treaty “the cornerstone of
preserving global strategic stability,” and as such, having significance beyond the U.S.-

95 Ibid.
96 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Hu o f the P eople’s Republic o f China at the
meeting on February 15, 2001, CD/PV.866, February 15, 2001, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmtngs2000.html (accessed 01.29.04).
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Russian relations—that is, having “a direct bearing on the security of all countries.” The
missile defense system, then under development by the United States, posed a serious
threat—a threat of space weaponization, triggering a space arms race. Hu also expressed
China’s great concerns with the space war game conducted in the United States and
involving the use of anti-satellite weapons, strategic missile defense systems, land-based
laser weapons attacking targets in space, and space weapons launching preemptive
strikes. This was seen as evidence of an “imminent threat” of space weaponization.
Based on this assessment, Hu called for urgent steps to prevent space weaponization and
the outset of arms race. He called for an immediate re-establishment of the Ad Hoc
PAROS Committee in order to negotiate and conclude a legal instrument preventing the
weaponization of outer space and an arms race in space. He blamed the United States for
the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate such a legal instrument. He
also blamed the United States for the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament for the
America’s refusal to agree to a negotiating mandate for the A d Hoc PAROS Committee.
Hu argued that objectives of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and prevention of weaponization of space were connected and required broad
international cooperation within the framework of collective security, relying on the
principle of equal security. Equality of security was a leitmotiv in the presentation of the
China’s representative. This principle was stressed as important for the process of
disarmament and non-proliferation and as a foundation of collective security.
Application of double standards with regard to security of states and fulfillment of their
commitments in the field of arms control and disarmament would undermine the arms
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control and disarmament process and contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.97
Taking the podium right after Hu, Ambassador Grey, the U.S. representative at
the Conference on Disarmament, put forth the U.S. vision of the work of the CD. He
urged a start on negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, a treaty whose
conclusion the United States considered to be its priority. Grey blamed both Russia and
China for linking negotiations on the FMCT with negotiations on a legal instrument
preventing an arms race in space.

QO

The American position was to agree on the program

of work for the Conference on Disarmament that would include reestablishment of the Ad
Hoc Committees on PAROS and nuclear disarmament in the context “of active and
ongoing negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.”99 The United States agreed to
make this concession—to agree to reestablish an Ad Hoc PAROS Committee for
discussing the issues related to outer space—with “great reluctance.”100 Grey
emphasized the difference that the United States saw in the situation with the FMCT and
PAROS. He restated the U.S. position that there was neither an arms race in outer space
at the moment, nor “any prospect of an arms race for as far down the road as anyone can
see.”101 According to this vision, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, in conjuncture with other
legal instruments, effectively prevented an arms race in outer space, and therefore, there
was no need to enhance international peace and security in outer space. Grey argued that,
in contrast to what was alleged by Russia and China, the United States’ plans to develop

97 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Hu, CD/PV.866, February 15, 2001.
98 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Grey o f the United States ofAmerica at the
meeting on February 15, 2001, CD/PV.866, February 15,2001, 18, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmtngs2001.html (accessed 01.29.04).
99 Ibid., 19.
100 Ibid., 21.
101 Ibid., 19.
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and deploy national ballistic missile defense system were aimed at enhancing strategic
stability and further reduction of the danger of the use of nuclear weapons.
The representative of the Russian Federation, taking the floor at the Conference
on Disarmament, explained Russia’s top diplomatic priorities: “The issue of the
prevention of an arms race in outer space has been for many years and remains one of the
top priorities for Russian diplomacy.”102 He pointed out that the significance Russia
attached to the prevention of an arms race in outer space has led Russian President Putin
to propose an international conference devoted to the issues of preserving outer space
free o f weapons. By holding this conference, Russia hoped to achieve two goals: firstly,
prevention of the introduction of weapons in outer space, and secondly, promotion of
international cooperation on the peaceful uses of outer space—in scientific,
environmental, and commercial activities in space. The idea was not to make this
conference a negotiating exercise or an academic occasion commemorating the first
human space flight, but to make it a “brainstorming session” where representatives of
national space agencies, foreign and defense ministries, academies, leading scientific and
industrial space centers, international non-governmental organizations, universities,
businesses and financial organizations could exchange opinions and explore ways of
approaching the issues of outer space. Sidorov emphasized that Russia took into account
that security related activities in outer space could have two different objectives and two
different consequences: on the one hand, space activities related to monitoring
compliance with arms control agreements could significantly contribute to international
security and stability, on the other, placing military systems in outer space could deeply
102 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Sidorov o f the Russian Federation at the meeting
on March 22, 2001, CD/PV.871, March 22, 2001, 5, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cd-mtngs2001.html
(accessed 01.29.04).
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undermine global strategic stability. By taking steps towards prohibiting the introduction
o f weapons in outer space and the use of force, the international community could and
should prevent the weaponization of space and obviate its future disarmament. In
Russia’s view, a prohibition on the placing of weapons in outer space and renunciation of
the use or threat of the use of force in, from or towards outer space could be used as an
approach aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and precluding degeneration of
outer space into a battlefield.
Submitting a new working paper on the prevention of an arms race in outer space,
China’s Ambassador Hu demonstrated that China was not just willing to express its
concern with security in outer space but that his country was prepared to lead in the
efforts to prevent the weaponization of space at the highest international arms control
forum. The document reaffirmed China’s commitment to promote negotiations on a
legally binding international instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer
space.103 This paper represented a follow-up to China’s 2000 position paper addressing
possible ways to prevent an arms race in outer space. According to the new paper
entitled “Possible Elements of the Future Legal Instrument on the Prevention of the
Weaponization of Outer Space,” a legal instrument should contain four main
components: (1) “not to test, deploy or use in outer space any weapons, weapon systems
or their components;” (2) “not to test, deploy or use on land, at sea or in the atmosphere
any weapons, weapon systems or their components designed for the conduct of warfare in

103 China’s new working paper entitled “Possible Elements o f Future International Legal Instrument on the
Prevention o f the Weaponization o f Outer Space” was circulated at the Conference on Disarmament as an
official document CD/1645. See Conference on Disarmament, Letter dated 5 June 2001 from the
Permanent Representative o f China addressed to the Secretary-General o f the Conference on Disarmament
transmitting a working paper entitled “Possible Elements o f the Future International Legal Instrument on
the Prevention o f the Weaponization o f Outer Space, "CD/1645, June 6, 2001.
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outer space;” (3) “not to make direct use of any objects launched into orbit for the
purpose o f combat operations;” and (4) “not to assist or encourage other countries,
regions, international organizations or entities to participate in activities prohibited by
this legal instrument.”104 As a result, this proposed treaty could outlaw all space-based
weapons and all weapons attacking outer space targets from the Earth. However, the
paper contained no specific suggestions for a verification mechanism. Ambassador Hu,
in his speech introducing the paper, stressed that “negotiating such an international legal
instrument is not merely a necessity, but an urgent necessity in the field of multilateral
arms control and disarmament.”105 He further reinforced China’s call for the
commencement of the negotiations on the PAROS issues by adding the argument that in
the Information Age nations of the world increasingly depended on outer space for their
economic development and well-being:
W hether or not outer space can be used in a rational manner that safeguards its
peace and stability w ill have an important bearing on world peace and the future
o f all humankind. It is com m on know ledge, how ever, that outer space now faces
the danger o f w eaponization. This danger is m anifested in tw o main aspects,
nam ely, the developm ent o f the m issile defense system and planned dom ination
o f outer sp ace.106

The U.S. plans for NMD involved developments that would necessitate the
abrogation of the ABM Treaty and would eventually lead to the introduction of space
weapons. The Chinese representative expressed his country’s concern not only with
space-based weapons, but also with space-based components that would provide
information and guidance for weapons systems on the ground or attacking ground targets
from space, thus effectively transforming space into a battlefield. China was also
104 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Hu o f the P eople’s Republic o f China at the
meeting on June 7, 2001, CD/PV.876, June 7,2001, 2, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmtngs2001.html (accessed 01.29.04).
105 Ibid., 2.
106 Ibid., 3.
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concerned with the very concept of progressive reliance of military on outer space— with
transforming space capabilities into “the main force in implementing national security
policy and military strategy,” whose main purpose would be achieving “space
superiority.”107 China considered the 2001 Rumsfeld Report that warned against a “space
Pearl Harbor” and called for the development of capabilities for deterring and defending
against hostile acts in and from space, including those operating in outer space, deeply
troublesome.
In a later speech, Ambassador Hu reiterated that prevention of an jarms race in
outer space was the most pressing priority in the work of the Conference in the light of
the possible abrogation of the ABM Treaty, which along with some other negative
developments in international security, was bound to have a “profound negative impact
on the international security of the twenty-first century and to jeopardize the interests of
I AQ

all states in the world.”

The ABM Treaty continued to be, in China’s view, a

“cornerstone of strategic stability and the basis for efforts to ensure the reduction of
offensive strategic weapons” and non-proliferation of WMD and means of their
delivery.109 Hu warned that unilateralism in security matters would fail at the end, firstly,
because it was not conducive to international peace, and secondly, because it was not
helpful in resolving security challenges confronting international community in the 21st
century.
According to China’s vision, the world peace, stability and prosperity could be
built by the international community via adopting a “new security concept” based on
107 Ibid.
108 Conference on Disarmament, Speech ofAmbassador Hu o f the People's Republic o f China at the
meeting on August 30, 2001, CD/PV.885, August 30, 2001, 2, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmtngs2001.html (accessed 01.29.04).
109 Ibid., 3.
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international cooperation and collective security—the concept that would be conducive to
“the process of multipolarization of the world.”110 Hu used the recently established
Shanghai Cooperative Organization as an example of the new approach to security.111 He
also expressed his support for the Russian proposal on the program of work submitted to
the Conference in August 2001 / 12
The Russian proposal provided for the reestablishment of the Ad Hoc Committees
on two issues: an A d Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament that would deal with the
issues on nuclear disarmament, “take into consideration all relevant views and
proposals,” and “address questions related to its mandate;” and an A d Hoc Committee on
PAROS that would negotiate with a view of reaching agreement on a legally binding
instrument capable of preventing an arms race in outer space. The significance of this
proposal was that Russia, for the first time, expressed its support for the establishment of
an A d Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament, with nuclear disarmament being one of
the issues that hindered the work at the Conference on Disarmament. It could be seen as

110 Ibid., 4.
111 China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia announced the establishment o f the
Shanghai Cooperative Organization on June 16,2001. It replaced the Shanghai Five Organization
established in 1996. In comparison with its predecessor, the Shanghai Cooperative Organization has a
greater scope o f functions. The new organization is to serve regional security via consultation and
coordination o f policies, and via promotion o f economic cooperation, trade and cultural exchanges. This
organization stands as a materialization o f China’s “new security concept”— an organization based on the
concept o f non-alignment, non-confrontation with any other countries and openness to the world. It is also
based on the concept o f mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for the diversity o f
civilizations and the quest for common development— features that China promotes in interstate relations.
See Conference on Disarmament, Speech o f Ambassador Hu, CD/PV.885, August 30,2001, 4.
112 The increased cooperation and coordination between China and Russia culminated in signing the
Treaty o f Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the
P eople’s Republic o f China on July 16, 2001. This treaty was submitted to the Conference on
Disarmament as an official document. See Conference on Disarmament, Letter dated 14 August 2001 from
the Permanent Representative o f the Russian Federation and the Permanent Representative o f China to the
Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General o f the Conference on Disarmament
Transmitting the Russian and Chinese texts o f the Treaty o f Good-Neighbor liness and Friendly
Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the P eople’s Republic o f China as well as the Moscow
Joint Statement o f the Heads o f State o f the Russian Federation and China on 16 July 2001, CD/1649, July
16, 2001, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cd-mtngs2001.html (accessed 01.29.04).
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one of the concessions that Russia was willing to make in order to push for achieving
progress on the issues of its high priority—that is, on the issue of PAROS.
Responding to Hu’s speech at the following meeting at the CD, Ambassador Grey
of the United States defended the U.S. plans for development and deployment of national
ballistic missile defense system and offered a reassurance that U.S. strategic missile
defenses were not aimed at Russia or China.

11

He furthermore said: “The United States

would like to build affirmative and forward-looking relations with Russia and China on
political, economic and cultural levels. The issue of missile defense should not stand in
the way, and in practice we do not believe that it does.”114 He condemned using the issue
of U.S. plans for a future missile defense system for procedural maneuvering that blocked
the work of the Conference on any other issues, effectively paralyzing the Conference
altogether. He restated again the U.S. position on negotiations of the legal instruments
for outer space:
Proposals to negotiate a new outer space treaty cannot possibly bear fruit unless
and until there is a convincing demonstration that collective security and mutual
restraint in outer space can best be achieved by seeking to negotiate some new
legal instrument. Such conclusion would not even be plausible unless and until
there were convincing reasons to believe that possible prohibition or restrictions
to be embedded in some new treaty would actually prove effective in practice.
That in turn, would have to be based on the conviction that there would be
reliable and efficient ways to verify compliance with new obligations.
... [T]he United States continues to have profound doubts that discussion in any
ad hoc committee with an exploratory mandate on outer space really would lead
to the conclusion I have just summarized.115
The 2001 session of the Conference on Disarmament closed without any
consensus on a program of work in general or any convergence on the issue of the
113 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Grey o f the United States ofAmerica at the
meeting on September 4, 2001, CD/PV.886, September 4, 2001, 4, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmtngs2001.html (accessed 01.29.04).
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prevention o f space weaponization, in particular, with the United States opposing
reestablishment of the Ad Hoc PAROS Committee with a negotiating mandate and with
Russia and China linking the beginning on negotiations of the FMCT with the
negotiations on PAROS.
Thus, China emerged as one of the major players in this debate that was not just
willing to express its concerns with security in outer space but as a country that was
prepared to lead in the efforts to prevent the weaponization of space at the highest
international arms control forum. Russia became China’s staunch ally on the space
security issues and their cooperation proliferated within the CD.

GROWING RUSSIAN-CHINESE COOPERATION AT THE CONFERENCE ON
DISARMAMENT: A JOINT DRAFT TREATY FOR OUTER SPACE SECURITY
At the 2002 session of the Conference on Disarmament, the member states failed
again to reach a consensus on a program of work and to engage in discussions on
substantive issues.116 With the Bush Administration’s December 2001 announcement
that the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty as of June 13, 2002, the issues of PAROS
received prominent attention in the CD discussions. At the beginning of the 2002
session, Ambassador Skotnikov of the Russian Federation expressed Russia’s position on
the matter in the following manner:
With regard to the decision taken by the United States to withdraw from the
ABM Treaty, we are extremely concerned at what is probably the most negative
o f all the p ossible consequences o f such a step, nam ely, the spread o f the arms

116 At the first part o f the 2002 session o f the Conference on Disarmament, an important procedural
decision was made to appoint Special Coordinators to review o f the agenda o f the Conference, expansion o f
its membership, and improved and effective functioning. In the course o f the consultations conducted by
the Special Coordinators, the most discussed issues were a possible limitation to the rule o f consensus,
modalities for the participation o f civil society and intergovernmental organizations in the work o f the
Conference, and the regional grouping system. These discussions and consultations were designed to find
ways out o f the stalemate at the Conference.
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race in outer space. Prevention o f that scenario remains one o f our main
priorities and represents an issue o f concern to the entire international
community.117

Skotnikov stated that Russia was convinced that there were ways to deal with missile
proliferation short of demolition of the existing arms control body and the whole strategic
stability architecture. He confirmed Russia’s commitment to negotiate and conclude a
legally binding agreement or agreements that would prevent an arms race in space. He
later emphasized again: “ ...PAROS negotiations are, without any question, among
Russia’s priorities in the Conference on Disarmament.”118 He reiterated the proposal
made at the UNGA by Igor Ivanov, the then Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, on
possible elements of a future comprehensive agreement on the non-deployment of
weapons in outer space. One of the key components of Russia’s new proposal was a
suggestion “to place a moratorium on the deployment in space of any means of warfare”
until an international agreement would be achieved on the matter.
Following Skotnikov’s presentation, Ambassador Bolton of the United States
recapitulated the U.S. position and the new U.S. security concept, which was envisioned
as having three components regarding the threat of missile proliferation: (1)
strengthening of non-proliferation measures; (2) robust counter-proliferation capabilities;
and (3) a new concept of deterrence that relies more on missile defense and less on
offensive nuclear arsenals. U.S. security, as well as its well-being, depended on its
ability to operate in outer space. While the United States needed to strengthen its military
space capabilities in order to defend against ballistic missiles, it saw no need for any new
117 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Skotnikov o f the Russian Federation at the
meeting on January 22, 2002, CD/PV.889, January 22, 2002, 5, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmetngs2002.html (accessed 02.01.04).
118 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Skotnikov o f the Russian Federation at the
meeting on March 28, 2002, CD/PV.900, March 28,2002,16, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmetngs2002html (accessed 02.01.04).
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agreement on outer space, arguing that the existing regime sufficiently regulated the outer
space activities, including military activities.119
In response to recent development and the U.S. position on the issue of PAROS,
Ambassador Hu of the PRC expressed concern with the urgent threat of space
weaponization and put forth a list of objectives to be pursued within the international
arms control and disarmament process: (1) preservation of global strategic stability; (2)
consolidation, development and promotion o f the existing arms control and disarmament
legal regime; (3) prevention of the introduction of weapons or weapon systems in outer
space; (4) complete prohibition and total destruction of all nuclear weapons and other
weapons o f mass destruction; and (5) non-proliferation of such weapons and means of
their delivery.120 In order for these objectives to be met, he argued, the international
community needed to adopt a new security concept long-advocated by China and based
on four cornerstones: mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation. Security
must be for all and that is incompatible with the policy of overwhelming unilateral
superiority ensuring “absolute security” for a single country. According to Ambassador
Hu, international efforts should be put into strengthening of the arms control and
disarmament process in order to maintain strategic stability in the absence of the ABM
Treaty: Russia and the United States must start negotiations on a new strategic
framework, they also should further cut their nuclear arsenals, the CTBT should be
ratified and put to work, the “first-use-policy” should be abandoned, and measures must

119 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Bolton o f the United States ofAmerica at the
meeting on January 24, 2002, CD/PV.890, January 24, 2002, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmtngs2002.html, (accessed 02.01.04).
120 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Hu o f the P eople’s Republic o f China at the
meeting on February 1, 2002, CD/PV.892, February 7, 2002 4, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmtngs2002.html (accessed 02.01.04).
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be taken to prevent weaponization of outer space. Later on, Hu expressed support for the
2001 Russian proposal to the UNGA to impose a moratorium on placing weapons in
space until international agreement could be reached.121 Thus, the U.S. decision to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty prompted China to harden its position and increase its
demands to the international community in the area of arms control. Putting forth a list
of steps to be taken by the international community, China clearly presented itself as a
player who wanted to lead and who had a vision—a vision that was, however, quite
different from that of the sole superpower of the post-Cold War era.
In May 2002, in a spirit of making compromises for the sake of achieving any
progress, China submitted an informal proposal on a program of work, according to
which it would agree to the program of work suggested by Ambassador Amorim of
Brazil. The three main issues causing the deadlock of the Conference were: (1) adopting
a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament, (2) negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty
(FMCT), and (3) negotiating a treaty to prevent the weaponization o f space. The CD had
agreed to a fissile cut-off negotiating mandate but was unable to establish an ad hoc
committee needed to carry talks forward. There was a linkage of issues made by the
Russian Federation and China between beginning negotiations on FMCT and establishing
an Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS. An attempt to break this impasse was made with the
so-called Amorim proposal put forward by the then CD President, Ambassador Amorim,
on August 24,2000. The Amorim proposal recommended to establish ad hoc committees
on the issues of contention, namely: (1) an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear
disarmament, a committee with a broader mandate to negotiate on negative security
121 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Hu o f the People's Republic o f China at the
meeting on March 28, 2002, CD/PV.900, March 28,2002, 20, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmtngs2002.html (accessed 02.01.04).
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assurances (NSA), (2) a committee to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile
materials based on a specific mandate agreed to in 1995, and (3) an ad hoc committee on
the prevention of an arms race in outer space which “shall examine and identify specific
topics or proposals, which could include confidence-building or transparency measures,
general principles, treaty commitments and the elaboration of a regime capable of
preventing an arms race in outer space.”122 A draft presidential declaration was attached
to this proposal which emphasized that the Conference was a disarmament negotiating
forum and that the relevant mandates of ad hoc committees should be viewed in this light
and noted that the CD continues “to be influenced by and responsive to developments in
the international strategic scene which affected the security interests of its individual
members.”123 The Brazilian proposal attempted to take into account China's demand for
comprehensive and balanced treatment of different countries security priorities by
proposing three ad hoc committees. From China's point of view, however, it failed
because the proposed mandates were differently weighted: Amorim's proposal would
mean treaty negotiations 'only' on FMCT and 'just' discussions on PAROS and nuclear
disarmament. The United States, which was eager to get FMCT negotiations commenced
as soon as possible, seemed to regard the proposal as generally good with a few words
that “remain to be worked out” on nuclear disarmament.124
In its 2002 informal proposal, China suggested adding the following worlds to the
final paragraph of the Amorim proposal, dealing with the mandate of the A d Hoc PAROS

122 Conference on Disarmament, Proposal by the President on the Programme o f Work fo r the 2000
Session o f the Conference on Disarmament, CD/1624, August 24, 2000, 1, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/
cd7cd-docs2000.html (accessed 06.29.04).
123 Ibid., 3.
124 Jenni Rissanen, “Silence and Stagnation as the CD Concludes Fruitless Year,” Disarmament
Diplomacy 50, September 2000, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd50/50geneva.htm (accessed 02.09.04).
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Committee in order to make it acceptable to China: “with a view o f reaching an
international legally binding instrument.”125 This amendment marked China’s “renewed
flexibility” that was meant to bring the Conference closer to a consensus on the Program
of Work and thereby move it to substantive discussions and negotiations.126 However,
the United States’ representative stated that this amendment of the Amorim proposal was
unacceptable and stressed that any proposal on PAROS would be unacceptable as long as
it prejudiced where the discussion should lead.

177

Ambassador Javits further elaborated the American position on space security and
arms control issues at an international conference on “Future Security in Space:
Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs” organized by the Monterey
Institute’s Center for Non-proliferation Studies at Southampton’s Mountbatten Center in
England on May 29, 2002. His speech was subsequently submitted to the Geneva
Conference on Disarmament as an official document. In this speech, Ambassador Javits
reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, which did not
exclude the use of space for national security purposes. Appealing to Article 51 of the
UN Charter that granted the right of individual or collective self-defense to all states
subscribing to the UN Charter, he argued that the global responsibilities of the United
States and the new threats that the United States was to face in the 21st century

125 Conference on Disarmament, Letter dated 28 August 2002from the H ead o f the Delegation o f the
P eople’s Republic o f China to the Conference on Disarmament Addressed to the Secretary-General o f the
Conference transmitting the Chinese and English Texts o f a Document entitled D raft Decision on the
Establishment o f an A d Hoc Committee on the Prevention o f an Arms Race in Outer Space and its
Mandate, ’ CD/1682, August 30, 2002, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cd-mtngs2002.html (accessed
01.29.04).
126 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Hu o f the P eople’s Republic o f China at the
meeting on June 27, 2002, CD/PV.907, June 27,2002, 19, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmetngs2002html (accessed 02.01.04).
127 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Javits o f the United States ofAmerica at the
meeting on August 29, 2002, CD/TV.912, August 29,2002, 21, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmtngs2002html, (accessed 02.01.04).
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necessitated extension o f this right to outer space.128 U.S. security in the new conditions
of the 21st century depended on the ability of the United States to operate in outer
space—that is, “to support military operations worldwide, monitor and respond to
military threats, and monitor arms control and non-proliferation agreements.”129 He
stated the U.S. priorities and position with respect to outer space, peace and stability, and
arms control:
We fully understand that maintaining international peace and security is an
overarching purpose that guides activities on Earth as well as in outer space, but,
in the final analysis, preserving national security is likewise necessary and
essential. For these reasons, the United States sees no need for new outer space
arms control agreement and opposes negotiation o f a treaty on outer space arms
control.130

According to the U.S. vision, the existing legal instruments and mechanisms—
that is, the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the work of the
UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) that facilitates peaceful
exploration and exploitation of outer space— already provided an extensive and
comprehensive system limiting the uses of outer space to those that were peaceful and
■I <3 i

provided legal foundation for “the legitimate military uses of outer space.”

He said:

“There is simply no problem in outer space for arms control to solve.”132 Concerns of the
international community that the planned U.S. missile defense system would upset
strategic stability and lead to an arms race on the Earth, or that it would cause a
disruption of the arms control process and lead to the extension of an arms race into outer

128
51.
129
130
131
132

Eric M. Javits, “A U.S. Perspective on Space,” in James C. Moltz, ed., Future Security in Space, 2002,
Ibid., 52.
Ibid., 51.
Ibid., 52.
Ibid.
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space were groundless.133 The Moscow Treaty signed by the United States and Russia in
May 2002 that was to reduce dramatically strategic arsenals of the two countries134
served as proof that the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and plans for the NMD
did not undermine strategic stability and did not preclude further reductions of nuclear
weapons. Contrary to the concerns expressed by China and Russia, the U.S. national
ballistic missile defense would promote world peace and stability by significantly
diminishing incentives for acquiring weapons of mass destruction and the means of their
delivery. The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty simply put an end to the Cold War
and marked a new era in U.S.-Russian relations, characterized now by strategic
cooperation that allowed for some small disagreements, such as the merit of the ABM
Treaty.
At the Conference on Disarmament, the U.S. Ambassador continued to argue that
the U.S. remained willing to support the establishment of an A d Hoc Committee on outer
space but only with a mandate short of negotiations—that is, a committee that would
carry out “broad-ranging discussions” on the issues of outer space—and only under the
conditions of ongoing active negotiations on a fissile cut-off treaty at the Conference.135

133 Ibid.
134 During the Russian-American Summit in May 2002 in Moscow, the Treaty on Strategic Offensive
Reductions was signed, which provided for the reduction o f the aggregate number o f strategic nuclear
warheads down to an agreed level o f 1,700-2,200 unites for each o f the parties. The text o f the Treaty was
passed to the Conference on Disarmament and circulated as a Conference’s official document. See
Conference on Disarmament, Letter dated 31 May 2002form the Permanent Representative o f the Russian
Federation and the Permanent Representative o f the United States ofAmerica to the Conference on
Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General o f the Conference transmitting the English and Russian
Texts o f the Treaty Between the United States ofAm erica and the Russian Federation on Strategic
Offensive Reductions and the Joint Declaration by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V
Putin on the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States and the Russian Federation signed on
24 May 2002 in Moscow, CD/1674, June 5,2002, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cd-mtngs2002.html
(01.29.04)
135 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Javits o f the United States o f America at the
meeting on June 27, 2002, CD/PV.907, June 27, 2002, 16, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmtngs2002.html (accessed 01.29.04).
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He confirmed that the negotiations on the FMCT was the U.S. priority goal at the
Conference on Disarmament and for this reason the U.S. was prepared to make
concessions and “to participate in good faith in the work of the other A d Hoc Committees
that would foster serious and thoughtful discussion of topics related to nuclear
disarmament and outer space.”

1 3A

“should be recognized as such.”

He clarified that it was “a major concession” and

I 07

Facing the unresponsive reaction of the United States to their concerns with space
security, Russia and China put forth further efforts to coordinate their activities at the CD.
At the plenary meeting o f the Conference in June 2002, China and Russia submitted a
joint working paper entitled “Possible Elements for a Future International Legal
Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat
or Use of Force Against space Objects.”138 This proposal was a further development of
the main themes put forth by China in its earlier papers and had all the components of a
draft treaty. The Preamble stated:
Outer space is the common heritage o f mankind and plays an ever-increasing role
in its future development. There exists a potential danger o f an armed
confrontation and combatant activities being extended to outer space. The
prevention o f the deployment o f weapons and an arms race in outer space
becomes a pressing task facing the international community. ... For the benefit o f
mankind, outer space shall be used for peaceful purposes, and it shall never be
allowed to become a sphere o f military confrontation.
Only a treaty-based prohibition o f the deployment of weapons in outer space and
the prevention o f the threat or use o f force against outer space objects can

136 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Javits, CD/PV.907, 17, June 27,2002, 17.
137 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Javits, CD/PV.912, August 29, 2002, 21.
138 Conference on Disarmament, Letter dated 27 June 2002 from the Permanent Representative o f the
People's Republic o f China and the Permanent Representative o f the Russian Federation to the Conference
on Disarmament Addressed to the Secretary-General o f the Conference, Transmitting the Chinese, English
and Russian texts o f a working paper entitled ‘Possible Elements fo r a Future International Legal
Agreement on the Prevention o f the Deployment o f Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat o f Use o f Force
Against Outer Space Objects. ’ CD/1679, June 27,2002, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmtngs2002.html (accessed 01.29.04).
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eliminate the emerging threat o f an arms race in outer space and ensure the
security for outer space.139

The basic obligations suggested in the paper included: (1) “not to place in orbit
around the earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons
on celestial bodies, or not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner;”
(2) “not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects; and (3) not to
assist or encourage other States, groups of States, international organizations to
participate in activities prohibited by this Treaty.”140
This proposal could be seen as a further concession from China, for it did not
suggest banning the use of outer space for all the weapons-related purposes as China’s
previous proposal did. Paragraph V of the working paper directly stated: “This Treaty
shall not be construed as impeding the research and use of outer space for peaceful
purposes or other military uses not prohibited by this Treaty.”141 The paragraph
containing confidence-building measures was further developed to include suggestions
for the states to make their space programs and activities more transparent. Importantly,
the document also elaborated on the mechanism of settlement of international disputes. It
specified that every party to this treaty would have the right to request clarifications from
any other party to the treaty whose activities gave rise to suspicion, and the suspected
party would be required to provide clarification on its activities in outer space. The
document envisaged that, in situations when clarification would fail to resolve the issue,
the cases w ould be handled by an executive organization o f the treaty. Each party to this

139 Joint Working Paper, “Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention
o f the Deployment o f Weapons in Outer Space, the Treat or Use o f Force Against Outer Space Objects,”
Paper submitted by the Delegations o f China and the Russian Federation to the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva on June 27, 2002, http://www.china-un.ch/eng/30622.html (accessed 09.27.02).
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treaty would be required to cooperate on the matters that caused the dispute. A separate
paragraph elaborated on the proposed executive organization of the treaty. The treaty
was envisaged to be of unlimited duration.
The joint Russian-Chinese paper marked a new unprecedented level of
cooperation between Russia and China at the international fora on the issue of PAROS
and a remarkable degree of convergence of the two countries’ security interests in the
area. In the course of preparation and discussions of their joint working paper “Possible
Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention o f the
Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat of Use of Force Against Outer Space
Objects” the two states held several rounds of open-ended consultations and briefings,
with more and more CD delegations joining in over time to take part in the discussions.
China expressed hope that all these contributions would become a part of the future
substantive work of the Conference on the issue of PAROS, leading to negotiations on
and conclusion of a treaty preventing the weaponization of outer space. In order to make
this hope a reality, Ambassador Hu announced: “Henceforth we stand ready to draw
further, in a flexible and open-minded spirit, on the reasonable views and suggestions put
forward by all sides and encourage more delegations to play an active part in the
process.”142 Speaking later, he added more urgency to the necessity of launching a
substantive work on PAROS:
If we are to prevent an arms race in outer space and its weaponization, we cannot
w ait until outer space w eapons have been put in place and started causing

damage, we cannot wait until one country takes the lead in introducing weapons
into outer space, with other countries following the suit, we simply cannot wait
for the proliferation of space weapons before we take any measures to prevent

142 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Hu o f the P eople’s Republic o f China at the
meeting on March 6, 2003, CD/PV.922, March 6, 2003, 14, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmtngs2003.html (accessed 02.01.04).
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them. The key is to take preventive action, otherwise the right of all countries to
the peaceful uses of outer space and the very security of the assets of outer space
will be placed in jeopardy. The ideal option would be, without further delay, to
conclude an international legal agreement to prevent the deployment of weapons
in outer space. 143
•

At the 2002 session, the joint China-Russia proposal found support from a wide group of
countries: Algeria, Belorus, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Syria,
Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe made statements welcoming the joint document on
PAROS. However, the overall situation on reaching consensus on the work towards the
prevention of space weaponization proved to be grave. Ambassador Salander of Sweden
summed up the work of the Conference on PAROS by saying that “the issue of outer
space is the part of the program of work where consensus seems most difficult to
reach.”144 On a more pessimistic note, Salander went on to give his evaluation of the
situation with PAROS:
I would go as far as to say that, in all other contested areas, there seem to exist
good possibilities of arriving at formulations which will be acceptable to all
delegations of the Conference. But on PAROS it is not certain that we can find
such a solution.145
Further attempts to revive the work of the Conference on Disarmament proved to
be futile in the following year.146 Instead of discussing the new draft treaty proposed by

143 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Hu o f the P eople’s Republic o f China at the
meeting on July 31, 2003, CD/PV.933, July 31, 2003, 7-8, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cdmtngs2003.html (accessed 02.01.04).
144 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Salander o f Sweden at the meeting on August 22,
2002, CD/PV.911, August 22,2002, 10, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cd-mtngs2002.html (accessed
02.01.04).
145 Ibid.
146 The 2003 session o f the Conference on Disarmament opened with a message from Secretary-General
o f the United Nations, Kofi Annan, in which he urged the Conference to overcome the deadlock and return
to work in order to deal with the urgent security challenges, such as the proliferation o f weapons o f mass
destruction and the means for their delivery, rising military expenditures, and the prospects o f an arms race
in outer space. The message o f the Secretary-General o f the United Nations, Kofi Annan, on the occasion
o f the commencement o f the 25th Session o f the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva was delivered by
Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Director-General o f the UN Office in Geneva, on January 21, 2003. See United
Nations, Statement by Secretary-General o f the United Nations on the occasion o f the Commencement o f
the 25lh Session o f the Conference on Disarmament, January 21, 2003, http://www.un.org/apps/
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Russia and China, the attention of the Conference was distracted by the events in Iraq and
North Korea.147 The Russian Federation, in an attempt to keep the attention of the
Conference on the issues of outer space security, submitted three papers related to the
issues of outer space security. One of the papers conveyed a statement from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. This document stated Russia’s growing
concerns with the U.S. NMD plans:
Moscow is watching with dismay as the United States of America steps up its
attempts to set in place its so-called “global missile defense system.” With the
political decision to deploy by 2004 several strategic interceptors with “support”
from outer space, a new destabilizing phase has now been reached in the
implementation of these plans.148
Russia warned that this new phase might lead to “weakening of strategic stability, a
senseless arms race in the world, including the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their missile delivery systems, and the diversion of resources from efforts
to combat the real challenges and threats of the present day - above all, international
terrorism.” 149
The second paper contained a text of the response by the Minister o f Foreign
Affairs o f the Russian Federation, Igor Ivanov, to a question in the Russian media
regarding the prevention of the deployment of weapons in outer space. In his answer to

sg/printsgstats.asp?nid=231 (accessed 01.29.04).
The Conference did not manage to agree on the Program o f Work and did not re-establish any
mechanism on any o f its specific agenda items. In the course o f the session, discussions were dominated
by the situation with Iraq and the withdrawal o f North Korea from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The issues
o f PAROS received, as a result, less attention at the Conference during the 2003 session. See Conference
on Disarmament, Report o f the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly o f the United
Nations, CD/1718, September 10, 2003, 5, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cd-yrrep.html (accessed 25,
2004).
148 Conference on Disarmament, Letter dated 23 December 2002 From the Permanent Representative o f
the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament Addressed to the Secretary-General o f the
Conference Transmitting the Text o f a Statement by the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs o f the Russian
Federation Regarding the Stepping up o f Attempts by the United States o f America to set in Place a Global
Missile Defense System, CD/1690, January 6, 2003, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cd-docs.html
(accessed 02.10.04).
149 Ibid.
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the question whether there were any new developments in the Russian position on the
issue of preserving space free of weapons of any kind and a comprehensive agreement
designed to prevent space weaponization, Ivanov recapped Russia’s recent initiatives in
this area. Ivanov further said that Russia was now “prepared to accept a new mechanism
to ensure openness and to build confidence in the domain of outer space: the advance
notification of planned launches of space objects, their purpose and their basic
parameters.” The significance of this paper was not only in the attention that it drew to
the issue o f outer space security, but also in the demonstration of growing concern with
the issue among the Russian public. The third Russian paper officially notified the
Conference on disarmament about the development of an initiative to promote openness
and build confidence in outer space via transparency in the use of outer space. This
document stated Russia’s willingness to provide advance notification of forthcoming
spacecraft launches and their purpose and main parameters. Furthermore, it claimed that
concerted steps were taken in the unilateral implementation of this initiative and gave a
website address on which information on launches provided by the Russian Ministry of
Defense and Russian Aerospace Agency would be posted in advance of launches. In this
document Russia called on other spacepowers to join this initiative: “By doing so they
will help build confidence in the domain of outer space activities and set the stage for
further joint efforts to reinforce the peaceful status of space.” This appeal was also
conveyed orally by Russia’s Ambassador Vasiliev during his speech at the meeting of the
Conference on Disarmament on June 5 ,2003.150 Thus, in its official documents

150 Conference on Disarmament, Speech by Ambassador Vasiliev o f the Russian Federation at the meeting
on June 5, 2003, CD/PV.929, June 5, 2003, 9, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cd-mtngs2003.html
(accessed 02.01.04). See also Conference on Disarmament, Letter Dated 11 June 2003 From the
Permanent Representative o f the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament Addressed to the
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submitted to the Conference on Disarmament, as well as in the speeches delivered during
the 2003 session, Russia made it clear that keeping outer space peaceful and free of
weapons was a “matter of priority.”
All in all, the three spacepowers’ positions on space arms control issues remained
unchanged and the chance of consensus emerging on the issues of space arms control and
negotiations on any legal instruments in a short-term future continued to be rather
minuscule. While Russia and China continued their cooperation on space security-related
issues and achieved a remarkable convergence of their interests in this area, the United
States did not take part in the PAROS discussions during the 2003 session. Due to
diverging interests on the key security issues the Geneva Conference concluded the work
of its 2003 session failing for a fifth year in a row to adopt a work program.

SECURITY INTERESTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
In the post-Cold War era, Russia and China, whose security interests with respect
to outer space largely converged at the fundamental level but diverged on the concrete
steps that were needed to achieve their objectives shortly after the end of the East-West
confrontation, managed to effectively narrow down their differences and interact
productively at the chief international forum on the arms control and disarmament issues.
Their interests had converged to such a degree that the two countries jointly produced and
proposed to the Conference a draft treaty prohibiting the use of force in outer space and
emplacement of weapons in space. They used the Conference on Disarmament not only
Secretary-General o f the Conference Notifying on the Development o f an Initiative to Promote Openness
and to Build Confidence in the Domain o f Outer Space Activities, CD/1718, June 26, 2003,
http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cd/cd-docs.html (accessed 02.10.04). As the first step in this initiative, the
Annex o f this document contained a table entitled “Schedule o f Spacecraft Launched for June 2003” with
the relevant information.
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for voicing their opinions and raising their concerns in pursuit of their national interests
but also for holding bilateral consultations and meetings in the course of the work on the
joint proposals. Thus, the Conference facilitated convergence of their views with respect
to the arrangements that would be necessary to provide security in space.
The United States, on the other hand, continued to prefer the existing regime in
outer space, insisting that the existing regime fulfilled the necessary functions. No
progress was made towards the beginning of negotiations on any change in the eroded
Cold-War security regime governing the military uses of space. The use of issue linkages
not only failed to produce favorable results concerning issues of security in outer space, it
paralyzed the work of the Conference on all other issues on the CD agenda.
Thus, the neoliberal hypothesis formulated in this study, maintaining that greater
commercialization and commercial cooperation in outer space may not lead to
converging security interests, but conflictual interests would be reconciled via
international institutions, is not supported for the U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese dyads.
It is supported only weakly for the Russian-Chinese dyad.
All in all, the neoliberal expectation that international organizations could
significantly contribute to the amelioration of conflictual interests failed to materialize, as
the U.S. position on space security issues continued to diverge from those of Russia and
China in the post-Cold War era and no new regime has emerged to regulate proliferating
military uses of space.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

401

CHAPTER X
CONCLUSIONS: SPACE COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY

‘It is quite clear that I must eat you, or you must
eat me. Let us come to a friendly agreement about it.’
Obviously, international order based on such logic is
unthinkable: ‘Security for one has to be purchased at the
insecurity of the other.’ This can have only one result: war.
Jaap de Wilde
1989

... [N]o technical solution;
it requires a fundamental extension o f morality.
Garrett Hardin
1968

The main question that this study attempted to answer was whether the
commercialization of outer space made international space security cooperation easier for the
three major spacepowers—the United States, Russia and China. In order to answer this
question, the study tried to place the discussion of outer space issues in the context of one of
the central debates in international relations—the realist-liberal debate on economic
interdependence and conflict and cooperation. In so doing, this study showed that, first, the
commercialization of space activities that started amidst the Cold War and then accelerated
after the end of the bipolar confrontation was undertaken by all three main space-faring states
and that commercial activities in space became a mainstream development, rather than a
marginal phenomenon, as the three spacepowers pursued a wide range of policies in order to
reshape their space activities and adapt them to market conditions.1
Second, it analyzed the evolution of security strategies and space security interests as
they were formulated at the domestic level, the bilateral relations of the three states, and their
interaction at the international level within the framework of a major international organization
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charged with global security issues, including space security issues, in order to evaluate the
influence of the commercialization of space on space security relations.

THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF OUTER SPACE: THE GREAT PROMISE
The commercialization of space activities in the three spacepowers—the United States,
Russia and China—was accompanied by changes in the domestic legal foundations on which
space activities rested, policies that provided an encouraging economic environment,
restructuring of space industries of the three space-faring states, and by the emergence of
commercial actors engaged in the development of space. Commercialization of outer space
activities required major efforts on the part of the three spacepowers, though the distance that
they had to go setting up market relations differed significantly: in the United States the space
industry, being a part of the aerospace and telecommunications industries, was already a
market participant in a global arena, whereas in Russia and China space industries were largely
integral parts of military-industrial sectors in non-market, centrally planned economies,
operating under the conditions of strict political control and high secrecy. What all three
spacepowers had in common was that with the commercialization of their space activities they
had to take steps towards “civilianization,” deregulation, and liberalization of major space
sectors.
As a result of the commercialization of space activities, accompanied by liberalization
and deregulation, a global space market emerged. All three spacepowers became dependent on
the global space market: China became dependant on the global space market for space
technology, trying to take shortcuts to full-fledged modem space capabilities that the PRC
leadership considered as a key to China’s development; Russia grew to depend on the global
space market for the survival of its space industry, as its small domestic market and post-Cold
1 The commercialization o f space, as Pasco argues, has been mostly a top-down process. It resulted from
governments’ reevaluation o f their needs and efforts to rationalize public costs. See Xavier Pasco, “A New Role
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War state funding could support only a fraction of its previous space activities; the United
States, the spacepower with largest space assets, relied on the global space market both as a
supplier and consumer of space services and products, as its interests were global.
The formation of the global space market was a response to the demands of a
globalizing world economy that required reliable and affordable communication lines across
the globe. The satellite networks and services provided by the global space market—
communication, satellite TV and radio broadcasting, GPS, Earth observation and remote
sensing—represent a vital infrastructure for a truly global economy.2 In its turn, the level of
interconnectedness achieved via satellite networks represents a qualitatively new phase of
globalization. Thus, commercial satellite networks propel overall economic interdependence
to unprecedented levels.
The commercialization of outer space is one of the most significant developments of
our time. It has given hope for the betterment of human conditions on Earth on an increasingly
widening scale. The commercialization of outer space is instrumental in translating the great
economic potential of outer space and the advances of space technology into real economic
gains. Services that commercial space activities provided have transformed major sectors of
the modern economy, government and military: banks use satellite links to make their
transactions around the world, ATM machines and private communication networks that are
used to process credit cards rely on satellite systems, tracking the location of parcels, ground
transportation, air traffic and ships rely on satellites for navigation across the land, air and sea,
farmers use satellite imaging for improving crop yields, management of natural resources relies
on data from satellites, weather forecasting, monitoring of the environment and climate
changes, gathering information for news, direct-to-home TV and satellite radio depend on
satellites, education in “virtual classrooms,” “telemedicine,” “videoconferencing” and business
for a New Millennium? The Changing Nature of Space Activities,” Space Policy 19 (February 2003): 15-22.
2 See Pandozy, 1998, 148.
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private communication networks are made possible by satellites, satellites supply links in
electronic voting systems, they provide mobile telephony and access to the Internet as well as
many other services. The developed countries became dependent on the services provided by
satellites for every-day life and business, governance and security, while many developing
countries pinned their hopes for economic development to space technology that can help them
leapfrog several stages of economic development, facilitate better use of their national
resources, improve living conditions, and promote their nation-building.
The great promise of outer space commercialization is not, however, in merely
improving human conditions on Earth. Ever since the time of Adam Smith and Immanuel
Kant, liberal thinkers associated free international commerce with more cooperative and
peaceful interstate relations. Therefore, according to a liberal perspective, the great promise of
space commercialization is that it should lead to more cooperative and peaceful relations
between states.
The commercialization of outer space activities was begun nearly simultaneously in the
three major spacepowers and marked the next step in the evolution of space utilization. This
transition was influenced by a number of factors: firstly, the progress in space and information
technologies of the past two decades, secondly, the ideological revolution of neo-conservatism;
thirdly, economic globalization; and fourthly, political changes brought about, first, by the
superpower detente of the mid-1980s and later by the end of the Cold War. As a result of
space commercialization, outer space started to play an increasingly important role in both the
security and economic realms.

THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF OUTER SPACE AND SPACE SECURITY: A TROJAN
HORSE
The commercialization of outer space also affected the security environment by
creating a new set of factors, which had not existed during the previous space era. On the one
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hand, the commercialization of space allowed those states who invested in space technology in
order to serve their security needs now to turn space activities, at least in part, to the private
sector and place space technology in the service of an ever-increasing number of consumers in
their countries and around the world. Not only did they make some returns on their investment
but also promoted technological progress and the economic well-being of their societies.
Throughout the 1990s, the global space industry was one of the world’s vital economic engines
that accelerated the growth of such high-tech sectors of the world economy as software and
hardware development, sophisticated electronics, telecommunications, advanced materials
research, which in their turn contributed to a whole range of other industries. Those states that
took part in commercial space activities benefited from technological advances in the space
sector and those spilling over into other sectors. The commercialization of space meant that
there were greater incentives for various non-space-faring states—and non-state actors—to
obtain their own space capabilities, firstly, because of the benefits that space activities could
bring to their economy, society, and military, and secondly, because it became easier, as some
technological components could be acquired in a global space market or through participation
in commercial joint ventures. Given the inherently dual-use nature of space technology, this
proliferation of space technology and capabilities raised serious security concerns.3
Furthermore, security concerns also arose with commercial space services, such as, for
example, accurate timing and navigation data, imaging data and other critical information that
were generated by satellites. These services were provided by an increasing number of
commercial players and distributed to customers around the world, potentially including those
who could use them towards hostile ends. There was also a realization that vertical
3 Pericles Gaspirini Alves, Access to Outer Space Technology: Implications for International Security, UNIDIR,
Research Paper No. 15, (New York: United Nations, 1992), xv-xvi. Proliferation of missile technology does
occur outside the market as well. On January 5, 2004, the Iranian defense minister Ali Shakhani announced that
his country would launch its own satellite on its own rocket and from its own launch pad within an 18-month
period. When an Iranian satellite is launched into orbit, Iran will join the club o f space-capable states. Experts
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proliferation of commercial space technology due to technology-led competition could result in
an incidental development of space weapon-related technology by commercial actors or that
horizontal proliferation could result in the use of dual-use technology for hostile purposes.4
The commercialization of space activities contributed significantly to the creation of
global networks of communication supporting global economic activities and to dramatically
increased dependence of the countries around the world on satellite communications, and on
space activities in general. The more societies depend on space services, however, the more
they become vulnerable to threats from hostile acts against space assets. The
commercialization of outer space activities coupled with the reduction of military budgets in
the 1990s led to a significant reliance of the military on commercial space service providers.5
As a result, commercial constellations appeared as “soft” targets for hostile acts. The
commercialization of outer space created added incentives to defend space assets not only
because the world economy became depended on them, but also because the military grew to
depend on them as well.6
On the other hand, plans for placing weapons in space to defend space assets—or for
any other purpose—created security concerns not only for those space commercial actors who
operated satellite constellations in space but for all countries around the world. Weapons in
space would not be welcomed by commercial actors because most commercial systems,
including those that are used for communications, neither carry extra fuel for maneuvering
against kinetic energy weapons nor are they hardened enough—against jamming or nuclear
explosions, for example—to share space with weapons. Hardening commercial satellites and
believe that the launch vehicle was developed from technology obtained from North Korea and Pakistan. See I.
Chemyi, “Again in Space under the Banner o f Islam?” Novosti Kosmonavtiki 14 (254), March 2004, 52.
4 For example, experts conclude that commercial reusable space systems could be potentially used by terrorists
as weapons: “If incidental development via commercial, reusable space systems is taken into account, the
difference between a truck bomb and a space cargo recovery module bomb might be only a question of time and
selection o f suitable ordinance.” See Preston, Johnson, Edwards, Miller and Shipbaugh, Space Weapons Earth
Wars, 2002, 98.
5 See, for example, Todd, 2002.
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providing them with extra fuel would inevitably raise the cost of operating in space, making
commercial space services less affordable, thereby undercutting the market. This would
impede further technological and economic progress, particularly among the developing
countries, and the development of space sector itself.7 Moreover, space weapons, whether
used for protecting commercial space assets or any other purpose, would exacerbate the space
debris problem, leading to greater hazards for operations in space and potentially even to
catastrophic consequences, making significant parts of space unusable altogether.8
The idea of introducing weapons in space raised serious security concerns, as space
weapons would not only be capable of defending commercial space assets, but could be also
used to destroy targets on the ground, under the ground, on the water surface, in mid-air or in
orbit. The greatest concern about space weapons arise from their potential to transform the
deterrence dominance into offense dominance by minimizing the deterrent effect of offensive
nuclear forces, thereby changing fundamentally the strategic balance.
Although the option of placing weapons in outer space could have been realized during
the Cold War, as the development of these capabilities was thoroughly considered and at times
pursued quite vigorously by the two superpowers, space remained free of weapons and force
was never used in outer space in a conflict at any time during the Cold War. The first legally
binding multilateral treaty outlawing nuclear explosions in space emerged a mere six years
after the start of the Space Age. A multifaceted outer space security regime was gradually
built to support the peaceful exploration and utilization of outer space and to minimize
incentives for the extension of militarized conflict in outer space. Moreover, as a result of
decades of peaceful exploitation of this global commons, a tacit norm of the non-use of force
in outer space emerged even amidst the intense superpower confrontation of the Cold War.

Haller and Sakazaki, Commercial Space and United States National Security, 2001. See also Tom Wilson,
Threats to United States Space Capabilities, 2001.
7 Hitchens, 2003.
8 Primack, 2002, 18-22.
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Unlike the legally established norm of “peaceful use” of outer space that received rather loose
interpretations over the years to include the possibility of space-based weapons, the tacit norm
of non-use of force in outer space underscores the taboo on the placement and use of weapons
in outer space.
On the one hand, the commercialization of space meant that space activities were
increasingly undertaken by commercial actors based on their commercial calculations, rather
than exclusively on political calculations of the governments. On the other, as
commercialization proceeded, space activities became more influenced by market forces. As
space competition became tougher in the international space market, the desire to survive in
such an environment led commercial actors to turn back to the states for help in developing
new generations of space systems and launch vehicles, including within military programs,
thereby further fueling the militarization of commercial space activities.9
The commercialization of outer space that led to the reliance of the military on
commercial space providers, also made the military dependent for their technological edge
upon the success of their national space firms in international competition. Therefore it made
the state eager to help these firms under conditions of high international competition in order to
prevent the loss of technological edge to foreign competitors.10 In the meantime, the reality of
technology-based competition also led many space firms to form multiple, complex
international strategic alliances with foreign firms, and therefore raise concerns with
technology transfers and more generally with diffusion of space technology.11 All in all, the
commercialization of outer space that had led to space technology proliferation, increased
9 Commercial space activities remain highly dependent on various forms of government assistance, including
subsidies. WTO rules restrict subsidies, leaving states with just a few options to help out its national firms. See
Hansson and McGuire, 1999,199-205. See also Haller and Sakazaki, 2001.
10 Crawford, 1992; and Doerer, 2000. The story o f the commercial failure of Iridium, the first satellite
communication system serving mobile telephony, is instructive. Creation of Iridium was financed partially by the
U.S. government with the view that the Pentagon would be one o f its main customers. From 1996, the Iridium
system was considered as an integral part of the military communications architecture plans of the U.S.
Department o f Defense. After Iridium announced its bankruptcy, the company was bought at a favorable price to
and the DoD became its main consumer. See more about the close state-industry relations in Pasco, 2003,15-22.
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accessibility to outer space, globalization and privatization of space industries created a
qualitatively new space security environment, in which concerns with space security and,
particularly with space weaponization, became more pronounced. The commercialization of
space and the growing economic and military dependence on space seem to have contributed to
creating greater incentives for space weaponization.

OUTER SPACE AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEBATE
With regard to International Relations studies, the commercialization of outer space has
transformed outer space from being the almost exclusive province of strategic studies into a
subject that lends itself to a broader analysis. This study tried to place the discussion of outer
space issues in the context of realist-liberal debate on economic interdependence and
international cooperation/conflict and answer the question whether commercialization had a
positive contribution to international space security cooperation during the post-Cold War
decade.
The realist-liberal debate on the relationship between economic interdependence, and
international institutions, on the one hand, and security relations between states, on the other,
provides an intellectually attractive and methodologically appropriate approach for the
discussion of the relationship between space commercialization and space security
cooperation. This debate tries to analyze and explain the relationship between the economic
and political realms, specifically the relationship between economic interdependence and
international conflict and cooperation, war and peace. It is one of the central debates in
international relations that deals with fundamental issues: Does greater international trade
bring about more cooperative interstate relations or greater conflict? Is a globalizing economy
under the conditions of unipolarity leading the world to more prosperous and peaceful relations

11 Haller and Sakazaki, 2001.
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or to more conflict? On a philosophic level, it addresses the questions: Do we, as a human
civilization, have a choice or are our actions determined by the unchanging nature of anarchy
of the international system? Do we have a hope for progress and peace, for betterment of
human lives, or we are compelled to repeat in vicious circles our history of violence on everincreasing scale as our technological capabilities grow? On a more pragmatic level, with
respect to outer space, the realist-liberal debate can help answer the question whether it would
make interstate security cooperation more likely if states further commercialize their space
activities and take part in commercial cooperation in space or whether commercialization of
outer space would lead to more competitive security environment.
Based on the assumptions that the international system is anarchic, realists predict that
economic interdependence is likely to lead to a greater conflict between states. They also
argue that international cooperation, particularly in the security realm, is problematic because
of high concerns with relative gains and the high price of a failure in this arena. Balancing
should be expected in the anarchic international system. Since economic cooperation affects
state capabilities, it is also rather difficult. Realist, thus, argue that it is common security
interests that are likely to lead to economic cooperation when security externalities of
economic cooperation are positive, and not vice versa.
Liberals, who agree with the realists that the international system is anarchic,
nonetheless, argue that the relationship between the state and its domestic and transnational
societies critically shapes state behavior in the international arena. They predict that the
economic interdependence arising from international trade will lead to greater international
cooperation and more peaceful relations—so much so that democratic economically
interdependent states form a special community, in which relations between states are
characterized as a Kantian “perpetual peace.” While from a liberal perspective, greater
economic interdependence is likely to lead to greater security cooperation directly via the
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evolution of the structure of domestic preferences, from a neo-liberal perspective, international
institutions have an important role to play in bringing about more peaceful and cooperative
inter-state relations.
The recent quantitative studies within the “liberal peace” debate have lent overall more
support to the liberal proposition: states who trade more are less likely to be engaged in a
interstate militarized conflict. These findings have created great hope that economic
globalization would lead to more peaceful world. With respect to outer space, the hope
inspired by liberal ideas has been that commercialization of outer space would bring about
more cooperative interstate relations, that the norm of non-use of force in outer space would be
strengthened by legally binding international instruments, and that measures aimed at
preventing an arms race and conflict in space would lay the foundation of a new space security
regime in place of the eroding old one, preserving thereby outer space as a weapons free
sanctuary for the exploration and exploitation of the fourth medium for the betterment of
human conditions on Earth.
In order to test realist and liberal propositions with respect to outer space, this study
suggested to substitute the concept of “militarized interstate dispute”12— the concept most
often used in the “liberal peace” literature as a dependent variable—with the concepts of
“converging security interests” and “non-converging security interests.” “Militarized interstate
disputes” were not an observable occurrence in outer space within the timeframe of the study,
and, therefore, were not an applicable operationalization. This modification was made relying
on two main suppositions. First, based on the recent IR research on international rivalries, an
assumption was made that militarized conflicts between states take place in a context of
rivalries that have temporal continuity and a pattern of development. They are most likely
12 Many studies adopted the definition o f “militarized interstate disputes” or MIDs as the concept was developed
within the Correlates of War (COW) Project and used COW data in the analysis. According to this definition, a
militarized interstate dispute involves a set o f interactions between or among the states involving threats of use of
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between the so-called enduring rivals. War or militarized conflicts between states are usually
preceded not only by a political crisis—a sequence of symbolic words and acts that
communicate a threat—but also by a historical period characterized by conflictual relations.
Second, it was assumed that interstate militarized conflicts are less likely when states have
converging security interests. Converging security interests were defined as security interests
that became more compatible over time, and non-converging security interests as security
interests that either did not significantly change over time or diverged - that is, became less
compatible.
This approach to the analysis of the space security cooperation is useful for two
reasons. First, the argument of commercial liberalism that maintains that states who trade
more are less likely to be engaged in a militarized interstate conflict relies on a cost-benefit
logic. The argument asserts that when states are faced with the dilemma of war and peace they
compare the expected benefits of militarized conflict or war with the benefits of the status quo,
which are significantly shaped by international trade. When economic interdependence is
high, states are more likely to prefer peaceful economic exchange to interstate violence
because the gains from trade critically shift the balance towards a peaceful trading option.
Realists disagree with the liberal proposition that economic interdependence leads to
more peaceful interstate relations. According to offense-defense balance theory, the
occurrence of war varies depending on the relative efficiency of offense versus defense, with
technological progress seen as one of the important factors of change. Thus states make costbenefit calculations with the primary attention on the costs of war and occupation rather than
the opportunity costs of war, as argued by the liberal school. The importance of cost-benefit
analysis, therefore, serves as a point of convergence between liberal and realist perspectives:

military force, display o f military force, or actual uses o f force that are explicit, non-accidental, and government
sanctioned.
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^°lh assume that it plays a significant role when issues of war and peace are decided. The two
diverge in the relative importance of the different components of the cost-benefit calculations.
It has been shown in the recent international relations literature that the empirical
observation of cost-benefit analysis of war-versus-trade that states are assumed to make while
making decision on war and peace is problematic. Ripsman and Blanchard, for example,
trying to investigate the link between economic interdependence and conflict, explicitly focus
0n the decision-making process during major international crises in order to determine whether
the systemic constraints of interdependence exert any influence on state behavior.13 This is
translated into the question whether any cost-benefit calculations are made and acted upon by
the relevant actors during interstate crises. For the purposes of their analysis, they choose two
case-studies: (1) the July crisis of 1914, and (2) the Rhineland crisis of 1936. Their findings
demonstrate that during these crises, as realists would expect, leaders were more concerned
Wlth military-strategic factors than with economic considerations. Thus, the liberal
pacification argument is rejected on the grounds that if leaders do not feel constrained by
economic interdependence when they make a decision on war, then economic interdependence
cannot bring about peace, as predicted by commercial liberalism.
Even though this conclusion seems to be reasonable, its foundation is not sound. While
it is logical to assume that short of a major international crisis the cost-benefit analysis of warvs--trade options can not be directly observed, during major interstate crises when prospects of
w ar are pondered, including its potential costs, such as the loss of life, the extension of
destruction and losses in case of defeat, the discussion should be expected to be biased
unfavorably—that is, it is biased against an influence of commercial interests. Thus, if
econom ic interdependence is to contribute towards more peaceful international relations, it
m u st make the largest contribution in the period before conflictual security interests escalate

R ip sm an and Blanchard, 1996/97,4-50.
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into an international crisis. If economic interdependence does influence interstate relations
towards more peaceful interactions, such influence has to be reflected in converging security
interests. If states increasingly come to share or complement their security interests, so that the
use of force against each other is not at issue, then conflicts that do arise will not escalate. It
would mean that cost-benefit calculations of states should converge—that is, all states
concerned should perceive resort to violence as less cost-effective than peaceful trading option
and it should be reflected in their security interests. Furthermore, based on their interests states
establish and maintain their relations with other states and build international institutions that
help them to settle their differences, find peaceful solutions, or defuse conflictual situations.
With regard to outer space, states that perceive space conflict as a cost-effective option
are likely to pursue weaponization of space and unlikely to pursue international regimes
banning such weapons or the use of force, while states that perceive space conflict as costineffective would be more inclined to seek an international regime prohibiting emplacement of
weapons in space and the extension of the use of force into this medium. This proposition
allowed this study to evaluate whether security interests of the three major spacepowers
converged as commercialization progressed in the post-Cold War era.
Furthermore, the analysis of evolving security interests is useful as it has been
established in the IR literature that a degree of convergence of security interests is necessary,
although not sufficient, in order for any cooperation to take place in the security realm—
whether such cooperation is aimed at creation of alliances against a common threat or at
establishing an international regime regulating security relations between states. Thus, by
studying evolving security interests of states we can analyze patterns of cooperation.
However, it should not be inferred from such an analysis that predictions could be made
concerning peace and war. An analysis of the evolution of security interests, nonetheless, may
shed light on the influences of economic interdependence on interstate relations.
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Based on this approach and the results of the contemporary realist-liberal debate on
economic interdependence and cooperation and conflict, this study put forth four hypotheses
for testing in the issue area of outer space:
Realist hypothesis No. 1: the commercialization of outer space leads to non
converging security interests
Realist hypothesis No. 2: converging security interests lead to greater
commercial cooperation
Liberal hypothesis: commercialization and greater commercial cooperation
leads to converging security interests
Neo-liberal hypothesis: greater commercialization and commercial cooperation
may not lead to converging security interests, but conflicting interests are
reconciled via international institutions.

SECURITY STRATEGIES AND SPACE INTERESTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
In order to test these hypotheses, security strategies and space interests of the three
spacepowers—the United States, Russia, and China—were analyzed based on officially
promulgated security strategies of these states. It was shown that in the post-Cold War decade,
American security strategy evolved in response to dramatic and sometimes tragic events from a
hesitating primacy to an assertive primacy, with the balance between economic and security
priorities changing from the Clinton Administration’s security through economic strength to
the George W. Bush Administration’s economic strength through security and introduction of
the preemptive war and decisive transition to the policy aimed at weakening multilateral arms
control process, withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty, and deployment of ballistic missile
defense system. U.S. space interests also transformed from President Reagan’s SDI to
President George W. Bush’s NMD and plans for space control and development of space warfighting capabilities. The U.S. commercial space systems became a part of the U.S. vital
infrastructure, on which the U.S. economy, government and military grew to depend. The
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United States began to increasingly consider the command of outer space as a foundation of its
dominant position in the world.
In the post-Cold War era, Russia underwent a fundamental transformation— its
political system, economy, society, and military were reformed— and continued to evolve
from a communist state towards a liberal democracy.14 Throughout this period of
transformation Russia reinvented its national security interests and reformulated its security
concept to put it more in line with those of the liberal democracies of the West, placing the
individual, at least on paper, on top of its security priorities. As Russia’s internal, above all
economic, conditions deteriorated, Russia became more and more dependent on its nuclear
arsenal and progressively lowered its nuclear threshold in its official security pronouncements.
Despite the new security vision, Russia’s security interests with respect to outer space
remained remarkably unchanged since the Cold War. In the new international environment
and with its new security approach, Russia continued to disagree with the idea of
weaponization of space in any form and consistently opposed the U.S. plans to deploy a
national missile defense and develop space war-fighting capabilities. Even though Russia
grew to depend on commercial space activities and on cooperation with the United States, it
nonetheless conducted an active international public campaign to rally international support
behind its opposition to U.S. plans for outer space. Russia considered the weaponization of
outer space a serious threat not only to the strategic balance and international peace, its
national security and its position in the international system, but also to the global space market
and the international regime under which its commercial space activities thrived.
Despite the revolutionary changes in the international system associated with the end of
the Cold War and changes in China’s internal situation brought about by two decades of
uninterrupted astonishing economic growth, China’s security strategy continued to be based on
14 This transformation is likely to carry on beyond the post-Cold War transition period and will encompass a few
decades.
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a non-liberal concept of security—a communist concept of “peaceful coexistence,”
emphasizing the survival of the existing regime as its priority. The chief goal of China’s
security strategy in the post-Cold War era was to provide a favorable, peaceful international
environment for the country’s economic and social development and ascendance as a major
player in the international system. China’s space activities, including its commercial space
activities, became an integral part of a comprehensive development strategy and military
modernization. The military aspects of space security became of a particular concern in the
context of China’s plans for reunification with Taiwan—a long-standing national goal of the
PRC. China expressed strong opposition to weaponization of space and the extension of an
arms race in outer space. Unlike Russia, however, China made it clear that it would be more
prepared to take up military challenges in space via asymmetric approaches. This is because,
unlike Russia, for China it is not merely a matter of economic development, technological
progress, integration into the global economy and free access to space, at stake in space
security there is a matter of China’s ability to reestablish sovereignty over its own national
territory.
From the perspective of bilateral U.S.-Russia, U.S.-China and Russia-China relations,
the analysis bore the following results. In the case of the U.S.-Russia dyad, the
commercialization of outer space has not led to converging security interests. Peaceful
resolution of the Cold War conflict laid the foundation for commercial cooperation between
the United States and Russia and postponed U.S. plans for a nation-wide anti-ballistic missile
defenses, and thereby deferred the resolution of U.S.-Russian conflictual security interests with
respect to outer space. The hope for space commercialization to bridge the gap in the
diverging space security interests of the two states did not materialize. Therefore, with regard
to the U.S.-Russian space security relations, the realist hypothesis No. 1 that asserts that
commercialization of outer space leads to non-converging security interest in outer space is
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supported by the evidence provided within the timeframe of this study. Realist hypothesis No.
2 that maintains that converging security interests lead to greater commercial cooperation is
not applicable, as it was shown that the United States’ and Russia’s security interests continued
to diverge during the time period under consideration. However, the improved general
relations between the United States and Russia in the context of the ended East-West
confrontation and the fragile balance that was reached in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations leading
up to the end of the bipolar confrontation related to outer space issues did provide the
foundation for the commercial cooperation between the two states. U.S.-Russian commercial
cooperation expanded over this time period despite continuous divergence of their space
security interests. The liberal hypothesis stating that commercialization and greater
commercial cooperation leads to converging security interests cannot be confirmed based on
the evidence brought in this study. The “democratic” liberal hypothesis that asserts that
security interests between liberal democracies are more likely to converge than between non
democracies cannot be supported in this study as well.
In the post-Cold War period, China’s security interests with respect to space continued
to diverge from those of the United States. Despite this divergence, China developed extensive
commercial cooperation that it used not only to serve its economic development but also to
further its technological progress in military space technology. Within this bilateral
relationship, the realist hypothesis No. 1, stating that commercialization would lead to non
converging security interests is supported by the evidence within the time period under the
study. The realist hypothesis No. 2 maintaining that converging security interests lead to
greater commercial cooperation in outer space is not relevant in this case, as the security
interests of the United States and China continued to diverge, as they commercialized their
space activities and developed commercial space cooperation. The liberal hypothesis,
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asserting that commercialization of space activities and commercial cooperation should lead to
converging security interests, is not supported by the evidence provided in this case.
In the case of Russia-China bilateral relations, the first realist hypothesis, predicting
that commercialization of outer space would lead to non-converging security interests is not
supported: the commercialization of outer space did not lead to non-converging security
interests of the two states. At the same time, in this case, it seems unlikely that convergence in
their security interests was primarily caused by commercialization and commercial
cooperation. The second realist hypothesis stating that converging security interests lead to
greater commercial cooperation can be supported with the evidence in this case to the extent
that converging security interests clearly took temporal precedence to commercial cooperation
in the issue area of outer space. Russia and China’s space security interests had started to
converge long before the two spacepowers reestablished their space cooperation after the
decades of alienation. The liberal hypothesis that commercialization and commercial
cooperation would lead to converging security interests cannot be rejected on the basis of the
evidence provided: commercial cooperation developed for the most part of the period under
study in parallel with increasing convergence of the two states’ security interests in space.
In order to test the neoliberal hypotheses, this study analyzed the interaction of the
three space powers within the Conference on Disarmament—the chief international
organization for negotiations on security issues, including space security issues. In the course
of work of the Conference on Disarmament in the post-Cold War era, Russian and Chinese
interests converged to such a degree that the two countries jointly produced and submitted to
the Conference a number of joint statements and a draft treaty prohibiting the use of force in
outer space and emplacement of weapons in space. The Conference on Disarmament provided
the necessary venue for the discussion of the outer space security issues and facilitated
convergence of their views with respect to the arrangements that would be necessary to provide
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security in space. It stimulated extensive informal consultations between the Chinese and
Russian delegation on the issues of outer space security. The United States, on the other hand,
continued to prefer the existing regime in outer space and no progress was made towards the
beginning of negotiations on any change of this regime or on establishing a new one. The use
of issue linkages not only failed to produce favorable results concerning issues of security in
outer space, it paralyzed the work of the Conference on all other issues on its agenda. Thus,
the neoliberal hypothesis maintaining that when commercialization and commercial
cooperation do not lead to converging security interests conflictual security interests can be
reconciled within international organizations cannot be supported with regard to U.S.-China
and U.S.-Russia dyads, while with regard to the China-Russia dyad the evidence supports this
hypothesis to the extent that even though Russia and China’s security interests converged at the
fundamental level, at the beginning of the time period of this study, their positions differed
with regards to the steps that were necessary to achieve their commonly shared goal and began
to converge as cooperation within the CD developed over time.
Table 1 sums up the results on all four hypotheses in this study:
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS

Realist hypothesis No. l:
commercialization of
outer space leads to non
converging security
interests
Realist hypothesis No. 2:
converging security
interests lead to greater
commercial cooperation
in space
Liberal hypothesis:
commercialization and
greater commercial
cooperation leads to
converging security
interests in space
Neo-liberal hypothesis:
greater
commercialization and
commercial cooperation
may not lead to
converging security
interests and conflicting
interests are reconciled
via international
institutions.

U.S.-Russia

U.S.-China

Russia-China

supported

supported

not supported

not applicable

not applicable

supported

not supported

not supported

cannot be rejected

not supported

not supported

supported
(weakly)

As can be derived from Table 1, the scores for the liberal and realist hypotheses are as
follows: for the realist hypotheses—three “supported,” two “not applicable,” and one “not
supported;” and for the liberal hypotheses—one “supported,” one “cannot be rejected,” and
four “not supported.” From these results, the conclusion can be drawn that the realist
perspective seems to provide a better overall depiction of interstate interactions between these
three spacepowers in the area of outer space security: strategic calculations of states exert a
stronger influence on interstate relations than commercial liberalism predicts. The United
States’ cost-benefit calculations, as reflected in its security interests and strategies, so far led
the United States to pursue more unilateral security objectives than collective security solutions
to the emerging space security threats.
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In the light of these conclusions, the Russia-China dyad attracts a particular attention:
the first realist hypothesis is not supported while two liberal hypotheses scored “cannot be
rejected” and “weakly supported.” It suggests that the two states have probably positioned
themselves for balancing. In this case, the interstate relations are accompanied by commercial
and security cooperation, as liberal propositions would predict. In spite of liberal expectations,
however, this relationship developed not between liberal democracies but between a nondemocratic and democratizing states. Furthermore, concerning the overall findings, in spite of
liberal expectations, the liberal hegemon did not support a security regime that would prohibit
or restrict the use of force in outer space.
A security regime regulating military uses of outer space may still emerge among the
great powers in the short-or medium-term future but it is not likely to take place via liberal
mechanism—that is, the role of commercial factors is likely to be relatively unimportant in
comparison with strategic factors.

SPACE COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY: REALISM VERSUS LIBERALISM IN
OUTER SPACE
The recent international relations research inspired by liberal ideas, and particularly the
quantitative analyses within the so-called “democratic peace” and “liberal peace” research
agenda of the past twenty or so years, put realism—the oldest and most prominent theoretical
paradigm in international relations—on the defensive. The sudden and peaceful end of the
Cold War also dealt the greatest blow to realism among all international relations schools of
thought.15 Democratization and liberalization of the countries from the former Soviet bloc and
integration of the Western European countries gathered many scholars under the umbrella of

15 See, for example, Kegley, “The Neoidealist Moment,” 1993, 131-147; Lebow, 1994, 249-277; Kratochwil,
1993,63-80; Gaddis, “International Relations Theory,” 1992/93, 5-58. See also responses in Wohlforth, 1994/95,
91-129; and Kapstein, 1995, 751-774.
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liberal research. So much so, that by the close of the 20th century adherents to the liberal
perspective began to wonder whether there were any realists left at all.16
The realist vision of the anarchic world of states being caught in vicious circles of
interstate power competitions, violence and war is rather appalling. In contrast to this realist
vision of the omnipresence of war, liberal thought put forth the idea of the progressive
evolution of international relations towards peace, justice and welfare. Increasing economic
interdependence together with nuclear and highly destructive conventional weapons, it is often
argued, have made the costs of war among the great powers prohibitively high, while the
acquisition of territory by force has become neither meaningful under the conditions of global
knowledge- and technology-based economy nor legitimate in the eyes of the international
community. The optimistic world vision and academic advances of the liberal school,
however, do not mean that the triumph of liberalism is carved in stone.
The present study has shown that there is a large and increasingly important area of
international relations that seems to defy liberal expectations. Almost half a century ago,
human activities expanded from land, sea and atmosphere into outer space—the fourth
medium. Although the vast economic potential of outer space was recognized even before the
dramatic opening of the Space Age, the use of space during the Cold War was overwhelmingly
for military purposes of the two superpowers. Nonetheless, a multifaceted space security
regime emerged that gradually restricted the use of force in outer space and led to the
establishment of a tacit norm of non-use of force in outer space. The technological and
political foundations of this regime eroded by the late 1970s and early 1980s, while its norms
endured beyond the era that brought them about. Outer space remained free of weapons, and
ground-based weapons were not used against space objects in any conflict during the Cold
War.
16 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security 24 (Fall 1999):
5-55.
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The end of the superpower confrontation brought widespread expectations for more
cooperative interstate relations in general, and in the area of outer space in particular. The
commercialization of outer space, which received an added impetus after the end of the Cold
War, promised to realize the economic potential of this vast global commons and raised further
hopes that this vitally important medium—both militarily and now economically—would be
preserved as a peaceful sanctuary, serving for the betterment of human conditions on Earth.
This is because, according to the liberal perspective, international economic exchange should
lead to more cooperative and peaceful relations between states. As the commercialization of
outer space advanced and space activities became an integral part of the economic mainstream,
transforming the world economy into a truly global economy, space activities became
increasingly influenced by commercial interests. The main space-faring states engaged in
commercial space activities became more interdependent, as the global space market emerged.
Progress in space and information technologies of the past two decades made
commercialization of space economically viable. It also significantly advanced the military
usefulness and with it the strategic importance of outer space. So much so, that the increasing
military uses of space have started to revolutionize and transform the military itself. The
weaponization of outer space has emerged as a real next step in the advancement of military
uses of space. All in all, this transformation is likely to revolutionize not only the way modem
wars are fought, which it has already started to do, as evidenced first by the 1991 Gulf War and
then by the wars in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and again in Iraq in 2003, but also the costbenefit calculations by which states decide on the issues of war and peace. This transformation
may lead to a perception that war has become less costly and thus, all else equal, more likely.17
The introduction of weapons and other war-fighting capabilities in space would mean that
militarized conflict is likely to be extended to outer space too.

17 Preston, Johnson, Edwards, Miller, and Shipbaugh, Space Weapons Earth Wars, 2002,105.
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The commercialization of space—the argument of liberal pacification would lead us to
expect—should promote converging interests among the major space-faring states with regard
to outer space security and should lead to the creation of a security regime regulating military
uses of space so as to make war in space less likely. However, the presented analysis of the
evolution of strategies and security interests with regard to outer space of the main
spacepowers—the United States, Russia, and China—and their interaction within the main
international organization charged with the military issues of outer space security—the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva—brings about a conclusion that the expectation of
more cooperative security relations in outer space is not supported by the post-Cold War
evidence. The emerging patterns of security interests in the issue area of outer space lend more
support to the realist propositions. The United States increasingly considers domination of
outer space as the strategic foundation of its hegemonic position in the world,18 while Russia
and China’s security interests increasingly converge in opposition to the U.S. plans concerning
military issues of space security. The converging security interests of Russia and China
promote a closer cooperation between the two so as to suggest that they may be positioning
themselves to balance the United States’ attempts to militarily dominate the fourth medium.19
Russia and China have invested their political capital and diplomatic efforts in the international
political arena in order to oppose the U.S. plans for outer space.
The weaponization of outer space has emerged as one of the most important and
contested issues in interstate relations in the post-Cold War era. The way this issue is resolved
will determine, to a large degree, the world order that is to come and whether it will be more
cooperative and peaceful or more conflict- and war- prone. A trend since the end of the Cold
18 See, for example, Barry R. Posen, “Command o f the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,”
International Security 28 (summer 2003): 5-46.
19 The term “balancing” is taken to mean a policy aimed at limiting a state’s behavior either via internal military
buildups or alignments with other states, or a combination of the two. This is in agreement with the use o f term
by Waltz, who distinguishes external balancing—that is, building coalitions intended to prevent anyone from
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War towards the erosion of the norm of non-use of force in outer space suggests that we may
be going back to a realist world where “war is always in the background.”20 Opening up a
whole new medium to the exercise of state violence, if it comes to it, during perhaps the most
liberal era ever that we now enjoy would greatly undermine the liberal idea. This is,
fortunately, is not a foregone conclusion, as weapons are not yet put in outer space. However,
the lack of cooperation between the three main spacepowers during the post-Cold War decade
in establishing a regime regulating further militarization of outer space is a serious reason for
concern.

SPACE POLICY IMPLICATIONS: THE CROSSROADS
At the dawn of the third millennium, we are at a critical crossroads. The choices that
now are being made will shape the emerging world order—whether it will continue to be
unipolar or it will become multipolar, whether it will be more cooperative and peaceful or
fraught with conflict and possibly war—and with it the future of human civilization in the
long-run. The realist and liberal perspectives suggest the possibility of two different scenarios.
Following the realist vision, the first scenario predicts that the United States would continue to
pursue security strategy aimed at ensuring the U.S. preeminence in the international system in
accordance with the space-age Mackinderian dictum: “Who controls low-Earth orbit controls
near-Earth space. Who controls near-Earth space dominates Terra. Who dominates Terra
determines the destiny of humankind.”21 A strategy aimed at preeminence would require the
command of outer space—the ability to dominate space and to deny its use to others. Under
these conditions, Russia and China would find themselves increasingly under the pressure to
try to check U.S. power by balancing—internally via arms build-ups and/or externally via

becoming a hegemon, and internal balancing via “moves to increase economic capability, to increase military
strength, to develop clever strategies.” See Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 1979,118.
20 Mearsheimer, 1994/95,9.
21 Dolman, Astropolitik, 2002,8.
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alliance-building. A space arms race will likely result from this, while arms control—a
security regime stabilizing balancing—may or may not follow. In this scenario, outer space is
likely to be weaponized and become a precinct of interstate violence.
In accordance with the liberal perspective, the second scenario envisions that expanding
commercial space activities would lead to more cooperative interstate relations: the three major
spacepowers—the United States, Russia, and China—would manage to reach compromises
and negotiate a new security regime for outer space based on a consensus. Because such a
regime would be based on a consensus, all three states will have incentives to cooperate: to
follow the rules and uphold norms, while enjoying gains from space commerce. This new
security regime may or may not preserve outer space as a weapon-free sanctuary but, at a
minimum, it leaves room for hope. While space systems made significant contribution to arms
control during the Cold War, space arms control itself represents one of the most challenging
areas of arms control due to the nature of space technology. The commercialization of space
creates added material incentives for arms control in outer space. It also makes it more
difficult, as it blurs the line between military and commercial systems. One of the implications
of this is that commercial actors, on the one hand, are concerned with the possibility that arms
control may ban or significantly constrain commercial activities in space, and on the other,
they are able to find ways to benefit from further military uses of space. Thus, they are
discouraged from asserting a more active role in promoting space arms control and security
cooperation between states.22
The choice between the two scenarios largely depends on choices of the three
spacepowers—the United States, Russia, and China. The United States is the dominant space
player both in the commercial and military realms. And being the dominant spacepower, it has

22 See, for example, Jonathan Dean, “Future Security in Space: Conference Report,” Report on a Conference in
Southampton on May 28-29, 2002, International Network o f Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation,
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Bulletin 20, http://www.inesap.org/bulletin20/bul20art04.htm
(accessed 07.06.04).
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the greatest freedom of choice. The United States has three options. First, it can choose to
follow the realist prescriptions as described above and pursue preeminence, facing in the nearto medium-term future a potential hostile bloc, a space arms race and the possibility of a
conflict in space. Second, the United States may choose to follow the liberal vision and
pursue a multilateral security regime requiring U.S. leadership and self-restraint. This option
presents complex challenges for space arms control and the potential for a breakout. Third, the
United States can choose to avoid multilateral negotiations and try to prevent the formation of
a Sino-Russian alliance by fostering close commercial and security cooperation with Russia
and driving an edge between Russia and China. The present study suggests that in the postCold War transition decade, the United States tried to engage this option but so far has been
unsuccessful.
In this trio, Russia may become the pivotal player and exert a significant influence on
the shape of the emerging world order. Russia has two basic options. First, it can choose to
cooperate with the United States, whether the United States chooses to follow the liberal or
realist prescriptions, and enjoy economic benefits that are likely to accrue from such
cooperation. Under the liberal scenario, Russia would enjoy both economic benefits and
security, while under the realist scenario, it would have to tolerate a subordinate position in the
international system and constrained sovereignty. Second, Russia may choose to balance the
United States in cooperation with China. In this case, Russia would need to sacrifice its
economic goals and prepare for a space arms race and a potential conflict in space. Given the
observed trend towards the convergence of Russian and Chinese security interests in outer
space and their preference for a multipolar world order, the second option seems to be a more
likely development. By opting for cooperation with the United States or China, under certain
conditions, Russia may influence whether the liberal or realist scenario would be realized.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

429

China also has two options. First, it may choose to cooperate with the United States
and accept U.S. preeminence in order to continue reaping economic benefits from its
integration into the global economy and commercial space activities. In this case, China
should be prepared to sacrifice its goal of reunification with Taiwan or its communist regime,
or both. Second, China can choose to pursue a closer cooperation with Russia and try to build
an alliance in order to balance the United States with a hope that it would allow China to
achieve both the reunification with Taiwan and the perpetuation of the communist regime. It
will probably require China to forgo some of its economic and social goals as it engages in a
space arms race and faces the possibility of a space conflict. Thus, for China the choice of the
first option— cooperation with the United States—is much more problematic than it is for
Russia.
Given the observed trends in the evolution of security strategies and space interests of
the three spacepowers in the post-Cold War transition decade, the prospects of a liberal
scenario are not promising, unless strategic calculations are changed. Short of this, the full
weight of the responsibility for realization of a liberal scenario falls on international
organizations. Under the present conditions of an impasse at the sole intergovernmental
organization charged with negotiations on space arms control, the hope seems to rest largely
with the non-governmental organizations who might mobilize world public opinion, reinvent
the space arms control process and bring new life to space security cooperation.23
All in all, this study suggests that complacency on the part of the policy-makers with
either the liberal or realist schools’ propositions is not warranted. The liberal perspective
creates an expectation that greater commercialization of outer space would lead, by itself, to
23 The option o f Ottawa-type process for space arms control has been suggested and discussed in the literature.
See, for example, Axworthy and Datan, 2002; Robert E. White, “Space Weapons Ban: Thoughts on a New
Treaty,” International Network o f Engineers and Scientists, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Bulletin
20,2002, http://www.inesap.org/bulletin20/bul20art08.htm (accessed 07.06.04). “Ottawa process” refers to the
arms control initiative that led to a successful conclusion o f a landmine ban in 1997. The driving force behind this
1997 treaty was the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)— a broad coalition of over 1500 non-
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converging security interests and more cooperative interstate relations. This study suggests,
however, that this is unlikely to materialize. Neoliberal predictions may also fail, as
international organizations may become paralyzed under the weight of complex challenges and
diverging security interests. As a result, the outcome is likely to be similar to the one predicted
by realism.
According to the realist perspective, under the conditions of anarchy of the
international system greater conflict in outer space is likely to arise from expanding economic
interactions in this medium. Because international cooperation is difficult in the security realm
states should take steps to provide their own security. Unilateral steps, however, are likely to
bring about a more competitive security environment characterized by the security dilemma.
Following the realist prescriptions, thus, may lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy and turn outer
space into a new battlefield in the 21st century.

governmental organizations (NGOs) in 90 countries—with the coordinator Jody Williams who was awarded the
1997 Nobel Peace Prize for her contribution into this international endeavor.
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